

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Conference for the Reduction and Limitation  
of Armaments

---

CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

---

VOLUME I

(Pages 1-282)

GENEVA, 1932.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS  
PUBLICATIONS OF THE DISARMAMENT SECTION

---

Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments

**ARMAMENTS YEAR-BOOK, 1932**

Eighth Year      Special Edition

**GENERAL AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION**

(Ser. L.o.N. P.1932.IX.1)

474 pages

7/6 \$2.00

The 1933 edition of the *Armaments Year-Book* is in preparation.

**STATISTICAL YEAR-BOOK OF THE TRADE  
IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION, 1932**

Eighth Year

(Ser. L.o.N. P.1932.IX.35)

(French and English texts)

430 pages

16/- \$4.00

**Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament  
Conference entrusted with the Preparation of the Conference for  
the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.**

Eleven series published at prices varying from      2/- \$0.50  
to      20/- \$5.00

---

**Annotated Bibliography on Disarmament and Military Questions.**

163 pages

2/- \$0.50

This work has been prepared by the Political and Legal Reference Service of the League of Nations Library to supply information on the principal publications which have appeared in connection with disarmament and on a selection of works dealing with military questions.

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS**

Geneva, December 1932.

**Conference for the Reduction and Limitation  
of Armaments**

---

**CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS**

---

**VOLUME I**

(Pages 1-282)

Series of League of Nations Publications

IX. DISARMAMENT  
1932. IX. 63.

The present volume contains the documents considered useful for the comprehension of the records reproduced in Volume I, Series A, and Volume I, Series B, whether these documents are mentioned in these records or not.

As the documents are referred to in the records by their serial numbers, they have been classified in the usual numerical order. They are enumerated in the contents table in this order, and reference is given, in the case of those inserted in the records, to the page of Volume I of Series A and Volume I of Series B, or to the page of the present volume. Certain documents, relating more especially to technical questions, which should, on the basis of their serial numbers, appear in this volume, have been omitted, and will be included later in a further volume, together with the documents of the technical commissions dealing with these questions. The numbers of these documents are, however, given in the contents table.

It should also be noted that, although they form part of the dossier of the Conference and consequently bear Conf.D. numbers, the documents dealing with the position of armaments of the various countries have not been reproduced in this volume. There is still a sufficient number of copies of these documents in existence to meet any demand for them, and they are not essential for the comprehension of Volume I of Series A and Volume I of Series B.

The contents table is divided into four parts:

- (a) Documents issued prior to the Conference and bearing C... M... Nos.;
- (b) Documents of the General Conference, bearing Conf.D. Nos.;
- (c) Documents of the General Commission, bearing Conf.D./C.G. Nos.;
- (d) Documents of the Bureau, bearing Conf.D./Bureau Nos.

Certain documents belong to more than one of these series; in such cases the necessary indications and references are given in the contents table.

---



# CONTENTS

## A. DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE.

		Page
C.687.M.288.1930.IX. [C.P.D.292(2)]	Draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference . . . . .	7
C.690.M.289.1930.IX. [C.P.D.295(1)]	Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. . . . .	30
C.602.M.240.1931.IX. [Conf.D.16]	Memorandum from the Polish Government regarding Moral Disarmament . . . . .	66
C.1002.M.558.1931.IX. [Conf.D.44]	Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference . . . . .	71
C.182.M.69.1931.IX.	Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions . . . . .	} [Will be found in a later series.]
C.259.M.115.1931.IX.	Report of the Committee of Experts to fix Rules for the Adoption of a Standard Horse-Power Measurement for Aeroplane and Dirigible Engines. . . . .	
C.260.M.116.1931.IX.	Proposals by Members of the Said Committee . . . . .	

## B. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS (Conf.D....).

Conf.D.16.	See above, document C.602.M.240.1931.IX . . . . .	66
Conf.D.44(1).	Rules of Procedure of the Conference . . . . .	73
Conf.D.53.	Study concerning the Present Situation in regard to Publicity of Civil Aviation and Collection of Provisions in Force concerning the Exchange or Publication of Information relating to Civil Aviation . . . . .	} [Will be found in a later series.]
Conf.D.54.	Report of the Petitions Committee of the Conference . . . . .	76
Conf.D.55.	Report by the Committee to draw up Rules of Procedure for the Conference. . . . .	77
Conf.D.56.	Proposals of the French Delegation. . . . .	113
Conf.D.74.	Proposals of the Spanish Delegation . . . . .	117
Conf.D.76.	Proposals of the Polish Delegation with regard to the Gradual Attainment of Moral Disarmament . . . . .	117
Conf.D.77.	Extract from the Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission with regard to the Private Manufacture of Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War (document A.16.1924.IX—Extract). . . . .	79
Conf.D.78.	Proposals of the Turkish Delegation . . . . .	119
Conf.D.79.	Proposals of the German Delegation . . . . .	119
Conf.D.80.	Proposals of the Haitian Delegation . . . . .	122
Conf.D.81.	Proposals of the Italian Delegation . . . . .	123
Conf.D.82.	Proposals of the Soviet Delegation . . . . .	124
Conf.D.83.	Proposals of the Swedish Delegation . . . . .	138
Conf.D.84.	Proposals of the Netherlands Delegation . . . . .	138

	Page
Conf.D.85.	Proposals of the United States Delegation. . . . . 139
Conf.D.86.	Proposals of the Swiss Delegation . . . . . 139
Conf.D.87.	Proposals of the Soviet Delegation . . . . . 129
[C.P.D.117]	
Conf.D.88.	Proposals of the Chinese Delegation. . . . . 140
Conf.D.89.	Proposals of the Norwegian Delegation . . . . . 141
Conf.D.90.	Proposals of the Danish Delegation. . . . . 141
Conf.D.91.	Proposals of the Czechoslovak Delegation . . . . . 142
Conf.D.92.	Proposals of the Argentine Delegation . . . . . 142
Conf.D.93.	Extracts from Speeches made during the General Discussion . 104
Conf.D.94.	Proposals of the Japanese Delegation . . . . . 143
Conf.D.95.	Proposals of the United Kingdom Delegation . . . . . 144
Conf.D.96.	Resolution adopted by the Conference (see Minutes of the Seventeenth Plenary Meeting).
Conf.D.97.	Proposals of the Hedjaz Delegation. . . . . 144
Conf.D.98.	Documentary Material with regard to Moral Disarmament forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellec- tual Co-operation . . . . . 83
Conf.D.99.	Survey of Proposals made by Various Delegations during the General Discussion. . . . . 93
Conf.D.100.	Report by M. Beneš to the Bureau . . . . . 145
[Conf.D./Bureau 6(1)]	
Conf.D.101.	Report of the Bureau adopted by the General Commission on March 8th, 1932 . . . . . 146
[Conf.D./C.G.5(1)]	
[Conf.D./Bureau 8(1)]	
Conf.D.102.	Co-ordinating Table of the Draft Convention and of the Propositions referred to the General Commission . . . 148
[Conf.D./Bureau 5(1)]	
Conf.D.103.	List of Questions referred to the Commissions for Examination 175
[Conf.D./C.G.6(1)]	
Conf.D.106.	Memorandum relating to the Italian Proposals for Qualitative Limitation. . . . . 181
Conf.D.107.	Memorandum on the Proposals of the Argentine Delegation relating to Capital Ships . . . . . 185
Conf.D.108.	Memorandum on the Proposals of the Netherlands Delegation 186
Conf.D.110.	Memorandum on the Proposals of the Swedish Delegation . . 191
Conf.D.111.	Memorandum on the Proposals of the Chinese Delegation . . 193
Conf.D.112.	Memorandum on the Suggestions of the Danish Delegation . 194
Conf.D.113.	Memorandum relating to the Proposals of the Turkish Dele- gation. . . . . 199
Conf.D.114.	Memorandum relating to the Proposals of the Japanese Delegation. . . . . 201
Conf.D.115.	Memorandum relating to the French Delegation's Proposals on the Internationalisation of Civil Air Transport . . . . . } [Will be found in a later series.]
Conf.D.116.	Proposals of the Afghan Delegation . . . . . 202
Conf.D.117.	Memorandum submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . . . 202
Conf.D.118.	Report of the Bureau adopted by the General Commission on April 18th, 1932. . . . . 203
Conf.D.120.	Report of the Special Committee on Chemical and Bacterio- logical Weapons to the General Commission . . . . . 210
[Conf.D./A.C.B.16(1)]	



		Page
Conf.D.121. [Conf.D./C.M.30(1)]	Report by the Naval Commission to the General Commission	215
Conf.D.122 [Conf.D./C.T.45(1)]	Report by the Land Commission to the General Commission	227
Conf.D.123. [Conf.D./C.A.34(1)]	Report by the Air Commission to the General Commission	245
Conf.D.124.	Proposal by the German Delegation concerning Qualitative Disarmament . . . . .	258
Conf.D.125.	Proposal by the Swiss Delegation concerning a } [Will be found in Special Regime for Militia Armies. . . . } a later series.]	
Conf.D.126.	Declaration by Mr. Gibson concerning President Hoover's Proposal . . . . .	259
Conf.D.127.	Communication from the Persian Delegation concerning the Report of the Naval Commission (document Conf.D.121)	261
Conf.D.128.	Letter concerning the Application of the Qualitative Principle from the Australian Delegation to the President of the Conference . . . . .	262
Conf.D.131. [Conf.D./Bureau 13]	Observations of the Polish Delegation on the Letter from the Australian Delegation (document Conf.D.128) . . . . .	263
Conf.D.133.	Statement of Views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarding President Hoover's Proposal.	265
Conf.D.136(1)	Resolution adopted by the General Commission on July 23rd, 1932 . . . . .	268
Conf.D.138. [Conf.D./C.D.M.24]	Report by the Committee on Moral Disarmament. . . . .	271

## C. DOCUMENTS OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION (Conf.D./C.G....).

Conf.D./C.G.2.	(See Minutes of the General Commission, page 3, note.)	
Conf.D./C.G.4.	(See Minutes of the General Commission, page 12, note.)	
Conf.D./C.G.5.	Now Conf.D.101 . . . . .	146
Conf.D./C.G.6.	Now Conf.D.103 . . . . .	175
Conf.D./C.G.9.	Communication from the President of the Naval Commission	273
Conf.D./C.G.11.	Proposed Article 1 submitted by the Soviet Delegation. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 49.)	
Conf.D./C.G.12(1).	Draft Resolution submitted by Mr. Gibson. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 40.)	
Conf.D./C.G.13.	Proposed Article 1 submitted by the Turkish Delegation. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 61.)	
Conf.D./C.G.14.	Draft Resolution submitted by the Persian Delegation. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 63.)	
Conf.D./C.G.15.	Proposal by the Yugoslav Delegation. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 65.)	
Conf.D./C.G.16.	Draft Resolution submitted by the Danish Delegation. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 71.)	
Conf.D./C.G.17.	Draft Article 1 submitted by the German Delegation. (See Minutes of the General Commission, page 75.)	
Conf.D./C.G.18.	Now Conf.D.118 . . . . .	203
Conf.D./C.G.26(1) Conf.D./C.G.28(2)	Resolutions adopted by the General Commission on April 22nd, 1932. (See Minutes of the General Commission, pages 113 and 116 . . . . .	
Conf.D./C.G.30. [Conf.D./Bureau 11 and 12]	Letter from the President of the Committee on Effectives to the President of the Conference, and Draft Resolution concerning effectives submitted to the Bureau by M. de Brouckère, M. Beneš and Mr. Gibson. . . . .	275

D. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE BUREAU (Conf.D./Bureau ...).

		Page
Conf.D./Bureau 2.	Now Conf.D.99 . . . . .	93
Conf.D./Bureau 5.	Now Conf.D.102 . . . . .	148
Conf.D./Bureau 6.	Now Conf.D.100 . . . . .	145
Conf.D./Bureau 8.	Now Conf.D.101 . . . . .	146
Conf.D./Bureau 9.	Now Conf.D.118 . . . . .	203
Conf.D./Bureau 11.	} Included in document Conf.D./C.G.30 . . . . .	275
[Conf.D./Effectives 21(1)]		
Conf.D./Bureau 12.		



Geneva, December 9th, 1930.

## DRAFT CONVENTION<sup>1</sup>

---

### Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention.

## PART I. — PERSONNEL.<sup>2</sup>

### CHAPTER A. — EFFECTIVES.

#### Article 2.

The average daily effectives in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of effectives defined in the tables annexed to this Chapter, the figure laid down for such party in the corresponding column of the said tables.

#### Article 3.

The average daily effectives are reckoned by dividing the total number of days' duty performed in each year by the number of days in such year.

#### Article 4.

By formations organised on a military basis shall be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, are, in time of peace, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament, equipment capable of being employed for military purposes without measures of mobilisation, as well as any other organisation complying with the above condition.

By mobilisation, within the meaning of the present article, shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.

---

<sup>1</sup> See general reservations by the Turkish	Delegation, paragraph	No. 41 of the Report.
German	" "	No. 42 "
Norwegian	" "	No. 43 "
Irish Free State	" "	No. 43 "

<sup>2</sup> See reservation by the German Delegation, paragraph No. 79 of the Report.

Tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I.<sup>1</sup>

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED  
IN THE LAND ARMED FORCES.

Table I. — Maximum Land Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country.				Table II (optional). — Maximum Land Armed Forces stationed Overseas.			Table III. — Maximum of the total Land Armed Forces.		
High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x <sup>2</sup> months of service	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x <sup>2</sup> months of service
A. B. C. D. . .									

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE LAND FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.

Table IV. — Maximum Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country.				Table V. — Maximum formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas.		
High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers or officials ranking as officers	c Other effectives or officials who have completed at least x <sup>2</sup> months of service	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers or officials ranking as officers	c Other effectives or officials who have completed at least x <sup>2</sup> months of service
A. B. C. D. . .						

<sup>1</sup> On certain tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I,  
see reservations by the French Delegation, paragraph No. 65 of the Report.  
German    "        "    No. 73, 74        "  
Italian    "        "    No. 73, 75, 76    "  
Turkish   "        "    No. 77         "

<sup>2</sup> Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript land army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.



TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE  
SEA ARMED FORCES.

Table VI. — Maximum Sea Armed Forces.		Table VII. — Maximum Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis.
High Contracting Parties	Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men)	Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men and officials of every grade)
A.		
B.		
C.		
D.		
.		
.		

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE  
AIR ARMED FORCES.

Table VIII (Optional). — Maximum Air Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country.			Table IX (optional). — Maxi- mum Air Armed Forces stationed Overseas		Table X. — Maximum of the Total Air Armed Forces	
High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b	b Effectives who have completed at least z <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b	b Effectives who have completed at least z <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b	b Effectives who have completed at least z <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)
A.						
B.						
C.						
D.						
.						
.						

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE AIR  
FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.

Table XI. — Maximum Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country.			Table XII. — Maximum Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas.	
High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b	b Effectives or officials who have completed at least z <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers, men and officials of every grade)	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b	b Effectives or officials who have completed at least z <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers, men and officials of every grade)
A.				
B.				
C.				
D.				
.				
.				

<sup>1</sup> Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript land army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

**CHAPTER B. — PERIOD OF SERVICE.**

*Article 5.*

The provisions of this Chapter apply only to effectives recruited by conscription.

*Article 6.*

For each of the High Contracting Parties concerned, the maximum total periods of service to which the effectives recruited by conscription are liable in the land, sea or air armed forces or formations organised on a military basis respectively, shall not exceed the figures laid down for such party in the table annexed to this Chapter.

*Article 7.*

For each man, the total period of service is the total number of days comprised in the different periods of service which he is liable under the national law to perform.

*Article 8.*

As an exception, each of the High Contracting Parties concerned may exceed the limits which he has accepted by the table annexed to this Chapter in so far as, owing to a falling-off in the number of births, such an increase may be necessary to enable the maximum total number of effectives fixed in his case by the tables annexed to Chapter A of this part to be attained.

It is understood that any High Contracting Party which avails itself of this option will immediately notify the measures taken and the reasons justifying them to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission referred to in Part VI of the present Convention.

*Article 9.*

In any case, the total period of service shall not exceed . . . months.

**Table annexed to Chapter B of Part I.**

High Contracting Parties	Maximum total period of service to which the effectives recruited by conscription are liable in the armed forces or formations organised on a military basis		
	Land	Sea	Air
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			
.			
.			
.			
.			



## PART II. — MATERIAL.

### CHAPTER A. — LAND ARMAMENTS. <sup>1</sup>

#### *Article 10.* <sup>2</sup>

(Provisional text subject to the drafting of the Annex.)

The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for land armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed, in the annex .... to this Article.

### CHAPTER B. — NAVAL ARMAMENTS. <sup>3 4</sup>

#### *Article 11.* <sup>5 6</sup>

Throughout the duration of the present Convention, the global tonnage of the vessels of war of each of the High Contracting Parties, other than the vessels exempt from limitation under Annex I to this Chapter and the special vessels enumerated in Annex II, shall not exceed the figure laid down for such Party in Table I annexed to this Chapter.

#### *Article 12.* <sup>6</sup>

Table II annexed to this Chapter shows, by tonnage per category, the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute during the period of application of the present Convention the global tonnage which is limited in the case of such Party to the figure laid down in Table I.

#### *Article 13.*

Within the limits of the global tonnage fixed for such Party in Table I, and failing any stricter conditions resulting from special conventions to which it is or may become a party, each of the High Contracting Parties may modify the distribution shown for it in Table II, subject to the following conditions :

(1) The tonnages by category shown for each High Contracting Party in Table II shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III annexed to this Chapter.

(2) Before the laying-down of the ship or ships for the construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned, due notice must be given to all the other High Contracting Parties and the Secretary-General and the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of the amount of tonnage transferred, the length of such notice being that laid down for each of the High Contracting Parties in Table III.

#### *Article 14.*

No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 16 inches (406 mm.) in calibre.

#### *Article 15.*

No aircraft carrier shall exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 mm.).

No aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement shall carry a gun exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre.

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the **American Delegation**, paragraph No. 94 of the Report.

<b>German</b>	"	"	No. 102 and 103	"
<b>Turkish</b>	"	"	No. 99	"

<sup>2</sup> Note. — In pronouncing on this Article, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of the annex to this Article.

The Preparatory Commission, by sixteen votes to three and six abstentions, adopted the principle of limitation by expenditure. It also discussed the following resolution:

" The Preparatory Commission is of opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material."

When this resolution was put to the vote, there were nine votes in favour, nine against and seven abstentions.

Lastly, it examined the principle of a combination of the two methods. Nine members of the Commission voted in favour of this principle; eleven voted against and five abstained.

<sup>3</sup> Note. — Such figures and dates as appear in this Chapter are only given as an illustration; most of them correspond to the figures and dates laid down in the Treaties of Washington and London.

<sup>4</sup> See general reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 109 of the Report.

<b>Italian</b>	"	"	No. 108	"
----------------	---	---	---------	---

<sup>5</sup> See reservation by the **Yugoslav and Finnish Delegations**, paragraph No. 116 of the Report.

<sup>6</sup> See reservation by the **Italian Delegation**, paragraph No. 112 of the Report.

If the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre, the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.), shall not exceed ten. If, alternatively, the armament contains no guns exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case, the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) in calibre, is not limited.

*Article 16.*

No submarine shall exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) in calibre.

*Article 17.*

No vessel of war exceeding the limitations as to displacement or armament prescribed by the present Convention shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

*Article 18.*

In regard to the replacement of the vessels of war limited by the present Convention, the High Contracting Parties will comply with the rules set out in Annex IV to this Chapter.

*Article 19.<sup>1</sup>*

No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre.

*Article 20.*

In the event of a High Contracting Party's being engaged in war, such Party shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

*Article 21.*

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to dispose, by gift, sale, or any mode of transfer, of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign Power.

*Article 22.*

Any vessels of war which have to be disposed of as being surplus to the tonnage figures allowed by the present Convention shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules set out in Annex V to this Chapter.

*Article 23.*

Existing ships of various types, which, prior to April 1st, 1930, have been used as stationary training establishments or hulks, may be retained in a non-seagoing condition.

*Article 24.<sup>2 3</sup>*

(Provisional text, subject to the drafting of the Annex.)

The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for naval armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed, in Annex . . .

\* \* \*

*Note.* — The two following articles appear in Part III of the London Naval Treaty, and are quoted as examples of supplementary restrictions which certain High Contracting Parties may be prepared to accept:<sup>4</sup>

“ *Article ...*

“ Not more than 25 per cent of the allowed total tonnage in the cruiser category may be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft. ”

“ *Article ...*

“ In the destroyer category, not more than 16 per cent of the allowed total tonnage shall be employed in vessels of over 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement. ”

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the **Japanese Delegation**, paragraph No. 134 of the Report.

<sup>2</sup> In pronouncing on this Article, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of the Annex to this Article.

<sup>3</sup> See reservation by the **French Delegation**, paragraph No. 139 of the Report.

<b>Japanese</b>	“	“	No. 140	“
<b>German</b>	“	“	No. 141	“

**British and Italian Delegations**, paragraph No. 142 of the Report.

<sup>4</sup> See reservation by the **Greek and Spanish Delegations**, paragraph 143 of the Report.



Tables annexed to Chapter B of Part II.

Table I.

High Contracting Party	Global Tonnage
A.	
B.	
C.	
D.	
E.	
F.	
G.	
.	
.	
.	

Table II.

Categories (defined in Annex III)	High Contracting Parties									
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	.	.	
(a) Capital ships. (i)  (ii) <sup>1</sup>										
(b) Aircraft-carriers.										
(cd) Light surface vessels	{	(c) Cruisers.								
		(i) Guns of more than 6.1 inches (155 mm.)								
		(ii) Guns of 6.1 inches and less (155 mm.)								
		(d) Destroyers.								
(e) Submarines.										

Table III. — Rules for Transfer.

The figures to be entered in this table will be calculated on the following principles:

1. Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power, and of the classes of ships involved in the transfer.
2. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons <sup>2</sup> will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships.
3. As regards the other Powers, the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total (global) tonnage of each of them.

<sup>1</sup> For Parties who do not possess any capital ship of a standard displacement exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons).

<sup>2</sup> This figure is given as an illustration.



## Annexes to Chapter B of Part II.

### Annex I.

#### EXEMPT VESSELS.

Subject to any special agreements which may submit them to limitation, the following vessels are exempt from limitation:

- (a) Naval surface combatant vessels of 600 tons (610 metric tons) standard displacement and under;
- (b) Naval surface combatant vessels exceeding 600 tons (610 metric tons), but not exceeding 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement, provided they have none of the following characteristics:
  - (1) Mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
  - (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre;
  - (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
  - (4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.
- (c) Naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:
  - (1) Mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
  - (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre;
  - (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
  - (4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots;
  - (5) Are protected by armour plate;
  - (6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines;
  - (7) Are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air;
  - (8) Mount more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line: or two, one on each broadside;
  - (9) If fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air, are designed or adopted to operate at sea more than three aircraft.

### Annex II.

#### LIST OF SPECIAL VESSELS.

.....

### Annex III.

#### DEFINITIONS.

For the purposes of the present Convention, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this Annex:

##### (a) *Capital Ships.*

(i) Vessels of war, not aircraft carriers, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.).

(ii) For Parties who do not possess any capital ship exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement:

Vessels of war not exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement and the calibre of whose guns exceeds 8 inches (203 mm.).

##### (b) *Aircraft Carriers.*

Surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

##### (c) *Cruisers.*

Surface vessels of war, other than capital ships or aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which exceeds 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1 inches (130 mm.) calibre.

The cruiser category is divided into two sub-categories as follows:

- (i) Cruisers carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.
- (ii) Cruisers not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

##### (d) *Destroyers.*

Surface vessels of war, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons) and with a gun not above 5.1 inches (130 mm.) calibre.

##### *Standard Displacement.*

1. The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel complete, fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

##### (cd) *Light Surface Vessels.*

Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and with guns not exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.) calibre.

The category of light surface vessels is divided into two categories, as follows:

- (i) Vessels carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.
- (ii) Vessels not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition.

The word "ton", except in the expression "metric tons", shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilos.).

#### Annex IV.

##### RULES FOR REPLACEMENT.

1. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this Annex, no vessel limited by this Convention shall be replaced until it becomes "over-age".

2. A vessel shall be deemed to be "over-age" when the following number of years have elapsed since the date of its completion:

- (a) Capital ships: 20<sup>1</sup> years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for the replacement of existing ships.
- (b) Aircraft-carriers: 20 years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for existing ships.
- (c) Surface vessels exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) but not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement:
  - (i) If laid down before January 1st, 1920, 16 years;
  - (ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1919, 20 years.
- (d) Surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement:
  - (i) If laid down before January 1st, 1921, 12 years;
  - (ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1920, 16 years.
- (e) Submarines: 13 years.

3. The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes "over-age": but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement.

The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage.

4. In the event of loss or accidental destruction, a vessel may be replaced immediately; but such replacement tonnage shall be subject to the limits of displacement and to the other provisions of this Convention.

#### Annex V.

##### RULES FOR DISPOSAL OF VESSELS OF WAR.

The present Convention provides for the disposal of vessels of war in the following ways:

- (1) By scrapping (sinking or breaking up);
- (2) By converting the vessel to a hulk;
- (3) By converting the vessel to target use exclusively;
- (4) By retaining the vessel exclusively for experimental purposes;
- (5) By retaining the vessel exclusively for training purposes.

Any vessel of war to be disposed of may either be scrapped or converted to a hulk at the option of the High Contracting Party concerned.

Vessels which have been retained for target, experimental or training purposes, shall finally be scrapped or converted to hulks.

##### *Section I. — Vessels to be scrapped.*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by scrapping, by reason of its replacement, must be rendered incapable of warlike service within six months of the date of the completion of its successor, or of the first of its successors if there are more than one. If, however, the completion of the new vessel or vessels be delayed, the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of warlike service shall, nevertheless, be completed within four and a-half years from the date of laying the keel of the new vessel, or of the first of the new vessels; but should the new vessel, or any of the new vessels, be a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement, this period is reduced to three and a half years.

(b) A vessel to be scrapped shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed or else destroyed in the ship:

- (1) All guns and essential parts of guns, fire control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets;
- (2) All hydraulic or electric machinery for operating turrets;
- (3) All fire-control instruments and range-finders;
- (4) All ammunition, explosives, mines and mine rails;
- (5) All torpedoes, war heads, torpedo-tubes and training-racks;
- (6) All wireless telegraphy installations;
- (7) All main propelling machinery, or alternatively the armoured conning-tower and all side armour-plate;
- (8) All aircraft cranes, derricks, lifts and launching apparatus. All landing-on or flying-off platforms and decks, or alternatively all main propelling machinery;
- (9) In addition, in the case of submarines, all main storage batteries, air compressor plants and ballast pumps.

<sup>1</sup> Under the London Treaty, certain Powers agreed not to exercise their rights to lay down the keels of capital ship replacement tonnage during the years 1931 to 1936 inclusive, as provided in the Washington Treaty.



(c) Scrapping shall be finally effected in either of the following ways, within twelve months of the date of which the work of rendering the vessel incapable of warlike service is due for completion:

- (1) Permanent sinking of the vessel;
- (2) Breaking the vessel up; this shall always include the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom-plating.

*Section II. — Vessels to be converted to Hulks.*

A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to a hulk shall be considered finally disposed of when the conditions prescribed in Section I, paragraph (b), of this Annex, have been complied with, omitting sub-paragraphs (6), (7) and (8), and when the following have been effected:

- (1) Mutilation beyond repair of all propeller-shafts, thrust-blocks, turbine-gearing or main propelling-motors and turbines or cylinders of main engines;
- (2) Removal of propeller-brackets;
- (3) Removal and breaking up of all aircraft-lifts, and the removal of all aircraft-cranes, derricks and launching apparatus.

The vessel must be put in the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

*Section III. — Vessels to be converted to Target Use.*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to target use exclusively shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there have been removed and landed, or rendered unserviceable on board, the following:

- (1) All guns;
- (2) All fire-control tops and instruments and main fire-control communication wiring;
- (3) All machinery for operating gun-mountings or turrets;
- (4) All ammunition, explosives, mines, torpedoes and torpedo-tubes;
- (5) All aviation facilities and accessories.

The vessel must be put into the above conditions within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

(b) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for target use exclusively, at any one time:

- (1) Not more than three vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these three vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
- (2) One submarine.

(c) On retaining a vessel for target use, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to re-condition it for warlike service.

*Section IV. — Vessels retained for Experimental Purposes.*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to experimental purposes exclusively shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section III (a) of this Annex.

(b) Without prejudice to the general rules, and provided that due notice be given to the other High Contracting Parties, reasonable variation from the conditions prescribed in Section III (a) of this Annex, in so far as may be necessary for the purposes of a special experiment, may be permitted as a temporary measure.

Any High Contracting Party taking advantage of this provision is required to furnish full details of any such variation and the period for which they will be required.

(c) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain for experimental purposes exclusively at any one time:

- (1) Not more than two vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these two vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
- (2) One submarine.

(d) On retaining a vessel for experimental purposes, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to re-condition it for warlike service.

*Section V. — Vessels retained for Training Purposes.*

(a) The following vessels may be retained, for training purposes exclusively, by the High Contracting Parties concerned:

.....

(b) Vessels retained for training purposes under the provisions of paragraph (a) shall, within six months of the date on which they are required to be disposed of, be dealt with as follows:

**1 Capital Ships.**

The following is to be carried out:

- (1) Removal of main-armament guns, revolving parts of all barbets and turrets; machinery for operating turrets; but three turrets with their armament may be retained in each ship;
- (2) Removal of all ammunition and explosives in excess of the quantity required for target-practice training for the guns remaining on board;
- (3) Removal of conning-tower and the side-armour belt between the foremost and aftermost barbets;
- (4) Removal or mutilation of all torpedo-tubes;
- (5) Removal or mutilation on board of all boilers in excess of the number required for a maximum speed of eighteen knots.



2. *Other Surface Vessels.*

The following is to be carried out:

- (1) Removal of one-half of the guns, but four guns of main calibre may be retained on each vessel;
- (2) Removal of all torpedo-tubes;
- (3) Removal of all aviation facilities and accessories;
- (4) Removal of one-half of the boilers.

(c) The High Contracting Party concerned undertakes that vessels retained in accordance with the provision of this Section shall not be used for any combatant purpose.

---

CHAPTER C. — AIR ARMAMENTS.

*Article 25.*<sup>1 2</sup>

The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table I annexed to this Chapter.

The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table II annexed to this Chapter.

*Article 26.*<sup>1 2</sup>

The number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles, capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table III annexed to this Chapter.

The number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table IV annexed to this Chapter.

*Article 27.*

Horse-power shall be measured according to the following rules . . .  
The volume of dirigibles shall be expressed in cubic metres.

*Article 28.*

1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aviation material, so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure of security and the most economic return. No preparations shall be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require civil aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for military purposes. They undertake to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to, and the employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Any such personnel or military material which may thus be employed in civil aviation of whatever nature shall be included in the limitation applicable to the High Contracting Party concerned in virtue of Part I, or Articles 25 and 26, of the present Convention, as the case may be.<sup>3</sup>

3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for military purposes instead of being established for economic, administrative or social purposes.

4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different countries and to confer together to this end.

---

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 148 of the Report.

<sup>2</sup> See reservation by the **Turkish Delegation**, paragraph No. 149 of the Report.

<sup>3</sup> See reservation by the **Canadian Delegation**, paragraph No. 163 of the Report.

Tables annexed to Chapter C of Part II.<sup>1</sup>

Table I. — Aeroplanes of the Land, Sea and Air Armed Forces.												
High Contracting Parties	a		b		c		d		a		c	
	Total aeroplanes of the armed forces		(Optional) Aeroplanes stationed in the home country		(Optional) Aeroplanes stationed overseas		(Optional) Aeroplanes in aircraft carriers		Total aeroplanes of the forces organised on a military basis			(Optional) Aeroplanes stationed overseas
	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power		
A.												
B.												
C.												
D.												
.												
.												
Table II. — Aeroplanes of the Land, Sea and Air Formations organised on a Military Basis.												
High Contracting Parties	a		b		c		d		a		c	
	Total dirigibles of the armed forces		(Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country		(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas		(Optional) Dirigibles in aircraft carriers		Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas
	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power		
A.												
B.												
C.												
D.												
.												
.												
Table III. — Dirigibles of the Land, Sea and Air Forces.												
High Contracting Parties	a		b		c		d		a		c	
	Total dirigibles of the armed forces		(Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country		(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas		(Optional) Dirigibles in aircraft carriers		Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas
	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power		
A.												
B.												
C.												
D.												
.												
.												
Table IV. — Dirigibles of the Land, Sea and Air Formations organised on a Military Basis.												
High Contracting Parties	a		b		c		d		a		c	
	Total dirigibles of the armed forces		(Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country		(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas		(Optional) Dirigibles in aircraft carriers		Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas
	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power		
A.												
B.												
C.												
D.												
.												
.												

<sup>1</sup> See reservations concerning the tables annexed to Chapter C of Part II by the German Delegation, paragraph No. 155 of the Report.  
 Turkish No. 156  
 Italian " " No. 73 and 155

### PART III. — BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Article 29.*<sup>2</sup>

(Provisional text subject to the drafting of the Annex.)

The total annual expenditure of each of the High Contracting Parties on his land, sea and air forces and formations organised on a military basis shall be limited to the figure laid down for such Party and in accordance with the conditions prescribed in the Annex. . . .

### PART IV. — EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

#### *Article 30.*

For each category of effectives defined in the model tables annexed to this Article, the exchange of information each year shall apply to the average daily number of effectives reached during the preceding year in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties.

For this purpose, each of the High Contracting Parties will forward to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within . . . . . months after the end of each year, the necessary information to enable the said tables to be drawn up in the case of such Party. Each Party shall attach to this statement an explanatory note showing the elements on which the figures supplied are based, and stating, in particular, for each sort of effectives (recruits, militiamen, reservists, territorials, etc.) the number of these effectives and the number of days' service they have performed.

The said tables shall be drawn up and published with the explanatory note referred to above by the Secretary-General not later than . . . . . in each year.

---

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 182 of the Report.  
**American**        „        „        No. 181        „

<sup>2</sup> *Note.* — In pronouncing on this Article, and in particularly as regards the possibility of a distinct limitation of the expenditure on land, sea and air forces, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of the Annex to this Article.





Table II. — Land Armed forces Stationed Overseas.

High Contracting Parties	Overseas territory	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least 12 months of service	d Soldiers whose period of service has exceeded the legal period of service but is less than 12 months (information to be supplied only for effectives recruited by conscription)	e (Optional statement.) (Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation)
--------------------------	--------------------	--	---------------	--	--	--

A	M N O P ...					
B	... R S T ...					

Table V. — Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas.

	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers or officials ranking as officers	c Other effectives or officials who have completed at least 12 months of service	d Soldiers or officials whose period of service has exceeded the legal period of service but is less than 12 months (information to be supplied only for effectives recruited by conscription)	e (Optional statement.) (Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation)
--	--	--	---	---	--

<sup>1</sup> See reservations concerning the tables annexed to Article 30 by the British Empire Delegation, paragraph No. 190 of the Report.  
French " " No. 189  
German " " No. 187  
Japanese " " No. 191  
Turkish " " Nos. 188 and 77 of the Report.

<sup>2</sup> Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.



MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE NAVAL FORCES.

Table VI. — Naval Forces.

Table VII. — Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis.

High Contracting Parties	Table VI. — Naval Forces.				Table VII. — Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis.			
	a Total effectives, including effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least y <sup>1</sup> months of service	d (Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation	a Total effectives, including effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least y <sup>1</sup> months of service	d (Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation
A.								
B.								
C.								
D.								
.								
.								

<sup>1</sup> Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript Navy of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention



MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE AIR ARMED FORCES.

Table VIII. — Air Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country.					Table IX. — Air Armed Forces stationed Overseas.				Table X. — Total Air Armed Forces.			
High Contracting Parties.	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	
	Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	Effectives who have completed at least 2 <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	(Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation	Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	Effectives who have completed at least 2 <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	(Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation	Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	Effectives who have completed at least 2 <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	Effectives who have completed at least 2 <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	(Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation	
A.												
B.												
C.												
D.												
.												

MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE AIR FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.

Table XI. — Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country.				Table XII. — Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas.			
High Contracting Parties	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	
	Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table.	Effectives who have completed at least 2 <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men and officials of all grades)	(Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation	Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table.	Effectives who have completed at least 2 <sup>1</sup> months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men and officials of all grades)	(Optional statement.) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation	
A.							
B.							
C.							
D.							
.							

<sup>1</sup> Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air force of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.



*Article 31.<sup>1</sup>*

If any youths have compulsorily received, during any year, preparatory military training within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party, such Party shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within . . . . .  $x$  months after the end of each year, the number of youths who have received such instruction.

The above information shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than . . . . . in each year.

*Article 32.*

The High Contracting Parties concerned shall forward to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations at the end of each year the following information as to the provisions of their law relating to the effectives recruited by conscription in their land, sea and air forces and formations organised on a military basis respectively;

- (1) The total number of days comprised in the first period of service;
- (2) The total duration in days of the ensuing periods.

The above information shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than . . . . . in each year.

*Article 33.<sup>2 3</sup>*

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall, within . . . . . months from the end of each budgetary year, communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a statement drawn up in accordance with a standard model, showing by categories of materials the total actual expenditure in the course of the said year on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war materials of the land and sea armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of such Party.

The information contained in this statement shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than . . . . . in each year.

*Article 34.*

Within one month after the date of laying down and the date of completion respectively of each vessel of war, other than the vessels exempt from limitation under Annex I to Chapter B of Part II, laid down or completed by or for them or within their jurisdiction after the coming into force of the present Convention, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations the information detailed below:

- (a) The date of laying down the keel and the following particulars:  
Classification of the vessel and for whom built (if not for the High Contracting Party);  
Standard displacement in tons and metric tons;  
Principal dimensions—namely, length of water-line, extreme beam at or below water-line;  
Mean draught at standard displacement;  
Calibre of the largest gun.
- (b) The date of completion, together with the foregoing particulars relating to the vessel at that date.

The above information shall be immediately communicated by the Secretary-General to all the High Contracting Parties and shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than . . . . in each year.

*Article 35.*

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretariat of the League of Nations the name and the tonnage of any vessel constructed in accordance with Article 19. (Chapter II). With regard to existing vessels of this type, this communication shall be made within two months after ratification of the present Convention. With regard to vessels to be constructed, the communication shall be made on the date of completion.

*Article 36.<sup>4</sup>*

For each of the categories of aircraft defined in the model tables annexed to this Article, the exchange of information shall apply to the maximum figures attained in each year in respect of the number and total horse-power, and for dirigibles the total volume, by the aircraft referred to in Articles 25 and 26 of the present Convention.

For this purpose, each of the High Contracting Parties will forward to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations within . . . . . months after the end of each year the necessary information to enable the said tables to be drawn up in the case of such Party.

The tables referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be drawn up and published by the Secretary-General not later than . . . . . in each year.

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 194 of the Report.  
**Italian** " " No. 194 "

<sup>2</sup> See reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 201 of the Report.

<sup>3</sup> Note. — In giving an opinion on this Article, the Governments will take into account the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts regarding the number and nature of the categories to be laid down and the methods of publicity thus adopted in connection with the provisions of the annex regarding limitation referred to in Article 9 of the present Convention.

<sup>4</sup> See reservations by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 206 of the Report.

Model Tables annexed to Article 36.<sup>1</sup>

Model Table I. — Aeroplanes of the Land, Sea and Air Armed Forces.										Model Table II. — Aeroplanes of the Land, Sea and Air Formations organised on a Military Basis.											
High Contracting Parties	<i>a</i> Total aeroplanes of the armed forces			<i>b</i> (Optional) Aeroplanes stationed in the home country			<i>c</i> (Optional) Aeroplanes stationed overseas			<i>d</i> (Optional) Aeroplanes in aircraft carriers			<i>a</i> Total aeroplanes of the forces organised on a military basis			<i>b</i> (Optional) Aeroplanes stationed in the home country			<i>c</i> (Optional) Aeroplanes stationed overseas		
	Number	Total horse-power		Number	Total horse-power		Number	Total horse-power		Number	Total horse-power		Number	Total horse-power		Number	Total horse-power		Number	Total horse-power	
A.																					
B.																					
C.																					
D.																					
. .																					
Model Table III. — Dirigibles of the Land, Sea and Air Armed Forces.										Model Table IV. — Dirigibles of the Land, Sea and Air Formations organised on a Military Basis.											
High Contracting Parties	<i>a</i> Total dirigibles of the armed forces			<i>b</i> (Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country			<i>c</i> (Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas			<i>d</i> (Optional) Dirigibles in aircraft carriers			<i>a</i> Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis			<i>b</i> (Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country			<i>c</i> (Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas		
	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume
A.																					
B.																					
C.																					
D.																					
. .																					

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the German Delegation, paragraphs Nos. 206 and 155 of the Report.  
Turkish " " Nos. 207 and 77 " "



*Article 37.*<sup>1</sup>

In order to ensure publicity as regards civil aviation, each of the High Contracting Parties shall indicate within  $x$  months after the end of each year to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations the number and total horse-power of civil aeroplanes and dirigibles registered within the jurisdiction of such Party. Each Party shall also indicate the amounts expended on civil aviation by the Government and by local authorities.

The above information shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than..... in each year.

*Article 38.*<sup>2</sup>

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations within..... months of the end of each budgetary year a statement drawn up in accordance with the standard model annexed to this Article<sup>3</sup> showing the total amounts actually expended in the course of the said year on the land, sea and air armaments of such Party.

The information supplied in this statement shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than..... in each year.

PART V. — CHEMICAL ARMS.<sup>4</sup>

*Article 39.*

The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.

PART VI. — MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

CHAPTER A. — PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.

*Article 40.*<sup>5</sup>

There shall be set up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission with the duty of following the execution of the present Convention. It shall consist of  $x$  (figure to be fixed by the Conference) members appointed respectively by the Governments of ..... (list to be drawn up by the Conference).

Members of the Commission shall not represent their Governments. They shall be appointed for  $x$  years, but shall be re-eligible. During their term of office, they may be replaced only on, death or in the case of voluntary resignation or serious and permanent illness.

They may be assisted by technical experts.

---

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 212 of the Report.

<sup>2</sup> See reservation by the **German Delegation**, paragraph No. 215 of the Report.

<sup>3</sup> Note. — In drawing up this annex, the Conference will have before it the standard model statement which will be submitted to it by the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

<sup>4</sup> See reservations by the **German Delegation**, paragraphs Nos. 229 and 230 of the Report.

<sup>5</sup> See reservation by the **French Delegation**, paragraph No. 238 of the Report.

*Article 41.*

The Commission shall meet for the first time, on being summoned by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within three months from the entry into force of the present Convention, to elect a provisional President and Vice-President and to draw up its Rules of Procedure.

Thereafter it shall meet annually in ordinary session on the date fixed in its Rules of Procedure.

It may also, if summoned by its President, meet in extraordinary session in the cases provided for in the present Convention and whenever an application to that effect is made by a High Contracting Party.

*Article 42.*

The Commission shall have full power to lay down its own Rules of Procedure on the basis of the provisions of the present Convention.

*Article 43.*

The Commission may only transact business if at least two-thirds of its members are present.

*Article 44.*

Any High Contracting Party not having a member of its nationality on the Commission shall be entitled to send a member appointed for the purpose to sit at any meetings of the Commission during which a question specially affecting the interests of that Party is considered.

*Article 45.*

Each member of the Commission shall have only one vote.

All decisions of the Commission shall be taken by a majority of the votes of the members present at the meeting.

In the cases provided for in Articles 50 and 52 the votes of members appointed by the Parties concerned in the discussion shall not be counted in determining the majority.

A minority report may be drawn up.

*Article 46.*

Each member of the Commission shall be entitled on his own responsibility to have any person heard or consulted who is in a position to throw any light on the question which is being examined by the Commission.

*Article 47.*

Each member of the Commission shall be entitled to require that, in any report by the Commission, account shall be taken of the opinions or suggestions put forward by him, if necessary in the form of a separate report.

*Article 48.*

All reports by the Commission shall, under conditions specified in each case in the present Convention, or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, be communicated to all the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League of Nations, and shall be published.

*Article 49.*

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall receive all the information supplied by the High Contracting Parties to the Secretary-General of the League in pursuance of their international obligations in this regard.

Each year, the Commission shall make at least one report on the information submitted to it and on any other information that may reach it from a responsible source and that it may consider worth attention, showing the situation as regards the fulfilment of the present Convention.

This report shall be communicated forthwith to all the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League and shall be published on the date fixed in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.



## CHAPTER B. — DEROGATIONS.

### *Article 50.*

If, during the term of the present Convention, a change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any High Contracting Party, a menace to its national security, such High Contracting Party may suspend temporarily, in so far as concerns itself, any provision or provisions of the present Convention, other than those expressly designed to apply in the event of war, provided:

(a) That such Contracting Party shall immediately notify the other Contracting Parties and at the same time the Permanent Disarmament Commission, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, of such temporary suspension, and of the extent thereof.

(b) That simultaneously with the said notification, the Contracting Party shall communicate to the other Contracting Parties, and at the same time, to the Permanent Disarmament Commission through the Secretary-General, a full explanation of the change of circumstances referred to above.

Thereupon the other High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented.

When the reasons for such temporary suspension have ceased to exist, the said High Contracting Party shall reduce its armaments to the level agreed upon in the Convention, and shall make immediate notification to the other Contracting Parties.

## CHAPTER C. — PROCEDURE REGARDING COMPLAINTS.

### *Article 51.*

The High Contracting Parties recognise that any violation of the provisions of the present Convention is a matter of concern to all the Parties.

### *Article 52.*

If, during the term of the present Convention, a High Contracting Party is of opinion that another Party to the Convention is maintaining armaments in excess of the figures agreed upon or is in any way violating or endeavouring to violate the provisions of the present Convention, such Party may lay the matter, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, before the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

The Commission, after hearing a representative of the High Contracting Party whose action is questioned, should such Party so desire, and the representative of any other Party which may be specially concerned in the matter and which asks to be heard, shall, as soon as possible, present a report thereon to the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League. The report and any proceedings thereon shall be published as soon as possible.

The High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the conclusions of the Report.

If the High Contracting Parties directly concerned are Members of the League of Nations, the Council shall exercise the rights devolving upon it in such circumstances in virtue of the Covenant with a view to ensuring the observance of the present Convention and to safeguarding the peace of nations.

## CHAPTER D. — FINAL PROVISIONS.

### *Article 53.<sup>1</sup>*

The present Convention shall not affect the provisions of previous treaties under which certain of the High Contracting Parties have agreed to limit their land, sea or air armaments, and have thus fixed in relation to one another their respective rights and obligations in this connection.

The following High Contracting Parties . . . signatory to the said treaties declare that the limits fixed for their armaments under the present Convention are accepted by them in relation to the obligations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the maintenance of such provisions being for them an essential condition for the observance of the present Convention.

---

<sup>1</sup> See reservation by the German Delegation, paragraph No. 273 of the Report.



*Article 54.*

If a dispute arises between two or more of the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention, and cannot be settled either directly between the parties or by some other method of friendly settlement, the parties will, at the request of any one of them, submit such dispute to the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal chosen by them.

*Article 55.*

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

The present Convention shall come into force, for each Party whose instrument of ratification has been deposited, as soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by . . . (list to be drawn up by the Conference).

(Should the present Convention not have come into force in accordance with the preceding paragraph by . . . the High Contracting Parties shall be invited by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to meet and consider the possibility of putting it into force. They undertake to participate in this consultation, which shall take place before . . . )<sup>1</sup>

*Article 56.*

Each of the High Contracting Parties will take the necessary measures for carrying the provisions of the present Convention into effect as soon as it has come into force for such Party.

*Article 57.*

Subject to the provisions of Articles 58 and 59, the present Convention shall remain in force for  $x$  years. It shall remain in force after the expiration of that period except in so far as it may be amended, superseded or denounced under the conditions specified in the following articles.

*Article 58.*

Before the end of the period of  $x$  years provided for in the preceding article, and not less than  $y$  years after its entry into force, the present Convention shall be re-examined by the High Contracting Parties meeting in Conference. The date of this meeting shall be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations, after taking cognisance of the opinion of the Permanent Disarmament Commission and of the intentions of the High Contracting Parties non-members of the League of Nations.

The above-mentioned Conference may, if necessary, revise the present Convention and establish fresh provisions in substitution therefor, fixing their period of duration and laying down general rules regarding their examination and subsequent revision, if the latter is required.

*Article 59.<sup>2</sup>*

Before the end of the period of  $y$  years provided for in the preceding article, but not less than  $z$  years after the entry into force of the present Convention, the procedure for examination and revision laid down in that article may also be carried out at the request of a High Contracting Party, with the concurrence of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, if the conditions under which the engagements stipulated in the Convention were contracted have undergone, as the result of technical transformations or special circumstances, changes justifying a fresh examination and, if necessary, the revision of such engagements.

*Article 60.*

In the course of a conference held in the circumstances provided for in the two preceding articles, any High Contracting Party shall be entitled to notify its intention to denounce the present Convention.

Such denunciation shall take effect two years after its date, but in no case before the expiration of the period of  $x$  years mentioned in Article 57.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Note.* — It will be for the Conference to decide whether this paragraph and any supplementary provisions which may be necessary would not be better placed in a protocol of signature.

<sup>2</sup> *See reservation by the German Delegation, paragraph No. 295 of the Report.*

Geneva, December 9th, 1930.

REPORT BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION  
FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.

	Page
I. HISTORICAL . . . . .	30
II. COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION.	
Article I . . . . .	35
Part I. — Personnel:	
Chapter A. — Effectives . . . . .	36
Chapter B. — Period of Service . . . . .	39
Part II. — Material:	
Chapter A. — Land Armaments. . . . .	39
Chapter B. — Naval Armaments . . . . .	41
Chapter C. — Air Armaments. . . . .	45
Part III. — Budgetary Expenditure . . . . .	48
Part IV. — Exchange of Information. . . . .	49
Part V. — Chemical Arms . . . . .	52
Part VI. — Miscellaneous Provisions:	
Chapter A. — Permanent Disarmament Commission . . . . .	53
Chapter B. — Derogations . . . . .	55
Chapter C. — Complaints. . . . .	56
Chapter D. — Final Provisions . . . . .	57
III. Annex. — REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE WORK OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE . . . . .	61

I. HISTORICAL.

1. The origin of the draft Convention is found in the following resolution adopted on September 25th, 1925, by the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations:

“ The Assembly,

“ Taking note of the declarations submitted to the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations in respect of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and of the fact that the said Protocol has not, up to the present, received the ratifications necessary for putting it into operation immediately;

“ Convinced that the most urgent need of the present time is the re-establishment of mutual confidence between nations;

“ Declaring afresh that a war of aggression should be regarded as an international crime:

“ Regards favourably the effort made by certain nations to attain those objects by concluding arbitration conventions and treaties of mutual security conceived in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in harmony with the principles of the Protocol (Arbitration, Security, Disarmament);

“ Records the fact that such agreements need not be restricted to a limited area but may be applied to the whole world;

“ Recommends that, after these conventions and treaties have been deposited with the League of Nations, the Council should examine them in order to report to the Seventh Assembly on the progress in general security brought about by such agreements;

“ Undertakes again to work for the establishment of peace by the sure method of arbitration, security and disarmament;

“ And, in conformity with the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant, requests the Council to make a preparatory study with a view to a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security as provided for in Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, the said Conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realised. ”



2. In pursuance of this decision, the Council requested a Committee of Enquiry, under the chairmanship of M. Paul-Boncour, to submit to it proposals for setting up an organ entrusted to prepare for a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments. This Committee's conclusions were adopted almost in their entirety by the Council on the report made to it by M. Beneš. This was the origin of the "Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference".

3. The Council naturally felt called upon, not only to draw up regulations for the composition and working of this new organ, but also to determine to some extent the direction of its work. For this purpose, the Council submitted to it the questionnaire—see below—which was based upon suggestions made to the Committee of Enquiry by the representatives of Great Britain, France and Spain.

4. This questionnaire was as follows:

*Question I.*

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments"?

- (a) Definition of the various factors—military, economic, geographical, etc.—upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.
- (b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments—military, naval and air—the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

*Question II (a).*

Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

*Question II (b).*

What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments"?

The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods—for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.

*Question III.*

By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another—e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?

*Question IV.*

Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

*Question V (a).*

On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

- 1. Population;
- 2. Resources;
- 3. Geographical situation;
- 4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
- 5. Density and character of the railways;
- 6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
- 7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?

*Question VI.*

- (a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament?

If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

- (b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?
- (c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

*Question VII.*

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

5. According to the Council resolution, the Preparatory Commission was to consist of delegates of all States Members of the Council of the League, and invitations to send representatives were also to be addressed to the Governments of Germany, the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, and Yugoslavia.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations was requested to bring to the notice of all other Powers, together with the questionnaire which was to be placed before the Preparatory Commission, the means placed at their disposal for stating their points of view.

6. The Preparatory Commission met for the first time on May 18th, 1926, and elected as President His Excellency Jonkheer Loudon (Netherlands), and as Vice-Presidents M. Cobián (Spain) and M. Buero (Uruguay). In consequence of resignations, certain changes had subsequently to be made in the composition of the Bureau.<sup>2</sup> During the sixth and last session, the places of the two Vice-Presidents were filled respectively by M. Politis (Greece) and M. Cobián (Spain).

\* \* \*

7. To provide for the preliminary study of the questions on which it had to give its opinion, the Preparatory Commission decided to appoint two Sub-Commissions, each under the chairmanship of one of its Vice-Presidents.

8. The first—known as Sub-Commission A—was entrusted with the technical examination of military, naval and air questions, and for this purpose split up into sub-committees. It was composed of experts appointed by all the States then represented on the Preparatory Commission; it met three times in 1926, under the chairmanship, first of M. Cobián, and then of M. Buero, M. de Brouckère, and General de Ceuninck. The voluminous report it subsequently submitted to the Commission contained extremely valuable technical observations and detailed replies to the questions referred to it.

9. The second Sub-Commission—known as Sub-Commission B—under the chairmanship of M. Buero, and subsequently of M. Veverka, and with the assistance of the Joint Commission set up by the Council<sup>3</sup> for this purpose, studied the other aspects of this problem.

10. This Commission's deliberations, as did those of Sub-Commission A, furnished valuable material for the Preparatory Commission's work.

\* \* \*

11. The Preparatory Commission held six sessions—two in 1926, two in 1927, one in 1928; the sixth, which began on April 15th, 1929, was suspended on May 6th, 1929, was resumed on November 6th, 1930, and lasted until December 9th. The report of the Commission on the work of its first session is annexed to this document.

12. At the opening of its third session the Commission had before it the technical reports referred to above. The time had come for the Commission to discuss as a whole the problem referred to it. A general discussion gave the several Governments an opportunity of explaining their points of view in regard to this matter. Two preliminary draft Conventions were submitted to the Commission by the French and British delegations respectively. The Commission examined these simultaneously and finally adopted at first reading a text which, though it was accompanied by numerous and important reservations, nevertheless remained the basis of its subsequent work and of the draft Convention which we have the honour to lay before you to-day.

13. At its fourth session, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was represented at the Preparatory Commission for the first time, submitted a proposal which differed radically from the draft adopted at first reading and aimed at complete and universal disarmament in the immediate future.

<sup>1</sup> The composition of the Commission was subsequently extended to enable Members retiring from the Council to retain their membership of the Commission. The Argentine Republic and Chile were invited to join the Commission by a resolution of the Council dated March 18th, 1926. Greece and Turkey were also invited, in 1927 and 1928 respectively, to take part in the work of the Commission.

<sup>2</sup> M. de Brouckère (Belgium) and M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia) acted temporarily as Vice-Presidents.

<sup>3</sup> The Joint Commission set up under the Council resolution of December 7th, 1926, was composed of representatives of the technical organisations of the League of Nations and of the Employers' Group and Workers' Group of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, to whom were added subsequently experts in industrial questions, transport and the chemical industry.



14. This draft, referred to the fifth session, was rejected. A further Soviet proposal was, however, then submitted to the Commission providing for partial disarmament on the basis of a fixed percentage of reduction. It was decided to postpone the consideration of this proposal to the next session. This session opened in Geneva on April 15th, 1929.

15. The Commission decided to continue its work on the basis of the 1927 draft, while signifying its readiness, should the Soviet delegation so desire, to annex to the final report the draft Convention submitted by the latter.

16. This decision having been adopted, the Preparatory Commission began to consider at second reading the text framed as a result of the preceding discussions. It had to interrupt this session, however, after having reached agreement on a certain number of points. At that time the naval problem still gave rise to considerable difficulties. Wholly divergent proposals had been put forward in regard to the methods of limitation. The statements of certain Powers more directly concerned in the question, however, gave reason to hope that negotiations would be entered into very shortly with a view to removing these divergencies and to reaching an agreement upon a concerted formula. This hope proved to be justified. Negotiations took place and resulted in the convocation of the London Naval Conference on January 31st, 1930.

17. In these circumstances, the Preparatory Commission considered it wiser to postpone to a later date the completion of its work. Before it adjourned, the German representative, considering the resolutions adopted during the first part of the sixth session, unsatisfactory and likely to impair the value of the draft, declared that he found himself obliged to dissociate himself definitely from the programme which the majority of the Commission had drawn up and to leave to it henceforth—seeing how its course was being shaped at that moment—the sole responsibility for the preparation of the Conference.

18. As soon as the London Conference had completed its work, it communicated the results to the Preparatory Commission through its President. Subject to a general reservation, an agreement had been reached between the Naval Powers which were the most immediately concerned on a method of limitation; the formula adopted established the principle of limitation by classes, but gave it greater elasticity by allowing, in certain cases, transfers from one class to another.

19. The obstacle which had temporarily brought the work of the Preparatory Commission to a standstill in 1929 having been removed, the President of the Preparatory Commission decided to resume the work of the sixth session. The Eleventh Assembly adopted, with regard to this matter, the following resolution proposed by the Third Committee:

“ The Assembly,

“ Has noted with satisfaction the results obtained at the London Conference and communicated to it by a letter from the President of that Conference dated April 21st, 1930.

“ It considers that these results are of a nature to facilitate a general agreement on the occasion of the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission regarding the methods to be applied in the matter of the reduction and limitation of naval armaments.

“ It trusts that negotiations, pursued in a spirit of conciliation and mutual confidence and with the determination to arrive at practical solutions, will make it possible to complete and extend the work of the Naval Conference.

“ The Assembly accordingly expresses the conviction that, during its session next November, the Preparatory Commission will be able to finish the drawing up of a preliminary draft Convention and will thus enable the Council to convene, as soon as possible, a Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

“ The Assembly decides that the proceedings and the report of the Assembly regarding disarmament shall be forwarded to the Preparatory Commission. ”

20. The Preparatory Commission therefore met again on November 6th last and was able to conclude the task assigned to it with the co-operation of twenty-seven<sup>1</sup> countries, including Norway and the Irish Free State, who were represented for the first time.

21. The present report is intended to give a concise survey of the results the Commission has achieved. Before analysing them, however, the Commission must outline briefly the results obtained by the Committee on Arbitration and Security, whose terms of reference were merged in those of the Commission.

22. As soon as it set to work, the Preparatory Commission was faced by the problem of international security. This was inevitable, for the connection between this problem and that of disarmament is obvious. Traces of it are, moreover, to be found in Article 8 of the Covenant, and it became increasingly evident as the work of the League of Nations proceeded.

---

<sup>1</sup> Belgium, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Irish Free State, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

The following countries were not represented at the second half of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference: the Argentine, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Uruguay.



23. There is no need to recall here the many resolutions in which the Assembly and the Council have emphasised the interdependence of these two factors. It may, however, be appropriate to point out that, at the very time when it invited the Council to set up this Commission, the Sixth Assembly affirmed "the fidelity and unanimity with which the Members of the League" remain attached to the triple object which had always inspired their efforts—namely, arbitration, security and disarmament. The attempts previously made to organise a complete system of mutual assistance had encountered insurmountable obstacles. It was now proposed, not in any sense to abandon the undertaking, but to prepare for its accomplishment on another plane and "to indicate methods or measures by which an approach might be made to this object, pending the achievement of a general settlement which many consider indispensable".

24. Two years later, pursuing the same course, the Eighth Assembly requested the Council to give the Preparatory Commission the necessary instructions for the creation of the "Committee on Arbitration and Security". This Committee, which was to consist of representatives of "all the States which have seats on the Commission and are Members of the League of Nations, other States represented on the Commission being invited to sit on it if they so desire", ". . . would be placed at the Commission's disposal and its duty would be to consider, on the lines indicated by the Commission, the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement".

25. The Eighth Assembly further directed that these measures should be sought at the same time:

"In action by the League of Nations with a view to promoting, generalising and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration and security;

"In the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the various articles of the Covenant;

"In agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States;

"And, further, in an invitation from the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region, each State indicating that, in a particular case, either its whole forces, or a certain part of its military, naval or air forces, could forthwith intervene in the conflict to support the Council's decisions or recommendations."

26. Thus, from the outset, a vast programme of enquiry was outlined for the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

27. The following year (1928), when the Committee had started its work, the Ninth Assembly adopted a new resolution. After recalling that "a close connection exists between international security and the reduction and limitation of armaments" and that "the present conditions of security set up by the Covenant of the League of Nations, by the Treaties of Peace, and in particular by the reductions in the armaments of certain countries under these Treaties, and also by the Locarno Agreements, would allow of the conclusion at the present time of a first General Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments", it declared that the time had come to conclude a first General Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which Convention would, moreover, of itself tend to increase international security. It took that opportunity to declare that, after the conclusion of such a Convention, the work relating both to disarmament and to arbitration and security should be pursued "so that, by further steps, armaments may be progressively reduced as the increase of security allows".

28. The Committee on Arbitration and Security, which was set up on November 30th, 1927, under the chairmanship of His Excellency M. Ed. Beneš, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, has so far held four sessions. In the present report, no attempt can be made to analyse, even in summary fashion, the enquiries this Committee has undertaken or the practical effect given to them by the Council, the Assembly, and by States Members of the League. A simple reference to the results achieved—to be appreciated by the Conference—is all that can be undertaken here.

29. These results are, first, in the field of the pacific settlement of international disputes, the three model general conventions which the 1928 Assembly decided to combine in a single Act, this being the origin of the "General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes", to which, up to the present, eight States have acceded, thus ensuring its entry into force.

30. In the same connection come the three model bilateral conventions which the Assembly proposed for the consideration of States, and which have already served as a basis for the drafting of a large number of treaties.



31. Next, there are the "Collective Treaty of Mutual Assistance" and the collective treaty and bilateral treaty of "non-aggression", the models for which were recommended by the same Assembly.

32. There is the resolution of September 26th, 1928, in which the Assembly recommends that States should accede to the Optional Clause of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and draws their attention to the elasticity of that clause and to the facilities it offers them. There is the model treaty "to strengthen the means for preventing war" which the Assembly, in a resolution adopted on September 20th, 1928, recommended for consideration by States and the "preliminary draft General Convention" of which the Eleventh Assembly decided to continue the study.

33. There are the studies on Articles 10, 11 and 16 of the Covenant which, on the recommendation of the Assembly, the Council adopted as "a useful piece of work" providing valuable indications as to the possibilities offered, in time of emergency, by the different articles of the Covenant.

34. There are the resolutions adopted by the Assembly on September 30th, 1930, with a view to ensuring, also at times of emergency, the normal working of the communications of the League of Nations.

35. Finally, there is the Convention on Financial Assistance, which was approved by the same Assembly, and has already been signed by twenty-eight States, its entry into force being dependent on that of the Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

---

## II. COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

36. The draft Convention adopted by the Commission preserves the structure of the French and British proposals considered at the third session. It is in six parts, some of which are subdivided into chapters. The numbering of the articles is, however, continuous.

### *Article 1.*

37. A first article of a general character governs the whole Convention and defines its scope:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention."

38. The form of this article is due to a suggestion of the Drafting Committee, made after the discussion by the Commission of the various sections of the Convention, particularly that relating to naval material.

39. The Commission has therefore recognised the principle laid down by Article 8 of the Covenant, which provides for the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement of international obligations.

40. The representatives of a number of Governments, while accepting the principle of limitation and reduction in the spirit of this article of the Covenant, desired to state that the reduction of all or some of the categories of armaments was not possible for them, their present armaments being far from sufficient to guarantee national safety. This reservation was made in precise form, particularly in relation to naval and air armaments, the latter being scarcely developed in the majority of States.

41. The Turkish delegation reserved its Government's right to submit to the future Disarmament Conference the proposal it made with regard to standards for the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to require any modification of the text which might be rendered necessary in the event of the adoption of this proposal.<sup>1</sup>

42. The German delegation reserved its Government's right to submit to the future Disarmament Conference any proposals regarding the standards of reduction and limitation of armaments which it might consider likely to promote these aims.<sup>2</sup>

43. Norway not having taken part in the earlier work of the Commission, in particular the first part of the second reading of the draft Convention, the Norwegian delegate made a general reservation concerning the attitude his Government might adopt at the Conference.

The delegate of the Irish Free State made a similar statement.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Minutes of the Sixth Session (first part), pages 206-208.

<sup>2</sup> See Minutes of the Sixth Session (first part), pages 203-206.

## PART I. — PERSONNEL.

### CHAPTER A. — EFFECTIVES.

#### *Articles 2 and 3.*

44. Chapter A of Part I of the draft deals with *effectives*, which it defines in the following manner in Article 2:

“The average daily effectives in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of effectives defined in the tables annexed to this Chapter, the figure laid down for such Party in the corresponding column of the said tables.”

45. This definition of peace-time effectives did not give rise to lengthy discussion, and the interpretation it should receive is made the clearer by the fact that the articles which follow define the scope of the two conceptions which might be open to question.

46. Article 3 lays down that “the average daily effectives are reckoned by dividing the total number of days’ duty performed in each year by the number of days in such year”. It is thus laid down, clearly and beyond question, that the limitation and reduction of effectives applies only to effectives in service. The Minutes of the meetings contain a number of interesting observations on this fundamental point, which was discussed at each session in greater or lesser detail.

47. At the third session, after simultaneous consideration of the initial proposals of the French and British delegations, the Commission adopted, by a majority, the solution which appears in the text of the draft. The representative of the British Empire, however, reserved his Government’s opinion as to the limitation of trained reserves, while the representative of the United States formulated a general reservation in regard to the inclusion of formations organised on a military basis and the exclusion of trained reserves. The German representative made a general reservation with regard to the whole of the chapter, as making no provision for limitation of trained reserves, registered and compelled by law to render military service in case of war, although such trained reserves in countries with the system of conscription represent (in his view) the main body of the personnel in time of war.

48. Some delegations, on the other hand, maintained at the first reading that, in view of the great military value attaching to trained reserves, a disarmament convention without limitation or reduction of these reserves would present a serious defect.

49. On the second reading (during the first part of the sixth session) the representatives of Great Britain and the United States withdrew their opposition on the subject of trained reserves for reasons which were expressed then and on subsequent occasions.

50. As regards the effectives of armed forces or formations organised on a military basis at sea, the representatives of the British Empire and the United States stated at the first reading that they only accepted limitation of naval effectives on the conditions of general adoption of this limitation and of a satisfactory agreement being reached in regard to the limitation of vessels of war; these reservations, however, were not maintained at the second reading.

51. It is understood that the armed forces, in the sense of Article 2, include all effectives receiving military training (other than preliminary training) wherever and however given. It is also understood that the effectives in reserve undergoing a period of training are to be included in the calculation of the effectives in service during this period.

52. The Polish delegation expressed some doubt as to the practical results of this method of calculation, but agreed to it on the understanding that there would be an opportunity at the Conference of comparing the various systems of military organisation and arriving at practical conclusions.

#### *Article 4.*

53. Article 4 contains the following definitions:

“By formations organised on a military basis shall be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, are, in time of peace, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament, equipment, capable of being employed for military purposes *without measures of mobilisation*, as well as any other organisation complying with the above condition.”

54. “By mobilisation, within the meaning of the present article, shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.”



55. The above text takes into account the different views expressed in the course of the discussion.

56. It is understood that the Conference itself will be called upon to decide the condition or conditions to be taken into account in determining whether a particular case comes under the category of "formations organised on a military basis".

57. The definition of *mobilisation* is so clear and precise that it gave rise to no discussion and requires no comment.

58. The Commission had adopted a text, provisionally designated as Article H, with all the necessary particulars for drawing up the *tables provided for in Article 2*. The Drafting Committee, while taking account of the rules laid down in Article H for the preparation of these tables, thought it simpler to omit Article H as such. This change of form in no way affects the Commission's previous decisions, and the table should be interpreted in the light of these decisions.

59. The Commission considered that, in order to prevent the number of officers exceeding the legitimate requirements of the several armies, it would be desirable to lay down a special limitation for this category of effectives. There were differences of opinion as to the form of such limitation, certain delegations proposing to lay down a fixed proportion between the number of officers and the total effectives, while others proposed to specify the absolute maximum figures of the average daily effectives for these categories. The Commission adopted the latter standpoint. It also decided, on the proposal of the Italian delegation, that it was desirable to limit the number of professional soldiers of other ranks.

60. When the question arose of practical measures for the application of these principles, certain difficulties became apparent, as a result partly of the differences between the system of voluntary armies and conscript armies, and partly of the differences between the periods of service in the conscript armies.

61. The compromise solution, which the Commission accepted, provides in the case of land forces for the *limitation (a)* of officers and *(b)* of other effectives whose effective service exceeds the longest legal period of service in force in the conscript army of any contracting Power at the time of the signature of the Convention. A system of tables of *publicity* has been drawn up in the case of conscript armies to show the number of men whose service exceeds the legal period fixed in their respective countries, while remaining lower than the maximum period specified under *(b)*.

62. The German delegation proposed that the standard of limitation should be the period of service fixed by the prevailing legislation in each country.

63. As regards naval armaments, *limitation* will apply to the aggregate figure of effectives (officers, petty officers and men), while the publicity tables will show separately the number of officers and men who have completed more than *y* months of effective active service.

64. As regards air forces, it was not thought possible or desirable to make a distinction between the officers and men, the functions of the two not being as clearly distinguished in air forces as in land and sea forces.

65. The French delegation stated that it could not accept specific limitation of professional soldiers in land or air forces unless provision was made for similar limitation in the case of sea forces.

\* \* \*

66. The Commission, after a discussion, in the course of which divergent views were expressed as to the necessity of limiting separately the forces stationed in the home country and the forces stationed overseas, adopted a compromise under which the contracting parties are to limit, in the case of their land forces, the maximum armed forces stationed in the home country and the maximum total of their armed forces. The table showing the maximum of armed forces stationed overseas is to be optional. Similarly, in the case of air armaments, the table showing the maximum of armed forces stationed in the home country is to be optional.

\* \* \*

67. In the light of the above explanations, the effect of the tables attached to Chapter A of Part I appears readily comprehensible.<sup>1</sup>

68. Table I is to fix the maximum total daily effectives in peace-time service in the land armed forces stationed in the home country in the case of each contracting party. This table will also show separately the officers and other effectives who have completed a number of months of service to be determined by the Conference, on the basis of the longest period of

---

<sup>1</sup> The question was considered whether it would not be well to add to the expression "service" some qualifying adjective such as "active", "actual" or "with the colours". But as the rules of limitation were based on the idea of average daily effectives, which in its turn was based on the idea of the number of actual "days' duty" on military service, it was finally decided that such a qualifying adjective was unnecessary.

service in force in the conscript army of any contracting party at the time of the signature of the Convention. Table II, which is "optional", gives the same particulars in the case of the maximum land armed forces stationed overseas. Table III, on the same lines as Tables I and II, will fix the total maximum land armed forces.

69. Tables IV and V are to give in the same way particulars of formations organised on a military basis stationed respectively in the home country and overseas.

70. In the case of sea forces, the Commission proposes two tables, numbered VI and VII, which are to fix in the case of each contracting party the figures of the total maximum effectives of the sea armed forces (Table VI) and the total effectives of the sea formations organised on a military basis (Table VII). These figures are to include officers, petty officers and men.

71. Tables VIII to XII inclusive are concerned with the limitation of the effectives of air forces. Tables VIII and IX are optional: they are to contain, Table VIII, the figures of the air armed forces stationed in the home country, and Table IX the air armed forces stationed overseas. Table X, which is obligatory, is to fix, like the two preceding tables, first the total effectives of the air forces of each contracting party, and, secondly, the effectives who have completed more than *z* months of service. Tables XI and XII are to fix similar figures for formations organised on a military basis. The arrangement of these tables is similar at all points to that of Tables VIII, IX and X.

\* \* \*

72. A number of reservations were made in regard to the tables attached to Part I, Chapter A.

73. In regard to Tables I, II and III, the German and Italian delegations made the following statement:

"In connection with the distinction between the effectives and armaments of the home country and those stationed overseas, the German and Italian delegations formulated a general reservation to the effect that, for the purposes of the reduction and limitation of armaments, the importance of the forces and materials which one contracting party assigns to its overseas territories may vary, in relation to another contracting party, by reason of the geographical situation of its territory in relation to the home territories of the two contracting parties. Consequently, one contracting party will have every reason to regard the overseas forces of another contracting party as forming part of the latter's home forces, if the proximity of the overseas territories in relation to the home territories of the two parties justifies such an assumption."

74. The German delegation again draws attention to this reservation in connection with Tables V, IX and XII.

75. As regards Tables I, II and III, the Italian delegation considers that there should be added to the three columns (*b*), the words "or officials assimilated to officers", and to the three columns (*c*), after the words "other soldiers" the words: "or officials, employees or agents assimilated to soldiers".

76. As regards Tables VIII, IX and X, the Italian delegation is of opinion that no distinction should be made between armed air forces stationed in the home country and armed air forces stationed overseas.

77. The Turkish delegation has made reservations regarding the tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I, both as regards the optional indication of land and air forces stationed overseas (Tables II and IX) and as regards the non-indication of the maximum forces stationed in each of the overseas territories (Tables II, V and IX).

78. As regards this last point, the majority of the Commission was of opinion that it was not possible in practice to prescribe a separate limitation of this kind in an international convention.

\* \* \*

79. The German delegation has made the following general reservation on the whole of Part I and the annexed table:

"The stipulations do not provide—either directly or by a reduction in the number of the annual contingent, or by a strict determination of the period of active service—for a reduction or limitation of trained reserves who, after having completed their service with the colours, continue to be registered and liable by law for military service, notwithstanding the fact that these reserves, though they do not exist in professional armies in the strict sense of the term, constitute the main body of the personnel in countries possessing conscript armies.

"Moreover, the stipulations do not provide for any method whereby the effectives of conscript armies serving with the colours and in reserve, and professional effectives, whose military value is naturally not capable of comparison, could be reduced to comparable units of calculation."



## CHAPTER B. — PERIOD OF SERVICE.<sup>1</sup>

80. Chapter B of Part I relates to the limitation of the period of service. Its provisions apply—as is specifically stated in Article 5—only to effectives recruited by conscription.<sup>2</sup>

81. Two different systems were proposed for this purpose: under one of them each contracting party would accept a special figure; under the other the Conference would fix a single maximum limit. The Commission was of opinion that the first system should be taken as a basis, whilst, at the same time, a general maximum should be prescribed. Several delegations pointed out that this general maximum would not be satisfactory unless it were fixed at a very moderate figure. It is understood that the contracting parties will have the option to accept, in respect of special limitations affecting them individually, different figures, not only for land, sea and air effectives, but also for the different services (infantry, artillery, etc.) of their armed forces. Since the contracting parties undertake not to exceed the figures accepted by each of them, they will always be at liberty to reduce this period, which must be regarded as a maximum.

82. These principles are set forth in Articles 6 and 7; but, on the proposal of the Belgian delegation, an important exception was provided for in Article 8. This exception is intended to obviate the disadvantage that would ensue, in the case of certain countries which have the conscript system, from a falling-off in the number of births as a consequence of the last war. This exception, which was unanimously agreed to, will allow the limits for the period of service under Article 6 to be exceeded “in so far as, owing to a falling-off in the number of births, such an increase may be necessary to enable the maximum total number of effectives fixed by the tables annexed to Chapter A of this Part” to be reached. Any contracting parties availing themselves of this option should immediately notify the measures they feel bound to take, together with reasons in support thereof, to the other contracting parties, and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, to be set up under Chapter VI of the Convention.

83. Article 9 provides that “in any case the total period of service shall not exceed . . . months”.<sup>3</sup> As regards this limitation, which is applicable to all contracting parties and represents a maximum that may not be exceeded, the Spanish delegation pointed out (and this view was accepted by the Commission) that the maximum fixed in accordance with this article cannot in any way affect, even indirectly, the figures given in the table provided for in Article 2, which are allowed to each contracting party without any restriction or reservation whatever.

\* \* \*

84. During the discussion of the period of service,<sup>4</sup> the German delegation submitted a proposal to the effect that the annual contingent should be limited, as well as the period of service. The Commission rejected this amendment by twelve votes to six with certain abstentions.

## PART II. — MATERIAL.

85. On this point, as already mentioned, the Commission encountered difficulties which it was unable to surmount either at its third session or even after the second reading of the preliminary draft Convention during the first part of the sixth and last session.

### CHAPTER A. — LAND ARMAMENTS.

#### *Article 10.*

86. As regards land armaments, the original position was as follows:

A proposal was made by the German delegation for the limitation of material in service and in reserve, in accordance with a table fixing under separate headings the maximum number of arms and the quantity of ammunition for the various arms. The French preliminary draft provided only for the limitation of the total expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material in the strict sense of the term, with the option of carrying forward sums not expended during one year.

<sup>1</sup> As regards this chapter, see the German delegation's general reservation concerning Part I.

<sup>2</sup> The Chinese delegation has, on many occasions, proposed the abolition of the conscription system. It has reserved the right to raise this question again at the Conference.

<sup>3</sup> In order to take into account the frequent cases in which “service” is performed in several separate periods, often of short duration, the word “months” was substituted for the word “years” of service.

<sup>4</sup> See reservation by the German delegation, paragraph 79.

87. The Japanese and Italian representatives formally opposed the first method, while the United States delegation made a general reservation on account of the omission of any provisions regarding the limitation of material of the land and air forces, whether in service or in reserve. Despite the fact that this reservation was withdrawn at the second reading, opinion was divided as to the method of limiting material for land forces.

88. The following methods were considered:

- (1) Application of the fullest possible publicity to expenditure on land material;
- (2) Limitation of expenditure on material;
- (3) Direct limitation of material by categories;
- (4) Simultaneous application of the two last-named limitations, either separately or in combination;
- (5) Application of any one of these methods at the choice of the contracting parties.

89. The Commission unanimously approved the principle that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments between the parties to the proposed Convention. It also recorded the unanimous desire of the members of the Commission to find some method which would provide for the limitation of war material in a more precise manner than can be achieved by publicity alone.

90. The result of the vote taken on the principle of direct limitation as proposed by the German delegation was as follows: nine votes for, nine votes against, and seven abstentions.

91. On a vote being taken on the principle of the simultaneous employment of the two methods proposed by the Italian delegation, nine members of the Commission declared themselves in favour of the system, eleven against, and five abstained from voting.

92. The principle of indirect limitation as set forth in Article 10 was adopted by sixteen votes to three, with six abstentions.

93. As regards the application of this principle the Commission passed the following resolution:

"I. With a view to limiting land material by limiting expenditure on its purchase, manufacture and upkeep, the Preparatory Commission requests its President to instruct the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions to enquire into the means by which such limitation could be carried out, paying special attention to:

"(a) The necessity of limiting all the expenditure in question;

"(b) The variety of ways in which budgets are presented and discussed in different countries;

"(c) The adjustment of the proposed method of limitation to possible fluctuations in the purchasing power of different currencies, especially with regard to the cost of war material.

"(d) The conditions in which credits for one financial year might be carried over to the following year or years.

"II. In order that the Governments may be able, before the Conference meets, to come to a decision on this point, the experts' report should be transmitted to them in good time by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations."

94. The American delegation stated that, whereas they were unable to accept budgetary limitation in any form as far as the United States was concerned (see American reservations, paragraphs Nos. 171 and 181), they did not wish their attitude to constitute an obstacle to agreement on the part of other Powers. They therefore stated that they were prepared to apply, as far as they were themselves concerned, direct limitation instead of indirect limitation, provided that some practical budgetary method were generally agreed upon, which would be sufficiently detailed and precise to constitute an effective means of limitation.

95. The Spanish delegation associated itself with this point of view, but observed that the direct limitation would have to be confined to material in service.

96. The Japanese delegation, while supporting the method of indirect limitation, nevertheless expressed the view that the adoption of this method did not necessarily exclude recourse to direct limitation in the case of a certain number of countries which cannot accept indirect limitation. But the number of such countries in this case should be strictly limited.

97. Several delegations stated that, in the application of the system of indirect limitation, account must be taken of the circumstances peculiar to each State. They urged that preferential treatment should be granted to non-industrial countries or countries whose budgets were below a figure to be fixed by the Conference.

98. The first of these arguments was put with particular clearness by the Greek delegate, who spoke as follows:

"It seems essential, in order to determine the budgetary limit for each country, to take into account the particular circumstances of each country, its economic circumstances, its standard of living, the cost of labour there, and, above all, its position as regards material at the time of signing the Convention. Obviously, if the material a country possessed at



that time were worn out or incomplete; if, consequently, it were in a clear position of inferiority as compared with the other signatory States, that would constitute a factor to be taken into account in fixing the budgetary limit binding upon that country."

99. Apart from the reservation in the footnote to the article, the Turkish delegation made its acceptance of any budgetary limitation of material and armaments expressly conditional upon account being taken—as also with any other method of limitation—of the special position of countries in which industry is not adequately developed.

100. The Norwegian delegation observed that the possibility of some combination of direct and indirect methods by budgetary means had not been precluded.

101. The British delegation were ready to admit that direct limitation may, in theory, be the most effective and the most obvious system, but feared that this method of limitation would, in practice, prove unsatisfactory. Even if adequate definitions and categories could be established, it would be impossible to impose on all countries such a system of verification and control as to give the assurance that the limitation would be properly observed. The British delegation had hoped that it might be possible to limit directly the larger weapons such as big guns and tanks, but here again similar difficulties would be encountered. They would be prepared to accept any practical scheme for direct limitation of the more important weapons that would offer any prospect of general acceptance and reasonable effectiveness. It may be that the Governments at the Disarmament Conference will be able to find such a scheme. In the circumstances, the British delegate advocated the adoption of the indirect method of budgetary limitation. The British delegation recognise that such a method is not so complete; but, so far as it goes, it is, they feel, more effective and more reliable. Budgetary expenditure, in all the more important countries, is subject to a number of checks and controls, and cannot to any serious extent be evaded. Moreover, it has the additional advantage that it may serve to arrest competition in the development and perfection of weapons.

\* \* \*

102. The German delegation has made a general reservation in regard to Article 10 since, notwithstanding its extraordinary importance, the material in service and in reserve of land armed forces and of land formations organised on a military basis is only covered—contrary to the method applied to air armaments and to naval floating material—by limitation of expenditure, and not by a reduction and limitation of specific articles and of numbers.

103. As regards the limitation of expenditure, the German delegation reserves the right to take a decision after considering the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

## CHAPTER B. — NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

104. At the third session of the Preparatory Commission, two opposite schemes for the limitation of naval armaments were submitted: the British draft provided for the limitation of the tonnage, and of the number of vessels to be allowed to each of the High Contracting Parties; in each of the categories to be specified; the Italian delegation could only agree to the limitation of total (global) tonnage which each High Contracting Party would undertake not to exceed and which it might allocate and arrange in the way best suited to its national interests, provided it communicated to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, at least six months before the laying down of the keel, the characteristics of each warship it intended to construct.

105. The French delegation, whose views were much nearer to those of the Italian delegation than to those of the British delegation after having first submitted a two-column table indicating in column I the tonnage required for the security and defence of its national interests, and in column II the tonnage which should be reached before the expiration of the Convention, later, in an attempt at conciliation, proposed a three-column table, the figures in the columns indicating for each High Contracting Party: (a) the total (global) tonnage it considered indispensable for its security and the defence of its national interests; (b) the total (global) tonnage it considered itself obliged to attain before the expiration of the Convention; (c) the manner in which it proposed to distribute, in total (global) tonnages for each category, the whole total (global) tonnage indicated by it in the previous column.

106. Four categories were provided: capital ships, aircraft-carriers, surface vessels of less than 10,000 tons, and submarines, with the power of transfer between categories when the High Contracting Party concerned considered this to be indispensable, provided that High Contracting Party informed the Secretariat of the League of Nations of the changes made in its allocation of its total (global) tonnage one year at least before laying down the keels of the tonnage to be transferred.



107. In spite of a reassuring statement made by the United States representative to the Preparatory Commission at the beginning of its sixth session in April 1929, the discussion of the naval problem was deferred. In view of the agreement reached at the London Naval Conference, the discussion was resumed in the second part of the same session, on the basis of a proposal submitted by the delegations of seven countries (United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, Irish Free State, Japan and Italy) which submitted a new text for almost all the articles in this section. By adopting this text in its main outline, the Commission was able to overcome the difficulties which had previously arisen, owing chiefly to the presence of two conflicting systems of limitation—*i.e.*, limitation of total (global) tonnage and limitation by categories.

108. The Italian delegation made a general reservation to the effect that the Italian Government could not finally agree to any specific method before all the Powers had agreed on the proportions and the levels of maximum tonnage.

109. The German delegation made a reservation in view of the great value of non-floating material, on the ground that the latter—unlike floating material—would not be subject to any direct limitation by specific articles and by numbers, and would only be affected indirectly by limitation by expenditure. With regard to the latter, the German delegation reserved its opinion until it had studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

110. In conformity with the general principles it has followed, the Commission has not proposed to the Conference any figures for tonnage, etc., in the articles and annexes of the draft Convention. The figures set out therein have been inserted merely as an illustration; they are similar to those given in the Washington and London Treaties. It should be observed here that, in several cases, delegations proposed other figures to the Commission or reserved the right to do so when the Conference meets.

#### *Articles 11, 12 and 13.*

111. These three articles must be regarded as a single whole, embodying the following system of limitation:

- (1) Limitation of the total (global) tonnage of each High Contracting Party (Article 11), with the exception of the tonnage of certain vessels referred to in Annexes I and II.
- (2) Distribution of total (global) tonnage (Article 12);
- (3) Power of transferring tonnage from one category to another (Article 13).

112. The Italian delegation proposed that Articles 11 and 12 should be replaced by a single article worded as follows:

“ The limitation of naval armaments, accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties, is indicated in the following table . . . ”

in the form of Table II of the text, Table I being omitted.

#### *Article 11.*

113. The Chinese, Spanish, Persian, Roumanian and Yugoslav delegations observed that it should be understood that the particulars of total (global) tonnage inserted by the High Contracting Parties in Table I would not be in any way binding on their countries even as a precedent after the expiration of the Convention.

114. The possibility was considered of providing two tables in the Convention, one to indicate the total (global) tonnage which each High Contracting Party regarded as indispensable for guaranteeing its safety and national interests, the other to show the figures of the total (global) tonnage to be completed before the expiration of the Convention. In order to give prominence to this idea, the Commission agreed, at the request of the Spanish delegate, to alter the wording of the first article proposed by the Powers signatory to the London Naval Treaty. This explains the meaning of the sentence: “ Throughout the duration of the present Convention . . . ”

115. Similarly, the Spanish delegation opposed a Soviet proposal to the effect that the limitation of naval forces should involve a reduction for all countries. The Commission finally adopted the principle of such a reduction, but with the addition of the words “ so far as possible ”. Since the same idea had been accepted in respect of the other armaments, it was thought preferable to embody it in a single clause which should govern the whole Convention. This—as has been pointed out—is the object of the first article of the present draft Convention.

116. The Yugoslav delegate emphasised the difference between recently created countries at present engaged in preparing a minimum naval programme compatible with their national security and countries having a maritime history and tradition and possessing a complete fleet. The figure of the total (global) tonnage to be inserted in Table I would, for the former countries, represent only the first stage in the execution of their minimum programme, whereas, for the latter, the figure will really indicate their maximum naval forces in the present state of international relations. In view of this essential difference, the Yugoslav delegation reserved the right to request at the Conference that recently created countries, which are obliged to distribute their expenditure for the construction of a minimum tonnage compatible with their



national security over a number of years exceeding the duration of the Convention, should be accorded the right to mention separately, within the limits of the agreed total (global) tonnage, what portion of their programme they intended to carry out during the period of the Convention. Similarly, if, under Article 57 of the draft Convention, the Convention remained in force for a further period, such prolongation should not debar the above-mentioned countries from continuing the execution of their naval programme within the limits of the agreed tonnage.

The Finnish delegate associated himself with this reservation.

*Articles 12 and 13.*

117. The Preparatory Commission's discussions on these articles were directed mainly towards rendering the proposed system of limitation applicable to navies of a small tonnage. With this object the Commission unanimously adopted the rules below, which appear as the introduction to Table III:

(1) Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power, and of the classes of ships involved in the transfer.

(2) Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons<sup>1</sup> will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships.

(3) As regards the other Powers, the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total (global) tonnage of each of them.

This table will be prepared or filled in at the Conference; but the Commission desires to state that it regards the application of the rules proposed as an integral part of the system on which Articles 11-13 are based.

On this subject the following statements should be noted:

118. The representative of the British Empire stated:

"I am glad to be able to inform the Commission that I am now authorised to accept the three proposed rules in Table III of the Naval Clauses. In doing so, I should like to make it clear that I regard the first rule as governing the other two—I understand that was why it was put first—that is to say, that though rules 2 and 3 establish certain important principles, yet their application must in the last resort depend to some extent upon the considerations set out in Rule 1. It is, of course, understood that in saying this I am dealing solely with the question of transfer and not suggesting that any limit can be put on the right of any Power to ask the Disarmament Conference for any class of ship as part of its navy."

119. The Swedish delegate spoke in the following terms:

"The Swedish delegation is glad to learn from Viscount Cecil's statement that the British Government approves the text of Table III.

"I wish to take this opportunity of saying that the Swedish delegation cannot accept any interpretation which might weaken the guarantees obtained by the Powers possessing fleets of small tonnage through the inclusion of the three principles in Table III as compensation for their acceptance of a large number of rules derived from the Treaties of Washington and London."

120. The representatives of Yugoslavia, Greece, Roumania, Turkey and Poland gave this statement their unqualified approval.

121. The Norwegian representative spoke to the same effect, adding that his country would certainly claim the utmost freedom of transfer at the Conference. The Chinese representative agreed with this view.

122. The Finnish delegate stated that he would like the three rules to be interpreted on a footing of equality; none of them should be regarded as taking precedence over the others.

123. The United States representative explained that, in accepting the three rules, which were drawn up as a compromise text, his delegation assumed that the application of Rule 3, Table III, was not intended to apply to Powers which are signatories of the Washington and London Treaties.

124. The Italian delegate spoke as follows:

"Like the British delegation, we consider that the basic criterion for the application of transfers should be that which was enunciated in principle No. 1. When this principle has to be applied in practice, we should make no difficulty in according complete liberty of transfer from the class of submarines to that of light surface vessels—*e.g.*, destroyers and small cruisers.

"On the other hand, I desire to state now that we should oppose transfers in the opposite direction—that is to say, from the class of light surface vessels to that of submarines."

125. This statement was formally opposed by the Spanish delegate, who pointed out that the text in question represented a compromise and had been adopted without any reservation other than that of the British delegation.

126. The Netherlands delegate also pointed out that, if they made the second rule adopted subordinate to the first, they would modify the scope of the system and in that connection he made a formal reservation.

<sup>1</sup> This figure is given as an illustration.

*Article 14.*

127. The Soviet delegation proposed that the tonnage limit for capital ships should be fixed at 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and the limit for gun calibres at 12 inches (304.8 mm.).

128. Several delegations recommended that the Conference should either abolish capital ships altogether or should reduce the maximum tonnage of their standard displacement.

129. The Commission confined itself, however, to inserting—but by way of illustration only—the figures given in the text proposed by the signatory Powers of the Washington Treaty, fixing the tonnage limit for capital ships at 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) and the limit for the calibre of their guns at 16 inches (406 mm.).

130. The other articles of the draft submitted by the Powers which took part in the London Naval Conference practically were adopted by the Preparatory Commission without discussion, it being understood that the figures contained in these articles were only given by way of illustration, and that the adoption of these articles in no way involved the adoption of the numerical data, which might be replaced by other figures.

*Article 15.*

131. The Spanish delegation, however, made a reservation regarding the second paragraph of Article 15, which provides for the limitation of the calibre of guns carried by aircraft-carriers whose tonnage does not exceed 10,000 tons. The Spanish delegation considered that certain navies which, for reasons of economy, were compelled to build ships not corresponding exactly to any of the classes specified in Annex III, Definitions to Chapter B, Part II, could hardly be expected not to arm aircraft-carriers of a lower tonnage with guns of the calibre authorised for aircraft-carriers of the heavier tonnage mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 15.

*Articles 16 and 17.*

132. Articles 16 and 17 lay down that the standard displacement and the guns of submarines shall be limited and that no vessel of war exceeding the limits as to displacement or armament prescribed by the Convention shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

*Article 18.*

133. Article 18 contains a reference to Annex IV of Chapter B, Part II, regarding the rules with which the High Contracting Parties must comply in the matter of the replacement of vessels of war. Annexes IV (Rules for Replacement) and V (Rules for Disposal), mentioned in Article 22, reproduce the corresponding provisions of the London Naval Treaty.

*Article 19.*

134. Article 19 gave rise to a short discussion. This article, which provides that no preparation shall be made in merchant ships for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, nevertheless authorises the stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches (155 millimetres) in calibre. This exception to the rule as stated was finally adopted. The Japanese delegation, however, reserved the right to raise the question of the limitation of aircraft equipment on merchant vessels, possibly at the Conference itself. The Soviet delegation emphasised the importance of laying down that no preparations shall be made in merchant ships with a view to converting such ships in wartime into fighting units.

135. The following articles of the draft were adopted without discussion:

(1) *Article 20*, prohibiting any High Contracting Party engaged in war from using as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

(2) *Article 21*, prohibiting any High Contracting Party from disposing of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign Power.

(3) *Article 22*, disposal of vessels of war surplus to the tonnage figures allowed by the present Convention.

(4) *Article 23*, authorising the retention of existing ships used as stationary training establishments or hulks.

*Article 24.*

136. On the proposal of the British delegation, the Commission adopted Article 24 providing for the limitation of the annual expenditure on the war material of naval armaments on lines similar to the limitation of material for land armaments prescribed in Article 10. The forms of this limitation are to be studied by the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

137. Certain delegations objected to the introduction of indirect limitation of naval material in addition to its direct limitation as provided for in the other articles of this Chapter.

138. The American delegation repeated its general reservation on the subject of budgetary limitation.



139. The French delegation does not see its way to accept the special limitation of expenditure on upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for naval armaments. Apart from the technical difficulties, it observes that the limitation of naval material under satisfactory conditions is assured by the direct limitation of floating material, as well as indirectly by the limitation of the aggregate expenditure on armaments.

140. The Japanese delegation also made a reservation in the same sense.

141. The German delegation reserves its opinion until it has studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

142. The British and Italian delegations explained that their acceptance of this article depended on the attitude finally adopted by other maritime Powers.

143. A note inserted in the draft Convention (after Article 24) quotes two articles of the London Naval Treaty as examples of supplementary restrictions which certain High Contracting Parties might be prepared to accept. It is understood that these articles, which are binding solely upon the signatories of Part III of the London Treaty, are only quoted by way of example, the Commission not having expressed any view in regard to them. The representatives of Greece and Spain, however, have made a formal reservation in regard to the possibility of these supplementary restrictions being applied.

144. The Commission attached several tables to Chapter B. Table I will have the figures of global tonnage allocated to each High Contracting Party. Table II will serve to show the distribution of such tonnage between the categories defined in Annex III in accordance with the scheme fixed in London. A special subdivision has, however, been admitted in the class of capital ships for those High Contracting Parties which have no capital ship of a standard displacement exceeding 8,000 tons.<sup>1</sup> Table III, regarding transfers, is also to be filled up by the Conference, account being taken of the three principles therein specified.

#### CHAPTER C. — AIR ARMAMENTS.

145. The text adopted in the first part of the sixth session provided in a single article for the limitation of air material in service by means of two tables, one for armed forces and the other for formations organised on a military basis, the limitation being applicable to aeroplanes and dirigibles capable of use in war employed in commission in the land, sea and air forces, or in the formations organised on a military basis. All these provisions have been re-grouped by the Drafting Committee. They are the subject of Articles 25 and 26, which the Commission has adopted.

##### *Articles 25 and 26.*

146. The method of limitation fixed in these articles represents a compromise formula taking account of the principal standards of limitation proposed to the Commission. The standard of limitation in the case of aeroplanes is first the number, and secondly the total horse-power. In the case of dirigibles it is the number, total horse-power and total volume.

147. The Commission accepted at the second reading, by 9 votes to 8 with some abstentions, a British proposal to limit, not only machines in service, but also complete machines in immediate reserve belonging to the State.

148. The German delegation made a reservation in regard to these articles, on the ground that reduction and limitation do not apply to the aggregate of war material, including material in reserve, and that in its view the countries are left free to increase their stocks of aircraft not yet put together, and to arrange their air armaments as they please, without exceeding the limits fixed by the Convention.

149. The Turkish delegation reserved its opinion on the extension of the direct limitation provided for in Articles 25 and 26 to armaments in reserve.

150. The tables referred to in these two articles will contain the figures allocated to each contracting party. As regards the aeroplanes of the armed forces (Table I) and those of the formations organised on a military basis (Table II) and dirigibles (Table III—Dirigibles of the armed forces, and Table IV—Dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis), there are certain differences in the make-up of the tables. The two tables relating to the armed forces (Tables I and III) contain an obligatory column for the total of the aeroplanes and dirigibles respectively, and three optional columns for the aeroplanes or dirigibles stationed in the home country, overseas or in aircraft-carriers. In the case of aeroplanes, the figures will show first the number and secondly the total horse-power.

<sup>1</sup> As regards Table II, it should be noted that the High Contracting Parties non-signatories of Part III of the Treaty of London have the option of including cruisers of subdivision (ii) and destroyers in a single category.

In the case of dirigibles, there will be additional figures showing the total volume. The tables with regard to the formations organised on a military basis (Table II—Aeroplanes, and Table IV—Dirigibles) have the same columns and the same particulars as the others, without column (d) (Tables I and III), which is irrelevant in the case of formations organised on a military basis.

*Article 27.*

**151.** It should be noted in the case of this article that the British and Canadian delegations consider that it is impracticable to find any standard of horse-power measurement that would afford a satisfactory basis of limitation.

**152.** The French delegation had proposed at the first reading to measure horse-power according to the rules laid down by the International Air Navigation Commission. These rules are as follows :

“ The power of an engine is the average power that the engine generates during two trials of one hour each during which it runs without stopping at a pressure of 760 millimetres of mercury in dry air and at a temperature of 15°C. The engine power will be measured in horse-power of 75 kilogramme-metres a second and will be expressed to the nearest lower horse-power for engines not exceeding 50 horse-power within 5 horse-power for engines between 50 and 200 horse-power and within 10 horse-power for engines exceeding 200 horse-power.”

**153.** The delegation of the United States expressed the view that, in the case of a subject on which technical methods change with great rapidity, it was not desirable to adopt a method at the present time which might not be acceptable by the time the Conference meets.

**154.** The Commission accepted this standpoint, and decided not to propose particular rules. The Commission is, however, of opinion that it is desirable for the Council to entrust to experts the preparatory studies required for the laying down of such rules, and that such rules should be communicated to the Governments, which might be invited to accept them as a preliminary basis for calculating the figures to be inserted in the table.

**155.** The German delegation makes a reservation of a general character in regard to columns c of Tables I, II, III, IV, attached to Chapter C of Part II. This reservation is to the following effect : for the purposes of reduction of armaments, the material which a contracting party may assign to its oversea territories may be of varying importance in relation to another contracting party by reason of the geographical situation of its territories in relation to the home country territories of the two contracting parties. One contracting party will therefore have every reason to regard the oversea material of another contracting party as forming part of the home country material of the latter, when such an assumption is justified by the proximity of the oversea territories in relation to the home territories of the two parties.<sup>1</sup>

**156.** The Turkish delegation repeated in regard to the tables attached to Chapter C the reservation it had made before (see paragraph 77 above) in regard to the tables in Part I (Chapter A).

*Article 28.*

**157.** Article 28 deals with the interesting problem of the relation between civil and military aviation.<sup>2</sup> It makes provision for prohibitions and obligations to be imposed on the contracting parties, with a view to avoiding the danger involved in prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aeroplanes, and with a view to encouraging the independent development of purely civil aviation. It is not superfluous to reproduce the somewhat complicated text of Article 28 :

“ 1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aviation material, so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure of security and the most economic return. No preparations shall be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.

“ 2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require civil aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for military purposes. They undertake to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to, and the employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Any such

<sup>1</sup> The Italian delegation called attention to the reservation presented by it with reference to the tables annexed to Part I, Chapter A (see paragraph 73 above).

<sup>2</sup> The Commission, in the course of its proceedings, examined on several occasions the problem of the relations between civil and military aviation.

The draft Convention submitted on first reading contained the following article :

“ The limitations laid down are accepted by each High Contracting Party in the light of the present development of civil aviation in other countries.”

On the second reading, the Commission was of opinion that as this article simply noted a *de facto* situation it was not necessary to retain it in the draft Convention, and decided that it would be sufficient to mention in the report that various delegations reserved the right to bring the whole question of civil aviation before the Conference.



personnel or military material which may thus be employed in civil aviation of whatever nature shall be included in the limitation applicable to the High Contracting Party concerned in virtue of Part I, or Articles 25 and 26 of the present Convention, as the case may be.

" 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for military purposes instead of being established for economic, administrative or social purposes.

" 4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different countries and to confer together to this end."

**158.** This article was drafted after the work of the Special Committee of Experts on Civil Aviation. The Preparatory Commission agreed with the Committee of Experts that the Convention should avoid any provision capable of obstructing the development of civil aviation; but it was of opinion that all efforts should be directed towards differentiating more and more definitely between civil and military aviation, and that Governments should be prevented from interfering in civil aviation undertakings in order to divert them from purely civil objects.

**159.** The Soviet delegation submitted the following amendment in the course of the discussion :

" Any adaptation of civil aviation material to the establishment of armaments or to military uses is prohibited."

Under the terms of this amendment, the Governments would be bound to take steps to prevent the construction for military purposes, or the adaptation to military purposes, of aircraft, whether constructed by, or belonging to, private companies or private persons.

**160.** It should be noted that the text of the article approved by the Commission does not bind the Governments to impose restrictions on the private manufacture or adaptation of civil aircraft to purposes of war, but only prohibits them from encouraging such adaptation.

**161.** An amendment was submitted to the Commission by the Canadian delegation to delete paragraph 2 of Article 28 and to substitute the following :

" Personnel seconded to, and military material employed in, civil aviation, whether Government or commercial, shall be counted in the agreed quota."

The effects of this amendment would have been to set out clearly that all seconded personnel and machines would be counted in the quota allotted to each State, and also to eliminate the temporary and provisional character of seconding.

**162.** The Commission, while appreciating the special circumstances of Canada, was not prepared to recede from the general rule to which it had given its approval—namely, that seconding should be only of a provisional and temporary character. It was thought that a solution of the difficulty might be found in the establishment of an exceptional arrangement, the form of which would have to be settled by the Conference. The Commission, while disallowing the deletion of the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 28, accepted unanimously the insertion of the Canadian amendment by which all seconded personnel and material should be included in the quota allotted to each State.

**163.** The Canadian delegation subsequently submitted a reservation in regard to the " temporary and provisional " character of the seconding of personnel to, and the employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Canada, because of its special needs and problems, requires, for the reasons given in the Minutes of December 2nd 1930, the unrestricted right of seconding, in order to develop its country of vast distances and to protect its citizens and natural resources.

**164.** In the course of the discussion on paragraph 3 the British delegation stated that it must be clearly understood that the proposal did not imply that the Governments committed themselves to complete internationalisation of aviation, and that on this point the British Government reserved its entire freedom of action.

\* \* \*

**165.** The British delegation proposed the insertion of a new article worded as follows :

" Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit its annual expenditure on the maintenance, purchase and manufacture of war material, for air armaments, to the figures and under the conditions defined in the Annex to the present Convention."

The voting on this article was as follows :

5 for ; 6 against ; 13 abstentions.

**166.** The British delegation expressed particular regret at the failure of the Commission to adopt a system of budgetary limitation of air material. They felt that the science of aeronautics is still in so early a stage that very great developments in size, cost and destructiveness of military machines are to be apprehended. These developments will in no

way be affected by the limitation of the total number of machines, and they fear it is impossible to rely on the limitation of horse-power as a practically effective check. Without budgetary limitation, therefore, they believe that the air arm, potentially the most destructive to civilisation, will be the most free for competitive international development.

\* \* \*

**167.** During the first part of the sixth session the German delegation submitted a proposal to prohibit the launching of weapons of offence of any kind from the air, as also the employment of unpiloted aircraft controlled by wireless or otherwise, carrying explosive or incendiary gaseous substances.

**168.** After a very interesting discussion,<sup>1</sup> this proposal was rejected, five delegations voting in its favour. In the discussion, the German delegate explained that he regarded these methods as essentially offensive, their destructive effects threatening the civilian population. The delegations which did not accept the German proposal stated that they did not thereby imply the authorisation of bombardment from the air of civil populations.

### **PART. III. — BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE.**

#### *Article 29.*

**169.** Upon the proposal of the French delegation the Commission considered at its third session the limitation of the total annual expenditure by budgetary years for the forces stationed in the home country, and the formations organised on a military basis in the home country, as well as the overseas forces, their reinforcements and overseas formations organised on a military basis.

**170.** On this occasion the delegations of the British Empire, Italy and Japan stated that in their opinion budgetary limitation should be effected solely by means of publicity.

**171.** The delegations of the United States and Germany made a general reservation regarding the inclusion in the draft Convention of stipulations concerning the limitation of budgetary expenditure.

**172.** At the sixth session the Commission accepted the principle of the limitation of the total expenditure on land, sea and air forces. In adopting this principle the Commission desired to emphasise that such limitation should be used for checking the growth of the armaments of each country, and not as a method of comparison between one country and another, since the cost and conditions of manufacture vary very much in different countries.

The Preparatory Commission, however, is not submitting any final proposal to the Conference regarding the method of such limitation.

**173.** Valuable studies have already been made in this field, in particular by the Committee of Budgetary Experts set up by the Preparatory Commission; this Committee held several meetings in 1927. The results of its work—to the value of which the Preparatory Commission desires to pay tribute—are embodied in documents C.P.D. 40 (Provisional Report) and C.P.D. 90. Some delegations thought that it would be desirable to convene this Committee once more so as to enable it to complete its report in the light of the experience acquired during recent years, and taking into account, in particular, the observations made on this subject during the second part of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission.

**174.** For this purpose the Commission requested its President to reconstitute the Committee of Budgetary Experts, and to convene it in good time to ensure that its report should reach the Governments as soon as possible so as to enable the latter to take it into consideration when preparing for the Conference. The next session of the Committee of Experts will open on December 11th, 1930.

**175.** The Commission requested the Committee to study, in particular, the following points :

- (a) The necessity of limiting the total expenditure in question ;
- (b) To take into account the diversity of methods of presentation and discussion of the budgets customary in the various countries ;
- (c) To adapt the method of limitation contemplated to the possible differences in the purchasing power of the various currencies, with particular reference to the cost of war material ;
- (d) To determine the conditions under which the carrying forward of credits from one budgetary year to the next year or following years might be effected.

**176.** The Committee of Experts will have to bear these points in mind when it studies the methods of special limitation of land and naval material (Articles 10 and 24).

<sup>1</sup> See Minutes of the Sixth Session (First Part), pages 85-93.



177. They will also, in accordance with the resolution adopted on December 6th, have to examine the possibility of a separate limitation of expenditure on land, naval and air forces.

178. The Soviet delegation proposed the insertion of a new article worded as follows :

“ Secret funds intended in a disguised form for extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war or an increase in armaments shall be excluded from the national budgets.

“ In conformity with the above provision, all expenditure for the upkeep of the armed forces of each State shall be shown in a single chapter of the national budget ; their full publicity shall be ensured.”

179. Since the Commission agreed as to the desirability of asking the Budgetary Experts to examine the whole problem of the methods of limitation, including that raised by the Soviet delegation, the latter did not press its proposal.

180. While agreeing to the limitation of budgetary expenditure, several delegations, including the Roumanian delegation, declared that it was essential in this connection to take into account the conditions peculiar to each country—that is to say, economic conditions, the purchasing power of each currency, the industrial development of each country, and in particular its position with regard to war material at the time of the signature of the future Convention. If at that date a country had not yet been able to carry out its minimum defensive programme in regard to certain categories of armaments, and if it possessed only obsolete, worn or incomplete war material, obviously such a State would be in an inferior position in relation to other signatory States more fortunately situated in this respect. These are the factors which will have to be taken into account when the budgetary limit imposed upon the contracting States comes to be laid down.

181. The American delegation made a general reservation on the subject of budgetary limitation and drew attention to its declaration of November 11th, 1930.<sup>1</sup>

182. The German delegation made a general reservation regarding this part pending the Committee of Budgetary Experts' report.

#### PART IV. — EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

183. Part IV of the draft Convention contains nine articles, providing for the drawing up of sixteen tables with a number of columns.

##### *Article 30.*

184. Article 30 provides for the exchange of information each year in regard to the average daily number of effectives reached during the preceding year in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the contracting parties. It also specifies the conditions under which the information, details of which appear in the tables, is to be supplied. The tables are largely similar to those of Chapter I (limitation of effectives), but are more detailed.

185. It is to be noted that the Commission, which did not see its way to propose limitation by *territories* of the armed forces and formations organised on a military basis stationed in the various overseas territories, nevertheless accepted the principle of publicity with regard to their distribution (by 5 votes to 4 with a certain number of abstentions). As Tables II and V show, this publicity is limited to land forces.

186. The Commission recognised that the method of calculating on the basis of the average daily effectives does not give adequate information in all cases. In the case of certain forms of military organisations the real effectives may be considerably higher than the average effectives. The explanatory note, for which provision is made in the second sentence of the second paragraph, is intended to give publicity to this special feature of certain military systems. It is understood that the words in brackets “ recruits, militiamen, reservists, territorials, etc.,” are only given by way of example. Each State will have to arrange the enumeration of the categories of effectives to which Article 30 relates, having regard to its special methods of organisation.

187. The following reservations were made in connection with Article 30 :

(a) The German delegation made a reservation to the article on the ground that the tables mentioned therein do not provide for publicity regarding trained reserves and the figure of the annual contingent.

The general reservation of the German delegation in regard to Chapter A, Part I (Table I)<sup>2</sup>, applies to the following Tables of Part IV—Table II, Table V and the Annex to Tables II and V, Table IX and Table XII.

(b) The German delegation also made a reservation in regard to the option allowed to States to show, if they desire, for purposes of information, in a special column of the Tables

<sup>1</sup> Minutes of the Sixth Session, Second Part (Fifth Meeting).

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 73 above.

annexed to Part IV (Table Ve) the number of recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation.

The German delegation considers that this option should not be allowed, unless the Contracting Parties are under obligation to publish at the same time and in the same tables similar information with regard to the number of their trained reserves. Failing such publicity, the German delegation considers it impossible to judge of the real military situation of the States.

**188.** (c) The Turkish delegation repeated in regard to the Tables annexed to Article 29 the reservations made by it in regard to the Tables in Chapter A. Part I.<sup>1</sup>

**189.** (d) The French delegation does not accept publicity for the effectives stationed in each overseas territory, as not being called for to any greater extent in the case of overseas territories than in the case of the various districts of the home country. The French delegation also desires to point out that detailed publicity in the case of each overseas territory, with a multitude of distinctions between the different categories of soldiers according to their rank and length of service, is even less acceptable, being materially impossible owing to the constant transfers from one territory to the other and the special conditions of the territories in question. An army of accountants would be required for the purpose. The inclusion in the Convention of such minute rules is calculated to multiply involuntary errors in the information supplied by the Contracting Parties, and further threatens to lead to unnecessary and provocative discussion, which no one can desire, and which cannot be the object the Commission has in view.

**190.** The British delegation concurred in the substance of this reservation.

**191.** (e) The Japanese delegation also made a reservation as to the desirability of separate publication of the average daily effectives in each oversea territory.

#### *Article 31.*

**192.** In adopting Article 31 the Commission considered it important to know the number of youths compulsorily receiving preparatory military training. No provision is made for information on this point in Article 30, since Article 30 does not cover training which precedes active service.

**193.** On these grounds the Commission considered it desirable that the Contracting Parties, who have systems of compulsory pre-regimental military training, should state the number of youths who have received such training. The Commission held that the Governments were not in a position to supply statistical information in regard to voluntary pre-regimental military training.

**194.** The German and Italian delegations consider that particulars should be given, not only of the youths who have been subjected to compulsory preparatory military training, but of all who have received preparatory military training, whether voluntary or otherwise.

#### *Article 32.*

**195.** Article 32 imposes on the Contracting Parties the obligation to inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations each year of the total number of days comprised in the first period of service, and the total duration in days of the ensuing periods: this provision applies only to the effectives recruited by conscription.

**196.** The limitation of the period of service laid down in Articles 6 to 9 (former Articles I and XB) did not provide for a separate limitation of the total number of days of the first period of service on the one hand, and the total duration of the periods of training not included in the first period of service, on the other.

**197.** The Commission considered, however, that, in order to give a clearer idea of the military organisation of the various countries, tables should be drawn up for purposes of publicity, giving these figures separately.

#### *Article 33.*

**198.** The Commission accepted (by 9 votes to 7) the principle of publicity in respect of land material by means of the budget. The Contracting Parties will state the amount actually expended for the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of land and naval war material. The methods of application of this principle will be determined on the basis of the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

**199.** The Netherlands delegation, supported by several other delegations, had proposed that each of the Contracting Parties should, each year, prepare a statement giving the numbers (and for certain categories and for ammunition also the weight) of material in service and reserve of the land, sea and air forces under twelve specific headings.

<sup>1</sup> See paragraph 77 above.



**200.** A Committee of Military Experts, which the Preparatory Commission had requested to study the method of application of this principle, if agreed to, adopted by a majority vote a simplified table applicable to land armaments. But the Commission, without discussing the principle involved and the table in question, adopted the French proposal and as a consequence the text of the article. Some delegations which were ready to accept publicity on the basis of this table in respect of material in service, did not see their way to accepting it in respect of material in reserve.

**201.** The German delegation made a general reservation in regard to Article 33. It considered that, in order to be effective, publicity should be given to the total of the land and air material and of non-floating material of the navies, and that this information should be published by categories and numbers.

As regards publicity in respect of expenditure, it reserved its opinion until it had had an opportunity to study the Committee of Budgetary Experts' report.

*Article 34.*

**202.** Article 34 specifies the information to be furnished by each Contracting Party regarding every vessel of war laid down or completed by or for such Party, or within its jurisdiction, after the coming into force of the Convention, except such vessels as are exempt from limitation under the terms of Annex I to Chapter B of Part II.

*Article 35.*

**203.** Article 35 lays down that the name and tonnage of any vessel whose decks have been stiffened as authorised in Article 19 shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

**204.** The Delegation of the United States pointed out that the obligation of this Article might be difficult to carry out in practice, and suggested that the Governments study the question between now and the General Conference in order to be in a position to devise a workable text.

*Article 36.*

**205.** Article 36 provides for publicity corresponding to the limitation of air material in service stipulated in Articles 25 and 26.

\* \* \*

**206.** The German delegation made a reservation concerning this article. It considers that publicity should apply to the total Air material, including material in reserve.<sup>1</sup>

**207.** The Turkish delegation repeated, in regard to the tables annexed to Article 36, the reservations it had made concerning the tables in Chapter A, Part I.<sup>2</sup>

*Article 37.*

**208.** Certain members of the Preparatory Commission urged the importance, from the point of view of armaments, which the development of the civil aviation of a country might assume. The Commission considered that the regular and official publication of information regarding civil aviation in the various countries would be extremely useful.

**209.** While accepting this principle, and approving the text of Article 5 as it stands at present, certain delegations were doubtful whether the provision contained in this Article would not be more suitably included in an international convention other than the Disarmament Convention.

A desire was expressed during the discussion that attention should be drawn to this point.

**210.** Upon the British delegation's proposal, the Commission adopted at second reading an addition to Part IV providing that the Contracting Parties shall be bound to furnish

<sup>1</sup> See also, in regard to Tables Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc, the German delegation's general reservation concerning the tables annexed to Chapter C of Part II (Paragraph 155 above).

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 77 above.

information regarding expenditure incurred on civil aviation by the Governments and local authorities. The delegation of the United States points out that it was doubtful whether its Government would be in a position to furnish data on the expenditure incurred for this purpose by local authorities.

**211.** On the proposal of the Polish delegation the Commission adopted an amendment providing that the returns furnished by the Governments should show not only the number but also the total horse-power of registered aircraft and dirigibles. The American delegation stated that its Government would probably not be in a position to furnish information of this kind.

**212.** The German delegation made a reservation in regard to Article 37. It considered that rules concerning publicity in regard to peace-time means of communication could not properly be included in a purely military convention, and that for this reason they should be dealt with in a special convention.

#### *Article 38.*

**213.** In adopting Article 38, the Commission approved the principles of publicity in regard to the total expenditure on the land, sea and air forces. Each of the Contracting Parties will undertake to furnish annually a statement of its expenditure in accordance with a standard model.

**214.** The standard model in question will be drawn up by the Conference on the basis of the studies made or to be made of this subject by the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

**215.** The German delegation reserved its opinion on the publication of expenditure until it had studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts; it considered, however, that the standard model should not be used for purposes of comparison and limitation.

### **PART V. — CHEMICAL ARMS.**

#### *Article 39.*

**216.** This part consists of only one article—Article 39—by which the contracting parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes and undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.

**217.** The insertion in the draft Convention of provisions concerning chemical warfare was proposed by the delegates of Belgium, Poland, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia.

**218.** There was a certain amount of discussion as to whether provisions of this nature were in their right place in a Disarmament Convention which aimed, not at codifying the rules applicable in wartime or at prohibiting the use of certain arms, but rather at regulating armaments in peace time, and whether it would not be preferable to insert these provisions in some other document.

**219.** The Commission's attention was also drawn to the existence of other international undertakings on the same question—in particular, the Protocol prepared by the 1925 Conference on the Trade in Arms. As was pointed out, however, the Governments which had acceded to the Protocol and those which would accede to the Convention might not in every case be the same, and thus the Convention would not produce its full effect.

**220.** Finally, the Commission adopted this article in the above-mentioned form, by a majority vote. Nevertheless, several delegations expressed the desire to reserve their right to submit to the Conference proposals concerning the chemical and bacteriological weapons, with a view to supplementing the provisions of the 1925 Protocol and amplifying their scope.

**221.** The Commission noted that certain Governments had signed and ratified the 1925 Protocol with reservations concerning, in particular, *reciprocity*. Though recognising that the undertaking to abstain from the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases (paragraph 1 of the draft article) could normally be observed only subject to reciprocity, the Commission thought that the undertaking to abstain from the use of bacteriological methods should be absolute. The use of such methods would, in any case, constitute a crime against international law, in that this arm necessarily strikes the whole population, and no civilised Government could possibly wish to be guilty of such a crime even against the armies of a criminal Government which had itself resorted to such methods.

**222.** The Soviet delegation drew the attention of the Commission to the following article of the draft Convention submitted by it:

“ All methods of and appliances for chemical aggression (all asphyxiating gases used for warlike purposes, as well as all appliances for their discharge, such as gas-projectors,



pulverisers, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices) and bacteriological warfare, either available for the use of troops or in reserve or in process of manufacture, shall be destroyed within three months of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention."

223. The Polish delegation, though in no way opposed to this proposal, expressed the opinion that the limitation or even destruction of any given appliance used for chemical aggression would merely create an illusion of action without in fact solving the problem of chemical warfare.

224. In the second part of the sixth session, the British delegation submitted a memorandum<sup>1</sup> concerning the interpretation of certain terms used in the chapter, particularly whether the use of tear-gas was to be regarded as contrary to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the provisions of Part V of the draft Convention or not.

225. The French delegation submitted certain observations on this memorandum.<sup>1</sup> The Commission felt itself unable to express a definite opinion on this question of interpretation. Very many delegations, however, stated that they were prepared to approve the interpretation suggested in the British Government's memorandum.

226. The Preparatory Commission thinks that it would be very useful if all the Governments which intend to send representatives to the Disarmament Conference were to devote very careful study to this question—the extreme importance of which the Commission recognises—so that the problem may be settled in all its aspects by the Conference.

227. The Polish delegation made the following declaration:

"Though recognising the moral value of international instruments forbidding the use of chemical and bacteriological methods in war, we nevertheless feel that it is necessary to make provision, in addition to these instruments, for practical preventive and executory measures. These measures should be such as to render chemical or bacteriological attack, if not impossible, at any rate difficult, and should limit the chances of success and efficacy of such attack. They should also constitute a fresh guarantee that no violation of the undertakings solemnly signed could be committed without involving very unpleasant consequences for the guilty State.

"In this connection, therefore, it would be desirable to consider the possibility of concluding a Convention for affording international aid on as liberal a scale as possible to any country chemically or bacteriologically attacked. As such aid would be essentially of a humanitarian nature (sanitary, scientific, etc.), it should meet with general approval.

"This problem might be studied in due course by the League of Nations."

228. The delegations of Finland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, associated themselves with this statement.

229. With regard to Article 39, the German delegation is of opinion that the effect of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons would be incomplete unless it referred also to preparations for the use of those weapons (instruction of troops, etc.).

230. The same delegation stated that a scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments should, in the first place, prohibit weapons of an essentially offensive character, the destructive efforts of which menaced not only armies but also the civilian population—*i.e.*, bombs from the air, large calibre guns and tanks of every kind.

231. The German delegation's proposals regarding the prohibition of bombing from the air (see paragraph 230 above), the suppression and destruction of all large guns and tanks, were rejected by the Commission.

## PART VI. — MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

### CHAPTER A. — PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.

#### *Article 40.*

232. This article, together with the other provisions of Part VI of the draft, underwent a thorough preliminary examination at the last session, having been entrusted to a Sub-Committee presided over by His Excellency M. Politis. The Sub-Committee's conclusions, having been stated and discussed in plenary meeting, were approved by the Preparatory Commission. The latter unanimously recognised the necessity of setting up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission to follow the execution of the Convention.

233. The object of Article 40 is both to provide for the creation of this organ and to determine its composition.

234. As regards the latter, several systems were suggested in the course of the debates. Differences of opinion were expressed with regard to the number of members composing the Permanent Commission, and with regard to the capacity in which these members should sit and the conditions in which they would perform their duties.

<sup>1</sup> See Annexes to the Minutes of the Sixth Session (Second Part).

235. The text adopted lays down that the members of the Permanent Commission will be appointed by the Governments. But which will be the Governments that will appoint them? Some delegations expressed the opinion that this right should be given to all the contracting parties. The Commission did not accept this view. It thought that an institution of this kind could not satisfactorily perform its task unless it were of comparatively small size. The rule of universality thus being rejected, it remained to decide how many States should have the right to appoint members, and how these States should be selected.

236. After careful consideration, the Commission came to the conclusion that any decision on this subject, which is a definitely political question, should be left to the Conference itself. It thought it desirable, however, to bring to the notice of the latter the three systems which had been proposed to it: (1) that of the British delegation, consisting in reserving the right of appointment to the States Members of the Council of the League of Nations and to two or three States not Members of the League; (2) that of the French delegation, consisting in conferring this right on the States Members of the Council, on certain States not Members of the League of Nations but designated by the Conference, and, further, on certain States Members of the League of Nations but not represented on the Council, which would also be determined by the Conference; (3) lastly that of the Chinese delegation,<sup>1</sup> which recommended that the Conference should elect all the countries which should be entitled to nominate members, it being understood, however, that those countries should fulfil certain special conditions to be determined.

In any case, whatever system the Conference may agree upon, the selected Governments will only be required to appoint one member each to the Permanent Commission.

237. The second question on which the Preparatory Commission was called upon to decide was that of the conditions under which members of the Permanent Commission will serve. It pronounced in favour of the solution formulated in the second paragraph of Article 40, which lays down the following principles: (a) Members of the Permanent Commission will not represent the Governments which appointed them; (b) they will hold office for a fixed period to be determined by the Conference, but will be re-eligible; (c) during their term of office they may be replaced only on death or in the case of voluntary resignation or serious and permanent illness.

238. The third paragraph provides that members of the Commission may be "assisted by technical experts". The French delegation was in favour of a clause providing that members of the Commission must themselves be technical experts, giving purely technical opinions and not prejudging any political conclusions that the Governments might draw from those opinions. The French delegation stated that it still preferred this system, although the majority of the Commission did not accept it.

239. The question of payment for members of the Permanent Commission was also raised. It was thought better to come to no decision for the time being, especially as the question will readily settle itself in due course.

#### *Article 41.*

240. Article 41 and those which follow lay down rules for the procedure of the Permanent Commission.

The first paragraph of Article 41 calls for no comment.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 provide that the Permanent Commission shall meet annually in ordinary session on the date fixed in its Rules of Procedure, and that, in addition to this compulsory session, extraordinary sessions may be convened by its President (1) in the cases provided for in the Convention and (2) whenever an application to that effect is made by a contracting party.

#### *Article 42.*

241. This is an important article, for it leaves the Permanent Commission full power to lay down, and consequently to revise, its own Rules of Procedure. The only restriction placed on its power of decision is that it must be guided by the provisions of the Convention: this restriction is so logical that there is no need to lay stress upon it.

242. In leaving the Permanent Commission such wide latitude in regard to its Rules of Procedure, the Preparatory Commission intended to enable it to change its methods of work and its various forms of action in accordance with the lessons taught by its own experience. Had definite rules on this point been embodied in the Convention, there might have been some danger of the establishment of a rigid theoretical system, to which it might have been difficult to accommodate practical needs.

#### *Articles 43, 44 and 45.*

243. These three articles must be read together. They specify certain conditions which the Permanent Commission must observe in the conduct of its business.

(1) Two-thirds of the members must be present before the Commission can transact business (Article 43).

(2) In order to be adopted, a decision must be passed by a majority of the votes of the members present at the meeting (Article 45, paragraph 2).

(3) Each member of the Commission shall have only one vote (Article 45, paragraph 1).

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the Chinese delegation had primarily supported the system of universality.



(4) When a question brought before the Commission specially affects a contracting party not having a member of its nationality on the Commission, that party shall be entitled to send a member appointed for that purpose to sit on the Commission, and he will accordingly be regarded, so far as concerns the matter in question, as on the same footing as other members of the Commission, and may vote equally with them (Article 44).

(5) In two specified cases, however—those provided for in Article 50 (on “derogations”) and in Article 52 (on “complaints”)—the votes of members appointed by the parties concerned in the discussion shall not be counted in determining the majority (Article 45, paragraph 3). This rule applies, of course, not merely to members specially appointed under Article 44, but also to ordinary members of the Commission.

(6) Lastly, the final paragraph of Article 45 provides that the minority may state its views in a report.

#### *Article 46.*

244. The Permanent Commission will obtain such information as it requires under the conditions laid down in Article 49. Apart, however, from these regular sources of information, Article 46 entitles any member of the Commission to have any person “heard” or “consulted” who is in a position to throw any light on any question which is being examined by the Commission. At the same time, in establishing this right, the text carefully emphasises that any member availing himself of it does so “on his own responsibility”. Indeed, in such delicate questions as those with which the Commission will have to deal, great circumspection must be exercised in selecting sources of information.

#### *Articles 47, 48 and 49.*

245. These articles have this common feature—that they specify the conditions under which the Permanent Commission is to draw up, communicate and publish its reports.

246. Article 47 deals with a special point, but one which could not be neglected. It entitles every member of the Commission to require that, in the Commission’s reports, account shall be taken of the opinions or suggestions put forward by him personally, if necessary in the form of a separate report. This provision is analogous to that in the last paragraph of Article 45. Its intention is the same—to ensure that all shades of opinion may be made public.

247. Article 48 provides that all reports by the Commission shall be *communicated* (a) to the contracting parties and (b) to the Council of the League. It also requires that they shall be *published*. The conditions for this communication and publication will be laid down in the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, so far as they are not already fixed in the Convention itself.

248. Article 49 deals with the reports to be drawn up by the Permanent Commission on the information it receives with regard to the application of the Convention.

249. To examine and judge this information is looked upon as the Permanent Commission’s normal function. It is in fulfilling this function that the Commission will become an essential factor in the system of the Convention, being responsible for watching its application, regularly reporting on the situation, and calling attention, where necessary, to any errors and omissions which experience may have revealed in the text in force.

250. In investing the Commission with this function, Article 49 lays down certain rules which it may not be out of place to consider more fully:

(1) In principle the information in the Permanent Commission’s possession will be sent to it through the Secretary-General of the League by the contracting parties in pursuance of their international obligations. It was thought advisable, however, that the Commission should be able to supplement these statements by information drawn from other sources. Here, however, a difficulty arose. It would be unwise to make this power so elastic as to be indefinite. There must be a certain weeding-out of the reports that might come before the Commission. Who is to do it? It was impossible to settle the matter in detail in the actual text of the Convention, which accordingly leaves the application of the principle to the Commission’s own judgment and merely emphasises the fact that this power of discrimination should be exercised with caution. That is the effect of Article 49, which lays down that the “other information” in question is that which “may reach it from a responsible source” and which “it may consider worthy of attention”. The Rules of Procedure will give a definition of what should be understood by such sources. It will also be remembered that Article 46, which is dealt with above, entitled every member of the Commission, on his own responsibility, to have any person “heard or consulted” who is in a position to enlighten the Commission.

(2) The report to be drawn up by the Commission under Article 49 must be produced at least once a year. It is to be communicated to the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League “forthwith”. Its publication will take place on a date to be fixed by the Commission’s Rules of Procedure.

### CHAPTER B. — DEROGATIONS.

#### *Article 50.*

251. Despite the Preparatory Commission’s desire to give the provisions of the Convention the maximum degree of stability, it felt obliged to provide for the possibility of certain derogations.



In a matter such as this, which affects the vital interests of national defence, grave circumstances may arise which would justify the application of exceptional measures.

252. But while recognising this truth and taking it duly into account, the Commission has endeavoured to take every precaution to avoid the abuses to which a system of derogations might possibly open the door.

253. The drafts submitted in 1927 by the French and British delegations contained certain provisions in the matter; but the system laid down in both of them gave rise to criticisms, the foundation for which their authors were the first to recognise. Finally, a simpler and more elastic proposal submitted by the United States delegation, which was the subject of certain amendments, met with the approval first of the Sub-Committee and then of the Preparatory Commission, and resulted in the text of Article 50.

254. Under the terms of this article, any contracting Power will have, on certain conditions, the right to suspend any provision of the Convention if a change of circumstances constitutes a menace to its national security.

255. An analysis of the text reveals the following features:

(1) The hypotheses in which the right of suspension shall apply are not *enumerated*, as so rigid a method was not to be recommended. Although, however, Article 50 does not enumerate the circumstances which would justify any suspension, it does lay down that these circumstances must constitute a menace to the national security of the State in question, so that its field of action is considerably restricted thereby. It is only in quite exceptional and really serious cases that any suspension will be possible, cases so serious and so exceptional that one may hope that they will not occur.

(2) The suspension may affect certain articles of the Convention or all its provisions as a whole, with the exception, however, of those designed to apply in the event of war.

(3) The suspension will in any case be purely temporary, and, when the reasons for it have ceased to exist, the armaments which have been temporarily increased must be reduced to the level agreed upon in the Convention.

(4) It seemed impossible to make the entry into force of measures implying suspension conditional on previous authorisation, as the menace which justifies it may be so urgent as to call for immediate precautions. The Commission noted this fact with regret but was obliged to acknowledge the impossibility. Each of the contracting parties may therefore take officially such measures as are necessitated by the circumstances in which it is placed, and will have the right for such purposes to appreciate the gravity of those circumstances. That is what is meant in the text by the words: "a change of circumstances constitutes, *in the opinion of any High Contracting Party* . . ."

(5) Article 50, however, after recognising this right, subjects its exercise to a series of precautions which constitute a powerful check against any attempted abuse.

256. It provides first that any contracting party which suspends any provision of the Convention shall immediately notify such suspension and the extent thereof not only to the other contracting parties but also, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

257. Further, it makes it incumbent upon the said contracting party to accompany the notification by "a full explanation of the change of circumstances" determining its action.

258. It provides lastly that the other contracting parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented.

259. In addition to these guarantees there is the guarantee under Article 54, the effect of which, as will be noted later, is to establish the principle of compulsory arbitration for all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.

In this way there is built up a system of precautions to obviate all risk of abuse.

260. In providing for this system the Commission, it need hardly be said, had no intention of restricting in any way the rights and obligations of States Members of the League of Nations under the provisions of the Covenant. Those provisions naturally retain their full force, and will help in their particular sphere of application to reinforce the guarantees laid down in the Convention.

## CHAPTER C. — COMPLAINTS.

*Articles 51 and 52.*

261. Article 51 embodies an important principle in that it lays down that any violation of the Convention is a matter of concern to all the contracting parties. Should such a violation occur, any one of them, therefore, would have the right to act and set in motion the procedure in the matter of complaints provided for in Article 52.

262. This article provides that a complaint may be lodged, not only when one of the contracting States violates the Convention (for example—this is the most typical case, though there may be others—by maintaining armaments in excess of the figures agreed upon), but also when it *endeavours* to violate it.

263. The complaint must be brought, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, before the Permanent Commission, which, after hearing the contracting party whose action is questioned, and any other party which may be specially concerned and which asks to be



heard, will draw up a report. This report, like all others framed by the Permanent Commission, must be presented to the contracting parties and to the Council of the League of Nations and published, together with any proceedings.

264. The Permanent Commission, being only a consultative body, cannot itself decide on the action to be taken on its report. But the High Contracting Parties will advise on the situation, and the Council of the League of Nations will take action, within the limit of its powers under the Covenant. It is understood, moreover, in this connection, that the various pacific procedures provided for by the existing international agreements would, if necessary, be employed. The procedure laid down in Article 54 of the draft Convention is naturally included among the various solutions that might be employed.

#### CHAPTER D. — FINAL PROVISIONS.

265. Certain formal provisions (such, for instance, as those relating to the signature of the Convention) do not figure in the present draft. It seemed preferable to leave it to the Conference to add them.

266. Further, the text makes no mention of a clause which generally figures in multilateral conventions and which provides for the possible accession of third Powers. The reason is that the present situation is somewhat peculiar. The Convention is intended, not only to lay down rules for collective application, but is to embody individual figures fixing the limit of the armaments for each State. Naturally, if a Power which is not an original party to the Convention wished subsequently to accede to it, it would have to submit concrete and detailed proposals, which would form the subject of difficult and complicated negotiations. Such being the case, the Commission decided that it was preferable not to establish formal rules of procedure for this somewhat theoretical hypothesis.

##### *Article 53.*

267. The first paragraph of this article is based on a proposal by the British delegation. The second is the outcome of an amendment submitted by the French delegation.

268. The article first of all embodies the principle that the present Convention does not affect the provisions of previous treaties under which certain of the contracting parties have agreed to limit their land, sea, or air armaments.

269. It also contains a provision enabling the contracting parties which so desire to declare, when signing the Convention, that the limits fixed under the latter for their armaments are accepted by them in relation to the provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph and that the maintenance of such provisions constitutes for them an essential condition for the observance of the present Convention.

270. Article 53 is designed in the interests of greater clearness. It seemed necessary to a large number of delegations, in view of disputes that might arise concerning the interpretation of the Convention—disputes which, under the terms of Article 54, would come within the competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice—that there should be no possible doubt as to the conditions under which the Convention had been concluded.

271. Moreover, in the matter of disarmament, every attempt should be made to avoid anything in the nature of a retrograde measure; accordingly, the provisions of the Convention must not restrict the scope of previous treaties on the same subject.

272. Further, certain Governments will estimate the position of their armaments according to the situation resulting from such treaties. The maintenance in force of these treaties is thus an essential condition for the Governments for their contractual undertaking under the Convention. It will be for the Conference if necessary to define this principle in order to prevent any abusive interpretation, in the event of any temporary and unimportant breach or suspension of the provisions of the said Treaties.

273. The German delegation stated, in connection with Article 53, that, in so far as it does not refer to the Washington and London Treaties, the German delegation would vote against the draft Convention as a whole. The draft, as drawn up by the majority of the Preparatory Commission, excludes essential elements from the limitation and reduction of land armaments. Instead of leading to real disarmament, this draft would serve only to conceal the real state of world armaments or would even allow armaments to be increased. To accept it would at the same time be tantamount to a renewal of the German signature to the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

##### *Article 54.*

274. This article, which owes its origin to the Belgian delegation, lays down the principle of compulsory arbitration for all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention, when such disputes have not been settled by direct negotiations or by some other method of friendly settlement. It provides that, in such cases, the dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal chosen by the parties to the dispute.

275. The principle underlying Article 54 met at once with the unanimous approval of the Commission. Certain delegations had, however, wondered on first examination whether the proposed text might not lead to a conflict of powers between the Permanent Disarmament Commission and the tribunals to which disputes concerning the application of the Convention might be referred. It was pointed out to them that this risk need not be considered, as the Permanent Commission is not a tribunal competent to settle disputes, but an examining body responsible simply for drawing up reports and giving opinions. The provisions of Article 54, which was finally adopted without opposition, thus leave the powers conferred on the Permanent Commission intact.

*Article 55.*

276. The first paragraph of this article concerns the ratification of the Convention and does not call for any comment.

277. Paragraphs 2 and 3 concern the entry into force of the Treaty. The Conference will have to establish the list of ratifications required to ensure its entry into force. If, however, by a date to be fixed in the Convention itself, the necessary instruments have not been deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the latter would invite the signatory Powers to meet and decide whether it is possible, notwithstanding, to put the Convention into force. This special procedure, the purpose of which is so clear as to require no emphasis, was suggested by the British delegation. It is based on the resolution concerning ratifications adopted by the eleventh Assembly of the League of Nations.

278. The last sentence of Article 55 provides that the contracting parties undertake to participate in this consultation, which will take place within a period to be fixed by the Conference. The Commission decided that it would be better to leave it to the Conference to decide whether it might not be better to insert such an undertaking in the Final Act or in a Protocol to be annexed.

279. The text adopted at the first reading contained an Article EC<sup>1</sup> by which Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Roumania set out certain conditions on which their acceptance of the Convention would depend.

280. The Commission decided that the study of this question should be left for the Conference. This decision was dictated by two reasons. The first was that the text raised an essentially political question, and the second that it brings up a very complex problem: the effect of the reservations which the contracting Powers will be allowed to formulate at the time of signature.

*Article 56.*

281. This article could, if necessary, have been omitted from the draft. Naturally, directly the Convention comes into force, each of the contracting parties must, in so far as concerns itself, take the measures necessary to ensure its execution. The insertion of an express provision to this effect is designed simply to direct the special attention of the contracting parties to their duty of exhibiting the greatest diligence in the performance of their obligations. It will be for the Conference to decide whether this text is to be kept in the body of the Convention or whether it should be placed either in the Final Act or in a Protocol to be annexed.

*Article 57.*

282. Article 57 provides for the period of validity of the Convention. The Commission could not itself suggest how long it should remain in force, as this will depend on the circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the Convention, and the Conference alone can judge of such circumstances. It is important, however, to note that, as regards the States Members of the League of Nations, Article 8 of the Covenant provides for a maximum limit, in that it lays down that the "plans" for the reduction of armaments "shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years". The period laid down in Article 57 cannot therefore exceed ten years. It might be less, but the general feeling of the Commission is that it should not be too short.

283. The British delegation directed attention to the desirability of establishing some agreement between the period of validity of the Convention and that of other agreements concerning the limitation of armaments, such as the Treaties of Washington and London.

284. Moreover, even when fixed, the period of validity of the Convention will not be at all rigid. Two categories of provisions will have the effect of rendering it more elastic—namely, Articles 57 and 58, which will be examined below and the effect of which may be to shorten it, and further the rule laid down in the last sentence of Article 57, the effect of which may be to

---

<sup>1</sup> See Minutes of the Third Session, page 416.



extend it. In virtue of this rule, the Convention will not be extinguished by the expiry of the period laid down. It will remain in force except in so far as it may be amended, suspended or denounced.

285. The Commission's purpose in instituting this system was to prevent the work of the coming Disarmament Conference, which will constitute a first stage, from coming suddenly to an end without there being anything else ready to replace it. In an undertaking such as this, continuity is essential if the results already achieved are to be consolidated.

*Article 58.*

286. This article provides that the contracting parties shall re-examine the Convention before the expiration of the period fixed in Article 57. The Conference must, however, see that such examination is not premature and the text accordingly provides for the fixing of a minimum date. The re-examination of the Convention must take place within these two limits. There will be a certain elasticity which will make it possible to select the most suitable moment. In order to ensure successful results, the new Conference, which will be responsible for the re-examination, will have to be convened at the moment when the circumstances are most favourable to the accomplishment of its work. To fix the date of the meeting in advance would be imprudent. The Commission thought it preferable to leave the proper organs to decide on the most suitable moment, while restricting their freedom of choice by means of maximum and minimum dates.

287. Who are these proper organs? The Council of the League of Nations, which will have been responsible for convening the first Disarmament Conference, seems eminently fitted to convene the others. Accordingly, the draft Convention entrusts this duty to it, adding, however, that, before passing the necessary resolution, the Council shall consult the Permanent Disarmament Commission and also the contracting parties non-members of the League of Nations.

288. This Conference will examine the position and will, if it thinks fit, revise the Convention wholly or in part. Should its proceedings lead to the establishment of a new Convention, it will itself fix the duration of that Convention and determine the conditions in which the latter will again be examined and possibly revised.

*Article 59.*

289. The procedure instituted by the previous article cannot, therefore, in principle, be set in motion before a certain date. Article 59, however, makes an exception to the principle.

290. It covers the case in which the conditions under which the engagements stipulated in the Convention were contracted have undergone, as the result of technical transformations or special circumstances, changes justifying a fresh examination and possibly the revision of such engagements. It may be that, before the date fixed by Article 58 as the starting-point of the period during which the Convention normally *must* be re-examined, the conditions under which it was drawn up may undergo such radical changes that it would be difficult, or even impossible, to await the prescribed date before reconsidering the situation and making any alterations it may entail. In such a case—but in such a case only—it is allowable under Article 59 for the procedure to be set in motion before the normal date. The Commission felt that it was inadvisable to authorise the immediate re-examination of the Convention, and that after its entry into force a certain period ought to elapse during which the option provided for in Article 59 could not be made use of.

291. Thus, three periods are contemplated by Articles 57, 58 and 59 of the draft. The first ( $x$  years) determines the normal duration of the Convention; the second ( $y$  years) is the period during which, in principle, the Conference to re-examine the Convention cannot be called; and the third ( $z$  years) is that during which the Convention can, in no case, be re-examined, even in the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 59.

292. These circumstances might include, for example, an unforeseen development of civil aviation. Indeed, the British, French, Japanese and Polish delegations definitely stated that they had this case, in particular, in mind.

293. The text of the draft adopted at first reading included, in Section III of Chapter II (material, air armaments), an Article AD, which read as follows:

“ The limitations laid down are accepted by each High Contracting Party in the light of the present development of civil aviation in other countries. ”

294. In view of Article 59, and subject to the statements which they made, the above-mentioned delegations agreed that the old Article AD should be omitted from the draft, but pointed out that its omission did not imply any change in their attitude, and that when they submitted to the Conference figures for the limitation of military aviation they would take into consideration the development of civil aviation in other countries up to that time.



295. On the other hand, the German delegation submitted the following reservation:

“ The German delegation is of opinion that the development of a peaceful means of communication must in no case be made a basis for armaments, especially as no account has been taken of the essential and purely military factors of material in reserve or in stock, trained reserves, etc., and other important means of communication, such as the mercantile marine, on which, indeed, preliminary warlike fittings have been authorised. ”

296. The exceptional procedure provided for in Article 59 may be followed, says the text, “ at the request of a High Contracting Party, with the concurrence of the Permanent Disarmament Commission ”. In other words, the initiative will come from a contracting Government, but will have no effect unless it is favourably received by the Permanent Commission.

#### *Article 60.*

297. The final article of the draft deals with the right of denunciation.

This is always a delicate question in multilateral treaties, and it is particularly delicate here, where the system implies a balance of mutual engagements which is in danger of being disturbed if one of the parties withdraw.

298. The Commission nevertheless considered it impossible to refuse the parties the right to denounce the Convention. It was careful, however, to make this right dependent on various conditions, which to some extent correct its disadvantages.

299. In this connection, Article 60 provides, in the first place, that the right of denunciation can only be exercised in the course of one of the Conferences held in virtue of the preceding articles to re-examine, and possibly revise, the Agreement. It further lays down that denunciation, when thus notified, shall not take effect until two years after its date, and in no case before the expiration of the normal period of duration of the Convention, as fixed under Article 57.

\* \* \*

300. The Preparatory Commission could only establish a draft Convention, or it would perhaps be more accurate to say the framework of the future Convention.

301. In the reservations which have been reproduced in this report, certain delegates expressed the view that, even within those limits, the results were disappointing. The great majority of the Commission, however, so far from sharing this attitude, regards what has been done as marking an important advance on the path of disarmament.

302. Be that as it may, it will be for the Conference not only to decide as to the final adoption of the draft that will be laid before it, but also to define its practical scope by fixing in figures the extent of the undertakings it involves.

303. This delicate and complicated task can only be successfully discharged on certain conditions, first and foremost among which we place the thorough and systematic preparation of the Conference itself. The German delegation proposed—and this proposal was seconded by the Italian delegation—that the Preparatory Commission should ask the various Governments, with this object in view, to furnish detailed particulars of the present position of their armaments. The Commission welcomed the spirit in which this suggestion was made, but felt that certain correctives must be supplied. In the first place, it held that, as the preparation of the Conference was a matter for the Council of the League, it was for the Council to take the necessary steps to that end. It also regarded the German proposal as too restricted. Indeed, the preliminary work of study and investigation which will have to be done cannot be limited to scheduling existing armaments. It will have to cover every factor, technical or otherwise, which may help to inform the Conference, and to justify such concrete proposals as the Governments may lay before it.

304. The Commission further decided to ask the Council of the League to fix the date of the Conference at its next session. The German delegation, with reference to the resolution adopted by the Council on December 8th, 1926, had proposed that a definite date (Thursday, November 5th, 1931) should be recommended. The Commission felt that it would be exceeding its sphere by doing this. It is, of course, anxious that the utmost despatch compatible with practical necessities should be employed, but it took the view that the Council, with which it rests to fix the date, was the only authority qualified to weigh the various factors that must be taken into consideration.

305. While the final result depends in part on the preparatory work that has still to be done, it also depends, in large measure, on the atmosphere that will prevail during the subsequent proceedings. In such a matter, mutual confidence among peoples is an essential condition of progress. It is our hope that that mutual confidence will be strengthened, and will enable the aim to which our efforts have been directed to be completely attained.



### III. ANNEX.

#### REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE WORK OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

*Held at Geneva from May 18th to 26th, 1926.*

The Preparatory Commission, convened by resolution of the Council dated March 18th, 1926 met at Geneva from May 18th-26th, 1926. It elected as Chairman H. E. Jonkheer J. LOUDON and, as Vice-Chairmen, M. COBIÁN and M. BUERO, delegates of Spain and Uruguay respectively.

From the outset the Preparatory Commission realised that the study of the questions submitted to it by the Council would be facilitated by the constitution of two special Sub-Commissions composed of persons directly attached to the delegations forming part of the Preparatory Commission and consequently representing the opinion of their respective Governments. The Preparatory Commission intended to entrust one of these Sub-Commissions with the study of the military, naval and air aspects of the questions under consideration, while the other would devote its attention to the non-military aspect of these questions.

Presided over by the two Vice-Chairmen of the Commission itself, these two Sub-Commissions, which would thus be in close touch with the Commission, would be in a position to observe faithfully the principles laid down for their guidance by the latter.

The Sub-Commission entrusted with the study of non-military questions has been authorised by the Preparatory Commission to ascertain the opinion of the organisations or persons it may judge advisable to consult on these questions, and particularly that of the Joint Commission set up by resolution of the Council. The Military, Naval and Air Sub-Commission has identically the same composition as the Permanent Advisory Commission as enlarged by the decision of the Council. The system thus set up by the Preparatory Commission therefore follows the main outlines of the organisation established by the Council.

The Preparatory Commission does not doubt that the Council will see fit to endorse its decisions, in which it has been guided by its desire to do all in its power to ensure the success of the task entrusted to it.

#### 1.

On the proposal of the French delegation, the Preparatory Commission considers that the task entrusted to it by the Council should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view for the proposed Conference for the preparation of a disarmament agreement, definite and quantitative proposals accompanied by reasons in support calculated with reference to the degree of security existing at the date when the Conference meets.

#### 2.

A. The Commission refers to its Technical Sub-Commissions the points stated below in order that it may be informed on the technical aspect of the questions submitted to it by the Council. The Commission is alone competent to deal with the political aspects of these questions in the same way that it has sole responsibility for the final answers to be given to the questions.

The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen may take the necessary steps to co-ordinate the work of the two Sub-Commissions and to enable each to consult the other on any particular point.

#### *Question I.*

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments" ?

- (a) Definition of the various factors — military, economic, geographical, etc. — upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.
- (b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace: the different categories of armaments — military, naval and air — the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

The Commission refers Question No. I to Sub-Commission A.

*Question II (a).*

Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

With regard to Question II (a), the Commission is of opinion that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. On the other hand, it affirms that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace-time by the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures. This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation as determined by an examination of the remaining questions, notably Question V.

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the definition of the forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the study of the possibility of a wider limitation than that referred to above.

*Question II (b).*

What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments"?

The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods: for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.

*Question III.*

By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another—e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the two following questions for its opinion:

- (a) What are the standards by which it is possible to measure the (a) military, (b) naval, (c) air armaments of one country against the corresponding armaments of another country?
- (b) What are the methods by which the reduction and limitation of (a) land, (b) naval, (c) air armaments can be effected, and what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each?

*Note.* — The following methods, amongst others, have been suggested: the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service; the reduction of munitions of war.

It has also been suggested that a limitation of armed forces might be effected by the reduction or limitation of expenditure on national defence.

The Commission wishes to have the opinion of the two Sub-Commissions on this last subject and on the conditions in which the above method might be applied, should they consider that it is practicable.

*Question IV.*

Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established for the purposes in a spirit of aggression?

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the following questions:

Are there any armaments (and, if so, what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State's territory?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?



*Question V (a).*

On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population;
2. Resources;
3. Geographical situation;
4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
5. Density and character of the railways;
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?

As the armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical considerations alone, the Commission, in order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a) and refers factor 6 to Sub-Commission A.

*Question VI.*

- (a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?
- (b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?
- (c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

The Commission refers Question VI to Sub-Commission A for its opinion.

*Question VII.*

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

The Commission asks Technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments.

Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term "region" should connote from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament.

B. The Commission has examined the attached proposal submitted by the Belgian delegate. Without expressing a definite opinion regarding the measures suggested in this proposal concerning which certain delegations have reserved their decision, the Commission has decided to refer this matter to the Technical Sub-Commissions, on the understanding that such reference does not prejudice the question in any way, either as regards the practicability of these measures or as regards any subsequent decision which the Preparatory Commission itself may take when it comes to examine the question from the general and political point of view.

The delegate of Italy reiterated his opinion that supervision would be ineffective and was inadmissible, and asked to have his view placed on record.

*Proposal.*

"The last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League stipulates that 'the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes'.

"With a view to organising this exchange of information, Sub-Commission A has been requested to consider the advantages and disadvantages from the military point of view of the various methods which might be employed and in particular:

- "(a) The organisation at Geneva of a permanent service for the collection of information received from the different Governments;

- “ (b) The conclusion of an international convention making it compulsory to publish all inventions which can be used in chemical or bacteriological warfare and in general all forms of warfare which are condemned by the opinion of the civilised world.

“ Sub-Commission A is requested to investigate what would be the consequences from the military point of view of inserting in the Convention relative to disarmament, or in that regarding the prohibition of certain forms of warfare, of provisions similar to those contained in the statute of the International Labour Office (Articles 411 to 420 of the Treaty of Versailles).

“ Sub-Commission B is requested to ascertain the consequences of such insertion from the economic point of view.

“ Sub-Commission A is requested to consider to what extent the experience acquired regarding the supervision of disarmament points to the possibility from the military point of view of general supervision.

“ Sub-Commission B is requested to state if such supervision offers any difficulties from the economic point of view and, if so, what difficulties.”

C. On the proposal of the delegate of the British Empire, the Commission decided to refer to the competent Sub-Commissions the questions defined below without prejudice to any Convention or Rule of International Law on the subject:

*To Sub-Commissions A and B.*

1. (a) Can factories normally and legitimately employed for chemical purposes, including dyeworks, be quickly adapted to manufacture poison gases ?
- (b) If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, how long would it take to effect the change ?
- (c) Can any proposals be made to prevent or hinder chemical factories from being used for the production of poisonous gases ?

*To Sub-Commission A.*

2. (a) What are the means which would probably be employed for spreading gas and what would be the apparatus required ?
- (b) How long would it take to manufacture this apparatus, and how long would it take to superimpose this apparatus on the normal equipment of an aeroplane ?
- (c) Would the length of time referred to immediately above vary in the case of military or civilian aircraft ?
3. (a) What is the information in existence as to the effect of the distribution of poisonous gas over closely populated districts ?
- (b) Have any experiments been carried out on this subject ?
- (c) Apart from the difficulty of equipping the entire population of a city with gas masks, are there any gases known against which a gas mask affords no protection ?

Sub-Commission A is invited to consider what effective sanctions can be proposed for the enforcement of the international undertaking not to employ poison gas or bacteria in warfare.

### 3.

A. *Questions V (a) 8 and V (b).*

8. The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State ?
- (b) Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed ?

The following very important proposal has been laid before the Commission by the French delegation:

#### *Proposal.*

“ With reference to Question V (a) 8 and V (b), the Commission considers that, in order that a State should be able to calculate to what extent it can consent to the reduction or limitation of its armaments, it is essential to determine what method and what machinery are best calculated to give help to that State when attacked.

“ The Commission therefore proposes to suggest to the Council:

“ 1. That *methods* or *regulations* should be investigated which would:

- “ (a) Facilitate the meeting of the Council at very brief notice in case of war or threat of war;
- “ (b) Enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce the obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.



" 2. That the Permanent Advisory Commission should be instructed:

- " (a) To define the measures necessary to comply with paragraph (a), No. 8;
- " (b) To investigate the procedure which would allow of the rapid drafting of recommendations regarding the military assistance provided for in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, *when the Council shall have decided to make such recommendations*;
- " (c) To investigate what measures should be taken in case of a conflict of which the Council shall have been notified, *and when the latter shall have taken a decision*, in order to prevent the development or preparation of hostilities, according to the precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute.

" 3. That the Joint Commission should be instructed:

- " (a) To investigate the question of the improvement of the telegraphic and the telephonic communications of the different countries with the Secretariat of the League;
- " (b) To study what measures would be most appropriate, *when the Council shall have so decided*, to give most rapidly such economic and financial help as may be necessary to a State which has been attacked;
- " (c) To determine the composition and procedure of the Committees for the supply and allocation of resources which the League might set up for that purpose."

It has been objected that the aim of the proposal was to define and elaborate the machinery for carrying into effect the decisions taken by the Council of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant, and that constructive proposals of this nature belonged rather to the competence of the organs of the League of Nations than to that of the present Commission.

Without pronouncing any opinion on the validity of this objection, the Commission feels that there are obvious inconveniences in asking a body comprising representatives of countries not members of the League of Nations to discuss new means of carrying out the provisions of an instrument which they have not signed.

The Commission has accordingly decided to forward the French delegation's proposal to the Council with a request that it should be immediately taken into consideration.

B. The Commission also decided to forward to the Council the following proposal of the Polish delegation, which is closely related to that of the French delegation:

*Proposal.*

" The Commission suggests to the Council that it would be well to consider whether a special organisation of regional assistance within the scope of the Covenant of the League would be likely to give the organs of the League effective help in supplying the assistance required and would thereby render the execution of the relevant articles of the Covenant easier and more expeditious (study of the machinery, form and procedure of regional assistance). "

C. The Commission has decided also to send to the Council the following proposal by the delegation of Finland:

*Proposal.*

" The Commission proposes that the Council should undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to by States unfavourably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security. "

\* \* \*

The United States delegation stated that it was anxious to favour every effort made with a view to disarmament, and that it therefore had no objection to certain proposals being discussed in connection with the obligations entered into by the Members of the League of Nations; but it naturally could not be bound in any way by such discussions in which it could not properly take part. This observation refers, in particular, to certain phases of the proposals reproduced in Nos. 1, 2 B and 3 above.

\* \* \*

The German delegation stated that its exceptional position did not at present allow of its being heard before the Council, and therefore desired to be in a position to submit an opinion to the Council on the proposals which were referred to it in regard to Questions V (a) 8, V (b).

The suggested examination of the methods likely to bring rapid assistance to a country attacked should not, in the opinion of the delegation, be based on the present position of armaments, which is only temporary. This examination should have as a starting-point a state of disarmament resulting from the Conference such that no country would be powerful enough to be in a position to assert its strength against that of the League of Nations. The examination of Questions V (a) 8 and V (b) could only give provisional results if it took as a starting-point the present position of armaments (see Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Drafting Committee).

*Series of Publications:* 1931.IX.19.

*Official No.:* C. 602. M. 240. 1931. IX.  
[Conf. D. 16.]

Geneva, September 23rd, 1931.

## MORAL DISARMAMENT

---

### MEMORANDUM FROM THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

---

At the request of the Polish Government, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference a letter from the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a memorandum annexed thereto on moral disarmament.

---

#### LETTER FROM THE POLISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Geneva, September 17th, 1931.

[*Translation.*]

With reference to the statements made by the Polish delegate at the last session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, the discussions in the Special Committee appointed to prepare a draft general Convention for strengthening the Means of preventing War, and my own statement at the Council meeting of May 21st last during the discussion of that Committee's report, I beg to forward to you herewith a memorandum from the Polish Government concerning the practical attainment of moral disarmament. I would request you to transmit this document to all the Governments invited to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and I should be grateful if you would be good enough to give it the widest possible publicity.

In the Polish Government's opinion, the problem is one of great importance for the future work of the Disarmament Conference. In this connection, the statements made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the tenth session of the League Assembly and by the British Foreign Minister at the annual meeting of the "Burge Memorial Trust" this year may be recalled.

Further, two great international associations, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies and the World Peace League, devoted special resolutions to this problem at their congresses this year. Their appeals to the Governments should not be in vain.

At the twelfth session of the Assembly, the problem of moral disarmament has also been raised by the Spanish delegation, which has submitted a proposal of great interest. This proposal, however, only deals with certain aspects of the problem.

The Polish Government believes that the question should be examined in its entirety and that the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, where all the principal countries of the world will be represented, is alone capable of finding practical and adequate solutions of this important question, which is so closely bound up with the future Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments.

(Signed) Auguste ZALESKI,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

#### MEMORANDUM FROM THE POLISH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE ATTAINMENT OF MORAL DISARMAMENT.

For some time past, the problem of moral disarmament has interested not only public opinion but also responsible statesmen.

The international situation will, it is to be feared, become increasingly unstable owing to the dangerous agitation of certain elements which are endeavouring to poison relations between the peoples and to sow the seed of fresh conflicts in the minds of their supporters. The appeals to hatred in certain quarters are arousing universal uneasiness and creating an atmosphere of distrust which frustrates all efforts for the consolidation of peace. This problem calls for particular attention on the part of the Disarmament Conference, the results of which are bound to be influenced by the degree of mutual confidence prevailing between the participating Governments. This confidence in a large measure depends on securing an improvement in the moral and political situation in Europe.



Everyone who wishes the Conference to meet with the fullest possible success is therefore faced with an important question—namely, how to counteract the movement against peace and assure a moral *détente* by concerted action of the Governments.

In submitting the present memorandum to the Governments invited to the Conference, the Polish Government desires to draw attention to the value of achieving moral disarmament, and to suggest, at the same time, a few of the spheres where this is most urgently required.

National laws must always reconcile the freedom of the individual with the interests of the community; certain restrictions must be placed on this freedom in order to safeguard the higher interests of society. With a few rare exceptions the interests of the community, to which the freedom of the individual was subordinated, have hitherto been thought to coincide with the interests of the various social classes existing within the nation. But a higher society exists outside the nation—namely, international society.

Why should not domestic legislations take this society's interests into account as well as those of the national society?

The problem was raised in 1927 at the First International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law. Certain legislative work along these lines was also undertaken in three countries: Brazil, Roumania and Poland. The draft penal codes of these three countries explicitly stipulate that any person guilty of incitement to war shall be punished with imprisonment. The Brazilian draft code goes even further, punishing also persons stirring up popular agitation with a view to exerting pressure on the Government in favour of war whilst diplomatic negotiations are in progress with a foreign country, and, more generally, any person attempting to disturb international relations. So far these three draft codes still remain alone amid penal legislation elsewhere, which is, in this respect, out of date. Would it not be worth while unifying every Government's efforts towards a general modification of the criminal codes? The latter should be extended by the addition of one or more articles for the defence of peace and international solidarity against the criminal activities of certain individuals or groups of individuals. Expert jurists would find the proper formulæ and define what act calculated to disturb international relations should be punished by penal legislation. The jurists' suggestions might serve as a basis for an international convention binding the Governments to introduce the proposed modifications in their respective penal codes. This would be an effectual way of co-ordinating and concerting Government activity in this sphere.

The Governments of almost every country have accepted the principle of the condemnation of war as an instrument of national policy, and have since endeavoured to base their international actions on this principle. Their domestic policy should also be based on this principle, and severe measures taken to deal with any person attempting to undermine the moral bases of world peace by a propaganda of hatred. A suitable modification of national legislation would only be the logical complement of international agreements now in force.

Several penal codes explicitly state that any person guilty of founding or directing, or of only belonging to, an organisation with illegal aims is liable to appropriate penalties. After a modification of the criminal law in the sense indicated above, this provision would be applicable to any person guilty of belonging to an association with aims dangerous to peace. The activities of certain associations might be even more effectually counteracted by making this provision embrace organisations whose aims appear to be legal, but whose activity had been proved to be dangerous to peace.

Propaganda aimed at disturbing friendly international relations is usually carried on by associations or in the Press. The problem of the Press was raised by the Swedish Government at the meeting of the Special Committee appointed to consider measures for preventing war. That Government drew the Committee's attention to the disastrous influence a certain section of the Press might exercise during an international crisis. The Polish Government fully shares this view. Not only when an international dispute has arisen, but also in daily life, the Press may exert, if it so desires, a salutary influence by calming people's minds and supporting the Council of the League in its difficult task as mediator, or it may play a fatal part by stirring up feeling and misrepresenting the facts of the case. Here, too, the intervention of the community would be of the utmost importance, for it alone would be capable of averting mischievous Press campaigns. Where must remedies be sought? An article punishing any person guilty of publishing in the Press false and tendentious reports on the international situation might possibly be usefully inserted in penal codes. But to punish the author of false news is only a repressive measure which, though of undoubted value, does nothing to correct the wrong information. This last result might be secured by extending the application of the right of reply so as to include foreign Governments. The latter would be entitled to ask a newspaper to correct false information it had published concerning the position of their countries. To prevent abuses, provision might be made for any rectification from a foreign legation to be sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country where the newspaper is published.

Other means of combating newspaper excesses, as, for instance, the setting up of an international disciplinary tribunal for journalists, might also be considered. This tribunal, the composition of which would be determined by an international Press conference, would be



competent to try, on the application of a professional Press organisation, any journalist charged with pursuing activities dangerous to peace. The court would be entitled to expel the accused from the journalistic profession, and its decision would be upheld in every country. Another effective means of preventing the false presentation of the international situation would be to set up at Geneva an international information bureau, whose reports would be accepted by the whole world because of its international prestige.

International Press conferences might be held every year. The whole problem of moral disarmament, in so far as it affects the Press, should be examined by the conference of journalists whose report would serve as a basis for Government decisions. Journalists themselves would be the most competent people to draw up a system capable of safeguarding international interests without compromising the freedom of the Press. It may be noted that the question of moral disarmament was fully discussed at the Press Conference held at Geneva in 1927.

In order to secure lasting moral disarmament, a great effort must be made to protect young people from everything capable of breeding in them hatred of a foreign nation. School-teachers should therefore be forbidden to abuse their position by arousing in their pupils' minds distrust and ill-will towards foreigners. School-books, particularly those dealing with history, geography, etc., would also have to be examined. On the other hand, instruction should be given to all young people so as to render them familiar with the aims and organisation of the League of Nations. The Sub-Committee of Experts of the International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation framed certain recommendations on this subject. This Committee recommended, *inter alia*: (1) compulsory instruction in all schools in regard to the work and aims of the League of Nations and, more generally, the development of international co-operation; (2) the formation of special League of Nations chairs in faculties of law; (3) the elimination from school-books of everything capable of arousing hatred of foreigners, etc. These recommendations have not, however, been carried out everywhere. Time is passing, and the position remains very much the same as it was before the foundation of the League. It would therefore be advisable to consider the possibility of giving practical effect to the suggestions of the Committee of Experts. An international convention binding Governments to take certain measures for eliminating from school instruction the elements of hatred and inculcating in young people's minds the dominating ideas of the League of Nations would be the most effectual way of making real progress towards educating young people in the spirit of international solidarity.

Certain competent bodies (for instance, the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation and the International Educational Cinematographic Institute, etc.) should be instructed to investigate the problem of moral disarmament in so far as it is affected by broadcasting, the theatre and the cinema. The practical suggestions resulting from these investigations might be used as a basis for concerted action on the part of the Governments. The Polish Government ventures to add as an annex the text of the agreement concluded on March 31st, 1931, between the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft m.b.H. and the Polskie Radio Company concerning this very problem of moral disarmament. This agreement may go to show that practical results in this field are in no way impossible.

The Polish Government is convinced that there are still other spheres where moral disarmament might be achieved practically. It does not therefore claim that its memorandum exhausts the subject. In submitting it to the Governments that will take part in the Disarmament Conference, it has desired to draw their attention to the possibility and the value of taking some effective action. Moral disarmament will make no headway if we rest content with words. What is needed is action. The Polish Government is certain that the other Governments will not refuse to make a thorough investigation of the problem.

---

#### Appendix 1.

EXTRACT FROM THE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 31ST, 1931, CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND POLISH BROADCASTING COMPANIES (REICHS-RUNDFUNK-GESELLSCHAFT m.b.H.—POLSKIE RADIO).

The two Contracting Parties undertake in future to do everything in their power to ensure that matter—whether political, religious, economic, intellectual or artistic—broadcast from their stations shall not compromise in any way the spirit of co-operation and good understanding which is necessary if broadcasting is to fulfil its mission of drawing the nations together.

Each Contracting Party reserves the right to carry on a certain amount of positive propaganda in regard to its national activities in their various spheres, while undertaking to see that the matter broadcast does not in any way offend the national sentiment of listeners who are subjects of the other Contracting Party.



Each Contracting Party expressly undertakes to give its special attention to the matter broadcast by it in the language of the other Contracting Party, so that such matter may strictly conform to the principles set forth above.

The Contracting Parties undertake to apply the principles set forth above, not only to matter broadcast by themselves, but also to that relayed from outside stations.

As regards matter broadcast by the Governments, the Contracting Parties declare that, in accordance with the concessions granted to the companies, the supervision of such matter is entirely in the hands of the Government authorities of each country.

---

## Appendix 2.

I. The fifteenth plenary congress of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, held in Budapest from May 24th to 28th, 1931, adopted the following resolution :

“Considering that the publication of false or tendentious news on the situation or activities of a State is likely to create currents of hostile opinion and may thus become a source of grave danger to peace between nations ;

“Considering that the danger is graver still in the case of the publication of false documents ;

“Considering that the laws of the various countries do not adequately prevent and punish such acts when they are likely to injure other States ;

“The Plenary Congress,

“(1) Notes with approval the decision of the International Federation of Journalists to set up an international professional jurisdiction empowered to judge journalists guilty of professional misdemeanours in international matters ;

“(2) Considers that the practice should be generally adopted whereby certain States, when information is published which is denounced as inexact, tendentious or calculated to disturb international relations, apprise the national or foreign Press associations in the country so that disciplinary measures may be taken against the journalists responsible ; and further considers that such journalists should also be denounced to the Information Section of the League of Nations ;

“(3) Considers that it would be expedient in such cases that the League of Nations Societies in the countries concerned should work together to devise the best means of enlightening and pacifying public opinion ;

“(4) Recommends that the Assembly of the League of Nations entrust competent organs to seek internationally a solution of the following questions :

“(a) *To establish* on behalf of any State about which a newspaper or a wireless broadcasting station shall have imputed a fact which is either inexact or calculated to disturb international relations *an international right of reply* ;

“(b) *To institute a summary procedure of international enquiry* in cases of diffusion of information calculated to disturb international relations ;

“(c) *Penal repression* in each State of the mischievous diffusion of inexact information or of false documents calculated to disturb international relations.”

Moreover, the same congress has noted in its resolution on disarmament that it would be desirable to make “an advance in moral disarmament through the abandonment of bellicose or aggressive propaganda and the consideration by the League of Nations of measures appropriate to that end.”

II. The Universal Peace Congress, held in Brussels from July 5th to 10th, 1931, has recognised that “moral disarmament is at the same time the condition and the guarantee of all reduction of military armaments” and has decided to include the problem of moral disarmament in the programme of the next Peace Congress.

---

## Appendix 3.

The Conference of Press Experts, held in Geneva in 1927, has adopted, amongst others, the following resolutions :

### *Publication or Distribution of Tendentious News.*

“Fully cognisant of the fact that the publication or distribution of obviously inaccurate, highly exaggerated, or deliberately distorted news or articles is calculated to cause undesirable misunderstandings among nations and suspicions detrimental to international peace ; and

“Desiring to promote among peoples the growth of mutual understanding, necessary to world peace ;

“This Conference expresses the desire that the newspapers and news agencies of the world should deem it their duty to take stringent measures to avoid the publication or

distribution of such news or articles, and should also consider the possibility of active international co-operation for the attainment of this purpose, which is in conformity with the spirit of the League of Nations.”<sup>1</sup>

*Courses for Journalists at Geneva.*

“Whereas it is important, from the point of view of consolidating peace and of ensuring reasonable criticism of the activities of the League of Nations, that the greatest possible number of journalists should become familiar with the organisation of the League of Nations ;

“This Conference recommends that preliminary consideration should be given to the question of organising at Geneva in connection with the League of Nations an international Press centre or institute which could be attended by journalists throughout the year in order to obtain such knowledge, and

“Draws the attention of Governments to the advantage of affording every support to such an organisation.”

*Establishment in Newspapers of a Special Heading on the League of Nations.*

“This Conference expresses its gratitude to the League of Nations, and especially the Information Section of the Secretariat, for the support and facilities granted to its members and for the organisation of its meeting, and notes that the League has in no way attempted in this connection to make League propaganda in its favour, but simply to assist in the material and spiritual development of the Press ; and

“Recognising that the work of the League is worthy of the closest attention, constituting, as it does, one of the most interesting movements of the century, recommends the establishment in the great newspapers of a permanent section, such as already exists in some papers, devoted to objective information on the work of the League.”

*Moral Disarmament.*

“The Conference makes a warm appeal to the Press of the world to contribute by every means at its disposal to the consolidation of peace, to combat hatred between nationalities and between classes, which is the greatest danger to peace, and to prepare the way for moral disarmament.”

*Regional Press Understandings.*

“This Conference,

“Considering that regional agreements with the object of promoting international harmony concluded by the Press of groups of neighbouring States constitute, not only one of the best means of facilitating the decisions of Governments on its improvements suggested by the Conference, but also, and above all, a permanent guarantee of pacification calculated to contribute in large measure to the prevention of misunderstandings between nations ;

“Recommends to the delegates of all countries that might benefit by agreements of this sort—in particular the Balkan countries—to confer immediately with each other in order to reach as soon as possible an amicable understanding which may draw closer the bonds between the Press of their countries and thus favourably influence public opinion.”

*Periodical Conferences of Press Experts.*

“With a view to examining, in the near future, the extent to which the resolutions and recommendations of this Conference have been acted upon by the Governments and other organisations concerned, and also to considering various new problems arising from changed conditions due to the application of those resolutions and recommendations,

“The Conference requests the Council of the League of Nations to consider the advisability of calling a subsequent Conference and also of making such Conferences periodical.”

*Right of Reply.*

“The Conference decides to refer the consideration of the right of reply to a subsequent Press Conference ; and requests that it be studied meanwhile by the League of Nations, with a view to issuing a report.”

---

<sup>1</sup> This resolution was adopted by twenty-seven votes to two.



Official No.: C.1002.M.558.1931.IX.  
[Conf. D. 44.]

Geneva, December 21st, 1931.

## DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE

---

*Note by the Secretary-General:*

After consultation with the President of the Conference, the Secretary-General has the honour to submit to the Governments invited to the Conference the accompanying draft rules of procedure.

---

### DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE.

*(For adoption by the Conference.)*

---

#### **Organs of the Conference.**

##### I. DELEGATIONS.

1. The Conference shall consist of the delegations appointed by the Governments invited to the Conference.

2. Each delegation shall consist of one or more delegates who may be accompanied by substitute delegates, advisers, experts and secretaries.

##### II. THE PRESIDENT.

1. The President shall announce the opening, suspension and adjournment of the meetings; he shall submit to the Conference all communications whose importance appears to him to warrant that course; he shall ensure the observance of the rules of procedure, accord the right to address the Conference, declare the debates to be closed, put questions to the vote and announce the result of the voting.

2. The Conference shall elect its Vice-Presidents, who shall act for the President if occasion arises.

##### III. GENERAL COMMITTEE.

1. The General Committee of the Conference shall consist of the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the Conference Commissions.

2. The General Committee shall assist the President in the general direction of the work of the Conference, in the constitution of such commissions as the Conference decides to set up, in deciding on the communications to be made to the Conference, in the framing of the agenda for each plenary meeting, and in the determination of the order of priority for its various items.

##### IV. COMMITTEE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF DELEGATES' CREDENTIALS.

1. A committee of five members nominated by the President and appointed by the Conference shall be set up to examine the delegates' credentials and shall report to the Conference without delay.

2. Any plenipotentiaries whose admission cannot be decided upon forthwith shall sit provisionally with the same rights as other plenipotentiaries, unless the Conference decides otherwise.

##### V. COMMISSIONS.

1. The Conference shall have the right, according to the exigencies of the business on hand and convenience of work, to set up commissions on which all delegations may be represented, as well as committees consisting of a limited number of delegates.

2. The constitution of the following commissions is hereby decided upon :  
Land Commission,  
Naval Commission,  
Air Commission,  
Commission on National Defence Expenditure,  
Conference Commission.
3. Each commission shall appoint its Chairman and its Vice-Chairman or its Vice-Chairmen and shall, at the appropriate time, appoint one or more Rapporteurs.
4. The commissions may themselves set up sub-commissions.

#### VI. SECRETARIAT.

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall be responsible for the secretarial work of the Conference and of its commissions, sub-commissions and committees as well as of the General Committee of the Conference.

#### Procedure.

#### VII. PUBLICITY.

The meetings of the Conference and of its commissions shall be held in public unless otherwise decided. Sub-commissions and committees will as a rule sit in private.

#### VIII. RIGHT TO ADDRESS THE CONFERENCE.

1. No member may address the Conference without the permission of the President. As a general rule, speakers shall be called upon in the order in which they have signified their desire to speak.
2. The Chairmen and Rapporteurs of commissions shall be accorded precedence for the purpose of defending or explaining the conclusions arrived at by their commissions.
3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to each speaker.
4. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion. If necessary, he may direct the speaker to resume his seat.
5. If, when a question is under discussion, a member rises to a point of order, such point of order shall be immediately decided by the President.

#### IX. LANGUAGES.

1. Speeches in French shall be summarised in English, and vice versa, by an interpreter belonging to the Secretariat.
2. A representative speaking in another language shall provide for the translation of his speech into one of these two languages.
3. All documents, resolutions and reports circulated by the President or the Secretariat shall be drawn up in both French and English.
4. Any representative may have documents circulated in a language other than French or English, but the Secretariat will not be responsible for their translation or printing.

#### X. PREVIOUS QUESTION : CLOSURE.

1. During the discussion of any question, any delegation may move the previous question or the adjournment. Any such question shall have priority in the debate. In addition to the proposer of the motion, two speakers may address the Conference, one in favour of and one against the motion.
2. A delegation may at any time move the closure of the debate, whether any other representative has signified his wish to speak or not. If application is made for permission to speak against the closure, not more than two speakers may be called upon, one to speak in favour and one to speak against. The Conference shall decide on the closure by a majority of votes.

#### XI. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENTS.

1. As a general rule, no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote unless copies of it have been circulated to all representatives not later than the day preceding the meeting.
  2. The President may, however, authorise a departure from this rule. If any objection is raised, he shall take the opinion of the Conference, which shall decide by a majority of votes.
-



## XII. VOTING.

1. The Conference shall vote by heads of delegations rising in their seats, and commissions shall vote by delegates raising their hands, except in cases where it is decided that a vote shall be taken by nominal roll-call.

2. Delegations which declare that they abstain shall be regarded as not present.

3. When a number of proposals are before the Conference, the proposal furthest removed in substance from the principal one—that is to say, from the one on which the discussion was opened—shall be voted on first.

4. Parts of a proposal shall be voted on separately if a delegation requests that the proposal be divided. In such a case, a vote must be taken on the whole text after its various parts have been voted upon separately.

5. If an amendment striking out part of a proposal is moved, the Conference shall first vote on whether the words in question shall stand as part of the proposal. If the decision is in the negative, the amendment shall then be put to the vote. When an amendment adds to a proposal, it should be voted on first and, if it is adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

## XIII. ELECTIONS.

1. Elections shall be carried out by secret ballot. In exceptional cases, elections may take place by acclamation, if no delegation objects.

2. If, when only one person is to be elected, no one obtains at the ballot an absolute majority of votes, a new ballot shall be taken; but on this occasion the voting shall be confined to the two candidates who have obtained the largest number of votes at the first ballot. If there is, at this ballot, an equality of votes for the two candidates, the elder candidate shall be declared elected.

3. When a number of elective places of the same nature are to be filled at the same time, those persons who obtain an absolute majority at the first ballot shall be elected. If the number of persons obtaining such majority is less than the number of persons to be elected, there shall be a second ballot to fill the remaining places, the voting being restricted to the unsuccessful candidates who obtained the greatest number of votes at the first ballot, but not more than double in number the places remaining to be filled. Those candidates, to the number required to be elected, who receive the greatest number of votes at the second ballot shall be declared elected.

## XIV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

The Conference's rules of procedure shall also apply, with suitable modifications to the commissions, sub-commissions and committees.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D. 44 (1).*

Geneva, February 3rd, 1932.

## RULES OF PROCEDURE.

---

### Organs of the Conference.

#### I. DELEGATIONS.

1. The Conference shall consist of the delegations appointed by the Governments invited to the Conference.

2. Each delegation shall consist of one or more delegates who may be accompanied by substitute delegates, advisers, experts and secretaries.

#### II. THE PRESIDENT.

1. The President shall announce the opening, suspension and adjournment of the meetings; he shall submit to the Conference all communications whose importance appears to him to warrant that course; he shall ensure the observance of the rules of procedure, accord the right to address the Conference, declare the debates to be closed, put questions to the vote and announce the result of the voting.

2. The Conference shall elect its Vice-Presidents, one of whom shall act for the President if occasion arises.

### III. BUREAU.

1. The Bureau of the Conference shall consist of the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the Commissions, on which all the Delegations are represented. The Honorary President shall be a member of the Bureau ex-officio.
2. The Bureau shall assist the President in the general direction of the work of the Conference.

### IV. COMMITTEE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF DELEGATES' CREDENTIALS.

1. The committee set up to examine the delegates' credentials shall report to the Conference.
2. Any plenipotentiaries whose admission cannot be decided upon forthwith shall sit provisionally with the same rights as other plenipotentiaries, unless the Conference decides otherwise.

### V. COMMISSIONS.

1. The Conference shall have the right, according to the exigencies of the business on hand and convenience of work, to set up commissions on which all delegations may be represented by a delegate, who may be assisted by advisers, experts and secretaries. Committees may also be set up consisting of delegates of a limited number of countries.
2. Each commission shall appoint its Chairman and its Vice-Chairman or its Vice-Chairmen and shall, at the appropriate time, appoint one or more Rapporteurs.
3. The commissions may themselves set up sub-commissions.

### VI. SECRETARIAT.

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall be responsible for the secretarial work of the Conference and of its commissions, sub-commissions and committees as well as of the General Committee of the Conference.

### Procedure.

### VII. PUBLICITY.

The meetings of the Conference and of its commissions shall be held in public unless the Conference or the commission otherwise decide. Sub-commissions and committees will as a rule sit in private.

### VIII. RIGHT TO ADDRESS THE CONFERENCE.

1. No member may address the Conference without the permission of the President. As a general rule, speakers shall be called upon in the order in which they have signified their desire to speak.
2. The Chairmen and Rapporteurs of commissions shall be accorded precedence for the purpose of defending or explaining the conclusions arrived at by their commissions.
3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to each speaker.
4. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion. If necessary, he may direct the speaker to resume his seat.
5. If, when a question is under discussion, a member rises to a point of order, such point of order shall be immediately decided by the President.

### IX. LANGUAGES.

1. Speeches in French shall be summarised in English, and vice versa, by an interpreter belonging to the Secretariat.
2. A representative speaking in another language shall provide for the translation of his speech into one of these two languages.



3. All documents, resolutions and reports circulated by the President or the Secretariat shall be drawn up in both French and English.

4. Any representative may have documents circulated in a language other than French or English, but the Secretariat will not be responsible for their translation or printing.

#### X. PREVIOUS QUESTION: CLOSURE.

1. During the discussion of any question, any delegation may move the previous question or the adjournment. Any such question shall have priority in the debate. In addition to the proposer of the motion, two speakers may address the Conference, one in favour of and one against the motion.

2. A delegation may at any time move the closure of the debate, whether any other representative has signified his wish to speak or not. If application is made for permission to speak against the closure, not more than two speakers may be called upon, one to speak in favour and one to speak against. The Conference shall decide on the closure by a majority of votes.

#### XI. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENTS.

1. As a general rule, no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote unless copies of it have been circulated to all representatives not later than the day preceding the meeting.

2. The President may, however, authorise a departure from this rule. If any objection is raised, he shall take the opinion of the Conference, which shall decide by a majority of votes.

3. Subject to the general rules of procedure, and the rule in Part X, paragraph 1, in particular, the Conference must come to a decision on all propositions submitted to it by delegations, if the delegation so demands.

#### XII. VOTING.

1. The Conference shall vote by nominal roll-call. The commissions shall vote by delegates raising their hands, except in cases where it is decided that a vote shall be taken by nominal roll-call.

2. Delegations which declare that they abstain shall be regarded as not present.

3. When a number of proposals are before the Conference, the proposal furthest removed in substance from the principal one shall be voted on first.

4. Parts of a proposal shall be voted on separately if a delegation requests that the proposal be divided. In such a case, a vote must be taken on the whole text after its various parts have been voted upon separately.

5. If an amendment striking out part of a proposal is moved, the Conference shall first vote on whether the words in question shall stand as part of the proposal. When an amendment adds to a proposal, the amendment should be voted on first and, if it is adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

#### XIII. ELECTIONS.

1. Elections shall as a general rule be carried out by secret ballot.

2. If, when only one person is to be elected, no one obtains at the ballot an absolute majority of votes, a new ballot shall be taken; but on this occasion the voting shall be confined to the two candidates who have obtained the largest number of votes at the first ballot. If there is, at this ballot, an equality of votes for the two candidates, the elder candidate shall be declared elected.

3. When a number of elective places of the same nature are to be filled at the same time, those persons who obtain an absolute majority at the first ballot shall be elected. If the number of persons obtaining such majority is less than the number of persons to be elected, there shall be a second ballot to fill the remaining places, the voting being restricted to the unsuccessful candidates who obtained the greatest number of votes at the first ballot, but not more than double in number the places remaining to be filled. Those candidates, to the number required to be elected, who receive the greatest number of votes at the second ballot shall be declared elected.

#### XIV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

The Conference's rules of procedure shall also apply, with suitable modifications, to the commissions, sub-commissions and committees.

---

Geneva, February 4th, 1932.

## REPORT OF THE PETITIONS COMMITTEE.

Rapporteur: M. REYNAUD (France).

The Petitions Committee yesterday held the first meeting at which, in accordance with the instructions it has received from the Conference, it examined the text of the petitions already received and the conditions under which these petitions could be submitted to the Conference.

The Conference had approved at its first meeting its President's suggestion to hold an *ad hoc* meeting on Saturday afternoon to hear the persons who are submitting petitions. The Petitions Committee had been instructed to define the conditions under which this presentation could take place.

While recognising the importance of the international and national organisations which some of the petitioners represent, the Committee was unable to disregard the fact that it was exceptional for a Conference consisting exclusively of the plenipotentiary representatives of Governments to hear persons who, whatever their personal standing might be, speak on behalf of private organisations.

No one would be prepared to admit that, after the discussions of the Conference, private persons should be allowed to take part therein officially, even in the form of petitions.

The Committee therefore wishes to make it quite clear that there can only be one single meeting prior to the opening of the general discussion.

Moreover, in order to mark clearly the exceptional character of this meeting, it proposes that a summary of the speeches made on Saturday should be included in an annex to the Minutes of the meeting.

As regards the conditions under which these speeches will be heard on Saturday, the Committee is of opinion:

1. That, in accordance with the suggestion made at the opening meeting of the Conference by its President, the text of these statements should be previously examined by the Committee, which has duly authorised its Chairman to do so. Only texts which have been submitted to the Committee before the approval of this report can be taken into consideration.
2. That the time allowed to each speaker should be limited, so that all may be heard at the one meeting devoted to the purpose.

The Committee also proposes to rely for the application of these rules on the President of the Conference.

Nevertheless, while allowing the President of the Conference all necessary latitude, the Committee has decided in order to facilitate the progress of the extraordinary meeting, to invite the various petitioners to group themselves together in the following categories:

1. Women's Associations;
2. Students' Organisations;
3. Religious Groups;
4. League of Nations Unions;
5. Labour Organisations.

The Committee recommends that each group should agree to entrust to one single person the duty of speaking on behalf of the group.

Should the Conference receive requests from associations which cannot be placed in one of the above categories, the Chairman of the Committee will get into touch with the President of the Conference, in order to decide the procedure to be followed.

The representatives of associations or groups will be allowed to speak on Saturday to the Conference, in the order to be fixed by the President.

These are the proposals submitted by the Committee for the meeting to be held for the purpose on Saturday next. In future, the Committee proposes to keep to the normal procedure regarding the reception of delegations by the President and the publication of communications addressed to the Secretariat by international and national organisations. These suggestions will apply both to communications already received and which will not be heard at the meeting on Saturday and to any which may reach the Secretariat of the Conference at any time before its close.

\* \* \*

### RECEPTION OF DELEGATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT.

Several delegations of international and national organisations have asked leave to present to the President of the Conference resolutions passed by those organisations or their good wishes



for its success. There seems no reason why the President should not receive the delegations of these organisations. In doing so, moreover, he will simply be following the precedent established by other international conferences.

#### PUBLICITY.

(a) *Communications from international organisations.*

The Conference might request the Secretariat to draw up and publish in the Conference *Journal* a list of the communications transmitted to the Conference at the plenary meeting and of those received by the Secretariat.

A brief summary of their contents would also be given.

(b) *Communications from national organisations.*

A list of the names of these organisations and the dates of their communications might be drawn up and published in the Conference *Journal*.

The Secretariat will also provide statistics of telegrams and letters from private persons embodying a similar formula. As was decided at the Hague Conference of 1907, the documents containing petitions might be placed at the disposal of any delegations that may wish to consult them.

\* \* \*

Should any difficulty arise in carrying out these rules, the Secretariat will consult the Committee.

Official No.: Conf. D. 55.

Geneva, February 4th, 1932.

## REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO DRAW UP RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE.

Rapporteur : M. COLBAN (Norway).

The Committee to draw up Rules of Procedure for the Conference met on February 3rd and 4th, under the Chairmanship of the President of the Conference, and made certain changes in the draft rules of procedure drawn up by the Secretary-General, which the Conference had referred to the Committee as the basis of its labours: comments on the most important of these changes will be found in this report. The Committee also saw fit to make a certain number of recommendations to the Conference, which are also specified below, with regard to the application of the rules.

*Part II, Paragraph 2.* — The Committee proposes to the Conference to fix the number of Vice-Presidents at fourteen, considering this number to be sufficient to allow of the inclusion in the Bureau of representatives of Germany, the British Empire, the United States of America, France, Italy, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an equal number of representatives of other countries.

*Part III, Paragraph 1.* — As regards the composition of the Bureau, it is understood that the Chairmen of Commissions on which all the delegations are represented will be added to the Bureau, where the Chairmen of Commissions are not taken from the list of Vice-Presidents elected by the Conference.

The Committee was unanimous in the view that the Honorary President elected by the Assembly should be a member of the Bureau *ex officio*.

*Part IV, Paragraph 1.* — The text of the draft rules has been amended to allow of the work of the Committee set up to examine delegates' credentials continuing during the Conference.

*Part V.* — It will be noticed that the Committee has proposed the suppression of paragraph 2 of the original draft rules. This omission was proposed on the ground that it is premature to decide here and now as to the establishment of the Commissions specified in the paragraph. The Committee was unanimous in the view that it might be necessary from the outset to refer certain questions to the General Commission, and it accordingly proposes that the Bureau should request the Conference to decide now on the constitution of this General Commission.

As regards the four other Commissions — namely, the Land, Naval, Air and National Defence Expenditure Commissions enumerated in the above-mentioned paragraph 2 of the initial draft — the creation of which will almost certainly be required, the Committee leaves the decision as to their constitution and the time of such constitution, if decided upon, to the Bureau which will in due course make recommendations to the Conference on the subject. The Committee was also of opinion that the Bureau might, if necessary, establish mixed Commissions to deal with questions coming within the sphere of activity of more Commissions than one.

*Part XI, Paragraph 3.* — The Committee draws attention to Paragraph 3, which is entirely new and does not appear to call for explanation.

Geneva, February 13th, 1932.

## PROPOSALS OF THE POLISH DELEGATION WITH REGARD TO THE GRADUAL ATTAINMENT OF MORAL DISARMAMENT.

---

Referring to its memorandum of September 17th, 1931 (document Conf.D.16), the Polish Government, being convinced of the absolute necessity of achieving moral disarmament in every field of public life controlled by the organs of government, and anxious to facilitate the work of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments by creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence, has the honour to suggest to the Conference that the following proposals be forthwith brought under consideration:

### I. REFORMS TO BE INTRODUCED IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION.

Inasmuch as the laws in force in the various countries do not take into account the new necessities arising out of the development of international relations, but confine themselves to protecting purely national interests, the Polish Government proposes that consideration be given to the possibility of adjusting national laws to the present stage of development of international life. The object of such consideration would be to define a class of actions incompatible with satisfactory international relations and dangerous to the peace of the world, such as the inciting of public opinion to warlike sentiments, propaganda aimed at inducing the State to violate international law, and the deliberate spreading of false or distorted reports or forged documents likely to embitter the relations between States.

On the basis of the results of this consideration, it would be possible to conclude a first international convention whereby Governments would agree to make the actions so specified punishable offences under their laws.

This first step might be followed by others as international ties were drawn closer.

### II. PRESS.

Inasmuch as newspapers and periodicals determine the main currents of public opinion, and thereby exercise a considerable influence on international life, the Polish Government proposes that a conference be held, as soon as possible, of qualified representatives of journalists' and publishers' professional associations, to consider what steps could be taken to put the idea of moral disarmament into effect so far as the Press is concerned. This conference might further discuss the specific proposals formulated in the Polish memorandum of September 17th, 1931.

The results of the proceedings of this conference might afford a basis for concerted action, both by Governments and by professional Press associations.

### III. EDUCATION.

Inasmuch as the future peace of the world depends upon the spirit in which the young are brought up, and the whole effort to organise an international community would be in vain if the young were not taught to look towards peace as the supreme good, the Polish Government proposes that the recommendations and suggestions already adopted should be progressively put into effect by international undertakings. In this connection, attention should be drawn to the desirability of a general revision of school text-books, to the introduction, in educational institutions of every grade, of instruction concerning the League, international co-operation and the life of other peoples, and to the importance of Government encouragement for closer relations between students and teachers in different countries.

### IV. BROADCASTING, THE CINEMATOGRAPH AND THE STAGE.

Inasmuch as international opinion is influenced by every kind of public manifestation of thought, such as broadcasting, the cinema and the stage, the Polish Government proposes that steps be taken to prevent, in these directions, abuses which would be dangerous to a good international understanding.

As regards broadcasting, the Polish Government is of opinion that considerable progress would be made if a general convention could be concluded on the subject. It should be observed that that part of the broadcasting programmes which deals with international relations is generally



reserved for Governments and official news agencies. If Governments would undertake to adhere to the principles of moral disarmament in their exercise of this privilege, they would contribute greatly to the achievement of moral disarmament in this field.

Films and plays are generally subject to Government censorship, and the Polish Government therefore proposes that the Governments should undertake to prohibit the exhibition of films and the performance of plays which might embitter international relations, and, on the other hand, to encourage—e.g., by exemption from tax—films and plays conveying propaganda in favour of peace.

## V.

Needless to say, the realisation of all these ideas in regard to the attitude of Governments to private activities would be entirely valueless if the Governments did not adhere to the fundamental ideas of moral disarmament in their mutual relations. The achievement here contemplated will not be complete unless the international policy of Governments is in harmony with their efforts in the direction of moral disarmament.

## PROCEDURE.

The Polish Government proposes that the question of moral disarmament be referred to the General Commission, which will doubtless appoint a sub-committee to draft the necessary convention or conventions.

Official No.: **Conf. D. 77.**

[A.16.1924.IX. Extract.]

Geneva, February 13th, 1932.

## PRIVATE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR.

### EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY MIXED COMMISSION FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

*(Document A.16.1924.IX mentioned in the proposals of the Spanish Delegation [Conf.D./74].)*

#### I. MAJORITY REPORT.

The Commission has continued during the year its investigations into the control of the private manufacture of arms on the basis of the following resolution taken by the fourth Assembly and forwarded to the Commission by the Council:

“The Assembly recommends that the Council should invite the Temporary Mixed Commission to refer its draft for the control of private manufacture of arms and munitions to the Economic Committee of the League for its observations, and that it should also endeavour, in co-operation with the Economic Committee, to draw up draft conventions for this purpose.

“The Assembly recommends that, when the Council has received the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission concerning the arms traffic and private manufacture of arms, it should consider the question of summoning an international conference to draw up conventions on this subject.”

The draft which is referred to in this resolution, and which was submitted to the Commission by Sir Hubert LLEWELLYN SMITH with the following title: “Draft Convention to serve as a basis of consideration at the Conference which may consider both private manufacture and trade in arms”, consists of various general proposals for the regulation of private manufacture.

At its February session, the Commission had on its agenda a draft submitted by one of its members, Colonel CARNEGIE, incorporating Sir Hubert LLEWELLYN SMITH's general proposals and supplementing them with other provisions, the whole being drawn up in the form of an international convention.

The Commission believed that it would be complying with the Assembly's intentions if it studied this more complete draft submitted by Colonel CARNEGIE before asking for the co-operation of the Economic Committee. This is the work to which the Commission has devoted itself throughout the year.

The First Sub-Commission, to which the Commission, after considering the principles contained in the draft, entrusted the detailed investigation of the problem, decided to submit the question to a Committee consisting of the following members of the Commission: Colonel CARNEGIE, M. HODAC, M. JOUHAUX, General DE MARINIS and Colonel RÉQUIN. This Committee, which met at Prague under the chairmanship of M. HODAC, first of all decided that, as the question of the definition of the term "arms and munitions" was at that time under consideration by the Permanent Advisory Commission, it would be advisable to draw the latter's attention to the expediency of defining also the articles to be included in the proposed convention for the control of private manufacture. The Permanent Advisory Commission discussed this question at its May meeting held in Paris. In its report to the Council the Commission put forward the following opinion:

"The Committee of the Temporary Mixed Commission, which met at Prague, expressed the opinion that the list of 'arms and munitions' of war to be drawn up by the Permanent Advisory Committee with a view to the control of the traffic in arms should be the same as the list of 'munitions and implements of war' the private manufacture of which was referred to in Article 8 of the Covenant.

"The Permanent Advisory Commission regrets that it cannot comply with this request to the letter, but it believes that it has complied with the spirit. The Permanent Advisory Commission recalls that, in a report submitted to the Council on May 17th, 1922, it *defined* war material as 'material exclusively designed for war', and drew attention to the technical difficulties which made it impossible to draw up a complete *enumeration*. As the same difficulties stand in the way of drawing up a list for the requirements of the national control of the private manufacture of war material or for any other purpose, the Permanent Advisory Commission, rather than give an incomplete and controversial list of war material, has preferred to draw up a list, which it believes to be complete, of all arms which are or shall be constructed for the purposes of land, sea or aerial warfare, whatever their mode of employment by armies, warships, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. The Permanent Advisory Commission has therefore included in Category I all arms and munitions which might be utilised either by weapons of war, such as warships or tanks, or by weapons not necessarily designed for war, such as aeroplanes."

As to the substance of the question, the Committee thought that it should define the principles which should guide it in its investigation in so far as they could be drawn from the previous work of the Temporary Mixed Commission. The aim of this work is defined in the following paragraph from Article 8 of the Covenant:

"The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety."

In regard to the principles which should underlie the measures referred to in this article of the Covenant, there was a certain divergence of views among the members of the Committee on the following two points: (a) The prohibition of private manufacture; (b) The nature of the control.

The majority of the members held that, as the Committee had been appointed to examine a draft convention for the control of the private manufacture of arms, it should obviously leave out of consideration the question of the prohibition of private manufacture.

This majority took the view that, owing to the very nature of the subject, the control of private manufacture should be exclusively national though based on principles common to all countries. International trade in arms, as is clear from the expression itself, extends beyond national frontiers, whereas the private manufacture of arms must be regarded as a purely national matter, the regulation and inspection of which should be left to the national authorities.

At its July session held at Geneva, the Temporary Mixed Commission endorsed the view of the majority of the Committee. Having considered the technical opinion of the Permanent Advisory Commission quoted above, the Commission was of opinion that the material the private manufacture of which would be made subject to control should include the arms, munitions and implements of war enumerated in Category I of Article I of the draft Convention on the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War.

With regard to the principle underlying the Convention, the majority of the Commission also endorsed the theory of national control. Further, in its study of the draft Convention, the Commission has confined itself to those clauses which have a purely technical character, considering that it was unnecessary to deal with the diplomatic or legal clauses required for the purpose of completing an international convention, since these clauses would certainly be similar to those contained in the Convention on the Control of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War. The Commission, however, thought fit to point out that one of these clauses should specify that the rights and obligations resulting from the Treaties of Peace should remain unaffected.



The text drawn up by the Commission is given below.

PRINCIPLES RECOMMENDED AS A BASIS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE  
NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE PRIVATE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS, MUNITIONS  
AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR.

*Preamble.*

" The Temporary Mixed Commission:

" Bearing in mind that the ' evil effects ' of private manufacture mentioned in paragraph 5 of Article 8 of the Covenant can be prevented by means of a control executed in each country by the Government on principles common to all;

" That the main purpose of this control, while maintaining intact the right of every Government to have recourse to either private or State enterprises for the acquisition of the war material for its own needs, is to:

" (1) Prevent all unauthorised manufacture, and thus complete the Convention for the Control of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War;

" (2) Prevent all improper and corrupt practices in the course of operations connected with the acquisition of war material by States:

" Submits to the Council of the League of Nations the following principles as a possible basis for an International Convention on the Control of Private Manufacture of Arms, Munitions and Implements of War:

" I. The war material, the private manufacture of which is to be controlled, shall include the arms, munitions and implements of war of Category I defined in Article I of the Convention for the Control of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War.

" II. The term ' private manufacture ' shall apply to any manufacture carried out for the profit of private individuals by an enterprise which is wholly or partially engaged in obtaining contracts for the manufacture and sale of arms, munitions and implements of war in Category I, or any other private enterprise which has for its main object the manufacture and sale of component parts of the above-mentioned articles in Category I.

" III. The manufacture by private enterprise of war material without the explicit consent of the Government shall be prohibited.

" This consent shall be in the form of a licence granted for a period to be determined by the Government and under the following conditions:

" (a) The licence must stipulate in writing the kind or kinds of war material the holder of a licence is allowed to manufacture;

" (b) The holder of a licence must communicate to the Government issuing the manufacturing licence the names, styles and addresses of the proprietor or proprietors in the case of enterprises belonging to a private individual or to the partners in a firm having a collective title and those of the directors and managers in the case of enterprises organised as commercial companies. The Government shall give official publicity to this information;

" (c) The holder of a licence shall supply to the Government issuing the licence the names of all the enterprises with whom he has concluded agreements or associations of any kind whatever with the view to the production of war material;

" (d) The holder shall publish annually a report of the enterprise's industrial, commercial and financial operations relating to the manufacture of the material for which the licence has been granted. The Government will decide as to the manner in which the report shall be verified and the extent of its publication;

" (e) The Government of a State issuing a licence shall have the right to inspect the works of the applicant before and after the issue of the licence and during the period of the licence;

" (f) The Government reserves, in dealing with a licence-holder, prior claim to the purchase and use of any patent and process and method and composition and any other like thing pertaining to the manufacture of war material.

" IV. The holder of a licence must not be in a position to influence a newspaper, either by owning a sufficient proportion of its capital or by holding any post whatever in its offices. This measure shall apply equally to all directors, managers and high officials of the firm holding the licence.

" The holder of a licence must agree not to carry on propaganda of any kind relating to the war material for which a licence has been granted.

" V. The exercise of a legislative mandate is declared to be incompatible with the simultaneous exercise of the function of director or manager of a private enterprise engaged in the manufacture of war material holding contracts with the State.

" VI. The Governments agree to send to the Central International Office lists of the names and addresses of all enterprises which are licensed by them. The Central International Office shall publish the lists of the licences issued by the Governments as soon as they have been received."

## 2. MINORITY REPORT.

The undersigned members of the Temporary Mixed Commission regret that they are unable to accept the report of the majority of the Commission concerning the control of the private manufacture of arms. They wish first of all to state that in their opinion the best way to prevent the evil effects which the Covenant recognises as being attendant upon the private manufacture of arms would be absolute prohibition. But even if, in a spirit of conciliation, they were prepared to admit an intermediate solution—namely, that private manufacture should be maintained but should be controlled—they could not accept as a satisfactory solution the confinement of such control within national frontiers. They consider that the international character of the problem cannot possibly be denied. In the first place, amongst the objections enumerated in the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on September 15th, 1921, as having been raised against the private and uncontrolled manufacture of arms, the following are of a pre-eminently international character, namely:

2. That armament firms have attempted to bribe Government officials, both at home and abroad;
3. That armament firms have disseminated false reports concerning the military and naval programmes of *various countries*, in order to stimulate armament expenditure;
4. That armament firms have sought to influence public opinion through the control of newspapers in their own and *foreign* countries;
5. That armament firms have organised *international armament rings* through which the armament race has been accentuated by playing off one country against another;
6. That armament firms have organised *international armament trusts* which have increased the price of armaments sold to Governments.

These quotations from the 1921 Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission would suffice to establish the international character of the problem. But the undersigned consider that no such proof is required, as the international character of the question is openly proclaimed by its being placed in the forefront of those problems which led to the conclusion of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8 of the Covenant contains the paragraph which forms the very basis of the Temporary Mixed Commission's work in this connection. The paragraph reads:

" The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. *The Council shall decide how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented*, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety."

This text leaves no shadow of doubt as to the genuinely international character of the control to which the authors and the signatories of the Covenant desired to subject the private manufacture of arms and munitions.

These differences in principle with the majority lead to differences on matters of detail in regard to the text which has been adopted. The undersigned do not think it necessary to dwell on these latter differences; they would merely observe that in their opinion, for the above-mentioned reasons, the text is inadequate on the following points:

The international character of the control, and the rôle of the Council of the League of Nations in the matter;

The control of the accounts of undertakings for the manufacture of arms and munitions;

The measures calculated to prevent owners, directors or higher officials of private enterprises for the manufacture of arms exercising undue influence over organs of public opinion and in particular over newspapers;

Measures calculated to prevent the establishment of international rings consisting of firms concerned in the manufacture of arms;

Measures to ensure uniform methods in regard to the national inspection of enterprises for the manufacture of arms and munitions and steps to co-ordinate such efforts by international arrangement.

Signed by MM. JANCÓVICI, JOUHAUX, OUDEGEEST and THORBERG.



Geneva, February 24th, 1932.

## MORAL DISARMAMENT

### DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL FORWARDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION ON INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION.

*Note by the Secretary-General.*

At the request of the President of the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, and with the approval of the President of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the delegates to the Conference the following documents :

- I. Letter from Professor Gilbert Murray, President of the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation.
- II. Annexes :
  - (a) Note on Intellectual Co-operation and Moral Disarmament ;
  - (b) Memorandum on the Organisation and Working of Intellectual Co-operation from the Point of View of Moral Disarmament.

#### I. LETTER FROM PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY, PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION.

January 19th, 1932.

Dear Mr. Henderson,

In response to the letter of the Polish Government on " Moral Disarmament ", I beg to enclose a statement of those activities of the I.C.I.C.<sup>1</sup> which are concerned, directly or indirectly, with that object.

The Committee, to quote one of its own documents, regards international co-operation as the normal method of world government and of human progress, and has in all its activities a twofold purpose : first, the advance of knowledge and the maintenance of intellectual standards, and, secondly, the increase of mutual understanding and goodwill between nations. Both these objects, as we understand them, require regular practice of international co-operation in the fields of science, art and letters. For example, if we try to organise co-operation between museums or libraries in different nations, our object is both to make each institution more practically useful, and also to encourage students and researchers in each country to look confidently to their colleagues in other countries for friendly aid. In the work of the International Committee of Experts on " Instruction in the Aims of the League ", or in the regular Conferences of the various National Institutes for the scientific study of international politics, this double object is attained even more clearly.

One part of the Committee's work is now practically finished. The various international learned societies which immediately after the war were split into mutually hostile divisions are now reconciled and united. Also the extreme distress of the learned class in central and eastern Europe is not nearly so acute as it was. But the field of work for Moral Disarmament which lies before us in the future is almost unlimited, or limited chiefly by the smallness of our means. Any further tasks in this direction which the Council or the Disarmament Conference may think fit to lay upon us will, I can assure you, be accepted by my colleagues and myself with the utmost readiness and executed with all the care and zeal of which we are capable.

Believe me, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) Gilbert MURRAY.

<sup>1</sup> International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation.

## II. ANNEXES.

### (a) NOTE ON INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION AND MORAL DISARMAMENT

Part of the problem known as Moral Disarmament comes to a great extent under the heading of intellectual co-operation.

It is clear that neither the Committee nor its committees are concerned with certain aspects of the vast problem of bringing the peoples together, which the League of Nations is endeavouring to solve. By organising international relations and encouraging the continuous and regular collaboration of the countries of which it is composed, the League endeavours to create a better international atmosphere and to put an end to rivalries and enmities.

Sometimes valuable forms of collaboration co-ordinated by the League with a view to international intellectual co-operation happen to be associated with other activities, giving the support of their high authority to work undertaken in other fields. In July last, for example, the Committee of Scientific Advisers met at Geneva, followed later by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation itself, and in their endeavour to defend the rights and future of the human intellect passed resolutions of great moral weight in favour of the success of the Disarmament Conference.

But the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation is directly concerned only with the moral disarmament to which the Polish Memorandum relates. It has already taken action in this connection, drawn up a programme and achieved results. There is no need to dwell on the obvious truth that it is building for the future and that its work will require much time, relying as it does above all on the education and instruction of peoples, and in particular of the younger generations. Complete success can only be attained by progressive stages : but once it is attained there can be no doubt that it will be decisive. To hasten this result, the support of the Governments represented at the Disarmament Conference on those points in the programme of intellectual co-operation which relate more directly to the endeavour to promote a spirit of international peace, understanding and friendship would be of the utmost help.

One of the first suggestions that occur is that of an appeal to the Press to facilitate the work of moral disarmament both by refraining from envenoming disputes and by exercising a positive pacific influence. These questions have not been dealt with up to the present internationally by the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation of the League. It is clear that there are great possibilities in this field of work for moral disarmament. The desired results might even be an immediate improvement in international relations, to say nothing of the educative effect which action by the Press might have in the long run. The present memorandum confines itself to the programme laid down for the work of intellectual co-operation and does not deal with these questions : but there can be no doubt that the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation, which is already in touch with a number of international associations of journalists, might help the League to solve these questions, if the latter were to decide to take action in this direction, which might be conducted jointly by a number of its organisations.

### I. Urgent Questions.

Of those activities of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation which are most closely concerned with the promotion of a spirit of mutual understanding and comprehension, some are capable, if actively pushed, of yielding rapid results. This class of questions includes the following :

(a) *Instruction in the Work of the League.* — Machinery has already been set up (see attached annex) to induce the Governments to give teaching of this kind in their schools at all stages. Documentary material has been placed at their disposal, particularly with a view to facilitating the training of teachers. The various countries periodically notify the Secretariat of the League of the steps which they have taken and of the results achieved. How and to what extent can this form of activity be intensified? This, it would appear, is the question which an assembly of representatives of Governments desiring to deal with this problem should put to itself.

It is conceivable that a firm obligation might be assumed to devote time at every stage of education to instruction in the work of the League under conditions to be determined. The conditions would relate, not merely to the time to be given to such instruction in the schools and particularly in the teachers' training colleges, but also to the subjects of instruction and to some extent the governing principles on which the lessons should be based (official documents, scrutiny of books used, prize competitions for teachers and pupils, visits of study to existing international institutions, etc.).

But, once the principle of such an undertaking was admitted, it would remain for experts to determine the manner and form. The question of the adaptation of the teaching, the age of the pupils and the character of the school calls for treatment by persons with special knowledge.

(b) *International Relations.* — While recognising the importance of instruction in the work of the League, it must be said that it cannot have its full value unless it is placed within its proper framework and combined with instruction in international relations. This question, which already arises in the case of secondary education, is of the first importance



in higher education and in the training of professors and teachers for all forms of teaching. The possibilities are the same as in the case of instruction in the work of the League in the narrower sense: but here again, once a decision of principle has been reached or an international obligation assumed, the advice of experts would be necessary to determine the exact steps to be taken. This impinges on the organisation of universities and of national education, and the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation should be asked to make a careful study of the point. A first step has already been taken by the Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations in connection with the Sub-Committee of Experts for Instruction in the Aims of the League.

(c) *School Text-books.* — Instruction in international relations is linked up with the still wider question which has so often been discussed, particularly at congresses of historians and educationalists, of how the nations are to get to know one another better. We are here confronted with a series of part problems — instruction in civilisation, and in history, and the revision of text-books. The Assembly of the League has several times dealt with this latter limited aspect of the general problem, and the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation has itself considered the subject last year with a view to proposing solutions. A report with documentary material attached prepared by the Institute contains particulars of all the measures which have been proposed officially or privately. It was considered on February 15th by a small committee of experts, historians and educationalists, which proposed a series of concrete measures. Many of these measures, which are to be submitted for approval to the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the Assembly, will (if they are approved) call for action by the Governments themselves or by the League. Here is a definite programme which might be applied almost immediately. Further developments are also under contemplation, for example, in connection with the improvement of the instruction given.

(d) *Broadcasting.* — The Committee on Intellectual Co-operation has asked the International Institute to undertake an enquiry into the educational aspects of broadcasting, with a view to submitting the results to experts in order to ascertain what conclusions can be drawn therefrom. The last Assembly extended the field of this enquiry to the questions raised from the standpoint of a good understanding between nations in connection with the use of wireless.

Apart from teaching, there are a whole series of openings in this new field for action to encourage the spirit of international peace. The questions in this case are similar to those which arise in the case of the Press, and of equal importance. One form of partial solution is the agreement between the Polish and German broadcasting companies of March 31st, 1931, which is quoted in an annex to the Polish Memorandum.

Other aspects of the broadcasting problem might also be made the subject of agreements. Broadcasting is a powerful means of education for those who have left school and for communicating information to the masses. Various steps have been taken publicly or privately to encourage the diffusion of news or to promote instruction in international institutions, objective accounts of international problems and a variety of talks of a kind to promote knowledge of foreign nations. The enquiry undertaken by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation will contribute a number of definite suggestions in this connection, action on which will in most cases depend on official initiative.

(e) *Cinema.* — Cinematographic activities of an international character are specially studied by the League's Institute of Educational Cinematography in Rome. It has dealt with various aspects of this wide problem.

It may be mentioned that the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation took steps last July for a meeting of specialists, which will take place in the course of the year, to deal with the question of educational films on the subject of the League. There can be no doubt that it is possible to improve the production of films of this kind. Such improvement would be a considerable step forward and of great use to teachers whose task it is to instruct youth in the new forms of international machinery.

An even wider problem arises in connection with films intended to foster the peace spirit, which are of more importance than productions dealing with war and its ravages. Valuable films calculated to spread the spirit of peace and concord can be made which do not deal with international disputes; and it is these in all probability which are the most useful. Here, again, is a question for competent experts to consider, and which might form part of international action.

Some of the steps to be taken in order to make use of that powerful form of propaganda, the cinema, might perhaps also be applied to the theatre, as suggested by the Polish Memorandum. International action in this latter connection is under study by the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation.

## II. Educational.

It has been so frequently repeated that the future of peace depends more than anything on education that there is no need to dwell on the importance of international collaboration in the matter of education. A great part of the work of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation is devoted to fostering direct contact between departments dealing with



education, in order to induce them to compare and exchange methods and to treat jointly and not separately questions of general interest which to-day arise for all civilised nations. On most of these points new work has been undertaken by the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation, some of it since the last meeting in July 1931 of the International Committee, and this has naturally not yet been able to yield all its fruits. But it can already be stated that the work has been warmly welcomed, and that there is a possibility of rapidly organising co-operation in this field. Of the subjects under consideration, the following may be mentioned :

(a) *Collaboration in Primary and Secondary Education.* — A Committee of Experts which met on February 11th in Paris has just recommended the development of National Centres of Educational Documentation where they already exist, or their establishment in countries where they do not yet exist. It is proposed that these centres should collaborate directly with one another and, through the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, inform one another of the results obtained in consequence of educational progress in their respective countries. They are to encourage the exchange of gramophone records, films, etc., and in a word to set up a form of continuous collaboration which should be particularly fruitful.

This new form of international collaboration might be powerfully assisted by Governmental sympathy.

(b) *Travel of Primary and Secondary School Children.* — The Institute of International Co-operation is preparing for submission to the Committee in July next, after consultation of qualified experts, of a report on the best method of organising these trips, of which there are a large number already, though the number might be still further increased. Special attention will be directed to the preparation for such trips so as to enable the school-children and young persons concerned to obtain a better understanding of foreign countries.

Such matters might be settled by agreements between the various Governments.

(c) *Exchange of Professors and Students.* — The important question of *exchange agreements* is under consideration by the Committee of Directors of Higher Education which is to meet in the near future at the Institute. It will be of direct concern to the Governments. The same is the case in regard to the question of the equivalence of diplomas. In this connection reference may be made to the bilateral intellectual agreements concluded since the war between a large number of countries.

(d) *Study Scholarships.* — The attention of the Governments has frequently been drawn by the Committee of Intellectual Co-operation to the question of scholarships for tenure in foreign countries. Last year again the Committee of Scientific Advisers urged that "the success of military disarmament with which all the nations are concerned calls for moral disarmament", and suggested that, in the attainment of this object, the principal hope must be based on those who have been able, to some extent at any rate, to pass their years of training in foreign countries and so to become "soldiers of peace and friends of international intellectual co-operation".

(e) *Scientific Study of International Problems.* — The question of instruction in the work of the League and in international relations has been given prominence in order to draw attention to its possible developments. But the contribution to the work of the League made by the Conference of Schools of Political Science and Institutes for Economic and Political Research should also be mentioned. Each year this Conference will study, on the basis of memoranda prepared by the Institutes in question, a problem of international interest and will discuss it without passing resolutions in a spirit of scientific objectivity and research. The Conference deserves all possible encouragement.

### III. *Intellectuals in International Life.*

The object of the whole work of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation is to give their proper place in international life to circles which devote themselves to disinterested work, together with the great national administrations and organisations having the same object. The aid and support of their most distinguished representatives will be solicited in future on more definite lines. At the instance of the Committee on Arts and Letters, regular exchanges of views are to be established between the masters of contemporary thought, in order to create something of what has been called "an intellectual policy". The creation of this current of thought, and the direct appeal to representative persons of the highest intellectual eminence with a view to interesting them in international aims, is of vital importance for moral disarmament. The first results of the exchanges of views proposed will be published by the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. It may be hoped that this undertaking will be able in the future to develop on a wide scale.

### IV. *Co-ordination of International Work in general.*

The enumeration of the above points must not give rise to the impression that the contribution of the Intellectual Co-operation movement to the work of moral disarmament



is confined even within these already wide limits. The object has been merely to call attention to the most immediate possibilities of action, aid and support. But in reality the central idea of intellectual co-operation work is to promote in all spheres which come within its range a co-ordination of effort and a collaboration capable, not merely of saving time and facilitating information, distribution and progress, but also of promoting the creation, gradually perhaps but none the less certainly, of the international outlook. The Intellectual Co-operation Organisation aims in particular at creating new links between all the big administrations dealing with intellectual subjects. In addition to the educational problems already referred to, it appeals to university offices, to students' associations, institutes of history and art, etc. It unites in collaboration (aimed primarily at practical objects) the ministries of fine arts and the great museums. Much of the joint work which it does for purely educational purposes is designed to enable the peoples to know one another better and in particular to appreciate each other's civilisations and disinterested achievements. It aims at performing the same services for research work by establishing liaison between the great libraries and record offices, as well as by the work it has begun in connection with translations, and by the programme which it has drawn up in agreement with the big international institutions for the co-ordination of the exact and natural sciences in scientific matters.

A network of international relations which is already close, though far too little known, also extends, thanks to the League of Nations, over the whole world. The scheme of this new form of collaboration is set forth in the memorandum annexed to this explanatory note. The operation of its machinery in all its forms will there be described. It is only right to conclude by stating that the official international organisations dealing with this task derive valuable assistance from the great international associations, especially from the Liaison Committee of educational organisations, from the University League of Nations Unions and from a number of private organisations. The interest aroused by the efforts which are grouped under the general name of intellectual co-operation is certainly increasing from year to year. A new and powerful impulse may yield decisive results.

(b) MEMORANDUM ON THE ORGANISATION AND WORKING OF INTELLECTUAL  
CO-OPERATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MORAL DISARMAMENT.

From the outset the League of Nations has endeavoured to promote a better international organisation of intellectual activities. The first Assembly requested the Council on December 18th, 1920, to associate itself as closely as possible with the efforts made to attain this end; it already realised the educational value of this work, which would also help to establish friendly relations and co-operation between the various countries and would enable the League to obtain the support of intellectuals. It considered the possibility of setting up for this purpose a technical organ attached to the League.

I. *The Task of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation.*

"The International Organisation of Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations" has now taken concrete shape and is working side by side with the Health, Communications and Transit and Economic and Financial Organisations, and forms one of the four technical organisations of the League.

The system of international relations which has developed since 1920 under the auspices of the League would have been incomplete without an attempt to carry out in the intellectual sphere what was being done in the political, juridical, technical, social and humanitarian fields. If we bear in mind the part played in the formation of States by national relations of an intellectual character, we shall naturally be led to regard intellectual relations between the various nations as the most valuable aid to international action and to conclude with Paul Valéry that a League of Nations implies a league of human intellects. All the texts relating to the establishment of an international organisation of intellectual co-operation lay stress on this essential aspect of the problem. The Council in its report of September 2nd, 1921, concerning the setting up of an international committee on intellectual co-operation recognised that "no association of nations can hope to exist without the spirit of reciprocal intellectual activity between its members".

The most explicit declaration is doubtless that made by the Committee of Enquiry appointed in 1930 to revise, in the light of eight years' experience, the work of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation:

"The object of intellectual co-operation is international collaboration with a view to promoting the progress of general civilisation and human knowledge, and notably the development and diffusion of science, letters and arts. *Its purpose is to create an atmosphere favourable to the pacific solution of international problems.* Its scope is that of the League of Nations . . . .

"*The activity of the League of Nations in the sphere of intellectual co-operation aims at the promotion of collaboration between nations in all fields of intellectual effort in order to promote a spirit of international understanding as a means to the preservation of peace.*"



## II. Composition.

On two occasions, in 1926 and in 1931 — the second time as a result of the reorganisation carried out in 1930 — the League Assembly formally approved the International Organisation of Intellectual Co-operation.

This organisation consists of :

(a) An International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation which acts as the advisory organ of the Council and Assembly. It consists of 17 members appointed by the Council, and is the supreme organ of intellectual co-operation whose work and activities it directs and superintends.

(b) Three permanent institutions : an Intellectual Co-operation Section in the League Secretariat, an International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris and an International Educational Cinematographic Institute in Rome.

1. *Intellectual Co-operation Section in the League Secretariat* — The Intellectual Co-operation Section acts as the Secretariat of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation, and in particular of the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, the Permanent Committee on Arts and Letters and the Sub-Committee of Experts for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League of Nations. It is also its duty to prepare the reports of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation for the Council and Assembly and to see that the decisions of those organs in regard to intellectual co-operation are carried out.

The Section also includes the Geneva branch of the Educational Information Centre, which is responsible for ensuring liaison with Governments on all questions concerning the instruction of youth in the aims and activities of the League.

2. According to its organic statute, the principal object of the *International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation* at Paris is to prepare the work to be discussed by the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, to ensure in all countries the carrying out of the decisions and recommendations of that Committee, and under the direction of that Committee and by every means in its power to promote through international co-operation the organisation of intellectual work throughout the world. In short, the Institute is the executive organ of the Committee.

Its officials are nationals of at least 15 different countries. Placed in 1924 at the disposal of the League by the French Government and accepted by it, the Institute is entirely dependent on the League in all matters relating to the recruiting of its staff, the establishment of its programme of work and the utilisation of its resources.

3. *The International Educational Cinematographic Institute*. — It is the object of the Institute to encourage by means of useful action and suggestions the production, distribution and exchange of educational films.

It also endeavours to make known the best methods of using films from an educational standpoint.

It likewise serves as an organ of international information in all matters relating to educational cinematography.

(c) Thirty-nine national committees in the following countries : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Free City of Danzig, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States of America, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia. These national committees were set up to serve as a link between the International Committee on the one hand and intellectual life in the various countries on the other. Through them nearly 600 representatives of the various branches of culture in all these countries are associated in the work of intellectual co-operation.

The number of national committees has been steadily increasing since 1922. The necessity for providing them with more effective and more powerful means of action is also becoming more and more urgent.

(d) A large number of committees of experts whose terms of reference, periods of appointment and size vary according to circumstances.



Some are of a permanent character<sup>1</sup>; other committees with limited terms of reference meet each year at Paris to furnish information on some specific question put to them by the International Committee or to solve some particular problem on the programme of intellectual co-operation. For the most part they deal with problems which directly concern international *rapprochement*.

Apart from the 600 members of the national committees, the 17 members of the International Committee, the officials of the Geneva Secretariat and Paris and Rome Institutes, the number of persons serving on the committees of experts of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation is estimated at approximately 150. In addition, some 40 States have delegates accredited to the Institute.

### III. Working.

We see, therefore, that the League has placed a powerful and extensive organisation at the service of international understanding. Needless to say, this organisation provides the opportunity for a large number of personal contacts. It also permits of the establishment of a double current of ideas between the League and intellectual circles; through the Geneva Secretariat or the Paris Institute proposals coming from all the States represented on the Council or in the Assembly can rapidly be communicated to the 40 national committees now in existence. Moreover, suggestions made by any national committee reach the Council and Assembly of States Members of the League in a very short space of time through the International Committee.

A large number of examples might be given. Proposals made by the national committees have been carried out thanks to the League's machinery of intellectual co-operation; after being examined by the Paris Institute they have been submitted to the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and, after approval by it, to the League Assembly and Council.

Ideas of interests to contemporary civilisation or which tend to promote international collaboration in instruction and education may thus pass in a short space of time from a national proposal to an international reality.

Conversely, the rapid co-operation of the various countries with the League is ensured by the working of the existing machinery. When the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the Assembly asked for an enquiry to be carried out into the educational aspects of broadcasting and the international problems raised by its use from the point of view of international *rapprochement*, the Institute got into touch with the national committees on intellectual co-operation. Three months after the decision of the Assembly, a list of the persons best fitted to carry out this enquiry had been drawn up by the Institute, they were being consulted and the enquiry was in progress; the results will be submitted next summer to the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and to the League Assembly.

### IV. Programme.

It is impossible in this short memorandum to describe the full programme of intellectual co-operation; however, a few concrete particulars of the activities most closely related to international *rapprochement* are given below.

1. *The Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League.* — As long ago as 1923 the Assembly considered the question of familiarising young people with the principles and work of the League and of training the younger generation to regard international co-operation as the normal method of conducting world affairs. It recommended the Governments of Member States to arrange for the youth in their respective countries to be made aware of the aims of the League, and thus contributed to the work of moral disarmament on the lines laid down in the Polish Memorandum. A Sub-Committee of Experts was set up and attached to the International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation.

The "Recommendations" (document A.26.1927. XII) made by this Sub-Committee of Experts aroused considerable interest in all countries. They were transmitted to all Governments of Member States and to the private groups concerned. The Committee recommended, *inter alia*, the introduction of compulsory instruction in regard to the League, the elimination from school text-books of passages prejudicial to mutual understanding between nations and the preparation of suitable literature for teachers and pupils. It also contemplated a series of educational measures to enable young people to acquire a better understanding of foreign nations and to instil them with the ideals of international co-operation. In this connection the Committee made a series of suggestions concerning the interchange of school pupils and university students, foreign travel, the utilisation of libraries, the cinema and wireless.

With a view to co-ordinating the work an Educational Information Centre was established, one section being set up in the Secretariat and the other at the International

<sup>1</sup> The Permanent Committee of Arts and Letters (Geneva).

<sup>2</sup> The Committee for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League (Geneva).

<sup>3</sup> The Directors' Committee of National University Offices (Paris).

<sup>4</sup> The Committee of International Students' Organisations (Paris).

<sup>5</sup> The Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations (Berlin, London, Paris, Copenhagen, etc.).

<sup>6</sup> The Committee of Library Experts (Paris) — includes the Directors of several important national libraries.

<sup>7</sup> The Committee of Expert Archivists (Paris) — also includes the Directors of various central record offices.

<sup>8</sup> The Committee of Experts on Museography (Paris).

<sup>9</sup> The Committee of Representatives of Legal Institutions dealing especially with intellectual rights (Paris).



Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. The information collected from Governments and private organisations appears in a half-yearly publication of the Secretariat, the *Educational Survey*. A book on the aims and organisation of the League, specially intended for members of the teaching profession, was also prepared. This publication has been translated into twenty-four languages, partly with the help of grants from the League, and about 250,000 copies have been printed.

We will confine ourselves to a few brief indications of the official action taken by Governments to give effect to the recommendations of the Sub-Committee of Experts. According to the reports which have reached the League Secretariat, 33 States have taken steps to introduce instruction in regard to the League into the curricula of primary and secondary schools. In certain countries, lectures and special courses have also been instituted in higher educational establishments. Twenty-three Governments have dealt with the recommendations of the Sub-Committee of Experts in ministerial notes or special communications in their official journals and have encouraged the publication of special manuals and works dealing with the League and international co-operation. Nineteen Governments have taken active steps to promote the revision of school text-books in order to adapt them to modern ideas on international relations. Twenty-one States grant special facilities to students, boy scouts, young people and children travelling in groups. Fourteen States directly encourage in some form or other the interchange of school-children and students. Lastly, three Governments have convened national conferences of teachers with a view to adopting the recommendations of the Sub-Committee of Experts to the special needs of their country.

Further, the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation and its Sub-Committee of Experts have arranged for the Educational Information Centre to examine a number of questions all tending to promote the development of instruction in regard to the League and international co-operation. The chief questions are :

(a) *Enquiry among Governments as to the measures adopted by the Ministries of Education to prepare teachers and professors in all types of schools for instructing their pupils in regard to the League, with a view to promoting international understanding.* — The Assembly, in order that the work might proceed methodically, had proposed that the Secretariat should obtain information from Governments at regular intervals. The Sub-Committee of Experts was of opinion that, with a view to facilitating the Governments' task, the scope of these enquiries should be restricted. It had emphasised on several occasions the importance which it attached to the training of teachers and this question is on its programme for the current year. The 1931 Assembly sanctioned this decision and on February 6th, 1932, the Secretary-General sent a circular letter to all Member States mentioning the questions which the enquiry was to cover. It will be the duty of the Sub-Committee of Experts to examine the Governments' replies and to make any suitable recommendations.

(b) *Enquiry into the activities of institutions for the scientific study of international relations in so far as they help to make known the aims and work of the League.* — For the purpose of establishing close co-operation between institutes engaged in the study of international relations and the work of the Sub-Committee of Experts, a Joint Committee consisting of three members of the Annual Conference of Institutes and three members of the Committee was set up. It adopted a resolution requesting the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation to arrange for its Educational Information Centre to carry out an enquiry into the nature and methods of instruction on international relations in so far as this helps to make known the work of the League, as it was of opinion that a comparison of experiences and of the results obtained in the international field would be helpful. A memorandum was accordingly sent in January to all institutes for the study of international relations, asking them for detailed reports on their work. As soon as the enquiry is sufficiently advanced, the Joint Committee will be called upon to examine the reports submitted and to express its opinion as to the further measures to be taken.

(c) *Films dealing with the League.* — As a general description of the aims and organisation of the League and its organs must necessarily be of an abstract character so far as school-children are concerned, the Sub-Committee of Experts had already suggested in its "Recommendations" that recourse should be had to visual instruction. The Sub-Committee accordingly requested the Educational Information Centre to obtain from the various circles concerned suggestions as to the possibility of preparing appropriate scenarios and financing the production of films of this description. The International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, the International Educational Cinematographic Institute at Rome, the International Labour Office and the Information Section of the Secretariat have been asked to lend their assistance. Representatives of these various bodies will meet at Paris during the year to draw up a programme of work. It is obvious that the production of a film or a series of films dealing with the League and its work should merely be the first step towards the preparation of a complete series of educational films demonstrating foreign civilisations and also the economic, political and cultural interdependence of the nations. Such a series of films would form an effective contribution to the work of moral disarmament.



2. *Co-operation between Musées pédagogiques (Collections of Teaching Material) and the Directors of Primary Education.* — Although the organisation of national study centres and collections of teaching material differs in some respects, it also has common features and aims at placing complete equipment, working facilities and documentation at the disposal of educationalists. While respecting the different conditions prevailing in various countries, the Institute proposed to arrange for the establishment in each of these national centres of a documentation section dealing with the League and important international questions. In order to facilitate the development of such a section, it is also proposed to set up a service for the exchange of works and bibliographies concerning international questions and books describing the life and characteristics of the different nations. For the purpose of studying and deciding upon the methods to be employed, the Institute convened in February a Committee of Experts, including representatives of the *Musées pédagogiques* and the directors of primary education in the different countries.

In addition to these questions which are connected with the propagation of the international spirit, the experts will also study general educational questions calling for an international agreement, such as the organisation of international school exhibitions and the interchange of lecturers between the different national centres.<sup>1</sup>

3. *Revision of School Text-books with a View to the Rectification of Passages prejudicial to Mutual Understanding between Nations and to the Spirit of International Friendship.* — This question, which is of primary importance to the work of moral disarmament now being carried out by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, led in 1925 to the adoption of the Casares resolution, which provided a practical method of correcting certain errors in school text-books. The International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, which was requested to examine the possibility of an enquiry into the matter, carried out preparatory studies dealing with the measures so far taken in this connection by official and private institutions in the various countries and the results obtained. This documentation, which has just been published, contains a large number of suggestions and deals with almost all the questions raised by this delicate problem of the revision of school text-books; methods of teaching history and of editing text-books; how to reconcile historical truth with goodwill towards foreign nations; the part that can be played by teachers and professors and by public administrations.

This report is to serve as a basis for the work of a Committee of Experts which is to meet at the Institute on February 15th and 16th, 1932. This Committee will include the representatives of the Teaching Commission of the International Committee on Historical Science, educationalists, institutes for the scientific study of international relations and the Sub-Committee of Experts for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League. It will be for this Committee in the light of the experience gained to recommend the most suitable means of action.<sup>2</sup>

4. *Educational Broadcasting and Propaganda for the League.* — In view of the growing success of broadcasting, the widest possible use should be made of the facilities which wireless companies put at the disposal of the teaching profession with a view to propaganda in favour of the international spirit. The Institute has accordingly been requested by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation to undertake (in conjunction with the International Broadcasting Union of Geneva and other important organisations which have done similar work) an enquiry into the educational aspects of broadcasting, with special reference to instruction on the League and the means of promoting mutual understanding between the nations, both in schools and among adults.

The principal object of this enquiry, which is now in progress, is to obtain opinions and suggestions as to the methods employed and the results achieved. It is addressed chiefly to educationalists who have been able to appreciate the value of these new methods of instruction.

This enquiry has also dealt with certain international problems raised by broadcasting, such as collaboration between educational broadcasting associations in the different countries, with a view to avoiding subjects which might prejudice international understanding, in accordance with the agreement concluded in March 1931 between the German and Polish broadcasting companies; the means of encouraging this spirit of co-operation and understanding; the transmission of lectures and the exchange of lecturers between educational broadcasting centres.

The results of this enquiry will be published in the form of a series of recommendations with practical suggestions for the use of teachers. They will be submitted to the League to enable it to draw up a programme of work for the next few years.

---

<sup>1</sup> This Committee, which has just met, proposed the organisation of national collections of teaching material and regular exchanges between them through the Institute, which will involve constant co-operation between the official educational administrations of the different countries.

<sup>2</sup> As stated in the explanatory note, the Committee has just met and has made definite recommendations, several of which advocate Government action.



5. *Travel and Interchange of School Pupils.* — There is no more effective means than this of promoting *rapprochement* between young people in different countries. Attention has been drawn to this question on several occasions by the Sub-Committee of Experts and by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation itself.

The Institute has accordingly undertaken an enquiry into the methods and principles on which these exchanges are at present carried out between the different countries with a view to determining the practical means of achieving the best results and co-ordinating the work of the various national centres for the interchange of young people.

A Committee on Inter-School Correspondence has also been set up and the Institute will act as its permanent secretariat. The Committee's task is to facilitate and co-ordinate the work of the national bureaux of school correspondence.

For this purpose, the permanent secretariat has instituted an enquiry into the organisation of national centres, their methods and the results obtained. The conclusions of this enquiry and the report on the activities of the different national centres will be published in a bulletin issued by the secretariat.

6. *Conference for the Scientific Study of International Relations.* — The large number of problems of a political, economic, legal, social and historical nature created by the war have led to a complete change in the methods of instruction in regard to international relations. During the post-war period, many new chairs were founded in the Universities, new study centres, both national and international, and also centres of instruction and research were set up in nearly every country. We may feel some astonishment at the number and diversity of the tendencies displayed during that period, but they all possess the common feature of placing the study on "international affairs" more and more on an international footing. These new tendencies might with advantage be put at the service of the Intellectual Co-operation Organisation in its efforts to bring about moral disarmament.

The Intellectual Co-operation Committee has already realised the importance of forming a link between the various national and international institutions, the number of which has been steadily increasing since the war and which are engaged in the study of political, economic, legal, social and historical problems from an international standpoint.

In March 1928, the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation convened a meeting, in Berlin, of the most distinguished representatives of national centres for advanced international studies, for the purpose of co-ordinating their work. In view of the extremely interesting results of this first meeting, it was decided that the Conference should be convened each year. It includes the representatives of institutes and schools of advanced international studies in the different countries and representatives of the large international study centres. A small Executive Committee follows up the questions on the agenda in the intervals between the sessions of the Conference, and the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation acts as the permanent secretariat.

Until 1930, the Conference devoted its attention to the organisation of close collaboration between its members. Thanks to its permanent secretariat, a complete system for the exchange of information, publications and bibliography has been organised. Various publications, including hand-books which are kept absolutely up to date, are issued with a view to facilitating the task of professors and students and establishing intercourse between national institutions hitherto unacquainted with each other.

At the last meeting held at Copenhagen in 1931, vaster prospects were opened up for the future.

The institutions represented at the Conference decided that the latter should itself become a research centre. The Conference will now carry out enquiries into one of the most important and most characteristic problems of international relations of the present day. Each national group representing the institutions in that particular country will submit reports on the subject selected, and these reports will form the subject of general discussion at the international meetings. Both the work and the discussions will be conducted in a spirit of scientific research.

This new (scientific and not political) method of study and discussion on the international plane, based on documentation of a national character, systematically collected and arranged, may be of great assistance to the work of moral disarmament.

The Conference also endeavours to promote the interchange of professors and lecturers between institutions in different countries. From this year onwards, it has decided to explain to the public the different national points of view in regard to the problems raised by the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, thus furnishing a first practical proof of its desire to serve the cause of moral disarmament.



Geneva, February 25th, 1932.

## SURVEY OF PROPOSALS MADE BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS DURING THE GENERAL DISCUSSION.

This document has been prepared in conformity with the decision taken by the Conference on February 24th, 1932.

It comprises a survey, divided into subjects, of the proposals made during the general discussion by thirty-three delegations. The figures given refer to those of the Conference documents in which these proposals are to be found, and also to the document (Conf.D.93) in which extracts from the speeches have been reproduced at the request of the delegations. The figures in parentheses indicate the numbered paragraphs in certain of those documents.

The survey is completed by an alphabetical index in which the references refer to its chapters and sub-chapters.

### LIST OF DELEGATIONS WHOSE PROPOSALS ARE REFERRED TO IN THIS SURVEY.

	Conf. D.	Page
Argentina . . . . .	92 and 93	I42, I04
Austria . . . . .	93	I05
Belgium . . . . .	93	I05
Brazil . . . . .	93	I06
Bulgaria . . . . .	93	I06
Canada . . . . .	93	I06
Chile. . . . .	93	I07
China . . . . .	88	I40
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91	I42
Denmark . . . . .	90	I41
Finland . . . . .	93	I07
France . . . . .	56	I13
Germany . . . . .	79 and 93	I19, I04
Haiti . . . . .	80	I22
Hejaz . . . . .	97	I44
Hungary . . . . .	93	I08
Italy. . . . .	81 and 93	I23, I09
Japan . . . . .	94	I43
Latvia . . . . .	93	I09
Netherlands . . . . .	84	I38
Norway . . . . .	89	I41
Persia . . . . .	93	I10
Poland . . . . .	76 and 93	I17, I10
Portugal . . . . .	93	I11
Roumania . . . . .	93	I11
Spain . . . . .	74 and 93	I17, I07
Sweden . . . . .	83	I37
Switzerland . . . . .	86	I39
Turkey. . . . .	78 and 93	I19, I12
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . .	82 <sup>1</sup>	I24
United Kingdom . . . . .	95	I44
United States of America . . . . .	85	I39
Yugoslavia . . . . .	93	I12

<sup>1</sup> See also Conf.D.87 (new edition of the draft Convention submitted to the Preparatory Commission), page 129.

## SURVEY

### I. ORGANISATION OF PEACE.

#### A. ARBITRATION.

	Conf. D.	Page
Denmark . . . . .	90 (8)	141
France . . . . .	56 (V)	116
Haiti . . . . .	80 (5)	123
Portugal . . . . .	93	111

#### B. SECURITY.

##### 1. *General Proposals.*

Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (5)	105
Bulgaria . . . . .	93	106
Canada . . . . .	93	106
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (last para.)	142
Denmark . . . . .	90 (9)	141
Finland . . . . .	93	107
France . . . . .	56 (V)	116
Germany . . . . .	93	104
Haiti . . . . .	80 (1 and 5)	122-123
Japan . . . . .	94 (2)	143
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Persia . . . . .	93	110
Poland . . . . .	93	110
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Spain . . . . .	93	107
Yugoslavia . . . . .	93	112

##### 2. *Definition of the Aggressor.*

Belgium . . . . .	93 (6)	106
France . . . . .	56 (V)	116
Haiti . . . . .	80 (1)	122-123
Roumania . . . . .	93	111

##### 3. *Creation of an International Force.*

Bulgaria . . . . .	93	106
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (6)	142
Denmark . . . . .	90 (7)	141
Finland . . . . .	93	107
France . . . . .	56 (III)	115
Haiti . . . . .	80 (8)	123
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Poland . . . . .	93	110
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Spain . . . . .	93	107

##### 4. *Placing at the Disposal of the League of Nations or Other International Authority of Certain Material.*

France . . . . .	56 (I and II)	113-115
------------------	---------------	---------

#### C. MORAL DISARMAMENT.

China . . . . .	88 (II)	140
Persia . . . . .	93	110
Poland . . . . .	76 (see also Conf.D.16)	117
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Spain . . . . .	93	107



D. ADAPTATION OF PACTS, TREATIES AND NATIONAL LAWS.

	Conf. D.	Page
Austria . . . . .	93	105
Bulgaria . . . . .	93	106
Germany . . . . .	93	104
Haiti . . . . .	80 (4 and 7)	123
Poland . . . . .	76 (I) and 93	118, 110
Roumania . . . . .	93	111

II. DIRECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF A GENERAL ORDER FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (I and 7)	105, 106
Brazil . . . . .	93	106
Bulgaria . . . . .	93	106
Chile . . . . .	93	107
China . . . . .	88 (I and III)	140
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (2 and 7)	142
Denmark . . . . .	90 (3 and 6)	141
Finland . . . . .	93	107
France . . . . .	56	113
Germany . . . . .	79 and 93	119, 104
Haiti . . . . .	80 (2)	123
Hejaz . . . . .	97	144
Hungary . . . . .	93	108
Italy . . . . .	81 and 93 (I and 2)	123, 109
Japan . . . . .	94 (2 and 3)	143
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Norway . . . . .	89 (I and 5)	141
Persia . . . . .	93	110
Poland . . . . .	93	110
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Spain . . . . .	74 and 93	117, 107
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (2)	140
Turkey . . . . .	78 (I) and 93	119, 112
U. S. S. R. . . . .	82	124
United Kingdom . . . . .	95	144

III. DRAFT CONVENTION DRAWN UP BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION:  
ATTITUDE OF THE VARIOUS DELEGATIONS.

Argentina . . . . .	93 (I)	104
Belgium . . . . .	93 (2)	105
Canada . . . . .	93	106
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (I)	142
Finland . . . . .	93	107
France . . . . .	56	113
Germany . . . . .	79 and 93	119, 104
Hungary . . . . .	93	108
Italy . . . . .	93 (2 b)	109
Japan . . . . .	94 (I)	143
Norway . . . . .	89 (I)	141
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (I)	138
Poland . . . . .	93 (2, 4 and 5)	110
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Sweden . . . . .	83 (I)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (I)	140
United States of America . . . . .	85 (I)	110

#### IV. ALTERNATIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY DRAFTS OF CONVENTIONS.

	Conf. D.	Page
France . . . . .	56	113
Germany . . . . .	79 and 93	119, 104
U. S. S. R. . . . .	82 and 87	124, 129

#### V. PERSONNEL.

##### A. EFFECTIVES.

Germany . . . . .	79 (1 to 4, 14 and 15)	120, 121
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (2 a)	138
Spain . . . . .	93	107
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 a)	138
U. S. S. R. . . . .	82 and 87	124, 129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95 (1)	144
United States of America . . . . .	85 (7)	139

##### B. TRAINED RESERVES.

Germany . . . . .	79 (2)	120
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (2 a)	138
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 a)	138
U. S. S. R. . . . .	87	129

##### C. FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.

Germany . . . . .	79 (5)	120
Poland . . . . .	93	110
Turkey . . . . .	78 (5)	119
U. S. S. R. . . . .	87	129

##### D. PERIOD OF SERVICE.

Latvia . . . . .	93	109
------------------	----	-----

#### VI. MATERIAL OF LAND ARMAMENTS.<sup>1</sup>

##### A. INDIRECT LIMITATION.

Spain . . . . .	74	117
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 and 6)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (3)	140
United States of America . . . . .	85 (9)	139

##### B. DIRECT LIMITATION.

Austria . . . . .	93	105
Germany . . . . .	79 (7, 23)	121, 122
Hungary . . . . .	93	108
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (2 b)	138
Norway . . . . .	89 (2)	141
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 b)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (3)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United States of America . . . . .	85 (9)	139

<sup>1</sup> See also XVI.B.



# C. ABOLITION OR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN LAND ARMS.

	Conf. D.	Page
<i>1. Heavy Artillery.</i>		
Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (3)	105
China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
Germany . . . . .	79 (6)	120-121
Italy. . . . .	81	123
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Netherlands . . . . .	84	138
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Spain . . . . .	93	107
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 c)	138
Switzerland. . . . .	86 (6)	140
Turkey. . . . .	78 (2 b)	119
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95 (2)	144
United States of America . . . . .	85 (8)	139

## 2. Tanks:

Austria . . . . .	93	105
China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
Germany . . . . .	79 (6)	120-121
Italy. . . . .	81	123
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Netherlands . . . . .	84	138
Spain . . . . .	93	107
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 c)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (6)	140
Turkey. . . . .	78 (2 c)	119
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United States of America . . . . .	85 (8)	139

# D. LAND FORTIFICATIONS.

Germany . . . . .	79 (8)	120
-------------------	--------	-----

# VII. MATERIAL OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.<sup>1</sup>

## A. ABOLITION OR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WARSHIPS.

### 1. Warships of all categories.

Germany . . . . .	79 (9 and 12)	121
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Turkey. . . . .	78 (2 d)	119
U.S.S.R. . . . .	82 and 87	124, 129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95 (4)	144
Yugoslavia . . . . .	93	112

### 2. Capital Ships.

Argentina . . . . .	92 (1) and 93 (3)	142-143, 104
China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
Germany . . . . .	93	104
Italy. . . . .	81	123
Japan . . . . .	94 (6)	143
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

### 3. Aircraft-Carriers.

China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
Germany . . . . .	79 (10)	121
Italy. . . . .	81	123
Japan . . . . .	94 (7, 8, 9)	143
U.S.S.R. . . . .	82	124

<sup>1</sup> See also XVI.C.

A. ABOLITION OR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WARSHIPS (*continued*).

	Conf. D.	Page
4. <i>Submarines.</i>		
Austria . . . . .	93	105
China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
Germany . . . . .	79 (II)	121
Italy . . . . .	81	123
Spain . . . . .	74	117
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95 (3)	144
United States of America . . . . .	85 (4)	139

B. MERCHANT VESSELS.

Germany . . . . .	93	104
Japan . . . . .	94 (10)	143
Spain . . . . .	74	117
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

C. NON-FLOATING MATERIAL.

Germany . . . . .	79 (13)	121
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

D. FORTIFICATIONS CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL SEA ROUTES.

Germany . . . . .	79 (16)	121
Spain . . . . .	93	107

E. TREATIES OF WASHINGTON AND LONDON: APPLICATION AND EXTENSION.

Japan . . . . .	94 (7)	143
United States of America . . . . .	85 (2 and 3)	139

VIII. MATERIAL OF AIR ARMAMENTS.<sup>1</sup>

A. MILITARY AVIATION: ABOLITION OR LIMITATION.

1. *General Proposals.*

Denmark . . . . .	90 (2 a)	141
Germany . . . . .	79 (17 and 19)	121-122
Hejaz . . . . .	97 (2)	144
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Sweden . . . . .	83 (3 a)	138
Turkey . . . . .	78 (2 a)	119
U.S.S.R. . . . .	82 and 87	124, 129

2. *Bombing Aircraft.*

Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (3)	105
China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
France . . . . .	56 (I—2)	114
Hungary . . . . .	93	108
Italy . . . . .	81	123
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (6)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

<sup>1</sup> See also XVI.D.



B. CIVIL AVIATION: INTERNATIONALISATION OR CONTROL.

	Conf. D.	Page
Belgium . . . . .	93 (3)	105
Denmark . . . . .	90 (2 b)	141
France . . . . .	56 (I—1)	113-114
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Sweden . . . . .	83 (3 b)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (4)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

IX. EXPENDITURE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE.<sup>1</sup>

Denmark . . . . .	90 (3)	141
Germany . . . . .	79 (23)	122
Norway . . . . .	89 (2)	141
Persia . . . . .	93	110
Poland . . . . .	93	110
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Sweden . . . . .	83 (4)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (3)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

X. CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL ARMS.

A. PROHIBITION OF USE.

Argentina . . . . .	93	104
Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (3)	105
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (4 and 5)	142
Denmark . . . . .	90 (5)	141
Germany . . . . .	79 (20)	122
Haiti . . . . .	80 (3)	123
Hejaz . . . . .	97 (1)	144
Italy . . . . .	81	123
Japan . . . . .	94 (5)	143
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (5)	138
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Sweden . . . . .	83	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (7 a)	140
Turkey . . . . .	78 (3 and 4)	119
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95	144
United States of America . . . . .	85 (6)	139
Yugoslavia . . . . .	93	112

B. PROHIBITION OF PREPARATION AND (OR) OF CONTROL OF MANUFACTURE  
OF CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (OF USE FOR WAR).

Austria . . . . .	93	105
Denmark . . . . .	90 (5)	141
Germany . . . . .	79 (20)	122
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (5)	138
Sweden . . . . .	83 (5)	138
Turkey . . . . .	78 (3 and 4)	119
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

<sup>1</sup> See also VI.A.

## XI. PUBLICITY (EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION).

	Conf. D.	Page
Germany . . . . .	79	119
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (3)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (5)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

## XII. SUPERVISION (PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION).

Argentina . . . . .	93 (2)	104
Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (4)	105
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (3)	142
Denmark . . . . .	90 (4)	141
Finland . . . . .	93	107
Germany . . . . .	79 (24)	122
Haiti . . . . .	80 (2)	123
Norway . . . . .	89 (4 and 5)	141
Poland . . . . .	93	110
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Sweden . . . . .	83 (6)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (9)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95	144

## XIII. SPECIAL PROVISIONS TO BE INSERTED IN THE CONVENTION.

Germany . . . . .	79 (25)	122
Spain . . . . .	74	117
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129

## XIV. TRADE IN ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIAL.

Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (3)	142
Germany . . . . .	79 (21)	122
Norway . . . . .	89 (4)	141
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (9)	140

## XV. MANUFACTURE OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIAL.

Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (3)	142
Germany . . . . .	79 (22)	122
Norway . . . . .	89 (4)	141
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (8)	140



## XVI. RESTRICTIONS AND INTERDICTIONS OF THE USE OF CERTAIN ARMS AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

### A. GENERAL PROPOSALS.

	Conf. D.	Page
Argentina . . . . .	93	104
Austria . . . . .	93	105
Belgium . . . . .	93 (3)	105
China . . . . .	88 (III)	140
Denmark . . . . .	90 (I)	141
Finland . . . . .	93	107
Haiti . . . . .	80 (3)	123
Hejaz . . . . .	97 (3)	144
Hungary . . . . .	93	108
Italy . . . . .	81	123
Japan . . . . .	94 (4)	143
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Norway . . . . .	89 (3)	141
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (4 and 6)	138
Persia . . . . .	93	110
Portugal . . . . .	93	111
Spain . . . . .	74	117
Sweden . . . . .	83 (2 c)	138
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (6 and 7)	140
U.S.S.R. . . . .	87	129
United Kingdom . . . . .	95	144

### B. LAND ARMAMENTS.

France . . . . .	56 (IV)	115-116
Spain . . . . .	74	117

### C. NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

Argentina . . . . .	92 (2), 93 (4)	143, 104-105
France . . . . .	56 (IV)	115-116
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (6 b)	138
Yugoslavia . . . . .	93	112

### D. AIR ARMAMENTS.

Austria . . . . .	93	105
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	91 (4 and 5)	142
France . . . . .	56 (IV)	115-116
Germany . . . . .	79 (18)	121
Haiti . . . . .	80 (3)	123
Japan . . . . .	94 (4)	143
Latvia . . . . .	93	109
Netherlands . . . . .	84 (6 a)	138
Roumania . . . . .	93	111
Switzerland . . . . .	86 (7 b)	140
Turkey . . . . .	78 (2 a)	119
United Kingdom . . . . .	95 (5)	144
United States of America . . . . .	85 (5)	139
Yugoslavia . . . . .	93	112

## XVII. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARISED ZONES.<sup>1</sup>

Finland . . . . .	93	107
-------------------	----	-----

<sup>1</sup> See also VI.D and VII.D.



ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

(The headings refer to the divisions and subdivisions of the Survey.)

		Pages
AGGRESSOR, Definition of . . . . .	I.B.2.	94
AIR ARMAMENTS:		
Bombing aircraft . . . . .	VIII.A.2	98
Civil aviation: internationalisation or control . . . . .	VIII.B	99
Military aviation: abolition or limitation . . . . .	VIII.A	98
Protection of civil populations . . . . .	XVI.D.	101
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS . . . . .	VII.A.3	98
ARBITRATION . . . . .	I.A	94
ARTILLERY, HEAVY:		
Abolition or limitation . . . . .	VI.C.1	97
Placing at the disposal of the League . . . . .	I.B.4	94
BOMBARDMENT:		
Bombing aircraft . . . . .	VIII.A.2	98
<i>See also</i> Protection of civil populations.		
CAPITAL SHIPS . . . . .	VII.A.2	97
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL ARMS:		
Manufacture of chemical products, control of . . . . .	X.B	99
Preparation, prohibition of. . . . .	X.B	99
Use, prohibition of . . . . .	X.A	99
CIVIL AVIATION:		
Internationalisation or control . . . . .	I.B.4	94
	VIII.B	99
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, PROTECTION OF . . . . .	XVI	101
COMMISSION, PERMANENT DISARMAMENT . . . . .	XII	100
COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE . . . . .	V.A	96
CONTRABAND . . . . .	XVI (Argentine)	101
CONTROL . . . . .	XII	100
CONVENTIONS, DRAFTS OF, <i>see</i> Drafts of Conventions.		
DEMILITARISED ZONES . . . . .	XVII	101
DIRECTIVES FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.	II	95
DISPUTES, INTERNATIONAL, PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF . . . . .	I.A	94
DRAFTS OF CONVENTIONS:		
Alternative or complementary drafts . . . . .	IV	96
Draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission:		
Attitudes of various delegations . . . . .	III	95
Special provisions to be inserted in the Convention . . . . .	XIII	100
EFFECTIVES. . . . .	V.A	96
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (PUBLICITY) . . . . .	XI	100
EXPENDITURE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE . . . . .	IX	99
<i>See also</i> Land armaments: Material: Indirect limitation.		
FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS. . . . .	V.C	96
FORTIFICATIONS:		
Controlling international sea routes . . . . .	VII.D	98
Land . . . . .	VI.D	97
INTERNATIONAL FORCE, CREATION OF . . . . .	I.B.3	94
LAND ARMAMENTS:		
Effectives . . . . .	V.A	96
Fortifications . . . . .	VI.D	97
Material:		
Abolition or limitation of certain land armaments, <i>see</i> Artillery, Heavy; Tanks.		
Direct limitation . . . . .	VI.B	96
Indirect limitation . . . . .	VI.A	96
Period of service . . . . .	V.D	96
Protection of civilian populations. . . . .	XVI.B	101



		Page
LEAGUE OF NATIONS: PLACING OF CERTAIN MATERIAL AT ITS DISPOSAL	I.B.4	94
MANUFACTURE OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIAL . . . . .	XV	100
<i>See also under</i> Chemical and bacteriological arms.		
MATERIAL:		
Air armaments . . . . .	VIII	98
Land armaments . . . . .	VI	96
Manufacture of . . . . .	XV	100
<i>See also under</i> Chemical arms, etc.		
Naval armaments . . . . .	VII	97
Placing at the disposal of the League . . . . .	I.B.4	94
Trade in . . . . .	XIV	100
MERCHANT VESSELS . . . . .	VII.B	98
MORAL DISARMAMENT . . . . .	I.C	94
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE . . . . .	I.B	94
NATIONAL LAWS, ADAPTATION OF . . . . .	I.D.	95
NAVAL ARMAMENTS:		
Abolition or limitation of certain categories of warships:		
<i>See under</i> Aircraft carriers,		
Capital ships,		
Submarines,		
Warships of all categories.		
Effectives . . . . .	V.A	96
Fortifications controlling international sea routes . . . . .	VII.D	98
Merchant vessels . . . . .	VII.B	98
Non-floating material . . . . .	VII.C	98
Placing at the disposal of the League . . . . .	I.B.4	94
Protection of civil populations . . . . .	XVI.C	101
Treaties of Washington and London: Application and extension .	VII.E	98
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES . . . . .	I.A	94
PERIOD OF SERVICE . . . . .	V.D	96
PERSONNEL:		
<i>See</i> Effectives,		
Formations organised on a military basis,		
Period of service,		
Trained reserves.		
PRINCIPLES FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS . .	II	95
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS . . . . .	XVI	101
PUBLICITY (EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION) . . . . .	XI	100
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS . . . . .	II (Chile)	95
RESTRICTIONS AND INTERDICTIONS OF THE USE OF CERTAIN ARMS . .	XVI	101
SECURITY . . . . .	I.B	94
SHIPS:		
Merchant vessels, <i>see that title.</i>		
Warships of all categories . . . . .	VII.A.1	97
SUBMARINES . . . . .	VII.A.4	98
TANKS:		
Abolition or limitation . . . . .	VI.C.2	97
Placing at the disposal of the League . . . . .	I.B.4	94
TRADE IN ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIAL . . . . .	XIV	100
TRAINED RESERVES . . . . .	V.B	96
TREATIES:		
Adaptation . . . . .	I.D	95
Washington and London: application and extension . . . . .	VII.E	98
USE OF CERTAIN ARMS, RESTRICTION OF . . . . .	XVI	101
WARFARE, CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL . . . . .	X	99
WARSHIPS OF ALL CATEGORIES . . . . .	VII.A.1	97

Geneva, February 22nd, 1932.

# EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES MADE DURING THE GENERAL DISCUSSION BY THE FOLLOWING DELEGATIONS.

	Page		Page
Argentina . . . . .	104	Italy . . . . .	109
Austria . . . . .	105	Latvia . . . . .	109
Belgium . . . . .	105	Persia . . . . .	110
Brazil . . . . .	106	Poland . . . . .	110
Bulgaria . . . . .	106	Portugal . . . . .	111
Canada . . . . .	106	Roumania. . . . .	111
Chile . . . . .	107	Spain . . . . .	107
Finland . . . . .	107	Turkey . . . . .	112
Germany . . . . .	104	Yugoslavia . . . . .	112
Hungary . . . . .	108		

**M. Brüning** (Germany), February 9th, 1932.

. . . The German people looks to the present Conference to solve the problem of general disarmament on the basis of equal rights and equal security for all peoples.

**M. Nadolny** (Germany), February 18th, 1932.

. . . The proposals that we have thus drawn up cover the whole field of disarmament. They are, therefore, not merely supplementary to the draft Convention prepared by the Preparatory Commission, but they constitute the various components of a complete plan that we desire to see discussed side by side with the draft submitted by the Preparatory Commission.

. . . But the German delegation declare here and now that it is also prepared to agree to the complete abolition of capital ships as proposed by Italy, Spain, and other delegations.

. . . It would, in particular, be glad if the Spanish proposal were accepted—that is to say, the proposal prohibiting in time of peace the fitting of merchant ships for military use.

. . . The provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning disarmament should be replaced by the new Convention which we shall be concluding under Article 8 of the Covenant.

**M. Bosch** (Argentina), February 16th, 1932.

. . . The Argentine delegation would naturally be glad if the Conference could agree to abolish in land, naval and air forces all those factors which, by their very nature, are specially destined for aggression, and if this Convention could be supplemented by effective stipulations prohibiting chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, the use of which is entirely contrary to all social progress.

I will now pass to the concrete points which our delegation wishes to submit at the present stage.

1. The Argentine delegation accept as a basis of discussion the draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission.

2. The Argentine Republic will support the establishment of a permanent international supervision of armaments in application of any agreements concluded here, provided that this supervision is accepted unanimously and without reservation and is carried out in a practical form and to the extent considered by the Conference to be compatible with the sovereign rights of each State.

3. The Argentine Republic proposes that an undertaking should be entered into between countries which did not sign the Washington and London Naval Treaties, not to build or acquire capital ships of more than 10,000 tons, since these armaments have a definitely aggressive character. Our country, like those States which signed the above-mentioned treaties, considers that, if the naval problem cannot be solved at one stroke, it will in any case be necessary to seek practical and positive solutions which will enable us gradually to draw nearer to the ideal to which we all aspire.

4. The Argentine Republic considers that there is one conception, that of contraband of war, of which this Conference should endeavour to lay down at least the essential principles, if it is not possible to define it more fully.

The conflagration of 1914-1918 showed that the lives of civilians, the extension of hostilities to distant countries and, what is still more serious, the consequent increase in the number of



belligerents, depends on the interpretation given to this conception. The London Declaration of 1909 attempted to cover and solve the complex problem as a whole. Experience has shown that this is impossible. In the frenzy of war this feeble structure, which was too theoretical and complicated was destroyed. The problem must be tackled in its simplest and most elementary form.

The war afforded a terrible proof of the fact that no country possesses unlimited and inexhaustible wealth for the support of its population. No country can be sure, if its attempts to conquer its opponents by this means, that the weapon will not be used against it. The spectre of famine would then be bound to arise, there would be the risk of a blockade of essential routes and finally and inevitably unrestricted submarine warfare. The object of this Conference is to reduce and limit armaments and also to mitigate the horrors of war, should this prove unavoidable in spite of our efforts. In accordance with the proposals and views which I have put before you, the Argentine delegation has the honour to propose to the Conference that an international agreement should be concluded under which the signatory States would agree never to regard as contraband of war certain foodstuffs to be mentioned in the Convention.

To exclude foodstuffs from articles which are declared contraband is to humanise war in the same way as is done by the prohibition to use bacteria and asphyxiating gases. The Argentine delegation accordingly hopes that this proposal will receive the unanimous support of Powers both great and small, producing and consuming countries alike, of those nations which passed through the war, as well as those which, although neutral, were not spared by the world conflagration, the various effects of which are still weighing, and will continue to weigh, upon the whole world for a long time to come.

**M. E. Pflügl** (Austria), *February 17th, 1932.*

. . . My Government does not wish to express an opinion upon them as yet; it reserves the right to submit during the progress of the work of the Conference any proposals that it may consider advisable. Nevertheless, that Government thinks that it may at once state its agreement with all proposals devised to ensure an effective reduction in the general level of armaments, a reduction carried as far as possible—that from the point of view of my country is an essential condition.

My Government approves of measures for the supervision of armaments by an international commission; the abolition of aggressive arms of all kinds; the abolition of chemical and bacteriological warfare and of bombardment from aircraft and of all preparations made in peace time for those purposes; my Government also approves all measures for the most complete protection of the civilian population.

. . . Are you to-day going to ask her to perpetuate in a freely signed Convention, and in spite of previous promises and of the equality of rights enjoyed by all Members of the League of Nations—are you going to ask her to perpetuate that inequality of rights and security which you would refuse for yourselves?

**M. P. Hymans** (Belgium), *February 11th, 1932.*

. . . 1. It is desirable in the interests of security and of peace that this Conference should lead to an agreement. If after a number of years of discussions, enquiries and preparations, Governments were to leave this Conference divided, irritated by clash and failure, the effect upon the public mind—which is already so anxious and disturbed—would be very serious indeed. The financial burden which is already very heavy would become yet heavier. The idea of peace itself, the idea of law in international matters would be weakened. We should be taking a very serious retrograde step and we should follow further competitive expansion of armaments, bankruptcy and revolution.

. . . 2. The duty which devolves upon all of us is therefore to co-operate in seeking an understanding. The Preparatory Commission has outlined the framework of a draft Convention for the limitation and reduction of armaments. Belgium co-operated in this work. One of its delegates, M. Bourquin, was a Rapporteur of that Commission. It appears to us that that draft is wisely and soundly prepared, and we hope that it will serve as a basis for a general agreement.

. . . 3. I desire, however, to draw attention to a number of them which appear to me to open the way towards satisfactory solutions. I refer to the prohibition of the most powerful and deadly offensive weapons, such as bombing aircraft, with the additional corollary of the internationalisation of civil aviation. I refer also to the prohibition of certain forms of long-range ordnance, of chemical and bacteriological warfare, and again in the event of disaster to measures to protect the civil population and keep them, as it were, outside the scope of the war, and to circumscribe the battlefields.

. . . 4. I refer finally to the organisation for the international control and regulation of armaments.

5. I now come to Article 8 of the Covenant, which is our fundamental law in this question. It lays down the method to be followed in settling this problem and closely links up the question of security with the question of armaments. That, after all, is nothing but commonsense. You will never get people to renounce armed defence unless they find equivalent safeguards and protection in the juridical organisation of peace; that is to say, in respect for law, in mutual assistance and in co-operation against unjust aggression. The idea of co-operation lies at the very root of the Covenant of the League.

Is the effort that has been made during the last ten years enough to create confidence, however; does it give to those peoples who have great commitments or are particularly exposed the necessary safeguard for their security? I do not think it can be argued that it does.



Certainly the political and moral condition of the world would be far more stable and far more steady if the peoples had the assurance that in the case of aggression co-operation against the aggressor would operate effectively and swiftly. That, no doubt, is the ideal, an ideal that is still far distant if we look around us and see what is at the present moment the position and what is the mentality of the peoples. But even at this moment there are certain lines on which we could progress, certain steps that we can contemplate in the immediate future; . . .

But if a state of security is to be organised, if a feeling of security is to be given—that is to say, if confidence is to be inspired—can we be content with a mere moral penalty? No doubt public opinion and world conscience are imposing forces, the full effect of which we have been able to gauge; . . .

One can hardly imagine a State, signatory of the Pact of Paris, passively witnessing a violation of the Pact; one can hardly imagine such a State putting obstacles in the way of a blockade organised against the aggressor, or allowing the aggressor State to trade with it or to obtain supplies from it. That argument is a very strong one, and it is worth careful examination. It is based upon the necessity for effective co-operation of all States against that State which is guilty of having violated its undertakings. It is a sound idea; it is the idea which is the basis of the League of Nations."

6. We are ready to examine with the greatest possible care and in the most open-minded spirit any proposal which is calculated to strengthen the authority of the League of Nations and develop common action and make it more effective. We should be making a considerable step forward if, as proposed by the French delegation, we devised a more precise definition of the aggressor.

7. It is therefore only stage by stage that we shall advance towards security; consequently disarmament will also come about stage by stage.

8. In the present year there are important political questions which will have to be considered. Considerable budgetary difficulties are being encountered by all States, difficulties which disorganise credit and paralyse initiative.

**M. de Macedo Soares (Brazil) February 9th, 1932.**

*. . . The system of excessive armaments has led to a political classification of nations into Great Powers and Powers of limited interests. It is therefore the duty of the Powers most concerned to take the initiative and to lay proposals before this plenary assembly, proposals backed by a conscious will and by loyal action on the part of their authors.*

**M. A. Malinoff (Bulgaria), February 18th, 1932.**

*. . . In view of this fortunate change of circumstances, Bulgaria feels herself justified in considering that the great difference between the present conditions and those existing immediately after the Great War removes any necessity for the one-sided disarmament to which she has been subjected. Every fresh problem requires a fresh solution. In the view of Bulgaria, the solution for the present problem is to be found in permanently reinforcing those means placed at the disposal of the world by the Covenant of the League which have not always played a large enough part in the settlement of the differences which have arisen from time to time. Such consolidation can only be obtained by the conclusion of a general pact of mutual assistance or by the creation of an international army for the purpose of applying effective sanctions in the case of a breach of the Covenant.*

*A further essential to this solution is, in the opinion of Bulgaria, the establishment of legal equality and freedom for each country to adopt that method of recruitment which is most suitable to the requirements of its national defence, the particular circumstances of each country being taken into account.*

*Thus, the edifice which we are striving to construct must rest upon a foundation of equality and equity; these foundations alone are durable; they alone correspond to the high ideals which inspired the authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations.*

*. . . In the hope that no less than other States, we will be guaranteed a security worthy of the name, Bulgaria declares that she is ready to bring to the Conference her modest quota of assistance in the great work of ensuring the success of our labours, and that she will accept any Convention founded upon the principles which I have just laid down.*

**Sir George H. Perley (Canada), February 13th, 1932.**

*. . . His Majesty's Government in Canada is convinced that the time has now come for a general limitation and reduction of armaments, and we believe that, for this purpose, the draft Convention now before the Conference, though it includes details which require further examination, provides a suitable basis for discussion and consideration.*

*. . . In respect to the organisation of peace, the importance of which we appreciate, we recognise the value of the many agreements that have been made during the last twelve years, and we are convinced that those agreements should already have resulted in a marked reduction of armaments, rather than in the disturbing increases which, in many cases, the published figures show. We think further that this organisation of peace can best be achieved at this time by emphasising the prevention of conflicts, rather than the punishment of aggression; by building up machinery for conciliation, rather than providing for sanctions; by using the League of Nations as a channel through which international public opinion can express itself, rather than by developing it into a super-State.*

*. . . May I repeat, in conclusion, that His Majesty's Government in Canada will wholeheartedly support any and every constructive proposal for the limitation and reduction of armaments which may be laid before this Conference. We believe that action towards this end should be taken, and taken now. Further delay would be fatal.*



H.E. M. Valdés-Mendeville (Chile), February 20th, 1932.

. . . The Chilian delegation sees in the firm and trusting nature of those relations—which have, at the same time, facilitated the conclusion of international acts of conciliation and arbitration linking up the majority of the American countries—one of the most valuable forms of regional security.

. . . And now I would remind you that the Chilian delegation remains faithful to the views which it so often had occasion to express in the Preparatory Commission. While not proposing to recommend one definite system for the Conference as a whole, *Chile considers that, from the standpoint of Latin-America, the reduction of armaments should be sought by means of regional agreements or pacts.* In advocating these means, I am not departing in any way from Article 8 of the League Covenant. I am, on the contrary, adhering strictly to its terms, for we have to admit that the four conditions laid down in that article—the national security, geographical situation and circumstances of each State and, indeed, the means of enforcing international obligations—exhibit a very different aspect according to the different continents concerned.

*The system of regional agreements, moreover, is not, in our opinion, such that it cannot be carried out within the framework of a general convention, provided that the existing draft is given the necessary flexibility to enable it to be adapted to the widely varying circumstances existing in the world.* The greater the allowance made for this in the Convention, the greater will be its prospect of becoming actually and in practice worldwide; but the effect of the Convention must not be nullified by reservations.

M. Zulueta (Spain), February 12th, 1932.

. . . Efforts to palliate the evil by attempting to humanise war will prove useless. I ask pardon of the distinguished speakers who have advocated such methods if I express my doubts as to the desirability of the attempts which they support for the proscription of those arms which are called inhuman. War has its laws as objective as the law of gravitation, and experience has proved that belligerents do not in practice accept any means of humanising war other than those which do not impair the success of military operations. We are also of opinion that there is some danger in combining points of this character with the question of disarmament; for, in the first place, by so doing we are distracting the Conference from its real object, which is not to mitigate but to abolish war, and, in the second place, we are wasting time and invaluable effort when we endeavour to render war tolerable and, in so doing, weaken the means of disarmament. . . .

. . . Now, to abolish war, or, in other words, international anarchy, we must endeavour to create international order. We here assembled are the artisans of that order, and the League of Nations provides the plan. . . .

. . . Among those causes are some of a psychological character; these have been dealt with more particularly in the Polish delegation's memorandum, of which the importance will undoubtedly be recognised by the Conference. . . .

. . . Spain looks forward to the day when this first rough framework of an international city shall be firmly established, take shape and assume its full proportions.

Spain would be glad to see a further extension of compulsory arbitration, the juridical settlement of disputes, the strict and courageous application of the Convention for preventing war and the Convention on Financial Assistance; in a word, the whole system of mutual aid and goodwill which is the true guarantee of Peace. Instead of fresh texts she would like to see existing texts better remembered, more faithfully complied with and less . . . interpreted. Within this framework she would wish other nations to accompany her in a bold scheme of disarmament which would include:

*On land:* Reduction of armaments, personnel and material, to the lowest limits strictly necessary for maintaining order at home, for fulfilling international obligations, and for the service of the League.

*At sea:* The reduction of Navies to the status of coastal gendarmerie, the neutralisation of straits and a contribution by each country to an international Police Fleet.

*In the air:* The absolute prohibition of all military aviation combined with the internationalisation of commercial aviation.

. . . We also share the opinion of those delegations which have proposed the abolition of arms of a plainly aggressive character. While fully aware of the relative and empirical nature of this distinction, we nevertheless believe that it can be quite easily applied in practice.

We therefore propose the abolition of long-range and highly mobile artillery, together with tanks, ships in high-tonnage categories, long-range naval guns and military aeroplanes of every description.

We also propose that the fullest information should be published with regard to armaments and military establishments capable of manufacturing them, in pursuance of the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant.

H.E. the Baron Yrjö-Koskinen (Finland), February 17th, 1932.

In offering a few short comments, I wish first to state that *my Government is prepared to consider with sincere attention and desire to achieve results any proposal for the limitation and reduction of armaments.* The attitude is, I think, a natural one for a small country which can never successfully base its future on force.

. . . Finland, therefore, has always insisted that the action of the League must be real; *she has always thrown in her weight in favour of reliable guarantees of safety.*



As regards armaments in particular, Finland has always been in favour of their regulation and *has welcomed in particular the principle of the prohibition of arms of a purely aggressive character*. Finland has already had the honour to take part in the work of the Preparatory Commission from the beginning. We know how difficult the discussions were from which the present draft Convention emerged. That is why we endorse the opinion, which seems to be prevalent in this Conference, that the *draft Convention should, as a first step towards more effective disarmament, be taken as a basis for the Conference's work*.

Without desiring just now to enter into the technical details of the draft Convention, I wish to point out that its value will depend in the last resort on the figures of reduction and limitation which each country will insert in its part of the future Convention. In this connection, the greater countries should set an example.

Subject to this reservation, my country urges a *sincere recognition of the equality of States*, a principle which does not by any means exclude the possibility of taking into account inequalities of fact, particularly as regards security.

In approaching thus the grave problem of security, I venture to observe that Finland regards as one of the guarantees of security *the establishment along the frontier of neighbouring countries of neutral demilitarised zones*, or, at any rate, where the proximity of vital centres or the existence of points of territory indispensable for the defence of a country does not permit of this solution, the establishment of *zones within which the number of military effectives will be limited*. Wherever such zones seem to be necessary and possible as between neighbouring countries, agreements on the subject might usefully be concluded as *corollaries to the General Convention on the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments*.

Security, however, is not always sufficiently guaranteed by the mere fact of multiplying international Conventions. More important than the number of international acts registered with the Secretariat of the League is the manner in which these acts are applied and honoured. *Effective international control is therefore a necessary complement to each general agreement concerning disarmament*. Consequently my Government is of opinion that this Conference will achieve effective results only by guaranteeing the effective operation of a system of international control of the reductions agreed to, the efficacy of the limitations fixed and, finally, the conscientious observance of the restrictions and prohibitions imposed on certain methods of warfare. *Such supervision obviously can only be exercised by an organ endowed with the necessary competency*. I also note with satisfaction that this idea of control, suggested by certain associations as powerful as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, has received the support of numerous delegations.

In such matters, security is a question of the very greatest importance and Finland has listened with the greatest satisfaction to the proposals put forward by the French delegation. While avoiding for the present any detailed examination, I should like to make a few comments on some of the more general aspects of this proposal.

*It is, however, essential for the successful completion of our great task that this problem should be solved*. I quite realise that, as has been, if I understand rightly, suggested in the French proposal, this solution may involve the entrusting to an international organ, still wider in scope than the League, of certain duties in connection with the application of a Convention which is to be drawn up. Finland is prepared to support this idea of such a body in so far as it is essential to the success of universal disarmament; she is convinced that, if only the principle, which is political in its nature, is once accepted, it will always be possible to find a formula which will be in perfect harmony with the Covenant of the League.

#### NOTE BY THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION.

The Hungarian delegation had the honour to state during the general discussion, which is not yet closed, the principles of which it will request the application in regard to the decisions to be taken on points of detail; it has made known its desire that these decisions should be based on the idea of peace and security for all and has stated that it is not attached to any particular formula; it considers that a practical agreement will be reached more easily if the Conference does not begin with general decisions, the scope of which cannot be gauged and which might possibly lead to discord and even to ruptures, which must be avoided at all costs. The Hungarian delegation has refrained from submitting detailed proposals in advance, but reserves the right to do so, in accordance with the principles set forth above, during the special discussion of the various articles and the proposals laid before the Conference by certain delegations.

We also have the honour to send you the authentic text of the speech delivered by the first delegate of Hungary which, we would repeat, contains not formal proposals but concrete suggestions that will help to explain our views.

Count Albert Apponyi (Hungary), February 13th, 1932.

In thus speaking of peace, I am following the recommendation which has been made, because *the consolidation of peace cannot be regarded as an isolated problem. It is rather the central star around which all other special problems revolve like planets*. Whether we are endeavouring to set up arbitration treaties, whether we are endeavouring to adjust the Covenant to the various Conventions concluded—whatever we are doing on these lines—the ultimate aim is always the consolidation and firm establishment of peace.

*It is from this standpoint that I shall therefore consider the modest contribution that our country desires to make to the success of this Conference*.

Our contribution to the difficult work with which this Conference is faced is to secure a general reduction of armaments in such a way as will meet with the exigencies of the moment



and satisfy the demands of public opinion. But, obviously, we cannot renounce the arms that we have not got. *We can only, therefore, insist upon the application of the principles whose enforcement is, in our view, necessary for us to secure really satisfactory results; that is to say, to move towards the ultimate aim in view—namely, the general reduction of armaments and the consolidation of peace.*

*What are these principles? I do not wish to expound theories to you; I simply want to lay before you one or two ideas which should commend themselves to this Conference on their own merits.*

*For us, the general outline of the kind of thing which disarmament was contemplated to be is given in Article 8 of the Covenant. That only applies, it is true, to Members of the League of Nations, but the terms of that clause have been drafted so wisely and so logically that I cannot help feeling those countries that are not members of the League (or as I always prefer to regard them, not yet members of the League) will be prepared to conform with Article 8 of the Covenant.*

*. . . M. Léon Bourgeois, replying, made it perfectly clear that there could not be two kinds of principles in a society if it was to be truly a society of nations.*

*Therefore the contribution which we can make here is to urge upon all the public and also the Conference to accept loyally and in spirit of fraternity the principle of equality under the terms of Article 8, an equality which no nation worthy of the name would ever renounce.*

*. . . It is true that the programme of the League of Nations Union says equality must be sought by levelling down and not levelling up armaments; we are perfectly prepared to accept that; we have no objection whatever to accept the condition of being able merely to police our country, provided others will do the same. We have no desire to increase our armaments, we wish for equality. If that can be acquired by scaling down armaments, so much the better. We shall welcome progress along those lines to the utmost possible limits.*

*. . . That is our idea of our contribution to be made to this Conference—not by referring to mere formulas but by getting down to the very essence of things. We come into the special work of this Conference with the resolve to go as far along the road of conciliation as the essential principles upon which the dignity and interests of our country depend permit.*

*. . . But after the remarks which I have had the honour to make, it will be obvious that I am diametrically opposed to some parts of that draft, and therefore I have to say that the draft is not acceptable to us as a whole. But the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden has put forward a formula which will enable me not to hamper the work, and which I can accept, at the same time not committing myself to that moral pledge by which I could not abide. He said that he was prepared to accept the draft Convention, not as a basis, but as a framework for our discussions.*

*In conclusion, may I formulate the principles which guide the Hungarian delegation in its participation in the common task of this Conference?*

*In the first place, we claim the universal application of Article 8 of the Covenant, which proclaims the equal right of all to the minimum of armaments consistent with national safety and the enforcement of international obligations, and prescribes at the same time that, when applying this principle, account shall be taken of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State in accordance with a plan formulated by the Council and accepted by all States.*

*Secondly: We give it as our opinion that the words "lowest point", used in the text of Article 8, mean the greatest reduction which can be obtained.*

*Thirdly: We consider that these words involve, not merely the reduction of effectives, but also that of war material; the total abolition of offensive weapons, of aeroplanes (particularly bombing planes), on the model of the prohibitions contained in the military clauses of the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly and Trianon.*

*Fourthly: If the aims thus set out can only be reached by stages, we demand that these stages should be spread over as short a period as possible, and that the Convention to be drawn up by this Conference should represent a genuine advance to the furthest possible limits in this direction, and, further, that it should contain definite guarantees for the complete realisation of these aims within as short a time as circumstances permit.*

**M. Grandi (Italy), February 10th, 1932.**

The Italian delegation begs to call attention to the following principal points in the statements made by M. Grandi during the plenary meeting on February 10th, 1932.

1. Equality of rights between all States and the equalisation of armaments at the lowest levels.

2. Simultaneous application of qualitative limitation and quantitative limitation:

(a) As regards qualitative limitation, the Italian delegation, refers to the proposal already presented by it (see document Conf.D.81);

(b) As regards quantitative limitation, the Italian delegation accepts as basis of discussion the draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission.

**M. Ch. Zarine (Latvia), February 13th, 1932.**

My country is prepared to support and accede to proposals designed to create a system of mutual assistance which would guarantee its security and independence. We sincerely hope that the present Conference may reach a satisfactory solution of this problem. The Latvian delegation



has accordingly noted with special interest the concrete proposals for *the creation of an international force under the control and authority of the League of Nations*.

. . . The Latvian Government considers that every effort should be made to *preserve mankind from the horrors of chemical and bacteriological warfare*. This can be accomplished only through the *complete prohibition of the manufacture and employment of chemical weapons*. The French proposal with regard to *new rules for the protection of the civilian population* has caused us the liveliest satisfaction. The Latvian delegation is, moreover, of opinion that it would be desirable to *prohibit the employment of such aggressive instruments of war as bombs dropped from the air, large calibre guns and tanks*.

We are prepared to support the proposals for the *limitation of the period of military service* and a general reduction of armed forces within the meaning of Article 8 of the Covenant.

M. Hussein Alâ (Persia), February 16th, 1932.

. . . *There is considerable good and considerable truth in all the arguments submitted*. It might be said that the ideal would be the abolition of war by total and general disarmament as proposed by the Delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; or the equalisation of armed forces as proposed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey.

. . . On one point I note with pleasure that we all agree. I refer to the necessity for the protection of civil populations, and the proscription of the use of the most aggressive forms of armaments. That is a step forward upon which the Conference might congratulate itself. In order to emphasise this determination to put a limit to aggression and recognise only legitimate defence, we might at the same time as considering the abolition of the most deadly and offensive weapons also consider *the strengthening of the means of defence of the less protected countries, the countries that have no fortifications and are insufficiently equipped from an industrial point of view*. The cause of the consolidation of peace would be thereby helped and strengthened. *This case must be foreseen if the principle of budgetary limitation is in the long run accepted*.

. . . Instead of spending our time in discussion as to whether *disarmament* comes before security, or, *vice versa*, it would be better for us to harness ourselves to useful and practical work and to agree on the *necessity of considering these two ideas side by side*.

With each step forward in the direction of security should correspond an equivalent in armaments. We shall thus arrive at a gradual consolidation of peace with less risk, and diminish armaments to the minimum provided for by Article 8 of the Covenant. Let us devote ourselves by every means possible to *moral disarmament*, because, as M. Hymans said so well, "it is the manners and customs of mankind which engender security", and "the respect for international law must sink deep into the consciousness of peoples".

. . . All we ask is to conform to Article 8 of the Covenant, which provides for the maintenance of national armaments consistent with a minimum of security and with the carrying out of international obligations imposed by common action, *taking due account of the geographical situation and the special conditions of each State*.

M. Zaleski (Poland), February 10th, 1932.

. . . For this reason, we have welcomed with real satisfaction the inclusion in the agenda of the French proposals to give the League of Nations an effective executive power, since this would in our opinion make possible an appreciable reduction of armaments.

[Poland's point of view on the draft Convention.]

I need only refer to the statements made in the Preparatory Commission.

[Poland's point of view on the problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments and on security—given in the Polish memorandum dated September 14th, 1931 document C.643.M.257,1931, (Conf. D.17).]

It is indispensable . . . that this draft (of the Preparatory Commission) should constitute the main basis of discussion.

. . . We regret that no reference has been made to the "potentiel de guerre".

. . . Let us hope that these omissions (from the draft Convention) will be at least partially made good by adequate guarantees against aggression.

. . . Nor must we lose sight of the necessity of ensuring that the provisions of the Convention cannot be rendered inoperative by some re-adaptation of the systems of military organisation.

. . . Obviously, if any country were to *expend an inordinate amount of its formations organised on a military basis*—an amount even equal, perhaps, to its military expenditure in the strict sense of the term—a situation would arise which would necessarily cause some concern.

. . . The limitation of the aggregate expenditure on the armed forces and formations organised on a military basis in the widest sense of the term is hence the only effectual limitation possible in the matter of armaments.



[Concerning the limitation of expenditure on armaments.]

. . . The Conference must carefully survey the whole of this field of the limitation of the expenditure on armaments; for there are a great many questions unsettled, such as the establishment of *reasonable proportions between the expenditure of countries which have the advantage of having uninterruptedly and continuously organised their defence system, and whose territory has never been devastated or suffered foreign occupation, and countries which have had to build up their system of national defence during the gravest economic crisis ever known in the history of mankind.*

. . . The attention of the world and of the whole body of public opinion must be mainly directed towards *preparations for war in every sphere: preparation for industrial aggression, preparation for air aggression and so on.*

. . . Our efforts must also be directed towards the *repression of international offences constituting a breach of the stipulations of the future Convention.*

. . . I am well aware that it will sometimes be a particularly delicate matter to find *common solutions for the Members and non-Members of the League.*

. . . We shall make a genuine effort (to find these common solutions) without thereby being obliged to abandon the principles on which the Covenant is based.

In the sphere of mutual assistance but very meagre progress has been recorded since the Covenant of the League.

. . . Possibly in certain cases a solution on a regional basis within the general framework of the Convention will be found the most suitable, according to well-known precedents.

M. Branco (Portugal), February 15th, 1932.

. . . We are therefore in favour of compulsory arbitration.

. . . *We still think that if it were possible to revive and secure the acceptance of the provisions of the latter instrument, a decisive step forward would have been taken towards the organisation of peace.*

. . . *In any case it does not seem to us that in the present situation so far as international undertakings are concerned, in view of the fragility of certain legal obligations, in view of the fact that in the event of a conflict any country can refuse to appear before the organisation of international justice, it does not appear to us in those circumstances that the normal operation of collective assistance constitutes an effective guarantee of security. In the circumstances it will be necessary for a system of mutual assistance to be set up by way of reinforcement of the safeguards provided for in the Pacts of general solidarity. These supplementary special guarantees will be necessary so long as that general solidarity which is referred to in the text of the Covenant is merely general in theory and is liable in practice to disastrous instances of default.*

. . . *We are prepared to maintain our armaments within the limits set by figures which we shall have occasion to submit in detail to the Technical Committees, figures which must necessarily be computed in consideration of what I have just said.*

*We accept as the basis of our discussion the Draft Convention prepared by the Preparatory Commission. We approve of the limitation of armaments by way of budgetary reductions; we are prepared to accept control by a Permanent Commission as proposed by the Preparatory Commission, provided that all the nations concerned have an opportunity of being represented in turn upon that supervisory body.*

*We note with great pleasure that all the previous speakers have undertaken on behalf of their countries to abolish chemical and bacteriological warfare. I need hardly tell you how gladly we associate ourselves with those declarations, especially as there is already in existence a special Protocol on the subject which has been signed by Portugal and a number of other countries.*

*With regard to the suppression of arms which has been termed aggressive, such as long-range artillery, bombing aircraft, etc., we view with every sympathy the proposals that have been made, provided they are accompanied by effective safeguards and guarantees that they will really be put into general effect.*

. . . *Its armaments have not been renewed or modernised as they will have to be.*

. . . *A number of highly interesting proposals have been put forward during the discussion here. Some of them will require careful consideration, and we shall examine them in the most sympathetic and broad-minded spirit, especially in view of the fact that in the course of my speech I have had occasion to adopt certain of the principles on which they are based.*

. . . I am glad to be able to tell you as a definite earnest of our goodwill and sincerity in this matter that *the Government of the Portuguese Republic has decided to accede to the General Act of Arbitration.*

M. Ghika (Roumania), February 17th, 1932.

. . . *My distinguished colleague, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has, moreover, clearly proved that organised moral disarmament is an absolutely necessary condition for military disarmament, and he has set out the main lines of his argument in the excellent memorandum he submitted last September. The urgent necessity of such action must be apparent to all. In every country sincere efforts should be made to achieve this purpose by those on whom the education of the young—and consequently the future of the nations—depends: I refer to the action which must be undertaken by parents, by the schools and by the Church, nay even by the cinemas and newspapers.*

. . . In this essential and burning question of moral disarmament I am proud to be able to say that Roumania was the first country to introduce in her Draft Penal Code the offence of war propaganda—that propaganda referred to in the Polish memorandum. My country intends to bring her internal law into line with the new international law.



. . . In this same spirit the Roumanian representatives at the various Conferences have expressed the desire that international conventions should be concluded for the universal prevention and punishment of war propaganda and all individual acts likely to disturb international relations.

. . . So much so that, advancing again certain logical projects, the French delegation, through its eloquent and outspoken mouthpiece M. Tardieu, invites us finally to provide the League with that force which it has hitherto lacked.

The Roumanian delegation gives to this proposal its warmest welcome and its fullest support; in its opinion, it provides not merely an instrument for the safeguarding and, if necessary, the successful re-establishment of peace through the application of speedy sanctions against violators of the Covenant, but also, a most important fact, a means of endowing the Covenant and the League with the prestige and the armed force which in the last resort are essential to the curbing of any temptation to appeal to arms or undertake aggressive action.

. . . It has given us very great pleasure to listen to the speeches of Sir John Simon, of the Hon. Mr. Gibson, M. Grandi, and to that of M. Tardieu, and to note that their words, whose eloquence equals their wealth of practical wisdom, contain many points of agreement which are of the happiest possible augury, particularly as regards the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare and of the employment of bombing planes against open towns and the civil population. Agreement on this point will have the invaluable advantage of providing, even if only in a limited sense, a criterion by which the aggressor in a given case can be determined, a matter on which at the present time ideas are far too vague.

I am in agreement with the remarks which the head of the Polish delegation made on the subject of war potentials. This matter is one of primary importance if we compare, on the one hand, the industrial equipment of States well supplied with factories and with the means for the mass production of armaments by the rapid transformation of their factory equipment and, on the other hand, the absence of similar resources in the case of States whose lack of industrial development places them under the handicap of procuring from beyond their frontiers the arms and munitions required for their defence, and places them at the mercy of all the uncertainties of transport and loads them with the burden of heavy payments arising out of the weakness of their national currency.

Similarly, I follow the Danish delegation in its opinion that a really effective supervision is indispensable and would be one of the most valuable means of securing disarmament.

When furnishing information regarding the state of her armaments, Roumania at the same time made some brief remarks with the object of explaining her position; I should like to remind this Conference of the particular geographical position of my country, and to point out that her armaments bear no relation to her needs and security; the limitation of her future programmes in this respect will depend strictly on the guarantees which may be provided for her and which are involved in the effective application of Article 10 of the Covenant, through the provision of speedy and effective assistance from the other members of the League, and by the respect for treaties and agreements contained in the Part V of these Treaties.

**Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Bey (Turkey), February 15th, 1932.**

. . . The British delegate in his speech referred to the system of military service. In my country, as in many others, military service is a duty from which no citizen would desire to escape. I merely must point out in this connection that nowadays, when preliminary military training is almost universal, the question of military service is really little more than a matter of form and structure. Therefore it would be essential for the Conference to recognise that each country must have the right to choose that form of military service which is best suited to its special circumstances and to its financial situation.

**M. Marinkovitch (Yugoslavia), February 16th, 1932.**

. . . We are compelled to take this fact into account and to distinguish between armaments intended for national defence and armaments which are mainly aggressive in character.

. . . We believe it should be possible to a very considerable extent to make this distinction in the case of certain arms—for example, in the case of aircraft, which is a new weapon in full course of development and in the case of navies.

We reserve the right to consider this possible in greater detail in the competent committees, but we believe we may state at once that in our view it would be possible immediately, without compromising the security of any of the nations represented at the Conference, to abolish all naval forces, the purpose of which is to make war at a distance, and which are consequently capable of being employed for aggressive war, and to restrict them to what is necessary for the defence of the national coast-line.

. . . Again the Yugoslav delegation considers it essential to prohibit the preparation and use of chemicals and bacteria in war, even for purposes of legitimate defence. Such forms of warfare, besides being cruel and inhuman in the extreme, are in the nature of war for the purpose of extermination, inasmuch as their chief menace is to the civilian population. Attacking as they do the women and children, they destroy all hope of any possible revival in the future of the belligerent nations. But we believe it to be our duty to say openly that the prohibition of these forms of war will be useless if no provision is made for sanctions.



## PROPOSALS OF DELEGATIONS

---

*Official No.: Conf. D. 56.*

Geneva, February 5th, 1932.

### PROPOSALS OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION.

The Government of the Republic, conscious of the gravity of the problem to be solved, is convinced that, in accordance with previous work of the League of Nations, the Conference should deal with this problem as a part of general policy.

This is all the more important since it meets at a time of economic and moral tension, at a time of general disturbance and uneasiness, when events emphasise the absolute necessity of a better organisation in a tormented world.

The Government of the Republic is anxious to honour the promise contained in its memorandum of July 15th, 1931, and to reply to the repeated appeals made by the League of Nations, notably in the resolution of the Assembly of 1927. It intends thus to fulfil a double duty.

It assumes that, on the basis of the draft Convention of 1930, action will be taken with the least possible delay.

Further, it presents herewith proposals for placing civil aviation and bombing aircraft, and also certain material of land and naval forces, at the disposal of the League of Nations<sup>1</sup>; for the creation of a preventive and repressive international force; for the political conditions upon which such measures depend; and, lastly, for new rules providing for the protection of civil population.

#### I. PROPOSALS TO PLACE CIVIL AVIATION AND BOMBING AIRCRAFT AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The Government of the Republic proposes, in the first place, to the Conference a series of measures dealing with the newest arm of war, now increasing immoderately in size and technique with consequent disorganisation of prices and international competition—this war arm whose character is the most specifically offensive and the most threatening to civilians.

Bombing machines capable of carrying great loads and having a wide radius of action which enables them to conduct operations far within the territory of belligerent countries offer the aggressor a particularly cruel weapon for use against non-combatants. It is to such machines that the following provisions refer:

##### 1. *Internationalisation of Civil Air Transport under a Regime to be organised by the League.*

This internationalisation, already studied by certain Governments for economic and financial reasons, would include:

(a) The undertaking by the Contracting parties not to permit their nationals to construct (with the exception of orders placed in accordance with the conditions fixed in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) hereafter) or to employ machines capable of military use. The maximum unladen tonnage of authorised aircraft will be to this end and in accordance with the advice of their experts, limited by the Contracting parties to  $x$  tons for aeroplanes,  $x'$  for seaplanes and  $x''$  cubic metres for dirigibles.

(b) The creation of an international civil air transport service entrusted to continental, inter-continental or inter-colonial organisations, to operate air transport under the auspices

---

<sup>1</sup> Or, in the case of the accession of States non-members of the League of Nations, of which several have taken part in the work of the Preparatory Commission, at the disposal of the international authority which would be constituted to ensure their co-operation.

of the League of Nations, which alone will have the right to build and to use machines of greater tonnage than that indicated in the preceding paragraph.

(c) The right to create lines between the home country and colonial territories presenting particular interest for one or more of the Contracting parties, provided always that they undertake to bear the costs, if requested to do so by the League of Nations, and that they submit to the League for its approval the number, the type and the unladen tonnage of the machines to be used.

(d) The fair distribution, according to their capacity, between the aviation industries of the different countries, of orders for material for international civil aviation, in accordance with conditions to be fixed in an annexed convention.

(e) The exclusive, permanent and inalienable right for the League of Nations to requisition all machines for the International Civil Air Service.

(f) The guarantee of the Contracting Parties not to place an embargo on machines belonging to the International Civil Air Service and not to sequester them, but to facilitate the League's right of requisition by all means in their power.

This internationalisation of civil aviation is the necessary condition of the proposals which follow.

## 2. *Limitation of Bombing Aircraft.*

The problem to be solved has two aspects of equal importance.

On the one hand, it is necessary that, in order to carry out its preventive and, if need be, its repressive action against war, the League of Nations should dispose of a superiority in air strength.

On the other hand, it would be inadmissible for a State suffering from an air bombardment, in violation of the rules laid down in Chapter V below, not to retain the full use of all its air strength in order to reply to this flagrant act of aggression.

In order to reconcile these two necessities, the Government of the Republic proposes:

(a) The contracting parties undertake not to retain, or not to build in the future for their military air forces, machines having an unladen tonnage exceeding a limit to be fixed by the contracting parties in consultation with their experts, at  $y$  tons for aeroplanes,  $y'$  tons for seaplanes and  $y''$  cubic metres for dirigibles.

Machines of tonnage above this limit will be set aside for the constitution of an international military air force. Consequently, they will be transferred by those contracting parties who own them when the Convention comes into force, to the League of Nations which will decide where they have to be stationed and will organise the command of the International Air Force.

(b) In the military air forces of the different States, two categories must be distinguished:

(1) Machines which will be left, in all circumstances, at the disposal of the Military Air Forces, and the unladen tonnage of which will be decided by the contracting parties after consultation with their experts and will not exceed  $z$  tons for aeroplanes,  $z'$  tons for seaplanes and  $z''$  cubic metres for dirigibles;

(2) Machines the unladen tonnage of which comes within the limits  $y$  and  $z$  and which will conform with the rules of paragraph (c) below.

(c) The inclusion of aeroplanes, the unladen tonnage of which comes between  $z$  and  $y$  tons, in the Air Forces they are entitled to possess, is only authorised to those contracting parties who undertake to place them at the disposal of the League in the eventuality of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant and of common action by the League of Nations. These machines will be permanently under the inspection of the League.

(d) Any contracting party suffering from an air bombardment in violation of Chapter V below, on the sole condition that it notifies the League of Nations, will be entitled immediately to use all its air forces including those machines earmarked to be at the disposal of the League of Nations. The contracting party will also, *ipso facto*, be freed from its own obligations *vis-à-vis* the aggressor.

The above provisions, while ensuring to the League its superiority of air strength, result in limiting bombing aircraft as regards number, power and use.

## II. PROPOSALS TO PLACE CERTAIN MATERIAL OF LAND AND NAVAL FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The same problem arises in the case of certain land and naval material as arises in the case of bombing aircraft. The French delegation offers a similar solution — namely :

(a) Only those Powers which undertake to place them at the disposal of the League of Nations in the event of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant and of common action by the League shall have the right to possess such materials;



(b) In the case of aggression contrary to the rules laid down in Chapter V of the present proposals, the said Powers, after notifying the League of Nations, will recover the full right to dispose of all such means of defence;

(c) The material coming under the present section includes:

Batteries of heavy long-range artillery;  
Capital ships carrying guns exceeding 8 inches or of a tonnage exceeding 10,000 (W.T.) tons;  
Submarines with a tonnage exceeding  $n$  tons.

### III. CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

The object of the third French proposal is to set up on behalf of the League of Nations and apart from the measures provided in Chapters 1 and 2:

(1) An international police force to prevent war;

(2) A first contingent of coercionary forces to repress war and to bring immediate assistance to any State victim of aggression.

(a) The police force will be permanently available with complete freedom of passage to occupy in times of emergency areas where a threat of war has arisen, and to assist the action of commissioners of the League of Nations on the spot, and also to contribute to all conservatory measures within the scope of the Convention to improve the Means of Preventing War and of Article 11 of the League Covenant.

This police force will be made up of contingents furnished by each of the contracting parties in a proportion to be determined. France is prepared to contribute a mixed brigade, a light naval division and a mixed group of reconnaissance and fighter aircraft.

The League of Nations will arrange for the command of the international police force and will be entitled to inspect its component elements.

(b) The first contingent of coercionary forces would, in conformity with the undertakings to be assumed by contracting parties, be made up of elements of strength varying according to the regions concerned.

These undertakings entered into by States towards the League of Nations would oblige them to come to the help of any State victim of aggression with forces of definite strength constantly available. The contracting parties would have the option of increasing this contribution on the recommendation of the Council of the League (Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant) or, in the event of aggression, with a view to applying regional conventions of mutual assistance coming within the scope of the Covenant.

The undertakings of the various States would differ according to the place of the conflict—a conflict concerning another continent from that to which the State belongs; a conflict concerning the continent to which the State belongs; a conflict in which the aggressor has a common frontier with the contracting State.

France is prepared to undertake the following contributions:

In the case of a conflict outside Europe: a mixed brigade, a light naval division, a mixed group of aircraft, material for land warfare without *personnel*, and munitions;

For a conflict in Europe: a division of all arms, a naval division, a mixed group of aircraft, material for land warfare with *personnel*, and munitions;

For a conflict in Europe in which the aggressor has a common frontier with France the contingents provided for in the preceding paragraph and, in addition, forces, the strength of which would be decided in each case in agreement with the League.

As far as material for land warfare is concerned, the contracting parties which possess tanks or similar armoured implements, as well as heavy field artillery, undertake to contribute from them to the forces which will be placed at the disposal of the League under the conditions mentioned above.

In these various eventualities the undertakings of each State would only become operative if the forces thus placed at any moment at the disposal of the League reached a minimum total to be determined, and if there were equitable proportion between the contributions of the principal States.

### IV. PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

In addition to the preceding provisions, the Government of the Republic proposes the adoption of the following rules which can be adopted unconditionally:

(a) The use by aeroplanes and by land or naval artillery of projectiles which are specifically incendiary or which contain poison gases or bacteria is forbidden, whatever the objective.

(b) Any bombardment either from the air or by artillery is forbidden at a distance of more than  $x$  kilometres from the front line in land warfare. The only exceptions admitted to this rule concern the bombardment of air bases used by belligerents or of the emplacements of long-range artillery.

(c) Along the coast air bombardment is forbidden behind a zone of a depth of  $x$  kilometres except on air bases and on batteries of artillery. In this zone of  $x$  kilometres air



bombardment is not permitted except under the conditions laid down by Convention IX of The Hague for naval artillery acting with or without preliminary warning according to the cases mentioned in Article 2 of the said Convention.

(d) The use of naval artillery will continue to be governed by the provisions of Convention IX of The Hague.

(e) Any flagrant violation of one of the rules stated in the present chapter will be regarded as *prima facie* evidence that the State guilty thereof has resorted to war within the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

## V. CONDITIONS FOR THE ORGANISATION OF PEACE.

The Government of the Republic is fully aware that the above proposals entail political measures, which alone permit and guarantee their successful operation.

It affirms once more that no substantial reduction of armaments can be brought about by empirical and technical means. Whoever desires the end—and the end is essential—must also desire the means. There must be a change of method; in future we must seek in common action that security which each nation has hitherto endeavoured to obtain from its own force alone.

This is the very spirit of the Covenant. We must give vitality to its stipulations, which, ever since we began to discuss their application, have been constantly interpreted along the line of least resistance.

The present Conference offers the best opportunity that has ever occurred to make a definite choice between a League of Nations possessing executive authority and a League of Nations paralysed by the uncompromising attitude of national sovereignty. France has made her choice. She suggests that the other nations should make theirs.

The measures without which the above proposals would be ineffective and even unthinkable include amongst others compulsory arbitration; definition of the aggressor; guarantees as to the rapidity of the decision of the authority controlling the international force; the bringing of the action of that authority into conformity with international law, which is still insufficiently precise, but the permanent and contractual elements of which result from international treaties and pacts; and the international control of the execution of all agreements concerning armaments.

These provisions, in regard to which the French delegation reserves the right to make concrete proposals are an integral part of the enquiries carried out by the League of Nations during the last twelve years. All the elements of the necessary solution are brought together.

Such a solution would be not only an important step towards a general and contractual limitation of armaments and towards their reduction, but also a great advance in the organisation of peace.

As the proposed organisation would have to be general, the execution of the undertakings which the various Powers would declare themselves ready to accept will be held in suspense until the ratification of the final Convention by all the contracting parties.

The Government of the Republic furnished in its Memorandum of July 15th, 1931, and in the Annexes to that Memorandum precise details of the modification of its armaments and the reductions which it has already brought about of its own accord, in execution of Article 8 of the League Covenant, since it came into force and since the conclusion of the Locarno Agreements.

These reductions, which the political conditions based on the existing order of things have rendered possible to France, are a pledge of her determination not only to fix them by treaty, but also, once co-operation has taken the place of isolation, to endeavour to achieve further reductions on the lines of the present proposals and of the fundamental guarantees to peace which these proposals would ensure.

### Annex.

#### EXPLANATORY TABLE OF CHAPTER I OF THE ABOVE PROPOSALS.

<i>Military Aircraft</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>	<i>Civil Aircraft</i>
Bombing machines capable of carrying great loads, set aside for the International Air Force; not allowed for national aircraft.		
Y	Y	International Air Transport Service
National aircraft placed at the disposal of the League in the eventuality of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant.		
Z	Z	
Military aircraft left, in all circumstances, at the disposal of the contracting parties.	X	Private Aircraft.
	o	

Note. — X, Y and Z to be determined by the Conference.



*Official No. : Conf. D. 74.*

Geneva, February 11th, 1932.

## PROPOSALS OF THE SPANISH DELEGATION.

### GENERAL PROVISIONS.

The Convention shall be explicitly concluded on the basis of Article 8, and in consequence Article 60 of the Draft Convention shall be either omitted or amended, as, under the terms of the Covenant and in particular Article 8, paragraph 4, the Contracting Parties may not denounce the Convention, but may only propose its revision under paragraph 3.

Provisions shall be added to the Convention with a view to rendering the application of Article 8 more effective.

### LAND ARMAMENTS.

1. Abolition of all arms which a majority of the Conference shall deem to be of an aggressive character. Technical criteria, such as calibre, mobility, etc., shall be decided by the Conference after consultation with experts.

2. As an additional measure to Article 10 of the Convention, provisions shall be included to provide for:

A. The limitation of stocks of material and the establishment and publication of an inventory;

B. The incorporation in the Disarmament Convention of:

(a) The Convention of 1925 on the supervision of the international trade in arms and ammunition:

(b) A Convention to be proposed by the Conference, providing for international and national supervision of the private and State manufacture of arms and ammunition, such manufacture to be subject to a system of licensing and publicity.

The principles which will govern this Convention are those formulated in the Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission (document A.16.1924.IX—Extract[Conf.D.77]), duly amended by the Minority Report on page 82.

### NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

1. No State may build vessels of over 10,000 tons or capable of carrying guns of over 203 mm. No submersible vessel may have a displacement of more than 1,000 tons or a radius of action greater than that which the Conference may determine as giving the vessel an aggressive character.

2. Merchant vessels may not be strengthened for the purpose of being equipped with guns or with other appliances enabling them to be used for war purposes.

### AVIATION.

Complete abolition of military aviation; internationalisation of civil aviation.

---

*Official No. : Conf. D. 76.*

Geneva, February 13th, 1932.

## PROPOSALS OF THE POLISH DELEGATION WITH REGARD TO THE GRADUAL ATTAINMENT OF MORAL DISARMAMENT.

Referring to its memorandum of September 17th, 1931 (document Conf. D. 16), the Polish Government, being convinced of the absolute necessity of achieving moral disarmament in every field of public life controlled by the organs of government, and anxious to facilitate the work of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments by creating an atmosphere

of mutual confidence, has the honour to suggest to the Conference that the following proposals be forthwith brought under consideration:

#### I. REFORMS TO BE INTRODUCED IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION.

Inasmuch as the laws in force in the various countries do not take into account the new necessities arising out of the development of international relations, but confine themselves to protecting purely national interests, the Polish Government proposes that consideration be given to the possibility of adjusting national laws to the present stage of development of international life. The object of such consideration would be to define a class of actions incompatible with satisfactory international relations and dangerous to the peace of the world, such as the inciting of public opinion to warlike sentiments, propaganda aimed at inducing the State to violate international law, and the deliberate spreading of false or distorted reports or forged documents likely to embitter the relations between States.

On the basis of the results of this consideration, it would be possible to conclude a first international convention whereby Governments would agree to make the actions so specified punishable offences under their laws.

This first step might be followed by others as international ties were drawn closer.

#### II. PRESS.

Inasmuch as newspapers and periodicals determine the main currents of public opinion, and thereby exercise a considerable influence on international life, the Polish Government proposes that a conference be held, as soon as possible, of qualified representatives of journalists' and publishers' professional associations, to consider what steps could be taken to put the idea of moral disarmament into effect so far as the Press is concerned. This conference might further discuss the specific proposals formulated in the Polish memorandum of September 17th, 1931.

The results of the proceedings of this conference might afford a basis for concerted action, both by Governments and by professional Press associations.

#### III. EDUCATION.

Inasmuch as the future peace of the world depends upon the spirit in which the young are brought up, and the whole effort to organise an international community would be in vain if the young were not taught to look towards peace as the supreme good, the Polish Government proposes that the recommendations and suggestions already adopted should be progressively put into effect by international undertakings. In this connection, attention should be drawn to the desirability of a general revision of school text-books, to the introduction, in educational institutions of every grade, of instruction concerning the League, international co-operation and the life of other peoples, and to the importance of Government encouragement for closer relations between students and teachers in different countries.

#### IV. BROADCASTING, THE CINEMATOGRAPH AND THE STAGE.

Inasmuch as international opinion is influenced by every kind of public manifestation of thought, such as broadcasting, the cinema and the stage, the Polish Government proposes that steps be taken to prevent, in these directions, abuses which would be dangerous to a good international understanding.

As regards broadcasting, the Polish Government is of opinion that considerable progress would be made if a general convention could be concluded on the subject. It should be observed that that part of the broadcasting programmes which deals with international relations is generally reserved for Governments and official news agencies. If Governments would undertake to adhere to the principles of moral disarmament in their exercise of this privilege, they would contribute greatly to the achievement of moral disarmament in this field.

Films and plays are generally subject to Government censorship, and the Polish Government therefore proposes that the Governments should undertake to prohibit the exhibition of films and the performance of plays which might embitter international relations, and, on the other hand, to encourage—*e.g.*, by exemption from tax—films and plays conveying propaganda in favour of peace.

#### V.

Needless to say, the realisation of all these ideas in regard to the attitude of Governments to private activities would be entirely valueless if the Governments did not adhere to the fundamental ideas of moral disarmament in their mutual relations. The achievement here contemplated will not be complete unless the international policy of Governments is in harmony with their efforts in the direction of moral disarmament.



PROCEDURE.

The Polish Government proposes that the question of moral disarmament be referred to the General Commission, which will doubtless appoint a sub-committee to draft the necessary convention or conventions.

---

*Official No. : Conf. D. 78.*

Geneva, February 15th, 1932.

PROPOSALS OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION.

ARTICLE 1.

The object of the reduction of armaments is to reduce the peace-time land, sea and air armed forces of all countries to an equal limit.

This limit is to be attained within ten years. Accordingly, armies exceeding a strength of ..... shall annually be reduced by 10 per cent of the amount by which their effectives exceed the limit so fixed.

ARTICLE 2.

When the above-mentioned limit is fixed, the manufacture and use of the following classes of war material shall be completely forbidden:

- (a) Military aircraft, together with all air bombardment;
- (b) Heavy artillery of a calibre exceeding  $x$  cm.;
- (c) Tanks and armoured cars;
- (d) Warships carrying guns of a calibre exceeding  $y$  cm. and having a displacement of more than  $z$  tons.

ARTICLE 3.

*Gas.* — The use of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological weapons being prohibited, all peace-time preparations for their use shall be likewise prohibited.

ARTICLE 4.

All material designed for the projection of the above-mentioned weapons is also prohibited.

ARTICLE 5.

The strength and armament of police and gendarmerie forces and Customs guards shall be fixed by special commissions, and these forces shall not be included in the limits provided for in Article 1.

In calculating these forces, the needs of the different countries will, of course, be taken into consideration.

---

*Official No. : Conf. D. 79.*

Geneva, February 18th, 1932.

PROPOSALS OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

When the German Government rejected the draft Convention at the last session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, they made it clear that, at the Conference itself, they would do their utmost, in co-operation with the other countries, to help finding the right way to disarmament. It is in this spirit that the German delegation submit the following proposals to the Conference.

In drafting these proposals the German delegation started from the fact that Germany and three other countries have already carried through disarmament for some years past under a

regulation which was set up by the same Powers that drafted Article 8 of the Covenant and declared at the same time that the disarmament of the above-mentioned four countries was to be the first step towards general disarmament as provided for in the Covenant. Germany therefore considers her own disarmament as indicative of the course which the disarmament of all Members of the League will have to follow, having regard to the fundamental equality of rights of all Members of the League which excludes all discrimination in regard to any of them. The principles governing the general reduction and limitation of armaments, which the Conference is called upon to lay down, must be equally applicable to all Members of the League and to all countries associating themselves with the League's action for disarmament.

The defects and omissions of the draft Convention, which have made it unacceptable to the German Government, can be seen from the reservations incorporated in the report of the Preparatory Commission. A few examples will be sufficient.

One of the chief defects of the draft Convention is the insufficient limitation of land material. A mere reduction of expenditure, as provided for in the draft, does neither affect the existing material in service or on stock, nor does it provide a reliable basis for the future limitation of fresh material. The draft Convention enables the countries generally to keep, and even to increase, their heavy offensive armaments. The air armament as such, in particular, is allowed to subsist in the draft. By exempting from reduction and limitation the main part of reserve aircraft and reserve airplane engines the draft even creates the possibility of a competition between the signatory States in the development of these instruments of aggression. As to personnel, the draft Convention allows the various systems of recruitment to be maintained, but in the case of conscript armies it does not include in its provisions the trained reserves on which the strength of such armies rests. Finally, by departing in almost every decisive point from the rules of disarmament imposed upon Germany at the end of the war, while expressly maintaining these same rules for Germany in its general provisions, the draft Convention makes it impossible to reach an acceptable solution of the problem of disarmament.

The following proposals, which are not exhaustive but reproduce the opinion of the German Government in its general outline, are intended to carry through an effective reduction and limitation of armaments extending to all important factors of armaments. They include, in particular, measures of fundamental importance in regard to the prevention of an aggression. The proposals are based upon the principle that there can be only one system of disarmament in future which must be equally applicable to all countries; such a system would produce an equitable and effective solution of the problem of disarmament if armament figures to be incorporated in it for all countries were fixed at the lowest possible level. These proposals are furthermore taking into account the necessity to safeguard the national safety of nations as provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant.

In submitting these proposals to the Conference, the German delegation wish to make it clear that the German Government cannot accept a Convention unless its provisions are equally applicable to Germany and to other signatory countries.

## I. LAND FORCES.

### A. *Personnel.*

1. The personnel of the land forces shall generally be recruited only by means of voluntary enlistment.
2. Should this solution prove to be unacceptable to the Conference, and should, in consequence, the choice of their military system be left to the decision of the countries themselves, it will be necessary, in the case of conscript armies, to make adequate allowance for trained reserves, which are known to constitute the main part of armies in case of war and to include these trained reserves in the general reduction.
3. Due regard must be had in any case to the special circumstances of States having a militia system.
4. The number of officers should be fixed at the lowest possible figure for all countries alike in terms of a percentage of the total effective strength of the armies, and that figure must not be exceeded.
5. Police forces, gendarmerie and similar organisations must be limited and subjected to provisions excluding their utilisation for military purposes.

### B. *Material.*

6. It shall be generally and absolutely forbidden to maintain and utilise the following categories of arms:

- (a) Outside fortresses and field works: guns of more than 77-mm. and howitzers of more than 105-mm.;
- (b) In fortresses and field works: guns of more than 150-mm. and howitzers of more than 210-mm.;



- (c) Mortars and trench-mortars of every kind of a calibre of more than 150-mm.;
- (d) Tanks of every kind.

7. The armaments allowed under the above regulation shall be fixed for each State both as regards categories and quantities, together with a uniform allowance for replacements. Countries which do not possess armament factories and work-shops of their own can furthermore be authorised to retain certain reserve stocks. Armaments existing beyond the authorised limit must be destroyed.

#### C. Fortifications.

8. The construction and maintenance of fortresses, field works and works which, owing to their proximity to the frontier, constitute a direct menace to the neighbouring country and might possibly obstruct measures taken for the prevention of war, shall be prohibited. (As regards coast-defence works, see II.C.)

### II. NAVAL FORCES.

#### A. Material.

9. The maximum tonnage of the various types of vessels shall be reduced simultaneously with a proportional reduction of the total tonnage. No vessel of war shall, in future, exceed 10,000 tons or carry guns of a calibre of more than 280-mm.

10. The maintenance of both naval and land air forces being prohibited under Chapter III, the maintenance of aircraft carriers is likewise generally forbidden.

11. Submarines shall be abolished and forbidden.

12. The following "definitions" shall apply to all vessels except special ships or vessels exempt from limitation:

(a) *Capital ships*: vessels of war whose displacement exceeds 6,000 tons standard displacement or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 150-mm.;

(b) *Cruisers*: vessels of war exceeding 800 tons of standard displacement or the calibre of whose guns exceeds 105-mm.;

(c) *Destroyers*: vessels of war whose standard displacement does not exceed 800 tons and the calibre of whose guns does not exceed 105-mm.

13. *The non-floating material* shall be fixed for each country both as regards categories and quantities.

#### B. Personnel.

14. The naval personnel shall only be recruited by way of voluntary enlistment. The system of limitation, however, should be adapted to the system to be applied to the personnel of land forces.

15. As regards officers and warrant officers, a percentage of the total strength shall be fixed as maximum limit.

#### C. Fortifications.

16. Coast-defence fortifications may, in principle, be maintained in their present extent. Fortifications, however, which control natural waterways between two open seas shall be forbidden, in order to secure to all nations free and unhampered passage through these waterways.

### III. AIR FORCES.

17. The maintenance of air forces of any kind is forbidden. The total air force material which has so far been either in service or in reserve or on stock shall be destroyed, except those armaments which are to be incorporated in the quantities allowed for land and naval forces.

18. The dropping of bombs or any other objects or materials serving military purposes from aircraft, as well as all preparations to this effect shall be forbidden without any exception.

19. With a view to strictly enforcing the prohibition of any military aviation, the following shall, *inter alia*, be forbidden.

(a) Any instruction and training of any person in aviation having a military character or a military purpose.

(b) Any instruction or training of members of the army or navy in civil aviation.

(c) The construction, maintenance, importation or putting into commission of aircraft which is in any way armoured or protected or supplied with devices for the reception of warlike armaments of any kind, such as guns, machine-guns, torpedoes, bombs, or which are supplied with gunsights or devices for the dropping of bombs and with similar warlike instruments.

(d) The maintenance of any relations between the military or naval administration and civil aviation for any military purpose.

#### IV. GENERAL CLAUSES.

##### A. *Chemical Arms.*

20. The prohibition of the military utilisation of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and all similar liquids, matters or processes as well as of all other means of bacteriological warfare shall be extended to the preparation of the utilisation of these weapons.

##### B. *Traffic in Arms and Manufacture of Arms.*

21. The export and import of war armaments and their ammunition as well as of war material shall be strictly prohibited. Countries, however, which are not in a position to manufacture the quantities of arms, war materials and munitions allotted to them shall be given the possibility of importing the necessary quantities from abroad.

22. The manufacture of war armaments and munitions as well as of war material shall only be carried out in a limited number of private or State factories or workshops which shall be made public. The Governments undertake to ensure by appropriate measures that the production does not exceed the quantities allowed for their own use and for export to countries without an armament industry.

##### C. *Expenditure.*

23. In conformity with the obligations of the Members of the League embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant, to exchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, this exchange must also extend to expenditure for armaments.

*Observation.* — The German delegation are of opinion that the numerous deviations from the solid basis of the gold standard which have recently occurred are going to bring about such a decisive and unforeseen change in purchasing power that, for the time being, the method of financial limitation cannot be used as an effective measure of disarmament. Under the present economic and monetary circumstances, the application of this method would give rise to continual derogations which would seriously interfere with the steady advance of the process of contractual disarmament. Moreover, the establishment of a common plan for the financial limitation would be connected with extraordinary difficulties owing to the great differences which are at present existing in the various countries as to the stocks of material in hand. On the other hand, regard must be had to the fact that any really effective direct disarmament would be automatically accompanied by the indispensable decrease of the heavy financial burdens under which the nations are suffering owing to the exaggerated level of armaments.

##### D. *Control.*

24. The carrying through and the observation of the disarmament clauses shall be secured by a procedure of control equally applicable to all countries.

#### V. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS.

25. In so far as the realisation of the present proposals necessitates measures of a technical nature or measures of organisation, the Conference shall have to lay down provisions regarding the procedure and the periods which the various States shall have to observe in adjusting their present armaments to the level fixed by the Convention.

*Official No. : Conf. D. 80.*

Geneva, February 17th, 1932.

#### PROPOSALS BY THE HAITIAN DELEGATION.

The Haitian delegation proposes that all States taking part in the Conference should undertake, in a general convention:

1. In accordance with the principles of mutual help which constitute the foundation of the League, to provide the latter, by a contribution from all the States belonging to it, to be fixed for each in proportion to the numbers of its population and to its national resources, with an organised land, sea and air force, and effectives deemed by experts to be adequate to assist or defend peoples who are the victims of aggression, without prejudice to the sanctions already



laid down in Article 16 of the Covenant: aggression to be defined by the League and the aggressor to be determined by the Permanent Court of International Justice;

2. To reduce existing armaments and to limit their strength in accordance with the principles contained in the six paragraphs of Article 8, under the conditions laid down in the draft of the Preparatory Commission, the supervision of these measures being left to a special organisation of the League in accordance with the suggestion of H.E. M. Zulueta Escolano, the distinguished head of the Spanish delegation;

3. To abolish forthwith chemical and bacterial arms, the bombardment from the air of civilian populations and the use of offensive armaments, and to forbid all methods of war which are cruel to excess and useless, and which generous minds, expressing the universal feeling of the members of this Conference, have condemned in this place. It must at the same time, in our opinion, always be borne in mind that there are no intermediate stages between barbarity and worse things, and that in any case it is essential, with the aid of the coercive police force to be placed at the disposal of the League, to achieve the progressive abolition of all the means of destroying human life and property, except in cases where the international force is itself repressing crimes committed against peace;

4. To renounce the compulsive clauses embodied in the treaties for the benefit of one nation or group of nations against defeated nations, inasmuch as the League should be exclusively responsible for the full and complete execution of all the duties deriving from those treaties; for if the world is to be delivered from its present intolerable and dangerous condition there must no longer be one mentality of the victors and another of the vanquished. There must be no victor but peace, and no vanquished but war;

5. As a corollary to the preceding Article, to refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice any dispute likely to lead to a rupture between two nations or between one nation and the League of Nations in accordance with the terms of Article 15 as amended; breaches of these undertakings and of the awards of the Permanent Court of International Justice to be followed by penalties enforced by the League;

6. To substitute henceforward in relations between organised nations this new régime of international law, in all parts of the world, for the previous régime which tolerates *de facto* situations created by the forcible action of one nation against another nation and which tolerates "regional understandings" not freely entered into by all the parties and essentially incompatible with Article 10 of the Covenant, to which no exception may hereafter be made either by the Covenant itself or by any individual treaty;

7. To recommend the participating States to follow the example of the Spanish Republic and bring into harmony with these new principles of the final Convention ultimately to be concluded the provisions of their national constitutions and the clauses of the Covenant which should be amended according to the customary procedure.

8. To bring into operation when necessary, according as the Council of the League of Nations may think fit, the sanctions provided for in Article 16 or any other kind of sanctions, against any State signatory to the Convention which may refuse to furnish its contingent to the international force.

---

Official No. : Conf. D. 81.

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

#### PROPOSAL BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF WAR MATERIAL OF A SPECIFICALLY AGGRESSIVE CHARACTER.

Being convinced that the reduction and limitation of armaments contemplated by Article 8 of the Covenant can be greatly facilitated by the simultaneous application of a quantitative and qualitative limitation:

*The Italian delegation has the honour to propose that the Conference examine first of all the question of prohibiting all war material of a specifically aggressive character.*

In this connection the Italian delegation would remind the Conference that it has already announced its willingness to accept an organised scheme of qualitative limitation covering:

##### *In the Sphere of Naval Armaments:*

1. Simultaneous abolition of capital ships and submarines;
2. Abolition of aircraft-carriers.

##### *In the Sphere of Land Armaments:*

1. Abolition of heavy artillery of every kind;
2. Abolition of tanks of every kind.

*In the Sphere of Air Armaments:*

Abolition of bombing aircraft.

*In Every Sphere:*

1. Abolition of aggressive chemical and bacteriological weapons of every kind;
2. Revision of the laws of war with a view to the more complete and effective protection of the civil population.

---

Official No.: Conf. D. 82.

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

**PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION.**

*Note by the Secretary-General:*

At the request of the President of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the delegates to the Conference the following documents:

Letter from M. Litvinoff, President of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with annexes:

- (a) Draft Resolution for General, Total and Immediate Disarmament;
- (b) Amendments to Draft Convention for the Proportional and Progressive Reduction of Armaments;
- (c) Schemes;
- (d) Explanatory Note.

---

**COMMUNICATION FROM M. LITVINOFF, PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION,  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE.**

Geneva, February 18th, 1932.

I have the honour to send you herewith the proposals of the Soviet delegation to the Conference for Disarmament.

In accordance with my statement of February 11th, I have the honour to ask you to put the enclosed draft resolution before the Conference. This resolution, if accepted by the Conference, would enable it to make the draft convention for total and general disarmament advanced by the Soviet delegation at the Preparatory Commission on February 15th, 1928, and at the time sent to all Governments, the basis of its further work.

Should the Conference reject this resolution, I would ask you, in accordance with my statement of February 11th last, to place before the Conference the draft convention for the proportional and progressive reduction of armaments presented to the Preparatory Commission by the Soviet delegation on March 23rd, 1928.

I venture to bring to your notice that, in a resolution of April 19th, 1929, the Preparatory Commission, after consideration of this draft convention, decided to transmit it for the discussion of the Conference now sitting. Taking into consideration the memorandum of the Soviet delegation of December 9th, 1930, and the note to the report of the Preparatory Commission of the same date, I regard the draft convention for the proportional and progressive reduction of armaments as being thus already before the Conference.

Realising, however, that the aforesaid draft convention for the reduction of armaments was submitted to the Preparatory Commission four years ago, since when great progress has been made in military technique, and being, moreover, desirous of taking into account certain opinions expressed during the discussion of this draft convention in the Preparatory Commission, the



Soviet Delegation thinks fit to make certain amendments to its own draft convention, and I have the honour to enclose these amendments herewith.

(Signed) M. LITVINOFF.

(a) DRAFT RESOLUTION.

Animated by the firm desire for an effective and solidly organised peace;

Actuated by the determination to create genuine security for all States and all peoples by preventing the possibility of future wars;

Convinced that the very existence of armaments and the tendency they show constantly to increase inevitably lead to armed international conflicts which tear the workers from their peaceful occupations and bring innumerable calamities in their train;

Considering that military expenditure, which imposes an intolerable burden upon the masses of the people, fosters and enhances the economic crisis with all its consequences;

Noting that the States which it represents have renounced war as an instrument of national policy;

Believing that the only effective means of contributing to the organisation of peace and the establishment of security against war is the general, complete and rapid abolition of all armed forces, setting out from the principle of equality for all;

Convinced that the idea of general and complete disarmament answers to the sincere aspirations of the masses towards peace:

The Conference decides to base its work on the principle of general and complete disarmament.

(b) AMENDMENTS TO THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS  
(Conf. D. 87).

*Article 1* of the draft to be modified as follows:

"In accordance with the preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States, when effecting the progressive and proportional reduction of the effectives or their armed land forces, agree to divide all the Contracting States into the following groups:

"States maintaining in peace time armed land forces:

"A. Of over 200,000 men;

"B. Of 30,000 to 200,000 men;

"C. Of 30,000 men or less.

"*Remarks.* — 1. States disarmed as a result of the world war are not included in any of the groups provided for in the present article.

"2. States having contracted alliances or agreements of mutual military assistance in case of armed conflicts shall be classified in the groups provided for in the present article, for the purpose of the reduction of their armaments, on the basis of a figure representing the total land forces of these States added together."

Remarks 1, 2 and 3 of the draft shall be maintained and shall become Remarks 3, 4 and 5 respectively.

*Article 2* of the draft shall be modified as follows:

"The effectives of the land armed forces shall be reduced:

"1. For States in Group A, by 50 per cent;

"2. For States in Group B, from 0 to 50 per cent according to the number of their effectives and to the scale of progressive and proportional reduction attached;

"3. For States in Group C, the effectives shall be limited to the present level.

"*Remark.* — The effectives of the armed land forces of the States disarmed as a result of the world war are not included in the above schedule and shall be fixed separately."

*Article 12* of the draft shall be modified as follows:

"In accordance with the preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States agree to effect a reduction of their naval forces on the following basis:

"A. Countries having a fleet of an aggregate tonnage exceeding 500,000 tons shall reduce it by 50 per cent, such reduction to affect both the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet and the tonnage of each category, without right of transfer.

"B. Countries having a fleet with an aggregate tonnage of 100,000 to 500,000 tons shall reduce it both as regards aggregate tonnage and the tonnage of each of the categories from 0 per cent to 50 per cent in accordance with the scale of progressive and proportional reduction attached.

"These countries shall enjoy a right of transfer from 0 per cent to 100 per cent in inverse proportion to the ratio of reduction of their respective fleets.

" C. States having a fleet whose aggregate tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons shall retain their fleet at the present level with unlimited right of transfer.

" D. States having aircraft carriers shall destroy them within a period of six months as from the entry into force of the present Convention "

" *Remarks.* — 1. Standards for the naval armed forces of the States disarmed as a result of the world war are not contained in the above schedule and shall be fixed separately.

" 2. States having contracted alliances or agreements of mutual military assistance in the case of armed conflicts shall be classified in the groups provided for in the present article, for the purpose of the reduction of their armaments, on the basis of a tonnage equal to the total tonnage of these States added together "

*Article 21* of the draft shall be modified as follows:

" In conformity with the preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States agree, when carrying into effect the progressive and proportional reduction of air armaments, to divide all the Contracting States into the following groups:

" States possessing in peace time air armed forces:

" E. Of more than  $N^1$  aeroplanes in service;

" F. From 100 to  $N$  aeroplanes in service;

" G. Not more than 100 aeroplanes in service.

" States in Group E shall reduce their armed air forces by 50 per cent.

" States in Group F shall reduce their armed air forces from 50 to 0 per cent in proportion to the number of aeroplanes in service and according to a scale of progressive and proportional reduction.

" States in Group G shall retain their armed air forces at the present level.

" This reduction shall apply both to the number of aeroplanes in service and to the total horse-power of these aeroplanes. In estimating this reduction, account shall be taken of the number and total horse-power both of aeroplanes in service in the armed air forces and of aeroplanes in service capable of use for war purposes and employed in formations organised on a military basis.

" The total engine-power of each aeroplane shall not exceed 600 h.p. on the ground.

" *Remark.* — States having contracted alliances or agreements of mutual military assistance in case of armed conflicts shall be classified in the groups provided for in the present article, for the purpose of the reduction of their armaments, on the basis of a figure equal to the total number of aeroplanes in service in the armed air forces of these States added together and to the total aggregate engine-power of these aeroplanes "

*Article 24* of the draft shall be modified as follows:

" When the number of aeroplanes in service is reduced in virtue of Article 21, 22 and 23 of the present Convention, aeroplanes with engines of over 600 h.p. shall be scrapped first."

(c) SCALE OF PROGRESSIVE AND PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.


(See *Schemes*, pages 127 and 128.)

---

<sup>1</sup> The figure  $N$  will be fixed according to the decision taken by the Conference with regard to the abolition of bombing-machines.




SCALE OF STANDARDS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE AND PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION OF THE LAND ARMED FORCES OF THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.



See Explanatory Note.



SCALE OF STANDARDS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE AND PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION OF THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS OF THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.



See Explanatory Note.



(d) EXPLANATORY NOTE.

The principle of progressive and proportional reduction of land, sea or air forces consists in reducing these forces in direct ratio to their size, so that the forces of the countries possessing the most powerful armaments shall be subject to the maximum reduction. For other countries, this reduction will take place in a ratio directly proportional to the size of their armaments. Thus, applying this principle to the reduction of land armies, it is possible and it will be more equitable to prescribe a certain maximum uniform reduction for armies exceeding a given figure. On the other hand, it is possible to exempt from any reduction the smallest armies, *i.e.*, those below another given figure. As regards all the other armies included between these maximum and minimum limits, their reduction should be fixed according to a ratio directly proportional to the effectives of each. This system will also be applicable to naval and air forces.

*Official No.: Conf. D. 87.*

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

**Draft Convention on the Reduction of Armaments Submitted by the Delegation  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Preparatory Commission  
for the Disarmament Conference on March 23rd, 1928.<sup>1</sup>**

Considering that the immense growth in armaments and in militarism imposes a general and heavy burden on the peoples of the entire world and lowers the level of their culture and their material well-being ;

And considering that the atrocious struggle between the various States for predominance in armaments and the tendency to increase the number of weapons for murderous and destructive military purposes are one of the factors which increase the possibility and the likelihood of armed outbreaks ;

And desiring to protect to the fullest possible extent the peaceful population of workers against the immediate dangers which threaten their life and property in the event of the outbreak of armed strife ;

The Contracting States have decided, with the object of taking a first serious and genuine step towards general and complete disarmament, to conclude the present Convention by appointing as their representatives . . . . .

. . . . .  
who, having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

Whereas a comparatively small number of the most powerful States, which aspire to a rôle of world domination, which expend on land, naval and air armaments a large portion of the national budgets, and which possess the power at any moment to increase unduly the armaments which support their aggressive policies by availing themselves of highly developed industries, have at their disposal by far the greater proportion of land, naval and air armaments,

The Contracting States recognise that the only just course to pursue is that of a progressive reduction of all kinds of armaments as regards their composition and number, this method being the least injurious to the interests of the weakest States, which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is accordingly desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.

CHAPTER I. — ARMED LAND FORCES.

SECTION I. — EFFECTIVES.

*Article 1.*

In accordance with the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States, when effecting the reduction of the armed land forces, agree to divide all States into the following main groups :

(a) Group A : States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 200,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, or having in the cadres of the armed land forces more than 10,000 regular officers or more than 60 regiments of infantry (180 battalions) ;

<sup>1</sup> Document C.P.D. 117.

(b) Group B : States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 40,000 men serving with the colours in the active army or having in the cadres of the armed forces more than 2,000 regular officers or more than 20 regiments of infantry (60 battalions) ;

(c) Group C : all other States maintaining armed forces inferior in number and composition to the figures given for Group B.

(d) Group D : States disarmed after the world war.

*Remarks.* — 1. In all the calculations mentioned above, account shall be taken of the total number of the armed land forces maintained by the State in question in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies, including military police, military gendarmerie corps and depot guards.

The numbers of the police forces organised on a military basis, gendarmerie, Customs guards, train guards, forest guards and other armed corps organised for the needs of the Customs preventive service, for the maintenance of order within the country and the protection of Government and public property shall be determined by means of a special Convention.

2. By persons " serving with the colours in the active army " are understood all persons serving permanently in the cadres of the armed forces and all persons serving in the army cadres as conscripts.

3. By " officers " (commanders) are understood all persons who have received specific military training and are described as " officers " (commanders) under the military law of the contracting countries.

#### *Article 2.*

Recognising that, among the methods of reducing armed land forces, the simplest and the fairest for all the States concerned, and that which at the same time least affects the system of organising, recruiting and training such forces, consists in applying the same coefficient of reduction to all States in the same group (Article 1 of the present Convention), the Contracting States agree to fix the coefficient at the following figures :

- (a) States in Group A shall reduce their armed land forces by one-half ;
- (b) States in Group B by one-third ;
- (c) States in Group C by one-fourth.

*Remarks.* — The proportionate strength of the armed land forces for States in Group D. shall be fixed under special conditions to be determined by the Disarmament Conference.

#### *Article 3.*

The armed land forces of the Contracting States shall be reduced by applying the coefficients mentioned in Article 2 of the present Convention to the following totals :

(a) To the aggregate total of the effectives serving with the colours in the active army, men belonging to the variable militia formations, the territorial formations, the organised reserves and other military formations receiving military training with the colours or elsewhere ; officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks shall be reckoned separately in each case ;

(b) To the number of the organised units and corps of the main categories of field troops in the regular or territorial armies, in the militia forces, in the organised reserves and in other military formations which can be employed immediately without an order for mobilisation or which exist and are recognised in peace-time as cadres of the armed forces in war.

#### *Article 4.*

The number of the effectives and units and the corps of the land forces which the Contracting Parties must not exceed shall be laid down in a supplementary Convention based on the following principles :

(a) The coefficients of reduction mentioned in Article 2 of the present Convention shall be applied to the several States according to the group to which they belong (Article 1 of the present Convention) separately in the case of :

(1) Each category of armed land forces (regular army, territorial militia, organised reserves, etc.) ;

(2) The total number of the armed land forces stationed in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies ;

(3) The total number of regular officers and regular non-commissioned officers and officers of the variable effectives ;

(4) The number of units and corps of each category of troops.



(b) In accordance with the foregoing, the following tables shall be annexed to the supplementary Convention. Each table shows, after the reduction of each category of armed forces, the remaining number of units and corps of infantry, field artillery and cavalry which make up the general effectives classified under the headings of officers, non-commissioned officers and voluntarily enlisted other ranks (total number), of the administrative services, civic education service, intendants, chaplains department, etc. :

Table I : Maximum home forces ;

Table II : Maximum overseas forces stationed in the home country ;

Table III : Maximum forces of dominions and other overseas possessions ;

Table IV : Maximum forces of the home country stationed in the several colonies, dominions or other overseas possessions ;

Table V : Maximum of the total forces of each State.

(c) The aforesaid coefficients of reduction used in calculating effectives will be applied to the effectives of the armed forces as shown in the returns on January 1st, 1928.

#### *Article 5.*

With the object of limiting the accumulation of trained reserves, the Contracting States agree :

(a) To reduce in each class, according to the coefficients of reduction given above, the aggregate number of men who have received military training and of officers who have received military training either with the colours or elsewhere ;

(b) To pass legislation prohibiting the existence of any civil bodies organised on a military basis by specialised instructors drawn from the army, and the assembly of such bodies for training, as also the military training of the civilian population at the instance of civil associations.

### SECTION 2. — MATERIAL.

#### *Article 6.*

For the armament of land forces, the existing patterns shown in the tables at January 1st, 1928, shall be retained, except tanks and heavy artillery with very long range, which are essentially designed for aggression.

#### *Article 7.*

All implements of war directed primarily against the civilian population which does not directly take part in the armed conflict (military aircraft and chemical weapons) must be destroyed as provided in the special Convention.

#### *Article 8.*

The quantities of arms for the land armies shall be strictly limited according to :

(a) The needs of the army in time of peace ;

(b) The number of trained reservists in each year-class, the number of such classes being the same for all countries in any one group (Article 1 of the present Convention) and not exceeding ten classes for countries in Group A, with a subsequent progressive increase of 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively for Groups B and C.

#### *Article 9.*

The maximum number of weapons allowed for every thousand trained reservists shall be fixed for each country in strict conformity with the normal proportions existing in the principal arms in different countries and for different forms of armament.

#### *Article 10.*

The actual maximum quantities of arms allowed for troops at depots and elsewhere in the territory of the State, which quantities may not be exceeded, shall be fixed on the bases laid down in Articles 8 and 9 of the present Convention, by an additional Convention and by annexed tables according to the list in paragraph (b) of Article 5 of the present Convention.

Each table must contain general summarised figures under the following heads :

- (1) Rifles, carbines and pistols :
  - (a) Automatic ;
  - (b) Non-automatic.
- (2) Machine-guns :
  - (a) Heavy ;
  - (b) Light.
- (3) Artillery :
  - (a) Light field guns (76-millimetre guns and 122-millimetre howitzers) ;
  - (b) Heavy field guns (105-millimetre guns and 150-millimetre howitzers) ;
  - (c) Heavy guns and howitzers (over 150 millimetres and up to 204 millimetres) ;
  - (d) Mortars and trench mortars of all patterns ;
  - (e) Guns accompanying the infantry :
    - (aa) Guns and howitzers ;
    - (bb) Mine-throwers, grenade-throwers and bomb-throwers ;
- (4) Armoured cars ;
- (5) Spare parts, machinery, gun-carriages and gun-barrels ;
- (6) Cartridges (for rifles and pistols) ;
- (7) Grenades (hand and rifle) ;
- (8) Shells for guns of the calibres and patterns mentioned above ;
- (9) Armes blanches.

*Article 11.*

All arms in the territory of the Contracting States over and above the quantities specified in Article 10 of the present Convention shall be destroyed.

CHAPTER II. — NAVAL FORCES.

*Article 12.*

In accordance with the principles set forth in the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States agree to effect a reduction of their naval forces on the following basis :

(a) Countries which on January 1st, 1928, had a fleet whose aggregate tonnage exceeded 200,000 tons shall reduce their naval forces by one-half, such reduction to affect both the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet and the tonnage in each of the following classes of warship :

Capital ships ;  
Other warships of displacement exceeding 10,000 tons ;  
Light forces ;  
Submarines.

(b) Countries which on January 1st, 1928, had a fleet whose aggregate tonnage was less than 200,000 tons shall reduce their naval forces by one-fourth of the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet.

(c) As soon as the present Convention comes into force, aircraft-carriers shall be struck off the establishment of the navy. Within six months they must be disarmed and so converted as to make it quite impossible for them to be used for warlike purposes.

*Note.* — The strength of the naval forces of those countries which were disarmed after the war of 1914-1918 shall be fixed in accordance with special principles to be laid down by the Disarmament Conference.

*Article 13.*

The maximum specific tonnage which must not be exceeded by the Contracting States shall be fixed in accordance with the above-mentioned principles by a special Convention, to be concluded within three months from the day on which the present Convention comes into force.

*Article 14.*

The division of the fleet into vessels which are to be struck off the naval establishment and vessels which are to remain on the establishment, the names of the vessels being given (within the limits of the tonnage allowed under Article 12 of the present Convention), shall, be effected by each Contracting Party. Within one year from the coming into force of the



present Convention, those warships which each Party designates to be struck off the establishment of the navy must be disarmed and put into such a condition that they cannot possibly be used for warlike purposes.

*Note.* — The disarmament of warships comprises the removal of the armour, guns and torpedoes, the destruction of special fittings, armoured turrets, conning-towers, fire-control instruments, communications for use in battle, and aircraft-launching devices.

#### Article 15.

The procedure for striking vessels off the naval establishment and putting them into such a condition that they cannot possibly be used for warlike purposes shall be fixed by an additional technical agreement which shall be attached to the present Convention, and shall be concluded in accordance with Article 13 of the present Convention.

#### Article 16.

The Contracting States agree that, as from the entry into force of the present Convention, warships (both those which are to be constructed in future and those which are now on the stocks) shall only be constructed to replace vessels of the corresponding classes or categories which have been retained on the establishment of the fleet after the reduction has been effected as provided in Articles 12 and 13. Such vessels must satisfy the following conditions :

(a) Except in case of total loss, no vessel may be replaced until it has reached the age-limit, as specified below :

Capital ships . . . . .	}	25 years.
Other warships of over 10,000 tons . . . . .		
Cruisers of over 7,000 tons . . . . .		
Cruisers of under 7,000 tons . . . . .	}	20 years.
Flotilla leaders . . . . .		
Torpedo-boat destroyers . . . . .		
Torpedo-boats . . . . .		
Submarines . . . . .		15 years.

(b) The maximum standard displacement for a warship shall be fixed at 10,000 metric tons. Vessels of more than 10,000 tons displacement now included in the naval forces shall be struck off when they reach the age-limit specified in paragraph (a) of this article, but in any case not later than . . . ;

(c) The maximum calibre of the guns mounted in warships shall be fixed at 12 inches (304.8 millimetres) ;

(d) No warship may be fitted with appliances for the carrying of aircraft ;

(e) The maximum limits for vessels by classes and categories are laid down as follows :

Class or category of vessel	Standard displacement	Calibre of guns	Age-limit
Capital ships . . . . .	10,000 tons	12 inches	25 years.
Coast-defence vessels . . . }		(304.8 millimetres)	
Cruisers of over 7,000 tons.		8 inches	25 years.
		(203.2 millimetres)	
Cruisers of under 7,000 tons		6 inches	20 years.
		(152.4 millimetres)	
Flotilla leaders . . . . .	1,200 tons	4 inches	20 years.
Torpedo-boat destroyers . }		(101.6 millimetres)	
Torpedo-boats . . . . .			
Submarines . . . . .	600 tons	4 inches	15 years.
		(101.6 millimetres)	

*Note.* — The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, with engines and boilers, equipped ready for sea, including all armaments and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements and supplies of every description that are intended to be carried in war, including fuel and reserve feed water for engines and boilers. The calculation must be made in metric tons.

*Article 17.*

The Contracting States agree to assume the following obligations :

(a) Not to use for warlike purposes warships which have been struck off the establishment of the fleet and replaced by new constructions (except in cases which may be specially provided for in supplementary technical Agreements) ;

(b) Not to hand over or sell their warships to foreign countries if the latter can use them as warships supernumerary to the establishment laid down for each State by the present Convention ;

(c) Not to build or allow to be built in their territories any warships exceeding any of the limits laid down in Article 16 of the present Convention ;

(d) Not to cause new vessels to be constructed in foreign yards over and above the limit laid down for each Contracting State ;

(e) Not to equip merchant vessels with any apparatus or appliance enabling such vessels to be used for warlike purposes.

*Article 18.*

The Contracting States agree to limit the quantity of shells and torpedoes as follows :

(a) For guns of calibres from 8 to 12 inches (203.2 to 304.8 millimetres), 200 rounds each ;

(b) For guns of calibres from 4 to 7.9 inches (101.6 to 200.7 millimetres), 500 rounds each ;

(c) For guns of calibres less than 4 inches (101.6 millimetres), 1,000 rounds each ;

(d) For each torpedo-tube, two torpedoes.

*Article 19.*

All supplies of ammunition and torpedoes over and above the quantities specified in Article 18 must be destroyed.

CHAPTER III. — AIR ARMAMENTS.

*Article 20.*

Within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all military dirigibles (lighter than air) shall be disarmed and placed in a condition precluding their utilisation for military purposes.

*Note.* — The disarmament of aircraft belonging to the armed forces includes the removal of guns, machine-guns and special appliances for the discharge of bombs and other instruments of destruction.

*Article 21.*

In conformity with the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States agree, when carrying into effect the reduction of air armaments, to divide all States into the following main groups :

(a) Group E : States having more than 200 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces ;

(b) Group F : States having from 100 to 200 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces ;

(c) Group G : States having fewer than 100 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces.

States in Group E shall reduce their air forces by one-half ; States in Group F by one-third, and States in Group G by one-quarter, with a simultaneous reduction of the engine-power of each aeroplane to 400 horse-power on the ground.

*Article 22.*

In addition to the standard laid down in Article 21, reserve machines, and engines for these machines, up to a number not exceeding 25 per cent of the total number of aeroplanes in service after their reduction, may be maintained in the establishment of the air forces.

*Article 23.*

All other machines, whether in service or in reserve, together with the engines for these machines, in excess of the limits laid down in Articles 21 and 22 of the present Convention shall be destroyed.



*Article 24.*

When applying Articles 21, 22 and 23 of the present Convention, aeroplanes with engines of over 400 horse-power shall be the first to be destroyed.

*Article 25.*

All arming of civil aircraft and all fittings enabling them to be armed or to be utilised for war are prohibited.

*Article 26.*

With regard to the types of aeroplanes and their armaments, Article 6 of the present Convention shall apply. The armament of military air forces is included in the standards laid down in Article 10 of the present Convention.

*Article 27.*

All stocks of air bombs and other instruments of destruction intended to be discharged by aircraft shall be destroyed within three months of the entry into force of the present Convention. It shall henceforth be prohibited to manufacture or retain them in the army or in the reserve of the military air forces.

*Article 28.*

The effectives of the military air forces must be reduced in proportion to the decrease in the number of machines in service.

*Article 29.*

The precise maximum numbers of machines in service and in reserve, of the engines intended for their use, and of the military air force effectives, classified as officers, pilots and other personnel serving on board aircraft, which must not be exceeded by the Contracting States shall be fixed in conformity with Articles 21 and 28 of the present Convention in a supplementary Convention.

To the latter shall be annexed the following tables :

Table I : Maximum armed air forces stationed in the home country ;

Table II : Maximum armed air forces stationed in each colony, dominion or other overseas possession ;

Table III : Maximum of all armed air forces.

*Article 30.*

With a view to restricting the production of military aeroplanes and the trade therein the Contracting States agree to conclude, within three months from the entry into force of the present Convention, a supplementary Convention on the limitation to be imposed on the manufacture and trade in war aeroplanes in proportion to the legitimate requirements of the new effectives of the military air forces as fixed in the tables indicated in Article 29.

#### CHAPTER IV. — CHEMICAL METHODS OF WARFARE.

*Article 31.*

All methods and appliances for chemical aggression (all asphyxiating gases used for warlike purposes, as well as all appliances for their discharge, such as gas-projectors, pulverisers, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices) and for bacteriological warfare, whether in service with troops or in reserve or in process of manufacture, shall be destroyed within three months of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention.

*Article 32.*

The industrial undertakings engaged in or adapted for the production of the means of chemical aggression or bacteriological warfare indicated in Article 31 of the present Convention shall be converted to other uses within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention on the basis of an additional technical agreement.

*Article 33.*

The Contracting States undertake, within three months of the entry into force of the present Convention, to ratify the Protocol on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare signed at Geneva in 1925.

## CHAPTER V. — ARMAMENTS BUDGETS.

### Article 34.

The total amounts of the armaments budgets calculated at their true values shall be reduced in proportion to the reduction of land forces in Groups A, B and C, of air forces in Groups E, F and G, and of naval forces as provided for in Articles 12 and 13 of the present Convention. The said reduction in budgets shall also apply to the items of expenditure on personnel (pay, clothing, victualling, quarters) and those relating to orders for implements of war and ammunition and to their upkeep.

### Article 35.

No secret funds intended to disguise extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war and the strengthening of armaments may be excluded in State budgets.

In conformity with the above stipulation, all expenditure on the upkeep of the armed forces of each State shall be brought together in a single chapter of the State budget ; it shall be open to publicity in all respects.

### Article 36.

The reduction of the armaments budgets shall be carried out as from the year 1929 *pari passu* with the reduction of armed forces and of war material. As from 1930, the maximum figures of these budgets shall be fixed separately for each of the Contracting States. Thereafter, no increase shall be made in them.

## CHAPTER VI. — TIME-LIMITS FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION.

### Article 37.

The reduction of land, naval and air armaments in conformity with Articles 2, 5, 11, 21, 22, 23 and 28 of the present Convention shall be carried out by the Contracting States in the course of two years, the first year being devoted to preparatory work and the second to the practical application of all the measures relating to the reduction of armaments.

### Article 38.

All the other measures for the reduction of armaments shall be carried out within the periods provided for in the relevant articles of the present Convention (Articles 20, 27, 31, 32 and 36).

## CHAPTER VII. — CONTROL.

### Article 39.

Within three months from the date of entry into force of the present Convention, a Permanent International Commission of Control shall be organised, with the following duties :

(a) The supervision, control and general co-ordination of the measures relating to the application of the present Convention, and the notification to each State of breaches of the provisions of the present Convention ;

(b) The preparation of an agreement concerning the pressure to be brought to bear upon States which may fail to carry out the provisions of the present Convention and of the supplementary Conventions and technical Arrangements completing it ;

(c) The selection of the places, the procedure and the technical conditions for the destruction of material, and the preparation of all the necessary supplementary technical Agreements ;

(d) The study of questions relating to further reductions of armaments and the preparation of international Agreements relating thereto ;

(e) Communication to the Contracting States and the public of information concerning progress in the work of reducing armaments.

### Article 40.

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and of the trade unions and other workers' organisations of all States participating in the present Convention.

The Permanent International Commission of Control will later include representatives of international associations whose aim it is to establish pacific relations between States and which have pursued this aim with success, provided that these organisations express a wish to participate in the work of the Permanent International Commission of Control.



*Article 41.*

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Permanent International Committee of Experts, consisting of an equal number of military, naval, air and other experts belonging to all the States acceding to the present Convention.

The Permanent International Committee of Experts shall act under the orders of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

*Article 42.*

The following may not be members of the Permanent International Commission of Control :

(a) Professional soldiers and officials of Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation ;

(b) Owners of and shareholders in military industrial undertakings, owners of and large shareholders in banking and commercial enterprises with interests in military undertakings and the traffic in arms, and higher employees in all these undertakings.

*Article 43.*

With a view to ensuring genuine control, the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entitled to carry out investigations on the spot in the event of reasonable suspicion of a breach of the present Convention and of the subsequent supplementary Agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to appoint for this purpose special commissions of enquiry.

*Article 44.*

In enterprises for the production of war material or in enterprises capable of being utilised for the manufacture of armaments, a permanent labour control may be organised by the workers' committees of the factories or by other organs of the trade unions operating in the respective enterprises, with a view to limiting the possibility of breaches of the corresponding articles of the present Convention.

A similar control shall be set up in the various branches of the chemical industry, of which a list shall be drawn up by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

*Article 45.*

The Contracting States undertake to furnish the Permanent International Commission of Control, within the time-limits fixed by it, with full information as to the situation of their armed forces, in accordance with the list and tables prescribed by the present Convention and the subsequent supplementary Agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments, as well as with particulars of the number of aeroplanes and dirigibles in civil aviation registered as such in the territory of each of the Contracting States.

*Article 46.*

The statutes of the Permanent International Commission of Control, the procedure for examining complaints concerning the non-observance of the obligations entered into for the reduction and limitation of armaments, the organisation of the procedure to be followed in local investigations, and the nature of labour control in regard to production (Article 44) shall be settled by means of a supplementary Convention within not more than three months from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention.

CHAPTER VIII. — RATIFICATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION.

*Article 47.*

The present Convention shall enter into force as from the date of its ratification, in conformity with the legislative practice of the Contracting States, by all the States in Groups A and B for the reduction of land armaments, as laid down in Article 1 of the present Convention, or in the first group for the reduction of naval armaments, as laid down in paragraph (a) of Article 12 of the present Convention.

*Article 48.*

All subsequent supplementary Conventions to be concluded in consequence of the present Convention shall be signed and ratified within not less than six months from the date of the entry into force of the latter.

*Article 49.*

The instruments of ratification shall be drawn up in five copies and shall be deposited in the capital of a State in each of the five continents.

The ratification of the present Convention in conformity with the provisions laid down in Article 47 shall be notified to all the Contracting States by . . . . .

---

Official No.: Conf. D. 83.

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

#### MEMORANDUM BY THE SWEDISH DELEGATION.

The speech made on February 11th by the first delegate of Sweden contained, *inter alia*, proposals relating to questions now under discussion. These proposals may be summarised as follows:

- (1) The draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission will serve as a basis for the work of the Conference.
- (2) As regards *land forces* the following recommendations are made:
  - (a) Limitation and reduction of effectives, applicable also to trained reserves;
  - (b) Limitation and reduction of material by the direct method, supplemented by the budgetary method;
  - (c) Total prohibition of tanks and mobile heavy artillery and possibly of other war appliances of a primarily offensive character, and hence the prohibition of all manufacture and training in connection with the use of these weapons.
- (3) As regards *air forces*:
  - (a) Total prohibition of military aviation, and manufacture, preparation and training in connection therewith;
  - (b) Internationalisation or strict international control of civil aviation.
- (4) Thorough examination of the budgetary method, notably with a view to its application in case of fluctuations in the purchasing power of currencies.
- (5) Study of the possibility of restricting preparations for chemical and bacteriological warfare.
- (6) Establishment of a truly effective international supervision of the application of the proposed convention.

\* \* \*

The Swedish delegation reserves the right to submit, during the work of the Conference or its committees, as and when necessary, concrete proposals with regard to the above-mentioned problems and any other proposals it may think useful.

---

Official No.: Conf. D. 84.

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

#### MEMORANDUM BY THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.

The speech made by the first delegate of the Netherlands on February 15th contained the following suggestions:

- (1) The draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission will serve as a basis for the Conference's work.
- (2) Limitation and reduction must be applied to the whole of the armed forces immediately mobilisable. Consequently they must embrace:
  - (a) Trained reserves, in the first instance by reducing the contingent;
  - (b) The material of the land forces, by the direct method.
- (3) Complete publicity of armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant, particularly publicity on land, naval and air material.
- (4) Prohibition of arms of a specially offensive or exceptionally destructive character.
- (5) Absolute prohibition of the use of poisonous and harmful gases and of any preparation for chemical warfare.
- (6) Prohibition of the use of destructive war appliances against the civil population, particularly:
  - (a) Prohibition of air bombardment;
  - (b) Prohibition of the use of automatic contact mines in the open sea.



*Official No. : Conf. D. 85.*

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

**MEMORANDUM BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.**

For the convenience of the Bureau, the delegation of the United States is submitting the suggestions contained in the speech of the Acting Chief Delegate on February 9th, as was stated at that time. These suggestions are not exclusive; nor do they purport to be an all-comprehensive plan. The points enumerated are merely intended to aid in carrying on the purposes of this Conference.

(1) The delegation of the United States advocates consideration of the draft Convention as containing the outline of a convenient basis for discussion, while expressing its entire willingness to give full consideration to any supplementary proposals calculated to advance the ends we all seek.

(2) The delegation of the United States suggests the possibility of prolonging the existing naval agreements concluded at Washington and London as soon as they are completed by the adherence of France and Italy.

(3) The delegation of the United States advocates proportional reductions from the figures laid down in the Washington and London Agreements on naval tonnage as soon as all parties to the Washington Agreement have entered this frame-work.

(4) The delegation of the United States advocates the total abolition of submarines.

(5) The delegation of the United States will join in formulating the most effective measures to protect civilian populations against aerial bombing.

(6) The delegation of the United States advocates the total abolition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.

(7) The delegation of the United States advocates the computation of the numbers of the armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defence. The former are obviously impossible of reduction; the latter is a question of relativity.

*Note.* — The only criterion for such a computation at present existing is to be found in the military forces maintained by the Central Powers in accordance with the treaties of peace, which specify that they were to be exclusively employed in the maintenance of order and policing of frontiers. This would indicate that a study of the ratio of the number of effectives in these countries to the population and territory would give some rough estimate of the number which world opinion has already agreed upon as essential for the purpose of order; and indicate, when applied to other nations, that the remaining existing forces were destined at least for defence, if not for possible aggression, and in the categories for defence and attack, since these numbers must at present be based on comparisons with the similar forces of other States and are thus relative. Therefore stringent reduction may be justifiably sought in accordance with the purpose for which this Conference was called.

(8) The delegation of the United States agrees in advocating special restrictions for tanks and heavy mobile guns as arms of peculiarly aggressive character.

(9) The delegation of the United States is prepared to consider a limitation of expenditure on material as a complementary method to direct limitation in that it may prove useful to prevent a qualitative race if and when quantitative limitation has been made effective.

---

*Official No. : Conf. D. 86.*

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

**MEMORANDUM BY THE SWISS DELEGATION.**

In reply to the invitation of the President of the Conference, and in order to facilitate the work of co-ordination, the Swiss delegation has the honour to draw attention below to the concrete suggestions in regard to technical problems put forward by M. Motta in his speech of February 16th.

1. The draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission to be taken as a basis of discussion.
2. The present level of armaments to be taken in all cases as the point of departure, and not to be exceeded in the future.
3. The system of budgetary limitation to be adopted as a general method, together with direct limitation for certain categories of material, the mode of application of these two methods to land, sea and air armaments being reserved.
4. Civil aviation to be under international control.
5. The fullest publicity to be adopted in regard to armaments.
6. Arms of an essentially aggressive character to be prohibited in pursuance of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War—e.g., heavy artillery, tanks and bombing aeroplanes.
7. Certain forms of warfare to be prohibited, viz:
  - (a) All forms, without exception, of chemical and bacteriological warfare;
  - (b) Bombardment from the air;
  - (c) Incendiary bombs.

8. Agreements to be concluded with regard to the manufacture, whether private or governmental, of arms, munitions and material of war, and to the trade therein.

9. A Permanent Disarmament Commission to be set up with the specific object of supervising the execution of the Convention to be concluded, and making the necessary preparations for future disarmament conference.

The above suggestions are obviously not limitative. The Swiss delegation accordingly reserves the right to define their purport or to put forward new suggestions, whether in regard to methods of limitation and prohibitions or in regard to agreements for the settlement of international disputes or generally for the consolidation of the foundations of peace.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D.88.*

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

### PROPOSALS OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

In view of the fact that the draft Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments has left untouched certain fundamental principles which are essential to the success of the Conference, and in order that certain proposals, put forward by the various delegations at the Preparatory Commission, looking to the solution of some of the most important but difficult problems, may obtain a fair hearing, the Chinese Delegation has the honour to make the following proposals:

I. The scale of armaments on land and sea and in the air for each country shall be determined by:

- A. Size of the territory,
- B. Number of population,
- C. Length and nature of land frontier and coast-line,
- D. Facility of communications on land and sea and in the air,
- E. Degree of security against external aggression,
- F. National resources.

II. The existing systems and measures calculated to induce or encourage citizens to take up warlike pursuit and to foster a warlike spirit among them, being conducive to the creation of militarism, shall be abolished.

III. The principle of national armament on land and sea and in the air shall be solely for the purpose of carrying out defensive measures at the land frontiers or on the sea coast and not for the purpose of invading and attacking another country. For this reason, the aggressive arms such as bombing aeroplanes, tanks, heavy artillery of a certain calibre, aircraft-carriers, submarines and battleships shall be abolished.

---



*Official No.: Conf. D.89.*

Geneva, February 19th, 1932.

#### PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION.

1. Extensive reduction of armaments. Acceptance of the draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission as a basis of discussion, subject to such proposals as may subsequently be made for its improvement.
2. Limitation of aggregate expenditure as well as expenditure under particular chapters of military budgets, including expenditure on aviation. Direct limitation of effectives and material wherever practicable.
3. Prohibition of arms of a specifically offensive character, including arms which are specially dangerous to civilian populations: prohibition of their manufacture and use and of all training with a view to their use.
4. Establishment of supervision on as strict and effective lines as possible of the execution of obligations assumed under the Disarmament Convention, including supervision of both private and governmental manufacture of arms and of the trade in arms.
5. Establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise the armaments of the several States, and to make preparations for further progressive disarmament.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D.90.*

Geneva, February 20th, 1932.

#### SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE SPEECH OF THE FIRST DANISH DELEGATE.

1. Prohibition, as proposed by a number of other delegations, of certain weapons of a specifically aggressive character, in view of the fact that these weapons are already prohibited by the Peace Treaties. Prohibition of all manufacture of such weapons and all preparation and training with a view to their use.
  2. (a) Total prohibition of military aviation and of the manufacture and preparation of military aircraft or training with a view to its use.  
(b) Internationalisation or rigorous international supervision of civil aviation.
  3. A percentage to be fixed to serve as a general guide for the reduction in the course of three years of the existing level of armaments of countries which are not at present tied in the matter of armaments, subject to adjustments in particular cases. Reduction of military expenditure in a proportion corresponding to the reduction in the general level of armaments.
  4. Establishment of a Permanent General Control Commission, consisting of representatives of all the States signing the Disarmament Convention.
  5. Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare and of all preparation, manufacture or training in the use of such weapons.  
Organisation of supervision of this prohibition by the establishment of an international cartel of manufacturers of chemical products under the supervision of the Control Commission.
  6. Preparation by a permanent organisation composed of representatives of all the signatory States of a programme for the reduction of armaments by stages: the details to be fixed by subsequent conferences, and reduction to be continued under the programme until the principles which form the foundation of Article 8 of the Covenant have been carried out in their entirety.
  7. Establishment and organisation of an international police consisting of an air fleet constantly available for intervention in cases of the violation of international obligations. Rules to be made in regard to the authority which will be the disposal of this international police.
  8. Steps to be taken to accelerate the general adoption of the system of justice organised by the League of Nations and of the obligation to have recourse only to pacific methods.
  9. Precise rules to be drawn up in regard to the operation of the sanctions for which the Covenant provides.
-

Official No.: Conf. D. 91.

Geneva, February 20th, 1932.

**SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE STATEMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK  
DELEGATION MADE ON FEBRUARY 12TH, 1932.**

1. The Czechoslovak Government accepts as a basis of discussion the draft Convention established by the Preparatory Commission and the principles set forth therein.

2. The Czechoslovak Government is of opinion that the future Convention should lay down forthwith the principle of a definite and explicit limitation of armaments.

3. It is prepared to adopt supervision of effectives, armaments and the manufacture of, and trade in, arms in a more complete and effective manner than that proposed in the draft Convention or than that which has in certain cases been in operation up to the present.

4. It would favour the establishment of a more complete system for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare, and is prepared to extend this prohibition to other means of offensive warfare, particularly the bombardment from the air of the civil population, of cities, and particularly of the capitals of countries at war.

5. It is convinced that this last provision should be supplemented by a system of penalties.

6. The Czechoslovak delegation regards the French proposals as of great importance, and states that it is prepared to accept them immediately.

7. The Czechoslovak Government is of opinion that the Convention might forthwith embody and apply the second fundamental principle of all action for genuine disarmament by stages, *i.e.*, the reduction of armaments.

At the same time, it reasserts its belief in the necessity for a policy of peace and a progressive systematic and scientific organisation of peace with a view to strengthening the authority and augmenting the powers of the Council of the League.

---

Official No.: Conf. D. 92.

Geneva, February 20th, 1932.

**PROPOSALS BY THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION.**

In compliance with the President of the Conference's wish that the delegations which have put forward suggestions during the general discussion should submit them in a definite form, so as to facilitate their consideration, the Argentine Delegation begs to submit the following proposals:

**I. CAPITAL SHIPS.**

The Argentine Republic proposes that countries not signatories of the Washington and London Treaties should undertake not to build or acquire capital ships of over 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), considering such vessels to be of a specifically aggressive type.

This proposal refers to the "Capital Ship" type of vessel defined in Part 4, Chapter II, of the Washington Treaty as follows:

"A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft-carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.)."

The contents of the treaty to be concluded, its form and term of validity, will be decided during the discussions on the proposal. It is already obvious, however, that the proposed agreement will form a useful and, indeed, essential supplement to the two international treaties which



have eliminated the danger of naval competition between the countries possessing the largest naval forces. The Argentine Delegation proposes that the other countries, whether they own capital ships or not, should complete this agreement, which would extend to all States the new naval policy of refraining henceforth from building vessels of excessive tonnage. A decisive initial step will thus have been taken towards abolishing the competition in armaments.

## 2. FOODSTUFFS.

The Argentine Delegation proposes that an international agreement be concluded in which the signatory States shall declare that:

(a) The following foodstuffs shall not be regarded as contraband of war:

Cereals;  
Rice;  
Flour and bakers' wares;  
Fresh and preserved meat of all kinds;  
Milk in all its forms and dairy produce;  
Eggs;  
Sugar;  
Fresh or preserved fish of all kinds;  
Fresh or preserved vegetables;  
Fresh and preserved fruits;  
Potatoes;  
Coffee;  
Tea;  
Cocoa;

(b) Neutral vessels carrying exclusively the foodstuffs enumerated in the foregoing article shall have the right of free transit in case of war, and may only be inspected for the purpose of ascertaining whether the above provisions have been complied with.

(c) This agreement shall apply to the foodstuffs mentioned in paragraph (a) and to the vessels referred to in paragraph (b), always provided that such foodstuffs or such vessels come from, or are proceeding to, the States signatories of the agreement.

(d) The stipulations of this agreement shall not operate in the case of the application of the sanctions provided for under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D. 94.*

Geneva, February 22nd, 1932.

## SUGGESTIONS BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

1. Adoption of the draft Convention as the basis of discussion.

2. Assurances to be provided for with a view to safeguarding each contracting party from menaces caused by the armaments of one or more States not party to the treaty or by the non-observance of treaty obligations on the part of one or more of the contracting parties.

3. Limitation and reduction of land and air armaments to be effected in such manner as to leave room for rectification of apparent defects in elements.

4. Prohibition of air bombardment of cities and towns and other methods of attack on civil populations.

5. Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

6. Reduction in the unit size of capital ships and the calibre of their guns.

7. Reduction in the tonnage allotted by the existing treaties of aircraft carriers.

8. Prohibition of the fitting of aircraft-landing platforms or decks on naval vessels other than aircraft carriers.

9. Total abolition of aircraft carriers, provided that agreement is reached on the prohibition indicated in paragraph 8.

10. Limitation of arms and aircraft equipment on merchant vessels.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D. 95.*

Geneva, February 22nd, 1932.

#### PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

The United Kingdom Delegation, while of opinion that the draft Convention provides the best groundwork on which to proceed, suggests that special attention should be directed to such prohibitions or limitations as will weaken the attack and so remove temptation for aggression, and to methods of warfare which are specially liable to cause injury to non-combatants. In particular it suggests (without attempting to draw up anything in the nature of an exhaustive list) that the following questions should be closely studied, with a view to the adoption of such proposals as may seem practicable:

1. The most practicable course for limiting the number of effectives;
2. The prohibition of mobile land guns above a certain calibre;
3. The abolition (and prohibition) of submarines as a humanitarian measure;
4. Consideration of the most practical method of reducing the size of men-of-war and the maximum calibre of guns carried by them;
5. The practical examination of the whole problem of bombing from the air in its widest possible form.

The United Kingdom Delegation attaches great importance to the maintenance of the provisions of the draft Convention relating to gas and bacteriological warfare, and of those providing for the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D. 97.*

Geneva, February 24th, 1932.

#### MEMORANDUM BY THE HEJAZ DELEGATION.

The Government of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, which relies for its guidance on the religion of Islam with its fundamental principles of universal peace and brotherly love, while naturally urging total and absolute disarmament and strongly advocating the complete prohibition of aggressive war, welcomes every attempt to bring humanity nearer to this goal, and supports every proposal likely to save mankind from the scourge of war, earnestly hoping that this Conference will achieve a substantial measure of success in that direction. It is encouraged in this hope by the earnest and sincere spirit of the different Governments of the world, so eloquently expressed by their worthy representatives here, and by the unanimity with which the aims and objects of this Conference are enthusiastically supported by the rank and file of every nation. It is with pleasure, therefore, that the Government of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies signifies its assent to the proposals put forward by so many delegates calling on the Conference to bring about:

1. The prohibition of poison gas and all bacteriological war materials;
  2. The prohibition of all military aviation;
  3. The prohibition of all war materials of aggressive character on land and sea;
  4. The reduction and limitation of all legitimate armaments to the absolute minimum required for national safety.
-



Geneva, March 9th, 1932.

## CO-ORDINATION OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION AND OF THE PROPOSITIONS REFERRED TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

---

### REPORT BY M. BENEŠ TO THE BUREAU.

At its meeting on February 26th, 1932, the Bureau of the Conference decided to invite me, for the purpose of forthcoming discussions of the General Commission, to prepare a scheme of work grouping within the framework of the draft Convention the provisions of that instrument together with the various proposals submitted to the Conference.

I have the honour to submit the results of my work in document Conf.D.102 to my colleagues of the Bureau for examination. It seems to me desirable to append various explanations.

The General Commission has already itself taken certain decisions regarding the organisation of its work. It decided first "to carry on its discussions within the framework of the draft Convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments, full liberty being reserved to all delegations to develop their own proposals in subsequent debate and to move their amendments in the form of modifications, additions or omissions at the appropriate point". It was agreed, further, when the General Commission set up Special Commissions, that it would come within its province to study, from the standpoint of the principles involved, the questions submitted to the Conference to define the main lines on which the other commissions will work and to refer to the latter the questions with which they will have to deal.

Accordingly, I found it convenient to arrange in four columns the table of co-ordination which the Bureau had asked me to draw up.

The first column shows the subjects referred to in the various parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention. In defining those subjects, I used the table of draft texts to be found in document C.428.M.178.1931.IX (documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series XI, page 53). Having thus indicated the framework for our future discussions, it seemed to me advisable to reproduce *in extenso* the text of the draft Convention and the reservations to be found in the final report of the Preparatory Commission, particularly as I am not sufficiently well informed as to the present attitude of the delegations with regard to those reservations.

In the second column I have endeavoured to place opposite each of the points in the first column all the proposals which it would seem possible to connect with them. I have tried to group them and classify them in such a way that they may be discussed methodically and under the best possible conditions.

I wish to point out that no comparison should be made between the contents of this column and the list drawn up by the Secretariat a few days ago (document Conf. D.99). That list mentions, under very general heads, all the delegations that have made suggestions or indicated to the Secretariat passages in their speeches.

In column 2 of my table I have taken into account only those suggestions which have been formulated in sufficiently precise terms to be able to form the subject of a special discussion.

The third column contains questions of principle raised by the provisions of the draft Convention and by the proposals of the delegations, the general political importance of which would appear to warrant their being treated first by the General Commission. My colleagues will realise that a classification of this kind is necessarily a delicate and difficult task. I therefore request them not to consider it as a complete or final work. It will be for the General Commission itself to select and to give definite expression to the main questions of principle which it will have to discuss. My task was merely to facilitate this work and to make suggestions.

The fourth column, lastly, contains observations which I found it necessary to make at this juncture, and which deal principally with the method and time of referring various questions to the Special Commissions.

The entire table has no other aim than to serve as a mere instrument for introducing a certain order into our discussions. I need not add that this table will need to be constantly adjusted and that the work will have to be co-ordinated and guided by the Bureau of the Conference and the Bureau of the General Commission.

In this connection, it may be useful to recall the principles which were apparently unanimously approved by the General Commission for the organisation of the work:

- (1) The General Commission will, as a general rule, discuss in the first place all questions from the point of view of principles;
- (2) After this discussion, the questions will, if necessary, be referred in due time to the Special Commissions;
- (3) Questions which do not require any preliminary discussion from the point of view of principles may be referred immediately by the General Commission to the Special Commissions;
- (4) Questions dealt with by the Special Commissions will form the subject of reports to the General Commission. It is understood that the Special Commissions are always entitled to submit to the General Commission any questions of principle which have arisen and which they are unable to settle themselves.

The task of the Conference is, however, so complicated that it would be wise to consider certain modifications in the practical application of these principles. It will always be necessary to exercise careful guidance and co-ordination. The Bureau of the Conference must from time to time give instructions regarding the course of the work. In addition, the Bureau of the General Commission must keep in constant touch with the Chairmen of the Special Commissions. It will be particularly necessary to avoid discussions of principle being unnecessarily reopened in the Special Commissions, and not to lose sight of the organic connection between certain questions.

Moreover, there are, no doubt, questions the technical side of which is of such importance that they can be discussed in a Special Commission, even before the General Commission has taken a decision in principle or for the express reason of supplying material for reaching such a decision in principle.

In making this classification, I have, moreover, realised that it will probably be necessary to create joint commissions or sub-commissions or to request one Special Commission to study an entire problem which concerns several commissions. In the same way, the Special Commissions may have to appoint sub-commissions or committees of experts.

Column 4 of the table contains a number of observations arising out of the ideas expressed above.

If the table is approved by the Bureau, it might be used as a preliminary draft agenda, with any amendments that the Bureau may decide to make.

---

*Series of Publications*: 1932.IX.27.

*Official No.*: **Conf. D. 101.**

[Conf. D./C.G.5 (1).]

[Conf. D./Bureau 8 (1).]

Geneva, March 9th, 1932.

## PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

---

### REPORT OF THE BUREAU ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON MARCH 8TH, 1932.

(*Rapporteur*: M. BENEŠ.)

1. At its fourth meeting, held on February 25th, the General Commission took certain important decisions with regard to the organisation of its work. It decided first of all "to carry on its discussions within the framework of the draft Disarmament Convention, full liberty being reserved to all delegations to develop their own proposals in subsequent debate and to move their amendments in the form of modifications, additions or omissions at the appropriate point". It was also agreed, when the General Commission proceeded to set up Special Commissions, that it would be for the former to study, from the point of view of principles, the questions laid before the Conference, to define in this way the general lines on which the other commissions should work and to refer to the latter the questions with which they would have to deal.



The President of the Conference thought it would be well for the Bureau to draw up, in order to facilitate the task of the General Commission, certain proposals with regard to the Conference's programme of work. For this purpose the Bureau asked me to make a preliminary study of all the proposals of the various delegations, which have been brought together by the Secretariat in a printed document (Conf. D.99).

2. I have in the first place drawn up a scheme of work classifying within the framework of the draft Convention the provisions of the latter and the proposals relating thereto submitted to the Conference. This document (Conf. D.102), together with the statement I have had the honour to make to the Bureau in this connection (Conf. D.100), has been communicated to all the delegations with the request that they should inform the Secretariat of any amendments they might wish to make to the summary of the proposals submitted by them.

3. As a result of this request, a number of delegations have sent rectifications, observations or amendments concerning their previous proposals. It should be noted that certain delegations thought it desirable to put forward arguments in support of their respective contentions. I have only been able, however, to embody in the tables the principles or proposals which were already in the documents (memoranda or extracts from speeches) submitted in concrete form and collected in the compilation prepared by the Secretariat. I considered that, if the new arguments submitted by certain delegations were embodied in the tables, there would be a risk of depriving this document of its objective character.

The delegations will naturally be able to defend their respective contentions at any time in committee.

I have had an opportunity of discussing their observations with the various delegations in conversations during which each point was discussed. Thanks to the spirit of conciliation displayed by the delegations, certain points which seemed difficult to retain have been withdrawn or adjusted to the existing framework.

It is unnecessary to say that the co-ordination tables in no way debar the delegations from submitting at any time to the Commissions any amendment or fresh proposal they may think desirable.

The Bureau hopes that the definitive document, based upon the observations which have been received and which has been prepared on a systematic plan, will assist the labours of the delegations and the investigation of those who, whether near or at a distance, are following the deliberations of the Conference.

I do not think there is any need for me to explain afresh the arrangement of the tables, as complete explanations are contained in the written and oral reports of the Rapporteur which were circulated to the delegations a few days ago. I would merely remind you that these tables contain a summary of all the proposals made during the general discussion and, in addition, the questions of principle raised by these proposals. The tables also contain certain suggestions regarding the procedure which the Conference might adopt for the discussion of the various questions.

4. The Bureau has thought it desirable, not merely to submit the tables, but to add a list of the questions which might be referred to the various Commissions of the Conference (document Conf.D.103). In the preparation of this list, account has been taken of the following principles, which would appear to result from the discussions in the General Commission:

(1) The General Commission should, as a rule, first discuss all questions from the point of view of the principles involved;

(2) After this discussion, the questions should, if advisable, be referred at the appropriate point to the Special Commissions;

(3) Questions which do not require preliminary discussion from the point of view of the principles involved may be referred immediately by the General Commission to the Special Commissions;

(4) The Special Commissions should report to the General Commission on the matters dealt with. It is, of course, always open to the Special Commissions to lay before the General Commission any questions of principle which prevent progress and which they are not in a position to settle themselves.

5. The questions of principle to be dealt with by the General Commission may be arranged under three headings:

(a) Those of which it will be possible to make a complete and definitive study;

(b) Those requiring a first examination involving a statement of views without this discussion necessarily leading to an immediate conclusion in the General Commission. The latter will be able to resume the discussion of these questions when it thinks fit;

(c) Those which should be referred by the General Commission to a technical committee for preliminary examination before being dealt with by the General Commission itself.

In considering questions in the first two classes, negotiations between the countries directly and principally concerned may be necessary at a certain stage in the proceedings. Such negotiations at a suitable moment might well end a deadlock over some difficult matter under discussion in a commission and lead to a solution.

Furthermore, questions referred direct to a Special Commission may themselves be divided into two classes—namely, those which, as was mentioned above under (c), are referred to it immediately for preliminary examination and report to the General Commission; and those which have been definitely referred to a technical commission by a formal vote of the General Commission.

6. These are the principles which have guided the Bureau in preparing the list which it has the honour to submit for the approval of the General Commission. The General Commission will, no doubt, realise the importance of not adhering too rigidly to these principles, and of allowing certain modifications in their practical application. Constant supervision and co-ordination will be necessary. With this object, close contact should be maintained between the Bureau of the General Commission and the Chairmen of the Special Commissions.

It will be necessary, in particular, to ensure that discussions on questions of principle should not be taken up again in the Special Commissions, except in so far as may be necessary, and the intimate relationship between certain questions must always be borne in mind.

It is probable that all the Special Commissions will have to appoint sub-committees or committees of experts. In order to prevent the machinery of the Conference from becoming too complicated, it might be well to appoint sub-committees to examine groups of questions or some definite question, it being understood that their mandate will expire as soon as they have disposed of the questions entrusted to them. It might also be necessary to set up mixed commissions or sub-committees, or to instruct a single special commission to examine as a whole a question in which several commissions are interested.

7. After a rapid examination of the questions which appear particularly to come within the scope of the General Commission, the Bureau entrusted its President and the Rapporteur of the General Commission with the task of drawing up a definitive list to serve as a first draft agenda for this Commission.

As a result of the preliminary consultations and discussions I have undertaken, I submit to you this outline of the draft. After you have made the necessary corrections and modifications, it might be taken as the preliminary agenda of the General Commission.

In arranging the order of the questions, I have been mainly guided by the desire to submit, at the outset of our discussions, a form of agenda likely to promote the progress of our work. It would be a mistake, in my opinion, to start off with the discussion of the most difficult questions.

On the other hand, I am convinced that we should not go to the other extreme and postpone indefinitely the consideration of questions which are of fundamental importance for the future work of the General Commission, even though they present serious difficulties, and their examination should not lead us to immediate conclusions.

---

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.28.

*Official No.:* **Conf. D. 102.**

[Conf. D./Bureau 5 (1).]

Geneva, March 9th, 1932.

## CO-ORDINATING TABLE OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION <sup>1</sup> AND OF THE PROPOSITIONS REFERRED TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Note.* — Without prejudice to the reservations made by various delegations in regard to articles of the draft Convention which have not been withdrawn or modified since the opening of the Conference.



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 1.</i></p> <p>Agreement to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce armaments as provided in the present Convention.</p>	<p>I</p> <p>(a) Reduction to an equal limit of peace-time armed forces (land, sea and air) of all countries. Reduction to be carried out within ten years. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 1.)</p> <p>(b) Reduction to be made at a rate directly proportional to the extent of the armaments of the various countries on a determined date, and to be less drastic in the case of the weakest States. The reduction of armed forces of the States which have contracted alliances or agreements of military assistance among themselves must be based on the total figures of the additional armed forces (by categories of armaments) of these States. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 124.)</p> <p>(c) Reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120.)</p> <p>II</p> <p>(a) A permanent Disarmament Commission to make preparations for further progressive disarmament. (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, para. 5.)</p> <p>(b) Idea of reduction by stages. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 142 (7).)</p> <p>(c) A permanent organisation to prepare a programme for reduction by stages, the details to be fixed by subsequent conferences and reduction to be continued under the programme until the principles of Article 8 of the Covenant have been carried out in their entirety. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, para. 6.)</p> <p>(d) If the aims can only be reached by stages, these stages should be spread over as short a period as possible. The Convention should represent a genuine advance to the farther possible limits in this direction and contain peremptory guarantees for the complete realisation of these aims within as short a time as possible. (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109 (4).)</p> <p>(e) Fixing of a percentage to serve as a general guide for the reduction, in the course of three years, of the existing level of armaments of countries which are not at present tied in the matter of armaments, subject to adjustments in particular cases. Reduction of military expenditure in a proportion corresponding to the reduction in the general level of armaments. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, para. 3.)</p>	<p>Principle of definitive reduction under a single Convention.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level.</p> <p>Reduction to be brought about by stages.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Proportional and progressive reduction based on the position of armaments at a specific date.</p> <p>Effective reduction from the first stage with peremptory guarantees in the first Convention of a complete realisation within a specific short delay.</p> <p>First stage: Proportional reduction on the basis of the <i>status quo</i>, with adjustments in particular cases.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article I</i> (continuation).</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">III</p> <p>(a) The scale of armaments on land and sea and in the air shall be determined for each country by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Size of the territory.</li> <li>2. Number of population.</li> <li>3. Length and nature of land frontier and coast-line.</li> <li>4. Facility of communications on land and sea and in the air.</li> <li>5. Degree of security against external aggression.</li> <li>6. National resources.</li> </ol> <p>(China—Conf.D.99, p. 140.)</p> <p>(b) Limitation to be effected in such manner as to leave room for rectification of manifest defects in elements.</p> <p>(Japan—Conf.D.94, p. 143.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>(c) Need for taking due account of the geographical situation and the special conditions of each State in the preparation of plans for the limitation of armaments.</p> <p>(Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 110.)</p> <p>(d) Computation of armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for internal order plus a contingent for defence, the former being absolute figures and the latter a relative figure.</p> <p>(U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 139.)</p>	<p>Criteria for limitation or reduction.</p> <p>Taking into consideration of all the particular conditions of the different countries.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Method of computation of the effectives based on the absolute needs for internal order and relative needs for national defence.</p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">IV</p> <p>(a) Preliminary examination by the Conference of the question of the prohibition of war materials of a specifically aggressive character.</p> <p>(Italy—Conf.D.99, pp. 109 and 123.)</p> <p>(b) Prohibition of certain material if the latter does not form the subject of an undertaking to place it at the disposal of the League of Nations.</p> <p>(France—Conf.D.99, p. 114.)</p>	<p>Preliminary discussion of the simultaneous application of a quantitative and qualitative limitation by the absolute prohibition of certain material.</p> <p>Prohibition of certain material except under certain conditions (placing at the disposal of the League of Nations).</p>	
	<p style="text-align: center;">V</p> <p>Examination of further reductions subject to measures to be taken to ensure security.</p> <p>(France—Conf.D.99, p. 113.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 105.)</p>	<p>Reduction subject to measures to be taken in regard to the organisation of peace.</p>	



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article I</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>ENUMERATION OF THE CONDITIONS MENTIONED ABOVE AND OF THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL QUESTIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH.<sup>1</sup></p> <p><i>A. Political Conditions.</i></p> <p>1. Placing at the disposal of the League of Nations or of another international authority of certain land and naval material and of civil aviation and bombing aircraft. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 113 (I and II).)</p> <p>The proposals in the matter connected with Part II, "Material", of the Draft Convention (provisions relating to land, sea and air material) are summarised under the respective chapters.</p> <p>2. (a) Creation of an international police force to prevent war. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115.)</p> <p>(b) Creation of a first contingent of coercionary forces to repress war and to bring immediate assistance to any State victim of aggression. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115.)</p> <p>(c) Establishment of a land, sea and air force of the League of Nations by a contribution from all the States belonging to it, to be fixed for each in proportion to the numbers of its population and to its national resources. Application of sanctions against signatory States that may refuse to furnish their contingents. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 122.)</p> <p>(d) Constitution of an international air police fleet. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141.)</p> <p>(e) Creation of an international army for the application of sanctions. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 106.)</p> <p>3. Moral Disarmament. (a) Necessity for moral disarmament. (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 110.)</p> <p>(b) Abolition of the existing systems and measures calculated to encourage citizens to take up warlike pursuits, and to foster a warlike spirit among them. (China—Conf.D.99, p. 140.)</p>	<p>Placing at the disposal of the League of Nations, or of another international authority, of certain land and naval material and of civil aviation and bombing aircraft.</p> <p>Creation of an international force.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Should the General Commission consider it necessary that a detailed examination be made of the questions grouped under this head or of certain of those questions, they might be referred immediately to the Political Commission</p> <p>Discussion on the adoption of measures to ensure moral disarmament.</p> <p>The questions appearing under No. 3 (Moral Disarmament) might be referred to the Political Commission, which might, in its turn, refer it to a special sub-committee, in conformity with the Polish delegation's request.</p>

<sup>1</sup> Under this head are collected all proposals relating to this type of question, even when the delegations which submitted them did not make them a preliminary condition for the reduction of armaments.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 1</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>A. <i>Political Conditions</i> (continuation).</p> <p>(c) Study of draft conventions relating to the following points:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Prevention and punishment by national law of actions incompatible with satisfactory international relations (incitement of public opinion to warlike sentiments, false reports, etc.).</li> <li>2. Convening of a conference of journalists and publishers to examine moral disarmament, so far as the Press is concerned, and more particularly to study the proposals formulated in document Conf.D.16.</li> <li>3. International undertakings relating to the instruction of youth in international matters.</li> <li>4. Prevention in the sphere of broadcasting, the cinematograph and the stage of abuses which would be dangerous to a good international understanding.</li> </ol> <p>(i) Conclusion of a general convention on broadcasting.</p> <p>(ii) Prohibition of films and of plays which might embitter international relations, and, on the other hand, the encouragement of films and plays conveying propaganda in favour of peace.</p> <p>(Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 117.) (See also Conf.D.16.)</p> <p>(d) Conclusion of international conventions for the prevention and punishment of war propaganda and all individual acts likely to disturb relations among peoples.</p> <p>(Roumania—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>(e) Approval of the general idea of the Polish proposal.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.)</p> <p>B. <i>Legal Conditions.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. (a) General adoption of the system of justice organised by the League of Nations. Obligation to have recourse only to pacific means.</li> </ol> <p>(Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.)</p> <p>(b) Compulsory arbitration.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.) (France—Conf.D.99, p. 116.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>(c) Compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court combined with a system of sanctions.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 123.)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. (a) Necessity for a system of mutual assistance.</li> </ol> <p>(Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p>	<p>Organisation of international arbitration.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Mutual assistance.</p>	



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article I</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>B. <i>Legal Conditions</i> (continuation).</p> <p>(b) Conclusion of a general pact of mutual assistance. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 106.)</p> <p>3. (a) Precise rules to be drawn up in regard to the operation of the sanctions for which the Covenant provides. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141.)</p> <p>(b) Guarantees as to the rapidity of the decision of the authority controlling the international force. Conformity of the action of such authority with international law. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 116.)</p> <p>4. Renunciation of the compulsive clauses embodied in the treaties for the benefit of a nation or group of nations, and modifications of the existing international regime. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 123.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">VI</p> <p>(a) The disarmament laid down in the treaties of peace must be regarded as an indication (model) for the reduction to be applied to all of the Members of the League of Nations. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p> <p>(b) Institution of a single system applicable equally to all States. Legal equality and equal security for all States. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 106.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p> <p>(c) Equality of right between all States and perequation of armed forces at the lowest levels. (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p> <p>(d) General reduction of armaments according to the principles of Article 8 of the Covenant applied to all nations. (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">VII</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of the whole of the armed forces immediately movable. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138.)</p>	<p>Mutual assistance.</p> <p>Organisation of sanctions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Readaptation of the international regime.</p> <p>The disarmament laid down in the treaties of peace must be regarded as an indication.</p> <p>Uniformity of methods of disarmament under the principle of the equality of rights of States.</p> <p>Equality of right between all States and perequation of armed forces at the lowest levels.</p> <p>Application of Article 8 to all States.</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of the whole of the armed forces immediately movable.</p>	

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 1</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>VIII</p> <p>(a) A regional solution might be necessary in certain cases. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>(b) From the point of view of the Latin-American continent, the reduction of armaments should be sought by means of regional agreements. The general draft should accordingly possess the necessary elasticity. (Chili—Conf.D.99, p. 107.)</p> <p>IX.</p> <p>Establishment of completely demilitarised zones or zones occupied by a limited number of effectives. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.)</p> <p>X.</p> <p>Relative agreement with regard to contraband of war. (Argentine—Conf.D.99, p. 143.)</p>	<p>Regional agreements within the framework of the general agreement.</p> <p>Demilitarised zones.</p> <p>Limitation of international law regulations with regard to blockade.</p>	
<p>PART I. PERSONNEL.</p>	<p>1. The personnel of the land forces and the naval personnel to be recruited only by means of voluntary enlistment. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, § 1, and p. 121, § 14.)</p> <p>2. Freedom to choose the system of military service. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 106.) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 112.)</p> <p>3. Limitation and reduction of trained reserves. (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 2 (a).)</p> <p>4. Limitation and reduction of trained reserves. (Netherlands—Conf. D.99, p. 138, § 2 (a).)</p> <p>5. Proportional reduction of trained reserves. (U.S.S.R.—Conf. D.99, p. 130, Arts. 3, 5 (a) and 8 (b).)</p> <p>6. Limitation and reduction of the annual contingent. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 2 (a).)</p> <p>7. Contribution of effectives to the international force.</p> <p>(a) Constitution of a permanently available police force made up of contingents furnished by each of the contracting parties in a proportion to be determined.</p> <p>(b) Constitution of a coercional force of a strength varying according to the regions concerned, made up of contingents determined for each country and constantly available.</p> <p>(France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, III (a) and (b).)</p>	<p>Abolition of compulsory service.</p> <p>Freedom to choose the system of military service.</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of trained reserves.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of the annual contingent.</p> <p>Creation of an international force.</p>	<p>Principle already appearing in the part relating to Article 1.</p> <p>Details left for examination by the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>PART I. PERSONNEL (<i>cont.</i>)</p> <p><i>Articles 2 and 3:</i> Definition and limitation of average effectives daily.</p>	<p>8. Mutual assistance force in proportion to the population and the national resources. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 1.)</p> <p>9. Constitution of an international police force consisting of an air fleet. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 7.)</p> <p>10. Creation of an international army for the purpose of applying sanctions. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 106.)</p> <p>11. Demilitarised zones occupied by limited effectives. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.)</p> <p>1. Ascertainment of the most practical course for limiting the number of effectives. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 1.)</p> <p>2. Reduction to a maximum equal for all by means of an annual 10 % reduction of the difference between the actual strength and the maximum fixed. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 1.)</p> <p>3. Method of progressive and proportional reduction of peace effectives based on a classification of States according to the amount of their armaments. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, pp. 125, 129, 130, Arts. 1, 2, 3 and 4 (a).)</p> <p>4. Estimate of and adequate allowance for trained reserves. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, § 2.)</p> <p>5. Special conditions for States having a militia system. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, § 3.)</p>	<p>Creation of an international force.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Demilitarised zones.</p>	<p>Principle already appearing in the part relating to Article 1. Details left for examination by the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>The principle already appears in the Part relating to Article 1. When the principle has been decided, the question may be referred to the Land and Air Commissions.</p> <p>The principles raised in points (2) and (3) already appear in the Part relating to Article 1. Points 4 and 5, as well as Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention, can be referred immediately to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, which would submit to the General Commission any questions of principle they could not dispose of.</p>
<p>TABLES RELATING TO LAND ARMED FORCES</p> <p><i>Table I.</i> — Maximum land armed forces stationed in the home country.</p> <p><i>Table II</i> (optional). — Maximum land armed forces stationed overseas.</p> <p><i>Table III.</i> — Maximum of the total land armed forces. (In each of the above tables a separate maximum is provided for total effectives, officers and regular soldiers.)</p>	<p>1. Modifications in the tables: <i>Table I.</i> — Maximum home forces. <i>Table II.</i> — Maximum oversea forces stationed in the home country. <i>Table III.</i> — Maximum forces overseas. <i>Table IV.</i> — Maximum forces in the several oversea territories. <i>Table V.</i> — Maximum of the total forces. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art.4(b).)</p> <p>2. The number of officers, non-commissioned officers and regular soldiers to be fixed in each of the above tables by units and corps. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art.4(b).)</p> <p>3. The number of officers to be fixed at the lowest possible figure for all countries alike in terms of a percentage, the figure not to be increased. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, § 4.)</p>	<p>Tables I, II and III and points 1, 2 and 3 of the draft Convention can be referred to the Land Commission, which will submit to the General Commission any questions of principle it cannot dispose of.</p>	

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>TABLES RELATING TO SEA ARMED FORCES.</p> <p><i>Table VI.</i> — Maximum sea armed forces. (Only total effectives are limited.)</p> <p>TABLES RELATING TO AIR ARMED FORCES.</p> <p><i>Table VIII</i> (optional). — Maximum air armed forces stationed in the home country.</p> <p><i>Table IX</i> (optional). — Maximum air armed forces stationed overseas.</p> <p><i>Table X.</i> — Maximum of the total effectives.</p> <p>FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.</p> <p><i>Article 4.</i> Definition of formations organised on a military basis and of mobilisation.</p> <p><i>Article 2.</i> Limitation of the average daily effectives in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis.</p>	<p>1. A percentage of officers and warrant officers to be fixed as a maximum limit. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 15.)</p> <p>1. Abolition of air forces. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, §§ 17 and 19 (a) and (b).)</p> <p>2. The effectives of the military air forces must be reduced in proportion to the decrease in the number of machines in service. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 135, Art. 28.)</p> <p>1. Prohibition of civil bodies organised on a military basis by specialised instructors drawn from the army and of the military training of the civilian population at the instance of civil associations. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art. 5(b).)</p> <p>2. Police forces, gendarmerie and similar organisations not to be utilised for military purposes. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, § 5.)</p> <p>3. The strength and armament of police and gendarmerie forces and Customs guards to be fixed by special commissions in accordance with each country's needs. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 5.)</p>	<p>Prohibition of the maintenance of military air force personnel.</p>	<p>Table VI in the draft Convention and point 1 can be referred to the Naval Commission with instructions to submit to the General Commission any matters of principle on which it may have difficulty.</p> <p>Principle discussed in connection with the more general question of the abolition of all military aviation. When matters of principle have been decided, Tables VIII, IX and X and point 2 in the draft Convention can be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>Articles 2 and 4 of the draft Convention and points 1 to 5 can be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, which may, if necessary, submit any questions of principle giving rise to special difficulties to the General Commission. These Commissions ought more especially to examine the following questions: Definition of formations organised on a military basis. Total prohibition of certain formations organised on a military basis. Prohibition of the utilisation of police and similar forces for military purposes.</p> <p>Method of limiting police and similar forces by special convention or by average daily effectives.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 2</i> (continuation).</p> <p>TABLES RELATIVE TO FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS</p> <p><i>Table IV.</i> — Ma- ximum figures for ef- fectives stationed in the home country.</p> <p><i>Table V.</i> — Maxi- mum figures for ef- fectives stationed overseas.</p> <p>These two tables provide for a sepa- rate limitation of the total number of ef- fectives, officers or officials ranking as officers and regular personnel.</p> <p><i>Table VII.</i> — Ma- ximum figures for sea formations orga- nised on a military basis. Limitation of the total only.</p> <p><i>Table XI.</i> — Ma- ximum figures for air effectives station- ed in the home country.</p> <p><i>Table XII.</i> — Ma- ximum figures for air effectives stationed overseas.</p> <p>These two tables provide for separate limitation of the to- tal number of effec- tives and of the total number of regular ef- fectives.</p>	<p>4. The number of the police forces organised on a military basis, gendar- merie, Customs guards, train guards, forest guards and other armed corps organised for the needs of the Customs preventive service to be determined by Convention. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 130, Art. 1, Remark 1.)</p> <p>5. Police forces, gendarmerie and similar organisations to be limited. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, para. 5.)</p> <p>1. Proportional and progressive re- duction and limitation of the number of units and corps of each arm and service. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 130, Art. 4.)</p>		<p>Method of limiting police and similar for- ces by special conven- tion or by average daily effectives.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Tables IV, V, VII, XI and XII can be referred respectively to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, which may, if neces- sary, submit any ques- tions giving rise to special difficulties to the General Commis- sion.</p> <p>Reduction and limi- tation of the number of units and corps. This question can be referred to the Land Commission, which may, if necessary, submit any questions of prin- ciple giving rise to special difficulties to the General Commis- sion.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>CHAPTER B. PERIOD OF SERVICE.</p> <p>Articles 5 to 9 and Table.</p>	<p>Limitation of the period of service. (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p>		<p>This question can be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions with instructions to submit to the General Commission any matters of principle on which they may have difficulty.</p>
<p>PART II. MATERIAL.</p>	<p>1. Prohibition in general terms of material deemed to be of an aggressive character. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 104.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (China—Conf.D.99, p. 140.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141.) (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 123.) (Hejaz—Conf.D.99, p. 144.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 108.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 109.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141.) (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 110.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140.)</p> <p>2. Prohibition of undefined material deemed to be offensive with prohibition of their manufacture, use and training with a view to their use. (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of certain material of a presumed specifically aggressive character and referred to in treaty of peace. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p> <p>4. Contribution of material forming part of the normal armament of the police force contingents, material forming part of the normal armament of coercionary forces and heavy artillery and armoured implements by States which possess such material. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, III (b).)</p> <p>5. Demilitarised zones. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.)</p> <p>6. Direct limitation of all war material by a combined system comprising a convention on trade, a convention on private manufacture and an inventory of stocks, the whole controlled by the Permanent Disarmament Commission. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.)</p> <p>7. Limitation on the lines of the treaties of peace. (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109, § 3.)</p> <p>8. Direct limitation wherever practicable. (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, §2.)</p>	<p>Absolute prohibition of certain classes of material.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Constitution of an international force.</p> <p>Demilitarised zones.</p> <p>Direct limitation with control of trade and manufacture and controlled inventory of stocks.</p> <p>Direct limitation on the lines of the treaties of peace.</p> <p>Possibility of applying different methods for the different States.</p>	<p>This principle figures already in the section relative to Article 1.</p> <p>Principle already included in the part concerning Article 1. When the principle has been decided, the question may be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>When the principle has been decided, the question can be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>CHAPTER A. LAND ARMAMENTS.</p>	<p>1. Prohibition of all kinds of heavy artillery. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 123.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 109.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 6.)</p> <p>2. Prohibition of mobile heavy artillery. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 2 (c).) (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 2.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of heavy long-range artillery. (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art. 6.)</p> <p>4. Prohibition of heavy artillery above an as yet unspecified calibre. (China—Conf.D.99, p. 140, III.) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 2.)</p> <p>5. Prohibition of heavy and field artillery above a specified calibre. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 120, § 6.)</p> <p>6. Prohibition of mortars and trench mortars above a specified calibre. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 6.)</p> <p>7. Prohibition of tanks. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (China—Ditto, p. 140, III.) (Germany—Ditto, p. 121, § 6.) (Italy—Ditto, p. 123.) (Latvia—Ditto, p. 109.) (Spain—Ditto, p. 107.) (Sweden—Ditto, p. 138, § 2.) (Switzerland—Ditto, p. 140, § 6.) (Turkey—Ditto, p. 119, Art. 2.) (U.S.S.R.—Ditto, p. 131, Art. 6.)</p> <p>8. Prohibition of armoured motor-cars. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 2.)</p> <p>9. Prohibition of the stocking of heavy high-power artillery except in the case of countries undertaking to place it at the disposal of the League of Nations, in the event of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 114.)</p> <p>10. Prohibition of the construction and maintenance of fortresses, field works and works which constitute a direct menace to the neighbouring country and might possibly obstruct measures taken for the prevention of war. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 8.)</p> <p>11. Quantitative limitation of land material. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.)</p> <p>12. Direct limitation of the whole of land material. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 2.)</p>	<p>Absolute prohibition of certain classes of land material.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Prohibition of certain classes of material except subject to certain conditions. (Certain classes of material to be placed at the disposal of the League of Nations.)</p> <p>Prohibition of certain land fortifications.</p> <p>Quantitative limitation.</p> <p>Direct limitation of land material including stocks.</p>	<p>When the principle has been decided, the question can be referred to the Land Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>The principle involved in this proposal already figures in the section relative to Article 1. On decision of the question of principle, the matter may be immediately referred to the Land Commission.</p> <p>When the principle has been decided, the question may be referred to the Land Commission.</p> <p>When the principles have been decided on, points 11 to 16 inclusive may be referred to the Land Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>CHAPTER A. LAND ARMAMENTS (continued).</p> <p><i>Article 10.</i> Limitation of material by budgetary method.</p>	<p>13. Quantitative limitation by category, with a uniform percentage for necessary replacements. Authorisation of stocks for countries with no arms factories. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 7.)</p> <p>14. Limitation in numbers of certain categories defined in proportion to peace effectives and trained reserves. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Arts. 8 and 9.)</p> <p>15. Special restriction of mobile heavy artillery and tanks. (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 139, § 8.)</p> <p>16. Prohibition against alteration of existing patterns. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art. 6.)</p> <p>1. Combination of quantitative and budgetary limitation. (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 2(b).) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 3.) (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 139, § 9.)</p>	<p>Quantitative limitation with adjustments.</p> <p>Limitation and direct reduction of war material.</p> <p>Restrictions relating to certain materials.</p> <p>Principle of direct qualitative limitation.</p> <p>Combination of quantitative and budgetary limitation.</p>	<p>When the principles have been decided on, points 11 to 16 inclusive may be referred to the Land Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>After preliminary discussion in the General Commission, this question might be referred to the Land Commission for an opinion.</p> <p>The question may form the subject of a preliminary discussion by the General Commission, which could, if necessary, refer it to the Land Commission or Commission on Expenditure for an opinion.</p>
<p>CHAPTER B. NAVAL ARMAMENTS.</p>	<p>1. Abolition of all naval forces the purpose of which is to make war at a distance—thus capable of aggressive war—and restrict to what is necessary for defence of national coastline. (Yugoslavia—Conf.D.99, p. 112.)</p> <p>2. Limitation of shells and torpedoes and destruction of quantities in excess. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 134, Arts. 18 and 19.)</p> <p>3. Maximum tonnage of various types of vessels to be reduced simultaneously with a proportional reduction in total tonnage. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 9.)</p> <p>4. No warships in future to exceed 10,000 tons or carry guns exceeding 280 mm. (11"). (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 9.)</p> <p>5. No warships in future to exceed 10,000 tons or carry guns exceeding 203 mm. (8"). (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.)</p> <p>6. When equal limit of land, sea and air forces of all countries is fixed, the building and use of warships carrying guns over <i>y</i> cm. and displacing over <i>z</i> tons to be forbidden. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Arts. 1 and 2.)</p> <p>7. Consideration of the most practical method of reducing size of warships and the maximum calibre of guns carried by them. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 4.)</p>	<p>Abolition of aggressive naval forces and limitation of forces to strict needs for coastline defence.</p> <p>Limitation and direct reduction of certain material.</p> <p>Method of reduction in naval armaments (in accordance with the principles of the London and Washington Naval Treaty or otherwise.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>When question of principle settled, refer to Naval Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
CHAPTER B. NAVAL ARMAMENTS (continued).	8. Extension of age-limits of various categories. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16 (a).)	Method of reduction in naval armaments (in accordance with the principles of the London and Washington Naval Treaties or otherwise).	When question of principle settled, refer to Naval Commission.
	9. Maximum standard displacement of a war vessel to be fixed at 10,000 metric tons. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16 (b).)		
	10. Existing vessels of over 10,000 tons to be struck off when they reach the specific age-limits, and in any case not later than . . . without prejudice to the right of disposal before the expiry of the said time-limit but without right of replacement. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16 (b).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	11. Maximum calibre of guns mounted to be 12" (304.8 mm.). (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16 (c).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	12. Appliances for carrying aircraft not to be fitted in any warship. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16 (d).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	13. Classes of categories—Limitations ( <i>vide</i> Draft Convention, Table II, Annex to Chapter B of Part II). (See also Article 12.) Maximum standard displacement. Maximum gun-calibre. Age limit. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16 (e).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	14. Inclusion of fuel and reserve feed water for engines and boilers in the calculation of the standard displacement. (See also Annex III.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16, Note.)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	15. Landing platforms or decks in vessels other than aircraft carriers — prohibition. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 8.)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	16. Washington and London Naval Agreements; prolongation of these as soon as they are completed by the adherence of France and Italy. (U.S.A.—Conf.D 99, p. 139, § 2.)		Naval Commission.
	17. Washington and London Naval Agreements; proportional reductions from figures laid down when all parties to the Washington Agreement have entered this framework. (U.S.A.—Conf D.99, p. 139, § 3.)		Ditto.
	18. Non-floating material — limitation. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 13.)		Ditto.
	19. (a) Coast defence fortifications. (b) Fortifications controlling natural waterways between two open seas. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 16.)	Prohibition of certain coastal fortifications.	
	20. Free and unhampered passage through natural waterways between two open seas. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 16.)	Ditto.	





1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<i>Article 15</i> (contd.).	3. Reduction in tonnage allotted by existing treaties. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 7.) 4. Landing platforms or decks in vessels other than aircraft-carriers. — Prohibition. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 8.)	Reduction in tonnage allotted by existing treaties. Ditto.	Naval Commission.
<i>Article 16.</i> Submarines: maximum displacement, maximum gun-calibre.	1. Abolition. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (China—Conf.D.99, p. 140, III.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 11.) (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 3.) (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 139, § 4.) 2. Conditional Abolition (simultaneous abolition of capital ships and submarines.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 123.) 3. Conditional right to possess submarines exceeding a certain tonnage. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 114, II.) 4. Reduction in size; reduction in gun-calibre; extension of age-limit. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16(e).) 5. Reduction in size; reduction in radius of action. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.)	Abolition of submarines.  Ditto.  International Force. (See No. 21, page 162.)	Once the principle has been decided to be sent to Naval Commission.  Ditto.  Naval Commission.  Ditto.  Ditto.
<i>Article 17.</i> General undertaking. (No vessel exceeding limitations prescribed to be acquired by or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party.)	1. Contracting Parties not to build or allow to be built on their territories any warship exceeding the prescribed limits. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 134, Art. 17(c).) 2. Not to cause new vessels to be constructed in foreign yards over and above the limits laid down for each Contracting State. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 134, Art. 17(d).)		Ditto.  Ditto.
<i>Article 18.</i> Rules for replacement.	Only replacement vessels to be built. Age-limits for replacement. Replaced vessels not to be used for warlike purposes. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16, 1st § and § (a), and Art. 17(a).)		Ditto.
<i>Article 19.</i> Rules re arming merchant vessels.	1. Limitation of arms and aircraft equipment in merchant vessels. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 10.) 2. Prohibition. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 104.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 134, Art. 17(e).)		Naval Commission, which will refer to General Commission if necessary. Ditto.
<i>Article 20.</i> Use of war vessels constructed for another Power.			Naval Commission.
<i>Article 21.</i> Cession of war vessels to another Power.	No handing over or sale of warships to another Power if such Power can use them as warships supernumerary to its prescribed establishment. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 134, Art. 17(b).)		Ditto.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<i>Article 22.</i> Rules <i>re</i> disposal of war vessels.	Rules for disposal. Disarmament of warships; what this comprises. Procedure for striking ves- sels off the establishment and rendering them unfit for warlike purposes. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 132, Art. 14.)		Naval Commission.
<i>Article 23.</i> Hulks or training establishments.			Ditto.
<i>Annex I.</i> Exempt vessels.			Ditto.
<i>Annex II.</i> Special vessels.			Ditto.
<i>Annex III.</i> Definitions.	1. Amended definitions. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 12.) 2. Standard Displacement. Amended definition. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 133, Art. 16, note.)		Ditto.  Ditto.
<i>Article 24.</i> Limitation of na- val expenditure.			Naval Commission and Defence Expendi- ture Commission.
CHAPTER C. AIR ARMAMENTS.	1. Prohibition of the maintenance of air forces of any kind. Destruction of existing material except those arma- ments which may be reincorporated in the quantities allowed for land and naval forces. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 17.) 2. Total prohibition of military avia- tion, as well as the manufacture, prepa- ration and entraining with regard to military aviation. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 2 (a).) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 3 (a).) 3. Total abolition of military air- craft: (Hejaz—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 2.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109.) 4. Within one year all military diri- gibles (lighter than air) shall be disarmed and placed in a position precluding their utilisation for military purposes. The disarmament of aircraft belonging to the armed forces includes the removal of guns, machine-guns and special applian- ces for the discharge of bombs and other instruments of destruction. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 134, Art. 20.) 5. Abolition of military aviation combined with the internationalisation of civil aviation. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.)  6. Abolition of air bombing. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138.) 7. Practical examination of the whole problem of aerial bombing in its widest sense. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 5.)	Abolition of mili- tary aircraft (aero- planes).  Ditto.  Ditto.  Abolition of mili- tary aviation (dirigi- bles).  Abolition of mili- tary aviation com- bined with the inter- nationalisation of civil aviation.  Abolition of aerial bombing.	Refer to the Air Commission after de- cision of the principle has been taken by the General Commission.  Ditto.  Ditto.  Ditto.  Ditto.  Refer to the Air Commission.



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>CHAPTER C. AIR ARMAMENTS (continued).</p> <p><i>Article 25.</i> Limitation of the number and total horse-power of aero- planes.</p> <p>TABLES ANNEXED:</p> <p><i>Table I.</i></p> <p>(a) Total aero- planes of the armed forces. (b) Aeroplanes sta- tioned in the home country (optional). (c) Aeroplanes sta- tioned overseas (op- tional). (d) Aeroplanes in aircraft-carriers.</p> <p><i>Table II.</i></p> <p>(a) Total aero- planes of the forces organised on a mili- tary basis. (b) Aeroplanes sta- tioned in the home country (optional). (c) Aeroplanes sta- tioned overseas.</p>	<p>8. Abolition of bombing aircraft. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (China—Conf.D.99, p. 140, III.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 109.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 124.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 6.)</p> <p>1. Reduction of the peace-time air armed forces of all countries to an equal limit, to be attained within ten years. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 1.)</p> <p>2. Progressive and proportional re- duction varying according to the num- ber of aircraft in the possession of the States and amounting to as much as 50 per cent of the existing aircraft. The total engine-power of each aeroplane shall not exceed 600 h.p. on the ground. Reserve machines, and engines for these machines, up to a number not exceeding 25 per cent of the total number of aero- planes in service after their reduction, may be maintained in the establishment of the air forces. Destruction of existing material.</p> <p>Tables relating to the maximum armed air forces stationed in the home country, in each colony, dominion or other over- sea possession and total. Supplementary Convention on the limitation to be imposed on the manufacture and trade in war aeroplanes in proportion to the legiti- mate requirements fixed by the maxima. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 126 and 134.)</p> <p>3. (a) Grouping of military aero- planes in three categories according to tonnage (aeroplanes and hydroplanes) or to their volume (dirigibles).</p> <p>(b) Conditional on preliminary inter- nationalisation of civil aerial transport (aeroplanes and hydroplanes above a specified tonnage, dirigibles above a certain volume). Military air-machines of the lowest category are placed at the disposal of national air forces. Military air-machines of the intermediary cate- gory are left to the national air forces on condition that the League of Nations can dispose of them in case of the applica- tion of Article 16 of the Covenant. The military air-machines of the highest category are prohibited in military air forces. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 113, I, II and III.)</p>	<p>Abolition of aerial bombardment.</p> <p>Reduction of air ar- maments to an equal limit for all States. Progressive reduction.</p> <p>Progressive and pro- portional reduction on the basis of material existing at a specific date.</p> <p>Internationalisation of civil aviation.</p> <p>Placing at the dis- posal of the League of military air-ma- chines above a certain tonnage or a certain volume.</p> <p>Creation of an inter- national air force.</p>	<p>Air Commission for preliminary examina- tion.</p> <p>The principle raised in point 1 is already found in Article 1.</p> <p>The principle is al- ready found in Ar- ticle 1.</p> <p>The principle is al- ready found in Article 1 for decision by the General Commission. Limitation of unladen tonnage, definition of that tonnage, and de- tails to be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>The principle is al- ready found in Article 1 for decision by the General Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 26.</i></p> <p>Limitation of the number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles.</p> <p>TABLES ANNEXED:</p> <p><i>Table III.</i></p> <p>(a) Total dirigibles of the armed forces. (b) Dirigibles stationed in the home country (optional). (c) Dirigibles stationed overseas (optional). (d) Dirigibles in aircraft carriers (optional).</p> <p><i>Table IV.</i></p> <p>(a) Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis. (b) (Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country. (c) (Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas.</p> <p><i>Article 27.</i></p> <p>Horse-power shall be measured according to the following rules. . . . The volume of dirigibles shall be expressed in cubic metres.</p> <p>Report of the Committee of Experts to fix Rules for the Adoption of a Standard Horse-Power Measurement for Aeroplane and Dirigible Engines. (Document C. 259. M. 115. 1931. VIII.)</p> <p>Committee of Experts to fix Rules for the Adoption of a Standard Horse-Power Measurement for Aeroplane and Dirigible Engines. (Document C. 260. M. 116. 1931. VIII.)</p> <p><i>Article 28.</i></p> <p>Civil aviation: relations with military aviation.</p>	<p>1. Internationalisation of civil air transport under a regime to be organised by the League. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 113, I.)</p>	<p>Internationalisation of civil aviation: international air transport to be placed at the disposal of the League.</p>	<p>To be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>To be referred to the Air Commission after the General Commission has decided regarding the principle.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 28</i> (continued).</p>	<p>2. Internationalisation of civil aviation: (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.)</p> <p>3. Internationalisation or strict international control of civil aviation: (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 2 (b).) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 3 (b).)</p> <p>4. Civil aviation to be under international control: (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 4.)</p> <p>5. All arming of civil aircraft and all fittings enabling them to be armed or to be utilised for war are prohibited. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 19.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 135, Art. 25.)</p> <p>6. Any instruction and training of any person in aviation having a military character or a military purpose to be prohibited. Prohibition of any instruction or training of members of the army or navy in civil aviation. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 19.)</p> <p>7. Prohibition of the construction, maintenance, importation or putting into commission of aircraft which is in any way armoured or protected or supplied with devices for the reception of warlike armament of any kind, such as guns, machine-guns, torpedoes, bombs, or which are supplied with gunsights or devices for the dropping of bombs and with similar warlike instruments. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 19.)</p> <p>8. Prohibition of the maintenance of any relation between the military or naval administration and civil aviation for any military purpose. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 19.)</p>	<p>Internationalisation or control of civil aviation</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>To be referred to the Air Commission after the General Commission has decided regarding the principle.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>To be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>
	<p><i>Trade in and Manufacture of Arms, Ammunition and War Material.</i></p> <p>1. Prohibition of the trade in arms, except for non-manufacturing States, within the limits of their needs. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 21.)</p> <p>2. Adoption of agreements, unspecified, relating to the trade in arms. (Czechoslovakia — Conf.D.99, p. 142, § 3.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 4.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 8.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of the manufacture of material elsewhere than in specified private or State factories. Publicity regarding these factories and limitation of their production through the Governments. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 22.)</p> <p>4. Direct limitation of the total quantity of all kinds of war material found on the territory of each High Contracting Party. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art. 10.)</p>	<p>Prohibition of the trade in arms.</p> <p>Supervision of the trade in arms.</p> <p>Limitation of the manufacture of arms, ammunition and war material.</p>	<p>To be considered at an opportune time by the General Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 28</i> (continued).</p> <p>PART III.</p> <p><i>Article 29. — Limitation of total annual expenditure.</i></p> <p>See also Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions (document C. 182. M. 69. 1931. IX).</p>	<p>5. Supervision, unspecified, of the private and Government manufacture of arms. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 142, § 3.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 4.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 8.)</p> <p>6. International and national supervision of private and Government manufacture by a system of licensing and publicity in accordance with the principles in the Mixed Temporary Commission's report (document A.16. 1924. IX). Incorporation in the Disarmament Convention of the 1925 Convention on the supervision of the trade in arms. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.)</p> <p>1. Inexpediency of the limitation of expenditure in view of the abandonment of the gold standard and the resultant changes in purchasing power. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 23, note.)</p> <p>2. Approval of the limitation of the aggregate expenditure allocated to armed forces, together with formations organised on a military basis in the broadest sense of the term. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>3. Examination of the ratios to be established between the expenditure of countries which have had the advantage of an uninterrupted organisation of their defence system and that of countries which have been obliged to build up a national defence system in the last few years. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>4. In the case where the budgetary limitation is accepted, necessity to provide for the reinforcement of means of defence of countries the least protected and unprovided with fortifications and insufficiently equipped from an industrial point of view. (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 110.)</p> <p>5. Reduction of expenditure proportional to the amount of direct reduction. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 136, Arts. 34 and 35.)</p> <p>6. Reduction of expenses to a proportion corresponding to the level of the reduction of general armaments. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 3.)</p> <p>7. Thorough examination of the budgetary method, more especially with a view to its application in the event of fluctuations in purchasing power. (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 4.)</p> <p>8. Approval of budgetary limitation as general method in conjunction with direct limitation of certain classes of material. (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 3.)</p> <p>9. Approval of the budgetary limitation combined with direct limitation constituted by the control of trade and manufacture and by the inventory of stocks. (See Trade and Manufacture of Arms, p. 112, § 6. Spain.)</p>	<p>Supervision of the private and Government manufacture of arms, ammunition and war material.</p> <p>Principle of control of trade and of control of manufacture combined with inventory of stocks and the whole considered as a system of direct limitation. (See p. 158.)</p> <p>Is it desirable to reduce and limit armaments by budgetary methods?</p> <p>Combination of both methods, direct and indirect.</p>	<p>To be considered at an opportune time by the General Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>As soon as the questions of principle in preceding columns are resolved, points 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 can be referred to the Expenditure Commission.</p> <p>Point 7 could be referred immediately to the Expenditure Commission, which in its turn could set up an <i>ad hoc</i> Committee for the examination of this question.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 29</i> (continued).</p> <p>PART IV. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.</p> <p><i>Article 30.</i> Publicity of average daily number of effectives. Tables I to XII.</p> <p><i>Article 31.</i> Publicity relating to compulsory preparatory military training.</p> <p><i>Article 32.</i> Publicity relating to period of service.</p> <p><i>Article 33.</i> Publicity relating to the annual expenditure on land and sea material.</p> <p><i>Article 34.</i> Publicity relating to the building of vessels of war.</p> <p><i>Article 35.</i> Publicity relating to merchant ships whose decks have been stiffened.</p> <p><i>Article 36.</i> Publicity relating to military aircraft. Tables I to IV.</p> <p><i>Article 37.</i> Publicity relating to non-military aviation.<sup>1</sup></p>	<p>10. Limitation both of aggregate expenditure and expenditure under particular chapters (including expenditure on aviation). (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 2.)</p> <p>11. Abolition of secret funds. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 136, Art. 35.)</p> <p>12. Unification of the military budget. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 136, Art. 35.)</p> <p>1. Complete publicity of armaments, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 3.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 107.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 5.)</p> <p>2. Complete publicity of reduced armaments. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 137, Art. 45.)</p> <p>Publicity relating to non-military aviation. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 137, Art. 45.)</p>	<p>Complete publicity of armaments, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant.</p> <p>Complete publicity of reduced armaments.</p> <p>Publicity relating to non-military aviation.</p>	<p>Points 10, 11 and 12 may be immediately referred to the Expenditure Commission.</p> <p>The principle of publicity being governed by Article 8 of the Covenant, the method of publicity in the various spheres could be referred to the Special Commissions as noted hereunder.</p> <p>Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Land Commission.</p> <p>Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Land and Naval Commissions and Commission on National Defence Expenditure.</p> <p>Naval Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Air Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

<sup>1</sup> See in this connection document C.95.M.47.1932.VIII: Study concerning the Present Situation in regard to Publicity of Civil Aviation and Collection of Provisions in Force concerning the Exchange or Publication of Information relating to Civil Aviation.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 38.</i> Publicity of total annual expenditure.</p> <p>PART V. CHEMICAL ARMS.</p> <p><i>Article 39.</i> Prohibition of the use of asphyxiating and toxic gases and liquids and bacterio- logical methods of warfare.</p>	<p>1. Conversion to other uses of industrial undertakings engaged in the preparation of chemical and bacteriological arms. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 135, Art. 32.)</p> <p>2. Prohibition of the manufacture of chemical arms. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 5.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 109.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of the preparation of, and training in the use of, chemical arms. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 5.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 20.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 123, § 3.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 124.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 5.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 5.) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 3.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 135, Art. 31.)</p> <p>4. Destruction of all appliances of chemical aggression and bacteriological warfare. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 135, Art. 31.)</p> <p>5. Control of the manufacture of chemical products. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 5.)</p> <p>6. Prohibition of the preparation and the use of chemical and bacteriological arms even in the case of legitimate defence conditionally on the outlawry of the aggressor and of the application in his case of the sanctions provided for in Art. 16 of the Covenant. (Yugoslavia—Conf.D.99, p. 112.)</p> <p>7. Preparation of a more complete system for the prohibition of chemical arms, supplemented by a system of penalties. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 142, §§ 4 and 5.)</p> <p>8. Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological arms. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 104.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 106.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 5.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 20.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 3.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 124.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 5.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 109.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 5.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.) (Roumania—Conf.D.99, p. 112.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 7(a).) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 119, Art. 4.) (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 135, Art. 33.)</p> <p>9. Prohibition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare. (United States of America—Conf.D.99, p. 139, § 6.)</p>	<p>Prohibition of the preparation of chemical and bacteriological arms.</p> <p>Control of manufacture.</p> <p>Penalties.</p> <p>Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological arms.</p> <p>Prohibition of the use of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.</p>	<p>Commission on National Defence Expenditure.</p> <p>When decisions on the principles of these questions have been taken, the proposals may be referred to a Commission to be appointed in due course. These proposals could also be referred for an opinion to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions prior to any decision on the principle.</p>



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
	<p style="text-align: center;">PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Protection of the civilian population enunciated in general terms. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 106, § 3.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 124.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 4.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 109.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 131, Art. 7.)</li> <li>2. Agreement to exclude foodstuffs from articles which are declared contraband of war. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 143.)</li> <li>3. Prohibition of bombardment by land artillery by means of shells which contain poison gases or are specifically incendiary. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, IV.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 7.)</li> <li>4. Prohibition of bombardment by artillery behind the battle area. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, IV.)</li> <li>5. Prohibition of submarines. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144, § 3.)</li> <li>6. Prohibition of the use of automatic contact mines in the open sea. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 6.)</li> <li>7. Regulation of the use of naval artillery in conformity with the provisions of the Hague Convention. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 116, IV.)</li> <li>8. Prohibition of the use by naval artillery of projectiles which contain poison gases or are specifically incendiary. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, IV.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 7.)</li> <li>9. Total prohibition of the use of missiles of any kind from air machines and of all preparations for this means of warfare. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 121, § 18.)</li> <li>10. Prohibition of the bombardment from the air of the civilian population. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 142, § 4.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 123, § 3.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 4.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 6.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 7.) (United States of America—Conf.D.99, p. 139, § 5.)</li> <li>11. Prohibition of bombardment from the air behind the battle area or behind a zone of a certain depth along the coast. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, IV.)</li> <li>12. Prohibition of the use of projectiles which contain poison gases or are specifically incendiary. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 115, IV.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 7.)</li> <li>13. Organisation of sanctions in the event of any violation of undertakings relating to the protection of the civilian population. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 116, IV(e).)</li> </ol>	<p style="text-align: center;">Protection of the civilian population.</p>	<p>Once decisions have been taken on the question of principle noted, the proposals can be referred to a commission which will be indicated in due course.</p> <p>These proposals could also be referred for an opinion to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions prior to any decision on the principle.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Sanctions.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>PART VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.</p> <p>CHAPTER A. PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.</p> <p><i>Article 40.</i> Creation and mem- bership of the Per- manent Disarma- ment Commission.</p> <p><i>Article 41.</i> Convocation and meeting of Commis- sion.</p> <p><i>Article 42.</i> Rules of Procedure.</p> <p><i>Article 43.</i> Quorum.</p> <p><i>Article 44.</i> Representation of countries not having a member on the Commission.</p> <p><i>Article 45.</i> Voting.</p> <p><i>Article 46.</i> Consultation of persons.</p>	<p>1. Assurances to be provided for with a view to safeguarding each con- tracting party from menaces caused by the armaments of one or more States not party to the Treaty or by the non- observance of treaty obligations on the part of one or more of the contracting parties. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 143, § 2.)</p> <p>1. Creation of a “ Permanent Inter- national Commission of Control ”.<sup>1</sup> (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 136, Arts. 39, 40, 41, 42 and 46.)</p> <p>2. Creation of an International Com- mission for the Supervision of Arma- ments.<sup>1</sup> (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 4.) (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 5.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 9.)</p> <p>3. Great importance attached to the creation of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 144.)</p> <p>1. Commission to consist of repre- sentatives of all signatory States. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 4.)</p> <p>2. Representation on the Commission of all the Powers in rotation. (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 111.)</p> <p>3. Organisation of a Commission representing all signatory States on a possibly larger basis than the League of Nations. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.)</p>		<p>Political Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

<sup>1</sup> On the question of supervision, see end of this chapter.



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 47.</i> Minority reports.</p> <p><i>Article 48.</i> Reports, to whom to be communicated, and publication of.</p> <p><i>Article 49.</i> Communication of information received.</p>	<p>ADDITION TO CHAPTER A OF PART VI: JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.</p> <p>1. Proposal to invest the Permanent International Commission of Control with the right to carry out investiga- tions on the spot; proposal for a labour control. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 137, Arts. 43 and 44.)</p> <p>2. Exclusion of personnel belonging to the forces and persons interested in war industries. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 137, Art. 42.)</p> <p>3. Attention to be directed to mili- tary preparations of all kinds; prepar- ation for industrial aggression, air aggression, etc.; need for ensuring that the provisions of the Convention cannot be rendered inoperative by some re- adaptation of the system of military organisation. (Poland—Conf.D.99, pp. 110 and 111.)</p> <p>4. Prepared to accept a more com- plete supervision than that proposed in the draft Convention. Proposal to extend supervision to the trade in and manufacture of arms. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 142, § 3.)</p> <p>5. Need for effective international supervision. (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 108.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 123.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 4.) (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 110.) (Roumania—Conf.D.99, p. 112.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 138, § 6.)</p> <p>6. Urges control equally applicable to all countries. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 24.)</p> <p>7. Accepts control upon certain con- ditions. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 104, § 2.)</p> <p>8. The Permanent Disarmament Commission to be responsible also for the preparation of further stages in disarmament.<sup>1</sup> (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 141, § 5.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 140, § 9.)</p>	<p>Labour control.</p> <p>Exclusion of per- sonnel belonging to the forces and persons interested in war in- dustries.</p> <p>The methods of dis- armament to be uni- form in accordance with the principle of the equality of rights of States.</p>	<p>Political Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Political, Land and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Political Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>This question to be discussed in the Gene- ral Commission in con- nection with Article 1.</p> <p>Political Commission.</p>

<sup>1</sup> See on this subject the Danish proposal II c, page 149.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the dra ft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
CHAPTER B. DEROGATIONS.  <i>Article 50.</i> Conditions, noti- fication.			Political Commission.
CHAPTER C. PROCEDURE REGARDING COMPLAINTS.  <i>Article 51.</i> Violation: concern to all.	1. The repression of infringements of undertakings relative to limitation of armaments should be considered. Application of Articles 50 and 52 in the case of a grave violation of the Convention or of another undertaking with regard to reduction and limitation of armaments constituting a threat to the national security of one of the High Contracting Parties. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 110.)		Ditto.
<i>Article 52.</i> Procedure regard- ing complaints.			Ditto.
CHAPTER D. FINAL PROVISIONS.  <i>Article 53.</i> Maintenance of previous treaties.	1. Provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning Disarmament to be replaced by the new Convention. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 105.) (Germany —Conf.D.99, p. 120.)	Uniformity of methods of disarmament in conformity with the principle of the equality of State rights.	The question will be discussed in General Commission in connection with Article 1.
<i>Article 54.</i> Differences rela- tive to the interpreta- tion or application: arbitral procedure.			Political Commission.
<i>Article 55.</i> Ratification and entry into force.	1. Proposals regarding the ratification and entry into force of the Convention. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 137, Arts. 47 and 49.)		Ditto
<i>Article 56.</i> Measures to be taken for the execution of the Convention. <sup>1</sup>	1. Provision for transitional measures for the adaptation of existing armaments to those provided for in the Convention. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 122, § 25.) 2. The reduction of armaments (in so far as immediate reductions are not provided for in previous instruments) to be carried out in two years, the first being devoted to preparatory work and the second to the actual process of reduction. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 136, Arts. 37 and 38.) 3. Fixing of a time-limit for the ratification of the supplementary conventions provided for in the Soviet draft. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 137, Art. 48.)		Ditto.

<sup>1</sup> The Haitian delegation proposes that the States be recommended to bring the provision of their national constitutions and the texts of the Covenant (which would stand in need of revision) into harmony with the new principles of the Convention.



1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<i>Article 57.</i>  Duration of the Convention.	1. It ought not to be possible to de- nounce but merely revise the Convention. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 117.)	Denunciation or re- vision of the Disarma- ment Convention.	General Commission.
<i>Article 58.</i>  Subsequent exami- nation and possible revision of the Con- vention.	Ditto.	Ditto.	Ditto.
<i>Article 59.</i>  Revision in the event of special cir- cumstances.	1. Interdependence of civil and mili- tary aviation. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 110.)	Ditto.	General Commission and Air Commission.
<i>Article 60.</i>  Denunciation.	See under Article 57.	Ditto.	General Commission

Official No.: **Conf.D.103.**

[C.G. 6 (1).]

Geneva, March 9th, 1932.

## LIST OF QUESTIONS REFERRED TO THE COMMISSIONS FOR EXAMINATION.

The following lists have been communicated to the General Commission as annexes to the report of the Bureau adopted by the General Commission on March 8th, 1932 (document Conf.D.101). There will be found, in the order of Commissions and in the order adopted by the draft Convention:

(a) The articles of the draft Convention and the proposals of the delegations in connection with these articles;

(b) The proposals which do not refer to the articles themselves, but whose contents relate to the chapters of the draft Convention.

The order in which the questions figure in these lists does not in any way bind the special Commissions as regards their agenda.

\* \* \*

A summary of all the proposals mentioned above will be found in document Conf.D.102.

## GENERAL COMMISSION.

### DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLE ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.

#### A. QUESTIONS REFERRING TO Article 1 WITH THE DIFFERENT PROPOSALS CONNECTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

The main questions involved are the following:

- I. The principle of reduction of armaments:
  - (a) Definitive reduction under a single convention;
  - (b) Reduction to the lowest possible level.
  - (c) Reduction to be brought about by stages.
- II.
  - (a) Criteria for limitation or reduction;
  - (b) Taking into consideration of the particular conditions of the different countries;
  - (c) Method of computation of the effectives based on the absolute needs for internal order and relative needs for national defence.
- III.
  - (a) Simultaneous application of a quantitative and qualitative limitation by the prohibition of certain material or of certain categories of armaments;
  - (b) Prohibition of certain material except under certain conditions.
- IV. Reduction subject to measures to be taken in regard to the organisation of peace:

*Political Conditions:*

  - (a) Placing at the disposal of the League of Nations of certain material, etc.;
  - (b) Creation of an international force.

*Juridical Conditions:*

  - (a) Organisation of arbitration;
  - (b) Mutual assistance;
  - (c) Sanctions;
  - (d) Re-adaptation of the international regime.
- V.
  - (a) Disarmament laid down in the Treaties of Peace regarded as an indication;
  - (b) Uniformity of methods of disarmament under the principle of the equality of rights of States;
  - (c) Equality of right between all States and perequation of armed forces at the lowest level;
  - (d) Application of Article 8 to all States.
- VI. Limitation and reduction of the whole of the armed forces capable of immediate mobilisation.
- VII. Regional agreements within the framework of the general agreement.
- VIII. Demilitarised zones.
- IX. Limitation of international law regulations with regard to blockade.

(The question of moral disarmament is referred to the Political Commission.)

#### B. OTHER QUESTIONS TO BE STUDIED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH THE HEADINGS AND ARTICLES OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

##### I. Part I. — Personnel.

Proposals raising the following principles:

- (a) Abolition of compulsory service;
- (b) Freedom of choosing the system of service;
- (c) Limitation and reduction of trained reserves;
- (d) Limitation and reduction of the annual contingent.



2. Part II. — Material.

Proposals concerning chiefly:

- (a) Prohibition of certain material;
- (b) Direct limitation (quantity) in different forms;
- (c) Application of different methods according to the country.

3. Chapter A. — Land Material.

- (a) Prohibition of certain material;
- (b) Prohibition of certain fortifications;
- (c) Direct limitation of quality;
- (d) Direct limitation of quantity;
- (e) Article 10: Limitation of land material by the budgetary method.

Proposals aiming at combined direct and indirect limitation.

4. Chapter B. — Naval Material.

Proposals aiming notably at:

- (a) Prohibition of certain material;
- (b) Prohibition of certain fortifications;
- (c) Fixing of the method of reduction;
- (d) Direct limitation of certain material (other than the vessels themselves).

5. Chapter C. — Air Armaments.

Proposals aiming notably at:

- (a) Abolition of military aviation;
- (b) Abolition of military aviation combined with an internationalisation of civil aviation;
- (c) Prohibition of certain material;
- (d) Internationalisation or supervision of civil aviation.

6. Trade in and manufacture of arms.

Proposals aiming at taking into account in the draft Convention the trade in and manufacture of arms.

7. Part III. — Article 29 (Limitation of expenditure).

Proposals raising notably the question of the principle of budgetary limitation, the extension of this method, and the question of the combination of the direct and indirect methods.

8. Part V. — Chemical arms (Prohibition of the preparation of chemical arms).

Proposals aimed at the introduction of further restrictions in this connection.<sup>1</sup>

- (a) Prohibition of the preparation of chemical and bacteriological arms;
- (b) Control of manufacture;
- (c) Sanctions;
- (d) Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological arms;
- (e) Prohibition of the use of deadly gases and of bacteriological methods.

9. Protection of the civilian population. Proposals in this connection.<sup>1</sup>

10. Article 53 (Maintenance of the previous treaties). Proposals in this connection.

11. Article 57 (Duration of the Convention). Proposal in this connection.

12. Article 58 (Revision). Proposal in this connection.

13. Article 59 (Special circumstances). Proposal in this connection.

14. Article 60 (Denunciation). Proposal in this connection.

---

<sup>1</sup> These proposals might also be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions for an opinion before any decision is taken on the principle.

## POLITICAL COMMISSION.

### QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH BY THE POLITICAL COMMISSION WITHOUT PREVIOUS DISCUSSION BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

1. Article 1. — Proposals relating to moral disarmament to be found in Article 1 under the sub-head, "A. Political Conditions: 3—Moral Disarmament".
2. Part VI. — Miscellaneous provisions. Proposal on the subject.
3. Chapter A (Permanent Disarmament Commission). Proposals on the subject.
4. Article 40 (Constitution and composition). Proposals on the subject.
5. Article 41 (Convocation and meetings).
6. Article 42 (Rules of Procedure).
7. Article 43 (Quorum).
8. Article 44 (Representatives of States not having Members on the Commission).
9. Article 45 (Votes).
10. Article 46 (Consultation of individuals).
11. Article 47 (Minority reports).
12. Article 48 (Communication and publication of reports).
13. Article 49 (Communication of information received. Report of the Commission).

#### *Additions regarding the Powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.*

- 14.(a) Supervision. Proposals on the subject.
- 15.(b) Preparations for further stages of disarmament. Proposals on the subject.
16. Article 50 (Conditions; notifications).
17. Chapter C (Procedure regarding complaints). Supplementary proposal on the subject.
18. Article 51 (Violation: matter of general concern).
19. Article 52 (Procedure in case of complaints).
20. Article 54 (Disputes: arbitral procedure).
21. Article 55 (Ratification and entry into force). Proposal on the subject.
22. Article 56 (Measures for carrying the Convention into effect). Proposals on the subject.

---

## LAND COMMISSION.

### QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH WITHOUT PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION IN THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

1. Articles 2 and 3 (Definition and limitation of average daily effectives, proposals 4 and 5).
  2. Tables I, II and III, and proposals 1, 2 and 3.
  3. Article 4 (Formations organised on a military basis) and proposals 1 to 5.
  4. Tables IV and V.
  5. Proposal regarding reduction in the number of units.
  6. Articles 5 to 9, table and proposal thereon.
  7. Article 30 and annexed Tables I to V (Publicity regarding effectives).
  8. Article 31 (Compulsory preparatory military training).
  9. Article 32 (Publicity regarding length of service).
  10. Article 33 (Publicity regarding expenditure on land war material).
  11. Part V (Chemical warfare (whole question) and proposals 1 to 4 of the Chapter: Protection of Civilian Population).
  12. Polish proposal regarding the powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. Page 173 of document Conf.D.102.
-



## NAVAL COMMISSION.

### QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH BY THIS COMMISSION WITHOUT PREVIOUS DISCUSSION BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

#### *Part I. — Personnel.*

1. Articles 2 and 3 and proposals 4 and 5, Table VI (Limitation of Naval Effectives).  
Proposal on the subject.
2. Article 4, Table VII and proposals on the subject.
3. Chapter B, Articles 5 to 9 and table. Proposal on the subject.

#### *Part II. — Material*

4. Chapter B (Naval Armaments). General proposals of a technical character.<sup>1</sup>
5. Article 12 (Distribution of tonnage by categories). Proposals on the subject.
6. Article 13 (Transfer). Proposals on the subject.
7. Article 14 (Capital ships).
8. Article 15 (Aircraft-carriers).
9. Article 16 (Submarines).
10. Article 17 (General undertaking regarding the construction and purchases of vessels)  
Proposals on the subject.
11. Article 18 (Rules for replacement). Proposals on the subject.
12. Article 19 (Merchant ships). Proposals on the subject.
13. Article 20 (Vessels constructed for other Powers). Proposals on the subject.
14. Article 21 (Transfer of vessels). Proposals on the subject.
15. Article 22 (Rules for disposal). Proposals on the subject.
16. Article 23 (Hulks).
17. Annex I<sup>3</sup> (Exempt vessels).
18. Annex II (Special vessels).
19. Annex III (Definitions). Proposals on the subject.
20. Article 24 (Limitation of expenditure on naval material).

#### *Part IV: Exchange of Information.*

21. Article 30 (Publicity of effectives).
22. Article 32 (Publicity regarding length of service).
23. Article 33 (Publicity of expenditure on naval material).
24. Article 34 (Publicity regarding the construction of vessels).
25. Article 35 (Publicity regarding merchant ships).

#### *Part V. — Chemical Warfare.*

26. Chemical warfare (in its entirety), and proposals 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Chapter:  
Protection of the Civil Population.

---

<sup>1</sup> These concern more particularly: (a) the prolongation of naval agreements; (b) the limitation of non-floating material; (c) restriction of the use of mines.

<sup>2</sup> The questions of principle raised in connection with these articles will be examined by the General Commission.

<sup>3</sup> The annexes and tables depending directly on the articles are not mentioned.

## AIR COMMISSION.

This Commission might undertake a preliminary examination of the principle of the abolition of military aviation (with or without the internationalisation of civil aviation).

Should the Commission not be in favour of the adoption of this principle, it might examine the following questions:

1. Articles 2 to 4 and Tables annexed (Limitation of air effectives). Proposals on the subject.
2. Articles 5 to 9 and Table (Length of service). Proposals on the subject.
3. Article 25 (Limitation of number and total horse-power of aeroplanes). Proposals on the subject.
4. Article 26 (Limitation of number and total horse-power and of total volume of dirigibles). Proposals on the subject.
5. Article 27 (Measurement of the horse-power and volume of dirigibles). Documents C.259 and 260.1931 (Standard measurements of the horse-power of aeroplane engines).
6. Article 28 (Civil aviation). Relations with military aviation.
7. Article 30 (Publicity regarding effectives).
8. Article 32 (Publicity regarding length of service).
9. Article 36 (Publicity regarding military aircraft).
10. Article 37 (Publicity regarding civil aviation). Document C.95.1932.
11. Part V. — Chemical Arms: Proposals 1, 2, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Chapter: Protection of the Civil Population. Document Conf.D.102.
12. Polish proposals relating to the powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.
13. Article 59 (Revision in special circumstances: Interdependence between civil and military aviation).

---

## COMMISSION ON NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.

QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH BY THIS COMMISSION WITHOUT PREVIOUS DISCUSSION  
BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

1. Article 29 (Limitation of total annual expenditure). Proposals on the subject, more particularly:
  - (a) Continuous study of the budgetary method in consideration of fluctuations in purchasing power;
  - (b) Budgetary limitation relating to total expenditure and to individual chapters;
  - (c) Abolition of secret funds and unification of the military budget.
2. Article 33 (Publicity of land and naval expenditure).
3. Article 36 (Publicity of total expenditure).
4. Examination of the Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions (document C.182.1931.IX):
  - (a) Part of the report concerning publicity.
  - (b) Part of the report concerning limitation, in so far as this part deals with the questions enumerated under 1.



Series of Publications: 1932.IX.32.

Official No.: **Conf. D. 106.**

Geneva, April 9th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE ITALIAN PROPOSALS FOR QUALITATIVE LIMITATION

(Document Conf. D. 81, see page 123.)

April 3rd, 1932.

### I.

In document Conf. D. 81, dated February 19th last, the Italian delegation submitted the following proposals to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments :

*In the sphere of land armaments :*

- (1) Abolition of heavy artillery of every kind ;
- (2) Abolition of tanks of every kind.

*In the sphere of naval armaments :*

- (1) Simultaneous abolition of capital ships and submarines ;
- (2) Abolition of aircraft-carriers.

*In the sphere of air armaments :*

Abolition of bombing-aircraft.

*In every sphere :*

- (1) Abolition of aggressive chemical and bacteriological weapons of every kind ;
- (2) Revision of the laws of war with a view to the more complete and effective protection of the civil population.

In the opinion of the Italian delegation, these proposals constitute an indivisible organic plan, in the sense that abolition should embrace all the war material mentioned above. This material could be scrapped, either immediately or by stages, within a period to be determined.

### II.

With a view to the practical application of the principles thus laid down, the Italian delegation suggests the following measures.

#### **Land Armaments.**

A. — THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO SCRAP HEAVY LAND ARTILLERY OF EVERY KIND, NOT TO MANUFACTURE OR ACQUIRE ANY SUCH ARTILLERY IN THE FUTURE NOR TO MANUFACTURE OR ACQUIRE GUN-CARRIAGES CAPABLE OF RENDERING HEAVY COAST OR NAVAL ARTILLERY IN ANY WAY TRANSPORTABLE.

*Definition.* — The term " heavy artillery " is to be understood to mean guns, cannon, howitzers and mortars of a calibre exceeding 100 mm., irrespective of their weight.

With a view to the abolition of artillery of this description, the Contracting Parties undertake :

(1) *To state :*

- (a) The number of pieces of heavy artillery ;
- (b) The number of mobile gun-carriages (or carriages which can be rendered mobile for the above-mentioned artillery) ;
- (c) The total stock of ammunition intended for the artillery mentioned under letter (a).

The returns under (a), (b) and (c) must include the whole of the material existing in each State.

The pieces must be classified according to the purpose for which they are intended (cannon, howitzers, mortars) and according to their calibre.

In the case of gun-carriages, the type (rigid or recoil) and the guns for which they are intended should be indicated.

(2) *To scrap* all the guns and gun-carriages mentioned under (a) and (b) of No. 1, with the exception of the guns required for arming the fixed batteries facing the sea belonging to maritime fortresses.

The guns and carriages must be scrapped separately and must be rendered totally incapable of warlike service.

Scrapping shall therefore be regarded as effected for the purposes of this Convention only when the material has been melted down or broken up.

(3) *To render* all ammunition intended for the said guns *unfit for service* with the prohibited artillery.

This scrapping shall be regarded as effected for the purposes of the Convention when the metal parts of the ammunition have been melted down or broken up.

(4) *To maintain* in the heavy batteries of maritime fortresses, for the exclusive defence of the sea-front, only guns on turret or centre-pivoted mountings not capable of adaptation for field use, with a stock of ammunition not exceeding  $x$  rounds per gun.

B. — THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES AGREE TO ABOLISH TANKS AND ARMoured CARS OF EVERY DESCRIPTION AND TO REFRAIN FROM CONSTRUCTING OR ACQUIRING THEM IN FUTURE ; THEY LIKEWISE AGREE TO TAKE STEPS TO SEE THAT MOTOR VEHICLES FOR INDUSTRIAL OR AGRICULTURAL USE DO NOT POSSESS CHARACTERISTICS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE CONVERTED INTO TANKS AND UTILISED IN THAT FORM.

With a view to the scrapping of this category of armaments, the Contracting Parties undertake :

(1) *To state* the number of tanks and armoured cars of every description in existence ;

(2) *To destroy or render incapable* of warlike service the whole of the material mentioned above and also all spare parts for the maintenance of this material in working order.

The armour plating and chassis must be scrapped—that is to say, broken up or melted down.

The arms may be kept if they are of the authorised calibre.

The engines may be kept provided they are employed for industrial or agricultural vehicles or establishments ; otherwise they must be scrapped.

#### Naval Armaments.

A. — THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO DISARM, TO SCRAP AND TO BREAK UP CAPITAL SHIPS AND SUBMARINES SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND ALSO TO DISARM, AND BREAK UP AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS AND NOT TO CONSTRUCT OR ACQUIRE VESSELS OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TYPES IN FUTURE.

*Definition.* — By a capital ship is meant a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.).

By an aircraft-carrier is meant any surface vessel of war, whatever its carrier displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

By a submarine is meant any vessel of war, whatever its tonnage, capable of navigating below the surface.

With a view to the abolition of armaments of this category, the Contracting Parties undertake to comply with the following rules : each of the units to be disposed of may either be scrapped or converted into a hulk at the option of the High Contracting Party concerned.

#### I. *Vessels to be scrapped :*

(a) A vessel to be scrapped must be rendered incapable of warlike service within  $x$  months of the entry into force of the Convention.



(b) A vessel to be scrapped shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed or else destroyed in the ship :

- (1) All guns and essential parts of guns, fire-control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets ;
- (2) All hydraulic or electric machinery for operating turrets ;
- (3) All fire-control instruments and range-finders ;
- (4) All ammunition, explosives, mines and mine rails ;
- (5) All torpedoes, war heads, torpedo-tubes and training-racks ;
- (6) All wireless telegraphy installations ;
- (7) All main propelling machinery, or alternatively the armoured conning-tower and all side armour-plate ;
- (8) All aircraft cranes, derricks, lifts and launching apparatus ; all landing-on or flying-off platforms and decks, or alternatively all main propelling machinery ;
- (9) In addition, in the case of submarines, all main storage batteries, air-compressor plants and ballast pumps.

(c) Scrapping shall be finally effected in either of the following ways, within  $x$  months of the date on which the work of rendering the vessel incapable of warlike service is due for completion :

- (1) Permanent sinking of the vessel ;
- (2) Breaking the vessel up (this shall always include the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour and all deck, side and bottom plating).

## II. *Vessels to be converted to Hulks.*

A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to a hulk shall be considered finally disposed of when the conditions prescribed in Section I, paragraph (b), have been complied with, omitting sub-paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, and when the following have been effected :

- (1) Mutilation beyond repair of all propeller-shafts, thrust-blocks, turbine-gearing or main propelling-motors and turbines or cylinders of main engines ;
- (2) Removal of propeller-brackets ;
- (3) Removal and breaking up of all aircraft-lifts, and the removal of all aircraft-cranes, derricks and launching apparatus.

The vessel must be put in the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

## Air Armaments.

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO DESTROY MILITARY DIRIGIBLES AND BOMBING-MACHINES AND NOT TO CONSTRUCT ANY IN FUTURE.

*Definition.* — By bombing-machines are meant all aircraft with the exception of :

- (a) Single-seater machines used for short-radius reconnaissance, defence and air police, the empty weight and power of which shall not exceed :

	Weight empty Kg.	Maximum power H.P.
Land aircraft . . . . .	$x$	$y$
Hydroplanes (Seaplanes) (excluding floats) .	$X^1$	$Y^1$

- (b) Training machines. The total of these machines shall be strictly proportional to the number of pilots in service and in reserve. The said machines, if single-seaters, shall be subject to the restrictions laid down in the previous paragraph ; if two-seaters, they shall not exceed 20 per cent of the above-mentioned total and shall conform to the following limits :

	Weight empty Kg.	Maximum power H.P.
Land aircraft . . . . .	$z$	$j$
Hydroplanes (Seaplanes) (excluding floats) .	$z^1$	$j^1$

With a view to the elimination of prohibited aircraft, the Contracting Parties undertake :

- (1) To make known the number and types of military aircraft which they own ;
- (2) Not to construct annually a number of aircraft exceeding that of the aircraft scrapped, exception being made for those necessary to reach the limit laid down in the Convention ;
- (3) To destroy immediately all the reserve material in service and in store ;
- (4) To destroy all means of aggression by dropping, and all appliances for discharge and aiming, and to prohibit their manufacture ;
- (5) To maintain the available reserve of new machines at not more than 25 per cent of the number authorised, and that of engines at not more than 50 per cent of the engines in service.

#### **Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons.**

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES AGREE TO ABOLISH THE USE IN TIME OF WAR OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF ALL KINDS AND PARTICULARLY TO PROHIBIT ALL ASPHYXIATING, TOXIC, LACHRYMATORY OR SIMILAR GASES, ALL LIQUIDS OR OTHER SUBSTANCES OR DEVICES PRODUCING RESULTS SIMILAR TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED GASES AND BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF ALL KINDS.

ACCORDINGLY, THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE :

- (1) To destroy, within a period of  $x$  months as from the entry into force of the Convention, all quantities of chemical and bacteriological substances of the kinds mentioned above constituting reserve depots or material for experiment, as well as the plant serving for their manufacture and all appliances serving for their utilisation. Nevertheless plant capable of direct employment by the chemical and pharmaceutical industry for non-military purposes may be retained on condition that it is strictly utilised for the needs of peaceable industries.
- (2) To destroy, within a period of  $x$  months as from the entry into force of the Convention, all artillery or hand ammunition and projectiles of all kinds loaded with chemical and bacteriological substances of the above-mentioned categories and intended for discharge by aircraft.
- (3) Not to manufacture in future chemical and bacteriological substances of the above-mentioned kinds specifically intended to harm the belligerents or the civil population, with the exception, however, of chemical or bacteriological substances capable of being utilised for peaceable industrial and scientific purposes and for such purposes only. They also undertake not to manufacture appliances for the utilisation of the said substances.
- (4) Not to maintain or train personnel specialised in the use of aggressive and bacteriological appliances of all kinds, even as personnel of other undertakings ; not to publish even for purely theoretical purposes regulations or instructions dealing with the use of the said aggressive appliances.
- (5) Not to import chemical and bacteriological appliances of any kind specifically intended for warlike purposes.

#### III.

As regards the time-limits within which the material should be destroyed, the Italian delegation realises that this material could probably not be rendered useless at the same date in its entirety and that the method of destruction must be appropriate to the particular requirements of the different categories of armaments.

The following measures might accordingly be considered :

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDERTAKE :

- (a) To render useless and to destroy the material whose abolition is stipulated, within  $x$  months from the date of entry into force of the Convention, and to complete this operation within  $x + y$  months.
- (b) To render useless and destroy the said material in instalments and in successive periods, having recourse to methods appropriate to the particular requirements of the different categories of armaments.

#### IV.

The Italian delegation considers that the qualitative limitation of armaments must necessarily be accompanied :

- (1) By a revision of the laws of war ;
- (2) By suitable measures for the control of civil aviation.



It wishes forthwith to draw the Conference's attention to the necessity of contractual obligations to prevent the utilisation of authorised means of war for purposes usually achieved with abolished means of war.

As regards civil aviation, the Italian delegation considers that it is necessary :

- (1) To give it the greatest possible publicity ;
- (2) To exercise technical and administrative supervision ;
- (3) For the High Contracting Parties to undertake not to vary materially the proportional ratios to be fixed.

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.33.

*Official No.:* **Conf.D.107.**

Geneva, April 9th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION RELATING TO CAPITAL SHIPS

(Document Conf.D.92, see page 142.)

Berne, April 4th, 1932.

The Argentine Republic has proposed that the countries which are not signatories to the Washington and London Treaties shall undertake not to construct or acquire, during the period of validity of any convention which they may sign, any capital ships of more than 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), as it regards all such vessels as alike of a definitely aggressive character. My Government considers that such a compromise would in itself be tantamount to an effective and practical restriction of naval units, as a real restriction of means of offensive warfare, and as an effective means of reducing the enormous expenditure entailed by armaments.

Our delegation is of opinion that, before dealing with Chapter B of the draft Convention, which refers to naval armaments, it would be desirable to adopt a resolution on the proposal to which I refer. The Naval Commission cannot establish the figures for the global tonnage and the tonnage per category dealt with in Articles 11 and 12, Chapter B, until the proposal has first been adopted or rejected, since, as far as the countries which possess this category of vessel are concerned, the fixing of the figures limiting the number of such vessels will depend on the decision taken.

The delegations of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Spain have submitted the same proposal, extending it to all States, though Germany slightly alters the calibre of the guns, while other delegations go further and propose either the absolute abolition of such vessels (like China) or their conditional abolition (like Italy).

Moreover, the idea of limiting offensive armaments—the fundamental principle underlying our proposals—has been supported by the majority of the representatives of the nations convened to the Conference, and is one of the main features in the essential object of the Conference (Denmark, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, the Netherlands, etc.).

With a view to co-ordinating the various proposals submitted, and as an advocate of the idea that the reduction of armaments should be carried out by successive stages (as immediate disarmament would raise too complicated a problem), the Argentine delegation ventures to propose to the General Commission that it should approve the following motion which, in our opinion, expresses in the simplest possible form the ideas underlying the proposal as defined by various delegations, and is also in conformity with the principle maintained by the others :

It is proposed that an article to read as follows should be appended to the draft Convention submitted by the Preparatory Commission :

“ Article . . . — The High Contracting Parties undertake not to construct nor to acquire, during the term of the present Convention, any war vessel not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carry a gun exceeding 8 inches (203-mm.) without prejudice, to the right reserved in that respect by France and Italy when signing the Treaty of London.”

(Signed) E. Ruiz GUINAZU,  
Argentine Minister at Berne,  
Delegate to the Disarmament Conference.

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.34.

*Official No.:* Conf. D. 108.

Geneva, April 11th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSALS OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION

(Document Conf. D.84, see page 138.)

The Hague, April 2nd, 1932.

### I. LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF IMMEDIATELY MOBILISABLE ARMED FORCES.

(VII, page 153, of the Co-ordination Table, Conf.D.102.)

The speech made by the first delegate of the Netherlands on February 15th contained the following suggestions :

“Limitation and reduction must be applied to the whole of the armed forces immediately mobilisable. Consequently they must comprise :

- “ (a) Trained reserves, in the first instance by reducing the contingent ;
- “ (b) Etc.”

The Netherlands delegation regards the limitation of these reserves as one of the most important elements of a real limitation of armaments.

If the limitation is confined to the effectives under the colours in time of peace, the great armies which a State might use in order to start a war might continue to exist without any reduction or any other limitation than the natural limitation resulting from the birth rate. The limitation and any reduction prescribed for the average effectives per day in peace time may be effected by fixing and, if necessary, reducing the number of days of real service compulsory for each man, without reducing the annual contingent by a single man. In drawing attention to this immediate consequence of the system of limiting the personnel, which is adopted in the draft Convention, there is no intention of making a malevolent supposition, but merely of revealing one of the essential traits of this system. The reason given on many occasions in the Preparatory Commission for rejecting the limitation of trained reserves was precisely that it is inadmissible to discriminate between the young men of the same annual class ; democracy, it was said, demands equality of burdens and sacrifices ; the system of conscription would therefore necessarily involve all able-bodied young men being called up. In this manner, the great war armies would continue to exist, although most of the elements composing them would be on leave. It may be supposed that these armies would not be without the necessary material.

The Netherlands delegation cannot believe that this state of affairs is inevitable. It is still convinced that, even if the system of conscription is retained, it is possible to reduce the war effectives of the armed forces. It ventures to point out that, in the Netherlands, the recruiting of armed forces takes place on a system of conscription under which the young men called up for compulsory military service are chosen each year by drawing lots up to the number fixed by law. In equity, exceptions may be made in the case of the military service of an elder brother or of a man maintaining his family by his work. The experience in the Netherlands does not confirm the supposition that a system of drawing lots would be considered by the people as discrimination, if not immoral, at any rate contrary to that equality of treatment to which all the citizens of a modern State are entitled.

The Netherlands delegation does not disguise the fact that the limitation and reduction of existing armed forces in peace time is of great importance. For a State with aggressive intentions, these forces constitute an instrument which is always at hand. But, on the other hand, it is obvious that a war army comprising all the immediately mobilisable forces may also constitute an instrument of aggression. But even if the eventuality of large-scale manœuvres (which sometimes coincide with a moment of crisis) is left on one side, the mobilisation of a few army corps takes place in such a short space of time that, in order to gauge the immediate aggressive force of a State and to limit and reduce that force, measures must be taken, not only against the peace-time effectives, but also against the trained reserves.



Not only must the Convention make possible—indeed, for that purpose, a Convention is not needed—but it must directly guarantee the limitation and reduction of the great war armies.

\* \* \*

With regard to the method of limiting these reserves, the Netherlands delegation, without pretending to exhaust the subject, submits the following observations :

In order to attain this end, two courses may be followed.

In the first place, it is possible for the Convention to prescribe a direct limitation (in addition to the limitation of peace-time effectives) of the *total* trained reserves at a State's disposal. On the other hand, it is possible to limit the total number of men receiving military training *each year*; by introducing only a limited number of men each year the State will have a limited total of trained men at its disposal. The two methods aim at the same result.

\* \* \*

The direct limitation of trained reserves might be based on more than one criterion. In the first place, it is possible to limit all the effectives *in service*, effectives *at disposal* and reserves with military training who are registered and compelled by law to do military service in case of war. This method was explained in a proposal discussed by the Preparatory Commission (documents, Series VIII, pages 114 *et seq.* and page 212). Under this method, the criterion as to which effectives are to be limited is to be found in the fact of their incorporation in the legal military organisation of the State. A further method may also be considered. It is based on the idea that the fact of having received military training is far more important than legal incorporation in a military organisation. Legal steps for incorporating or re-incorporating in the military organisation of a State men who have received instruction calculated to make them useful for military purposes may be taken, if necessary, in a few days. It is therefore preferable to limit the total number of men who have received or are receiving military instruction and who have not reached an age at which they are no longer of military value. As it is impossible to reduce the present number of men who have received military training, this method can only produce its full effect after the lapse of a certain number of years. In all States where men who have received military training continue to be obliged by law to do military service in case of war up to a certain age, this method will not differ greatly in application from that discussed in the Preparatory Commission.

In order to define the proposed method, the Netherlands delegation submits the two following articles, which, if necessary, it reserves the right to put forward formally at a subsequent date.

“ Article 4 (a).

“ The total effectives of the land, sea and air armed forces, immediately mobilisable, of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of effectives defined in tables . . . annexed to this chapter, the figure laid down for such Party in the corresponding column of the said tables.

“ Article 4 (b).

“ The effectives of the land, sea and air armed forces, immediately mobilisable, provided for in Article 4 (a) shall include men not over  $x$  years in the case of those who have or have had the rank of officer and  $y$  years in the case of other men who have received since peace time or are receiving military training which renders them capable of being used for military purposes.”

\* \* \*

As stated above, the limitations may refer, not only to the total number of men who have received or are receiving military training, but may also apply to the total number of men receiving military training every year. Such limitation should be applied, not only to effectives recruited by conscription, but to all entering the armed forces. Limitation referring exclusively to the contingent recruited each year by conscription would leave a wide possibility of increasing that contingent by means of voluntary enlistments. Attention should be paid, not to recruiting by conscription, but to military training; the latter is given to all entering the armed forces. As an illustration of an article based on this method, the Netherlands delegation submits the following wording, while reserving the right, if necessary, to make a formal proposal at a later date:

“ Article 4 (c).

“ The effectives incorporated yearly for military service in the armed forces, or in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis, of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figure laid down for such Party in the corresponding column of tables . . . annexed to this chapter.”

2. LIMITATION OF MATERIAL OF THE LAND FORCES.

(No. 12, page 159, of the Co-ordination Table, Conf.D.102.)

The Netherlands delegation is of opinion that Article 10 of the draft Convention, in limiting only the annual expenditure on the purchase, manufacture, etc., of war material for land armaments, presents a serious defect. The existing material would be neither reduced nor limited and each country would remain free in future to purchase or manufacture any material which it pleased.

The limitation, and, in particular, the reduction, of war material for land armaments is therefore a supplement to the indirect limitation laid down in Article 10 and the prohibition of land material considered as offensive.

The method of limitation submitted for this purpose by the Netherlands delegation is included in Article 10 (a) annexed to the present memorandum.

In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, a judicious application of the system of control laid down in the draft Convention, which would be exercised already on naval and air material, would suffice for the control of land material, which the delegation proposes to limit and reduce.

Guns of a calibre of more than 150 mm. and tanks are provisionally mentioned, it being understood that these categories will be omitted if the Conference agrees on the absolute prohibition of these arms.

Rifles, carbines, muskets, revolvers and pistols are not included in the limitation, as these arms have only a relatively small value as compared with other firearms. In addition, it would be difficult to limit them in view of the number of old-fashioned types of rifles, etc. to be found in various countries, the ease with which they are manufactured and the fact that sporting shot-guns, together with pistols and revolvers for personal defence, would enter into this category.

In order to fix the figures, the Conference will take as a basis the total number of immediately mobilisable armed forces.

In the first place, it must fix a maximum figure per 1,000 men for the different categories of arms.

Each State would, moreover, be quite free as regards the *distribution* of the *total* land material, both as regards the grant of material for peace-time formations and for war units, and also as regards the material in use and that in stock.

In accordance with this method, the *total* material of a country would depend on two elements—namely :

- (1) The total armed forces immediately mobilisable ;
- (2) The quantity of material taken as a basis per 1,000 men of these immediately mobilisable forces.

The figures to be taken as a basis by the Conference will be defined in accordance with technical conditions, will be based as a whole on the war material necessary for defence and will be fixed on the lowest possible level.

As regards the exchange and spare material necessary for each country, special figures will have to be fixed.

“ Article 10 (a).

“ The total number of materials in use, in reserve and in stock of the land armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of material defined in the table annexed to this chapter, the figure laid down in the said table.”



TABLE SHOWING THE TOTAL OF MATERIALS IN USE, IN RESERVE AND IN STOCK  
WHICH MUST NOT BE EXCEEDED BY THE LAND ARMED FORCES.

Materials	Total material in the land forces of the High Contracting Parties <sup>1</sup>		
	State A	State B	State C
Machine-rifles and other automatic arms fitted with appliances enabling them to be fired from the shoulder . . . . .			
Machine-guns . . . . .			
Guns, howitzers and mortars of a calibre not exceeding 150 mm. (5.9 inches). .			
Guns, howitzers and mortars of a calibre exceeding 150 mm. (5.9 inches) . . . .		<sup>2</sup>	
Tanks . . . . .		<sup>2</sup>	

3. PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF AUTOMATIC CONTACT MINES  
IN THE OPEN SEA.

(Number 23, page 162, and number 6, page 171, of the Co-ordinating Table, Conf.D.102.)

Convention VIII of the Second Peace Conference of 1907, relating to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines, contains the rules to be observed in time of war for the employment of submarine mines.

As pointed out in the Preamble to this Convention, these rules are based on the principle of the freedom of the seas for all nations. The object is to limit and determine the use of submarine mines, so as to restrict the rigours of war and, as far as possible, to ensure to peaceful shipping the security which it has a right to claim in spite of the existence of a war. Moreover, the Preamble lays it down that the rules of this Convention have been drawn up in the expectation that it will be possible so to settle the question as to give all desirable guarantees to the interests involved. At the eighth plenary session of the Peace Conference, the Convention was adopted ; but, when voting the Convention, the delegate of Great Britain stated that he could not regard that arrangement as providing a final solution of the question, and added that the high seas were a great international route on which it behoved belligerents to do nothing to render it dangerous to neutrals. The world war showed the disastrous results of the laying of submarine mines in the open sea for peaceful shipping. Thousands of non-combatant seamen lost their lives as a result of the destruction of merchant vessels and fishing vessels by these mines.

In order effectively to protect the lives of non-combatant seamen and passengers, the use or laying of automatic contact mines in the open sea must be prohibited.

The proposal of the Netherlands delegation provides for the incorporation of the following rule in the Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments :

“ It is prohibited to lay automatic contact mines in the open sea. ”

4. PROHIBITION OF AIR BOMBARDMENT.

(Number 6, page 164, and number 10, page 171, of the Co-ordinating Table, Conf.D.102.)

The Netherlands are signatories to the declaration signed at The Hague in 1907 forbidding the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons. According to the terms of this declaration, the contracting Powers agree to refrain from “ launching projectiles and explosives from balloons or by any new method of a similar kind ”. These terms are sufficiently general to cover all air-bombing.

<sup>1</sup> This figure is to be fixed by the Conference on a technical basis per 1,000 men as stated above.

<sup>2</sup> This figure would be *nil* if the said arms were prohibited.

The duration of the declaration extended until the end of the third Peace Conference, which should have met in 1914 or 1915, and its application was confined to a war between contracting States without the participation of a non-contracting State.

The number of signatories is very small, and a general agreement on the question of air bombing is therefore highly desirable.

The Committee of Jurists set up in virtue of a decision of the Washington Conference in 1922 endeavoured to replace the 1907 declaration by fresh conventional provisions.

It proposed to stipulate that only certain objectives were admissible for bombardment. Articles 22 to 26 of the Rules of Air Warfare (second part, Chapter IV) of the general report gives the solution of this problem adopted by the Committee of Jurists.

The Netherlands delegation is of opinion that the only effective method of protecting the civilian population against the horrors of a bombardment is its absolute prohibition. Any method providing for exceptions to this prohibition would open the door to abuses of which the civilian populations would be the victims. Moreover, this prohibition would prevent the principal military use of civil aviation.

It therefore proposes the following general rule :

“ All air bombardment by whatever means shall be prohibited.”

##### 5. COMPLETE PUBLICITY OF ARMAMENTS IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE COVENANT.

(Number 2, page 169, of the Co-ordinating Table, Conf.D.102.)

The speech made by the first delegate of the Netherlands on February 15th contained, *inter alia*, the following suggestion :

“ Complete publicity of armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant ; particularly publicity of land, naval and air material .”

In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, the obligation imposed by Article 8, paragraph 6, constitutes an absolute rule which cannot be regarded as being weakened by the restriction provided for in paragraph 1 of the same article, as that restriction relates exclusively to the reduction of national armaments. On the contrary, publicity carried out universally and in good faith is of itself a means of increasing the degree of security.

There is interdependence between limitation or reduction and publicity. As regards effectives, this interdependence is observed in Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the draft Convention. As regards naval and air material, the Netherlands delegation is of opinion that the combination of the provisions regarding limitation and the exchange of information already gives a certain amount of satisfaction.

The position is different, however, as regards land material. It is true that, as regards the exchange of information on this subject, regard being had to the budgetary limitation provided for in Article 10, the Preparatory Commission in Article 33 adopted the system of budgetary publicity ; publicity applies particularly to the amount actually expended per category of material in the course of a year for upkeep, purchase and manufacture.

The Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions devotes Chapter 24 of its report (document C.182.M.69.1931) to showing the impossibility of comparing the strength of armaments of various countries on the basis of the figures for expenditure. As regards the methods of applying the principle of publicity of land material by budgetary means, which it had been instructed to examine, it states (page 26 of the report) :

“ As regards publicity of various categories of expenditure on war material dealt with by Article 33 of the draft Convention, the Committee has reluctantly been forced to the conclusion that the technical difficulties of arriving at a sufficiently uniform and comprehensive method were too great to allow the Committee to put forward any positive proposal.”

Consequently, the execution of the provisions of Article 33 seems impossible of realisation.

There still remains, however, a need for the exchange of information on land material, and this need is urgent if the proposal of the Netherlands delegation with regard to the direct limitation of land material is adopted. In this connection, we may quote here a passage from the above-mentioned speech in which it is stated :

“ The Netherlands delegation, as a wholehearted supporter of the direct reduction of the forces of every arm, is of opinion that, until that end can be achieved, publicity would constitute a valuable means of eliminating mistrust between the peoples and thus reducing the causes of conflicts.”

During the second part of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission, the Netherlands delegation submitted a proposal with regard to the direct publicity of land material. Nevertheless, the principle involved by that proposal has not been discussed (see paragraph 200 of the report). This is a further reason why the method contemplated should be reconsidered and put into concrete form. With this end in view, the Netherlands delegation proposes the following article to replace Article 33 of the draft Convention :



“ Article 33 (a).

“ Each of the High Contracting Parties shall every year communicate to the Secretariat of the League of Nations a statement drawn up in accordance with the model annexed to the present article, showing the material in use and the stocks of material of the land, naval and air forces. The statement referred to in the present provision shall show the position as at December 31st and shall be submitted before March 1st of the year following that to which it refers.”

MODEL TABLE ANNEXED TO ARTICLE 33 (a).

Material	Age of the models of arms		
	Models created before January 1st, 1914	Models created between January 1st, 1914, and January 1st, 1933	Models created after January 1st, 1933
I. <i>Portable arms:</i>			
(a) Rifles, carbines and muskets (in thousands) . . . . .			
(b) Machine-rifles and other automatic weapons fitted with appliances enabling them to be fired from the shoulder (number)			
(c) Machine-guns (number) . . . . .			
II. <i>Artillery:</i>			
(a) Guns, howitzers and mortars of a calibre of 150 mm. or less (5.9 inches) (number) . . . . .			
(b) Guns, howitzers and mortars of a calibre of more than 150 mm. (5.9 inches) (number) . . . . .			
III.			
(a) <i>Tanks</i> (number) . . . . .			
(b) Automobiles and other armoured vehicles (number). . . . .			

Series of Publications: 1932.IX.37.

Official No.: **Conf. D. 110.**

Geneva, April 12th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSALS OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION

(Document Conf. D.83, see page 138.)

Following the suggestions made on March 16th last by the President of the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, the Swedish delegation has drawn up explanations of certain of the proposals submitted by it to the Conference on February 19th last. These explanations are reproduced below in the same order as the various points enumerated in the Swedish proposal distributed to the Conference as document Conf.D.83.

Point 2 (a). Throughout the preparatory work for the Disarmament Conference, the Swedish Government constantly upheld the thesis that the limitation of effectives should be such as to apply also to trained reserves. The Swedish delegation remains faithful to this principle ; for it is convinced that trained reserves are too essential an element of armaments to be left outside the scope of an effective disarmament convention.

With regard to the means of effecting such a limitation of trained reserves, the delegation has considered in the first place the idea of a quantitative limitation of personnel undergoing military training in time of peace—i.e., *a limitation of the annual contingent*. This would of course have the effect of limiting trained reserves.

The delegation has also studied another method which seems likely to be of considerable value. This method is based on the idea that, if the period of service of part of the annual contingent is limited, there will be in consequence a reduction in the number of men who can be drafted immediately, on the outbreak of war, into the units assigned to aggressive operations. It would seem that such a limitation could readily take its place among the principles on which the first part of the Draft Convention is based. For instance, a separate column in Table I of Chapter A might lay down maximum figures for the average daily effectives of men undergoing training for more than six months. The number of conscripts undergoing training for longer periods should consequently not exceed the figure shown in that column for each country.

On the same lines, this principle, if accepted by the Conference, should perhaps also be expressed by the insertion of a supplementary provision in Chapter B of the Draft Convention ("period of service").

Point 2 (b). In the opinion of the Swedish delegation, no effective limitation or reduction of land material can be secured without the application of the direct method supplemented by the budgetary method. Accordingly, the delegation proposes that Article 10 of the Draft Convention should be supplemented by clauses providing for the direct limitation of certain main categories of arms, such as (a) rifles and carbines; (b) automatic rifles and machine-guns; (c) guns and howitzers; (d) mortars and mine-throwers. The delegation does not for the moment wish to submit detailed proposals in this connection, but it requests the Conference to consider the explanations given above and the annex attached as suggestions for its future deliberations.

Point 2 (c). The delegation is happy to note that a considerable number of delegations have proposed the complete abolition of tanks and mobile heavy artillery. With regard to this latter class of armament, the delegation is inclined to advocate a limit of 16 cm. for the calibre and 4 tons for the weight of guns and howitzers, except those which form part of the fixed armament of fortifications.

Point 4. The delegation notes with satisfaction that the National Defence Expenditure Commission has already placed on its agenda the study of the budgetary method with a view to its application in case of fluctuations in the purchasing power of currencies. It trusts that this study will be continued until definite results have been secured.

Like several other delegations, the Swedish delegation has proposed the complete abolition of military aviation. Pending the Conference's final decision on this point, the Swedish delegation proposes that the investigations undertaken by the Conference in connection with the budgetary method should be pursued on such lines as to include the application of that method to air force material. The aim of such an investigation should be a limitation of air armaments on the same lines as the limitation of land and naval armaments proposed in the report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions. In the delegation's view, this limitation should also cover every expenditure, subsidy or loan included in the budget and intended for the purchase and upkeep of civil aviation material, the parties having the option of making certain exceptions specified and justified in a special table.

Stockholm, April 6th, 1932.

ANNEX TO POINT 2 (b) ABOVE.

Article 10 (a).

The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake not to keep or maintain nor to manufacture or purchase weapons of war of the categories specified in the annexed table in greater numbers than those fixed in the said table for the various High Contracting Parties.

Existing stocks of weapons referred to in this article in excess of the number fixed in the table shall be destroyed within a period of  $x$  months after the putting into force of the present Convention.

Article 10 (b).

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to keep or maintain nor to manufacture or purchase the following war material, which shall be generally and without restriction prohibited :

(a) Guns and howitzers which are of greater calibre or weight in battery, including platform and carriage, than those specified in column (d) of the table annexed to Article 10 (a) and which are not exclusively and permanently employed (in a fixed manner, in turrets, on fixed carriages, etc.) for the defence of fortified works.

(b) Mortars and mine-throwers of every kind constructed to throw projectiles more than 50 kg. in weight.

(c) Tanks of every kind.



Existing stocks of the war materials referred to in this article shall be destroyed within a period of  $x$  months after the putting into force of the present Convention.

TABLE TO ARTICLE 10 (a).

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
High Contracting Parties	Rifles and carbines (musketoons), in thousands.	Automatic rifles and machine-guns.	Guns and howitzers of calibre not exceeding 16 cm., and weight in battery, including platform and carriage, not exceeding 4 tons.	Guns and howitzers <sup>1</sup> of calibre exceeding that specified in column (d) which are exclusively and permanently employed (in a fixed manner, in turrets, on fixed carriages, etc.) for the defence of fortified works.	Mortars, mine-throwers and other appliances constructed to throw projectiles less than 50 kg. in weight.

Series of Publications: 1932.IX.38.

Official No.: Conf. D. 111.

Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSALS OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION

(Document Conf. D.88, see page 140.)

Geneva, April 12th, 1932.

The first proposal deals with the principle by which the scale of armaments is to be determined. The principle has been stated in Article 8 of the Covenant. Paragraph 1 of the said article provides: "The maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety". Paragraph 2 of the same article provides: "The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction".

Thus it seems that the essential principles of reduction have been already laid down in the Covenant. The Chinese delegation thinks it highly desirable to have these principles supplemented and elaborated by setting up certain criteria for the determination of the armaments of each State consistent with its safety—namely:

- A. Size of the territory;
- B. Number of population;
- C. Length and nature of land frontier and coast-line;
- D. Facility of communications on land, sea and in the air;
- E. Degree of security against external aggression;
- F. National resources.

The Chinese delegation is fully conscious of the incompleteness of the proposed criteria, but the proposal is submitted with the intention to implement the spirit of the Covenant.

<sup>1</sup> Mobile pieces belonging to the armament of fortresses, etc., are to be reckoned in column (d) if they are not covered by the provisions of Article 10 (b).

Note: Arms of a pattern dating from before 1880 are not reckoned.

The second proposal of the Chinese delegation deals with moral disarmament. The last European war has brought home to everyone the horrors of war. The peace organisations throughout the world have been making strenuous efforts towards the realisation of a worldwide disarmament, which, they believe, is the only guarantee of peace. To this, Governments have generally professed sympathy and promised support, and in some cases they have even made attempts at some form of reduction. They have, however, neglected a more fundamental problem : they have failed to disarm mentally and morally. Thus we find that nations are still cultivating the growth of nationalism and fostering, at every opportunity, the warlike spirit of the people.

The Chinese delegation entirely shares the point of view of the Polish delegation as expressed in its proposals (document Conf.D.76) and also deeply appreciates the methods suggested by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation (document Conf.D.98). The Chinese delegation is glad to see that a special commission has been appointed to study the question, and hereby expresses the hope that many practical measures may be devised to hasten the realisation of moral disarmament throughout the world.

The third proposal of the Chinese delegation deals with the abolition of all aggressive and offensive arms. Since national safety has become the sole object for maintaining armaments, there can be no justification for the retention of armaments of an offensive nature. Therefore, all such armaments should be abolished forthwith, or, at least, be reduced to the minimum. The Chinese delegation is aware of the fact that the difference between the aggressive and defensive armaments is relative and not absolute. But certain arms are of specifically aggressive character, and the abolition of them will undoubtedly diminish the potentialities of aggressive wars. The importance of the qualitative limitation cannot be under-estimated. In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the Conference should insist on the abolition of capital ships, submarines, aircraft-carriers, heavy artillery, military aeroplanes of every kind, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

---

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.39.

*Official No.:* **Conf.D.112.**

Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE DANISH DELEGATION

(Document Conf. D.90, see page 141.)

---

### PROPOSAL I.

The arms referred to in suggestion I are, generally speaking, those whose use is already prohibited in certain countries under the treaties of peace, namely :

“ Tanks, heavy artillery, large-calibre trench artillery, capital ships, battle cruisers, aircraft-carriers, submarines, automatic contact mines laid in the open sea, military aircraft, chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, and incendiary bombs.”

Although it is rather the use of the arms than their actual type that determines their offensive or defensive character, there will still always be certain kinds of arms, vessels and aircraft which possess specifically offensive qualities, as compared with arms of a more defensive character ; the arms in question are certain groups of implements particularly suited for attacking a foreign country at a great distance and at great speed, or for producing extensive damage affecting the civilian population and material property.

The perfecting of offensive arms of this nature which has been brought about during the last few decades has conferred on the offensive a much greater superiority than it possessed during the preceding period, and has, in particular, increased the possibilities of rapid and unexpected attack. This evolution is not only such as to confer on all wars a more destructive character, but implies in itself a great increase in the danger of war and a continual menace of a specially serious character for all peoples who neither desire nor are able to play the part of aggressors. The suspension of this evolution of offensive arms would thus constitute a big step towards the security of nations and the establishment of a lasting peace.

As regards *land armed forces*, the world war led to the creation of various groups of new arms designed in the main to assist the attack in a foreign country.



*Tanks.* — Tanks appeared when the line of defence became too difficult to break, owing more particularly to the increase in the number of machine-guns and the extended use of barbed wire. The artillery of the attacking army experienced growing difficulty in discovering and reaching the desired objectives (*i.e.*, the machine-gun nests scattered along the enemy front). At the same time, the efficacy of automatic arms had greatly increased. Such being the case, it was felt that the best means of restoring the superiority of the attacker would be to place the arms designed to destroy the defenders' machine-guns in an armoured vehicle which would carry these offensive arms actually into the enemy's lines, at the same time breaking down his barbed-wire entanglements. Tanks, then, it is clear, originally constituted a definitely offensive weapon. A distinction should be made, however, between tanks and the lighter armoured cars armed with rifles. The latter are employed, as was intended, for reconnaissance, and are not characterised by such definitely offensive features as the heavy tanks.

The evolution of artillery is dominated by an attempt to achieve the following two objects : to increase the effect produced by the projectile, and to increase the weapon's range. The need to increase the force of projectiles is felt mainly by the attacker, since the defence tends increasingly to employ for the protection of its arms all sorts of means of cover : earthworks, armour, concrete, etc. Large-calibre artillery and long-range artillery thus constitute definitely offensive arms.

First and foremost there is the mobile heavy artillery, whose chief object is the destruction of the more strongly fortified positions of the defence ; together with tanks it forms the main instrument of an attacking army for breaking down the resistance of positions of this kind.

*Non-mobile heavy artillery* set up permanently in a fortified position cannot be regarded, generally speaking, as a specifically offensive weapon, unless so constructed as to be easily made transportable. It may, however, assume a definitely offensive character if set up near a land or sea frontier, so that it can fire on the territory of a neighbouring Power. In this case it would, of course, be expedient to fix limits. At the same time, it has to be remembered that there often exist, quite close to the frontier, towns or big undertakings the proper protection of which is of vital importance to the country, while it cannot be claimed that fortifications set up in such a place would, even if armed with heavy artillery, constitute an essential danger to the neighbouring country.

Trench artillery (mine-throwers), particularly of large calibre, is also a definitely aggressive weapon.

The peace treaties have already noted the distinction between heavy and light artillery, and also between large-calibre and lighter mine-throwers, and it will thus be quite natural to employ the same distinction in future conventions.

As regards *sea armed forces*, the peculiar qualities which confer an aggressive character on a vessel are :

Wide range of action ;  
Great speed ;  
Great power in battle.

From this standpoint the following categories should be specially considered :

- (1) Capital ships ;
- (2) Battle cruisers ;
- (3) Aircraft-carriers ;
- (4) Submarines, if such as to constitute a threat to other Powers in their territorial waters.

*Battle cruisers* exceeding certain dimensions possess the same offensive character as capital ships, in view of the strength of their armament and their wide range of action.

The offensive character of *aircraft-carriers* is self-evident : such vessels make it possible to convey aircraft to points from which, without them, the latter could not operate. The big aircraft-carriers can convey from 20 to 90 aircraft at a time ; they are armed with from 6 to 16 guns, whose calibre ranges from 10 to 20.3 cm. ; their maximum speed is from 20 to 35 knots, and they also are characterised by a powerful armament, high speed and wide range of action.

As regards submarines, those exceeding 500-600 tons are peculiarly suited to offensive warfare, owing to their great navigability, their wide (surface) range of action and their powerful armament. The nature of the living-quarters, however, hardly permits of a lengthy stay at sea on board vessels of less than about 1,000 tons.

The smaller submarines (under 600 tons) will be suitable for offensive purposes only if the distance between the territorial waters of the two countries is fairly short. They may, indeed, have a wide range of action, but their armament—especially as regards torpedoes—

is generally inconsiderable, and the lack of space for quarters for the crew makes it difficult to carry on prolonged operations without communication with the shore. The prohibition to employ such craft would thus be less important, in connection with the limitation of offensive weapons, than the prohibition of the bigger submarines.

*Mines* are in themselves a definitely defensive weapon, but their application may be offensive when they are laid near the enemy coasts or on frequented routes by mine-layers, more particularly torpedo-boats, destroyers and submarines. The laying of mines in such circumstances must be regarded as a definitely offensive act. At the same time, however, the mine is peculiarly suited for certain defensive purposes—for example, the protection of the ports and anchorages of a country. The best procedure as regards mines would be to prohibit the use of automatic contact mines in the open sea.

*Air armed forces* are all definitely offensive in character, and it is difficult to distinguish between the various classes of aircraft, most of these being capable of carrying bombs in varying degrees. The big bombing aircraft are specifically offensive. The best index of the offensive character of these armaments is, no doubt, their horse-power.

Scouting aircraft are, of course, defensive weapons, but they can always be loaded with bombs; they may thus play an offensive part, though less offensive than the regular bombers, whose special suspension gear ensures greater precision of aim, which enables them to hit limited targets, such as ships, fair-sized buildings, factories, etc. In the case, however, of fairly large objectives (towns, big industrial establishments, etc.), bomb-bearing scouts will produce the same effects as bombing aircraft.

*Chemical and bacteriological means of warfare*, employed with the help of artillery or aircraft, are all of a manifestly offensive character and specially suited for use against the civilian population. The prohibition of these offensive weapons should involve that of *incendiary bombs* and implements of a similar character.

## PROPOSAL II.

The Danish delegation proposes :

“ That a small technical commission be appointed to examine, in conjunction with the Commission for Air Navigation placed under the authority of the League of Nations, with the International Air Traffic Association, consisting of national associations grouped together for commercial purposes, and with the International League of Aviators, the possibility of internationalising civil aviation or of instituting strict international supervision over it, with the object of preventing its employment for military purposes.”

With a view to giving effect to the suggestion set forth in the French proposal and reiterated by several other delegations, including the Danish delegation, for the internationalisation of civil aviation or the institution of supervision over it, it will, no doubt, be of practical value to discuss the question at once with the representatives of the big international federations which have already set up an important international civil aviation organisation.

## PROPOSAL III.

The Danish delegation proposes :

“ That the examination of the extent to which the prohibition of the several specifically offensive arms would reduce the level of armaments and the military expenditure of countries in which such arms have assumed considerable proportions be referred to the special Commissions—Land, Naval, Air—and to the National Defence Expenditure Commission.”

The organisations particularly concerned in the work of the League of Nations—the Interparliamentary Union, the Federation of League of Nations Societies and other bodies—have put forward the idea of fixing a percentage which might be taken as a guide for the reduction of the existing level of armaments of countries not already bound in this respect.

The Danish delegation took up this idea in its suggestions of February 20th, 1932, convinced as it is that it will be necessary to agree on certain general principles if any result is to be obtained.

Failing such general principles, it will be very difficult to agree on the figures to be inserted in the draft Convention framed by the Preparatory Commission. Most of the States, if asked what figures they wish to have inserted, would probably reply : “ That depends on what figures are decided upon for the other States whose armaments concern us particularly”. And even if some of them reply without knowing the figures put forward by the others, the figures they give will in many cases probably be very high. With this method, there would thus



in reality be a risk of opening the door to competition in armaments, instead of paving the way for their reduction. The only means of obviating this danger would be to resort to private conversations between certain groups of States. Negotiations of this kind will certainly be necessary, at all events between the big Powers.

It would undoubtedly be an excellent thing to agree in advance on a common starting-point and on a principle to be taken as a general basis for the reduction of armaments.

As regards the starting-point, it is only natural to turn to the present level of armaments of the various States, that level being normally the point where all those factors converge which are characteristic of the political, geographical and economic situation of the country in question. True, there are exceptions ; there are new countries which have not yet organised their armaments in conformity with their actual requirements ; there are others which, for one reason or another, are keeping their armaments at a very different level from what has ordinarily been adopted by Powers of a similar character. In such cases, it will be natural to make adjustments, if the States in question so desire. As a general rule, however, the existing level of armaments can be taken as a starting-point. Once agreement has been reached on that basis, it would be possible to take as a general guide a certain percentage of reduction. The Interparliamentary Union and the Federation of League of Nations Societies have proposed 25 per cent, other groups 15 per cent. Those figures, needless to say, are open to discussion. In any case, however, it will not be impossible, given goodwill, to succeed, in the course of this Conference, in finding a practical basis for fixing this percentage.

A large number of delegations have proposed the prohibition of arms of a specifically offensive character. If, by accepting these proposals, it is possible to prohibit the use of such weapons, and also training and preparation with a view to their use, and if a reasonable construction is placed on the term " weapons of offence ", this will mean a substantial reduction of the level of armaments and military expenditure, at all events in the case of the big Powers, which have gone farthest in the use of those arms. This reduction would imply a result which would be different for the various big Powers, but not so different as to prevent its being used as a basis for a percentage applicable also to the other States.

It would therefore undoubtedly be useful to make an exhaustive study with a view to determining to what extent, in certain countries where these arms play an important part, their level of armaments and also the sum of their military expenditure would be reduced by the abandonment of each of the principal arms classified as specifically aggressive arms : heavy artillery ; tanks ; capital ships ; submarines, divided into two categories, below and above 600 tons ; military aviation ; chemical and bacteriological weapons.

A practical method would certainly be to institute a separate study of each category of these various weapons. The result of such researches could, of course, only yield approximate figures. Even for expenditure, it would not be possible to arrive at accurate figures, and as regards the level of armaments, of which that expenditure is the expression, one would certainly have to be content with a fairly rough estimate. That result, however, would in itself be sufficient to give some idea of the extent to which armaments will be reduced if the prohibition of the more offensive weapons, or at all events of certain of those weapons, can be brought about.

The adoption of higher age-limits for warships would also result in a reduction of military expenditure, which should be duly taken into consideration.

Obviously, even if one succeeds in establishing this proportion, which might be taken as a guide in fixing the figures to be inserted in the tables annexed to the Convention, that guide cannot be mathematically applied, for it will always be necessary, under the terms of the Covenant, to take into account the special circumstances of each country : its geographical and political situation, the duties peculiar to certain Powers and recent changes in armaments. In other words, certain adjustments will have to be allowed. Once a common basis of reduction has been established, however, it will be essential that States which desire to depart from it should specify their particular reasons for doing so. Further, the percentage reduction cannot be applied to States which are bound by the peace treaties, and whose armaments are consequently quite different in character from those of States that resemble them in other respects, whereas they would be subject, like the others, to budgetary limitation.

#### PROPOSAL IV.

The Danish delegation proposes :

" That the Permanent General Control Commission provided for in the draft Disarmament Convention should consist of representatives of all the States signing the Disarmament Convention."

The purpose of this proposal is to safeguard the juridical equality, from the standpoint of joint control of all the States whose armaments will be limited by the Convention, and to facilitate the task of the Control Commission by ensuring the presence at all times of representatives who can give it such information as it may require.

PROPOSAL V.

The Danish delegation proposes :

“ That the 1925 Convention concerning chemical and bacteriological warfare be supplemented by an undertaking entered into by the States not to engage in any preparatory manufacture or training with a view to the use of such weapons, and to prohibit all private manufacture of means of chemical and bacteriological warfare ;

“ That a technical sub-committee be set up with a view to getting into touch with national cartels for chemical and bacteriological manufacture and studying with them the possibility of organising an international cartel responsible for ensuring that such private manufacture shall not be employed for preparation for chemical or bacteriological warfare.”

PROPOSAL VI.

The Danish delegation proposes :

“ That the Conference agree to the principle of reduction by stages until the object of Article 8 has been achieved and the principle of juridical equality realised ;

“ That the first reduction of armaments be carried out within the first three years ;

“ That the preparation of the successive stages be entrusted either to the Permanent Control Commission or to some other permanent commission consisting of a representative of each signatory State, such commissions having power to appoint sub-commissions and to co-opt experts ;

“ That the interval between the successive stages of the progressive reduction be fixed at five years.”

It seems probable that the present Conference will only achieve a first step towards disarmament, and that the result of its work will in all likelihood not be such that the object laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant can be deemed to have been attained. True, there is room for discussion as to the level to which armaments should be reduced with a view to giving effect to the provisions of that Article. At the same time, other chapters of the peace treaties in which the Covenant is inserted contain provisions in which certain indications may be found relating to the object of Article 8 : the chapters in question are those which fix the limits imposed in the matter of armaments on four States which now belong to the League of Nations. That does not mean that a mathematical comparison is possible between the armaments of those States and the armaments of others. Account must always be taken, as provided in the Covenant, of the special situation of each country, and important differences, it may be added, are found in the provisions of the peace treaties relating to the four countries concerned. Further, if one attempts to compare the level of armaments in the different countries, with the object of establishing juridical equality, a number of problems admittedly arise which are difficult of solution, as for example : To what extent must account be taken of the colonies of this or that State ? How is its “ war potential ” to be calculated, independently of the level of its armaments ? How make up by a difference in armaments for the difference in the “ war potential ” of two States ? How is the special situation of a country to be equitably estimated ?

These problems will have to be settled before full effect can be given to Article 8 of the Covenant. Undoubtedly it would be of the utmost value were it possible at once to apply the principles of that Article in full, but it has to be admitted that such an integral application will be difficult of achievement until moral disarmament has made more adequate progress in every country. All that we can hope to do at present is to set up the first marks and lay down a programme for reduction by stages.

In the circumstances, it is unnecessary, then, to settle at this first Conference all the problems that will arise ; it is possible, moreover, that later they may assume a different aspect, and that it will then be easier to find solutions.

On the other hand, the States whose armaments are already limited maintain that the principle of juridical equality must be recognised, and, even if the present political situation does not permit of the immediate enforcement of that principle, they may expect that at all events the first step shall be taken, and that the main lines of a programme shall be established now with a view to its realisation at a later date.

PROPOSALS VII, VIII, IX.

As regards the problems referred to under numbers VII, VIII and IX of the Danish suggestions, the Danish delegation assumes that the French delegation, which first submitted a proposal in this connection, intends to explain and define them. It reserves the right, if necessary, to table proposals later concerning those problems.

---



Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION

(Document Conf.D.78, see page 119.)

Geneva, April 7th, 1932.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of March 17th, 1932, in which you inform me of the General Commission's decision to the effect that delegations who have made proposals should prepare and send to the Secretariat memoranda giving detailed explanations and plans for putting them into effect.

In reply, I beg to forward herewith to Your Excellency the memorandum relating to the proposal which our delegation had the honour to submit to the Conference.

I desire at the same time to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the Turkish proposal for the reduction and equalisation of forces must be considered as a whole, and that this delegation does not regard itself as in any way bound by any particular part of its scheme or the explanations relating thereto taken separately and apart from the scheme as a whole.

(Signed) Cemal HÜSNÜ.

### MEMORANDUM.

The Turkish delegation indicated in its general statement the political, economic and social reasons which led to the preparation of its scheme. The delegation thinks that the most certain and effective way of attaining total disarmament, which is the ideal to be reached by humanity, is the equalisation of the reduced forces of all States.

It further desires to state that this result can only be made completely effective by the strict observance of the principle of neutrality and peace proclaimed by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

The fixing of a common level for all immediately mobilisable forces, with their reserve effectives and material, which may, for instance, be 100,000 men—the lowest figure being naturally the most desirable—will be a matter for the Conference, and, when once this level is determined, the armies with a strength exceeding this figure will reduce the surplus by an annual reduction of  $n$  per cents so as to reach in  $x$  years the strength of  $y$  men fixed by the Conference. As regards armies with a strength below the level decided on, it goes without saying that the moment when nations have agreed to reduce their forces is not one at which such States could think of increasing them for the purpose of attaining the level fixed. Their security, which, with their existing forces, may be relative during the race for armaments, would be virtually absolute under the system of equalisation, which would have secured, around the States that have kept their effectives below the common level, a considerable reduction of forces and therewith of potential menace.

It may be well at this point to make clear the fundamental idea embodied in the Turkish scheme by saying that the proposed system of equalisation aims at a gradual diminution of all armies according to their strength, and that this system is the exact opposite of those systems which would maintain the existing situation as regards the present proportions of forces.

### METHOD OF EXECUTION.

#### *Land Armed Forces.*

States with an army the strength of which exceeds the figure  $y$  fixed by the Conference will proceed to reduce their forces, from the level given in the declaration made to the League of Nations in 1931, by means of the formula given below :

$x$  = effectives declared to the League of Nations in 1931.

$y$  = level of forces fixed by the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

$z$  = number of years over which the gradual reduction will be spread.

$n$  = percentage of annual reduction.

$$\frac{x - y}{z} = s$$

or in other words :

$$\frac{n (x - y)}{100} = s'$$

$s$  = exact reduction to be made yearly by each State.

The result of this system would be a gradual, not destructive and hardly noticeable, reduction by which, after a fixed period, all the forces of the world would be reduced to a common level.

A not less appreciable advantage of this solution would be that the offensive power of large armies would be decreased more and more each year without the defensive potentialities of the smaller armies being too greatly affected.

#### *Sea Armed Forces.*

The Turkish delegation has proposed a scheme for the complete equalisation of forces, but is nevertheless ready to admit that naval forces, which are considerable only in a very small number of States, should be equalised more slowly by providing for a first stage of equalisation in two or three parts, absolute equality being reached after a certain period. This delegation is, in fact, of opinion that naval forces, which safeguard free communication between different nations with common interests, and which, by themselves, have not the opportunities for attacking which land armies clearly have, may be reduced less rapidly and in two or three stages, as required, of 7 tons each, forces below the lowest level not being liable to reduction.

This less radical proposal is, moreover, only put forward as a compromise, for the Turkish delegation is, above all, in favour of complete equalisation of all forces.

#### *Air Forces.*

The Turkish delegation has proposed the complete abolition of air forces. If this proposal is accepted by the Conference, such aeroplanes as are capable of transformation into commercial or sporting machines should be so converted and the others destroyed ; moreover, there must be reliable guarantees that the transformation and the destruction are, in fact, carried out.

#### *Reserves.*

While each State is left entirely free to organise the recruiting and training systems of its army as it thinks fit, the Turkish delegation considers that, with a view to attaining effective equalisation and reduction, all States must accept a system of standardisation of the period of service, the annual reserves called up and the maximum numbers for officers and N.C.O.s.

In the same way, the manufacture of war materials should be unified under conditions which are stated below.

#### *Material.*

The Turkish delegation has proposed the complete abolition of tanks and heavy artillery. As the tanks and guns cannot be used for other purposes, their destruction and that of all the material connected with them must be completely carried out under the fullest guarantees.

#### *Manufacture.*

The effective reduction of forces and their equalisation can only be ensured by the internationalisation of armament manufacture. Manufacture by the State or by private firms and free or even limited sale of war material automatically lead to an increase of forces. For this reason, it would be desirable to consider the complete abolition of a large number of armament factories and a wise and safe distribution of the other centres of manufacture, in which each State would have an interest equal to the full amount of its orders, to be carried out under the effective supervision of all the other parties concerned.

#### *Chemical Arms.*

As regards chemical warfare, the Turkish delegation considers that, at the present time, the gravest anxiety felt by the various peoples at the thought of a future war relates to technical surprise. Any army that is conscious of its inability to attain its objective by the ordinary and usual means of warfare endeavours to secure weapons unknown to its adversary and capable of throwing him into confusion and thus of leading to victory by surprise.

It goes without saying that, when peoples are assured of a peaceful existence without having to provide their armies with methods more effective than those of their neighbours, and when the principle of equalisation has produced its salutary effects, there will be no further need to seek for and to use the means in question. But, even after complete prohibition of chemical warfare by international treaties, the chemical industry, restricted to its true purpose, should be internationalised in the same way as the manufacture of war material.

It would, moreover, be absolutely necessary to take the first step in the direction of prohibition by a complete destruction at the outset of all means of chemical warfare at present in existence.

---



Geneva, April 13th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION

(Document Conf.D.94, see page 143.)

1. Adoption of the draft Convention as the basis of discussion.

2. Assurances to be provided for with a view to safeguarding each contracting party from menaces caused by the armaments of one or more States not party to the treaty or by the non-observance of treaty obligations on the part of one or more of the contracting parties.

In view of the relative nature of national armaments, and in view of the present world situation in which certain countries with peculiar political, social and economic structures, or with disturbed internal conditions, are holding enormous armaments, creating the sense of uneasiness in the minds of their neighbouring peoples, it is considered necessary that measures be taken to remove fears that will be caused by the armaments of non-signatory Powers or the possible non-observance of treaty obligations on the part of some signatories, in order that the proposed General Disarmament Convention may be found acceptable to the Powers and be put into force at an early date.

For the above purpose, the following suggestions are made :

(1) To facilitate the acceptance of the Convention (*a*) by carefully fixing the number of ratifications necessary for the coming into force of the Convention, or (*b*) by stipulating that each Power should be bound by the Convention upon the completion of ratifications of certain countries to be specified by that Power.

(2) Against the non-observance of the Convention, the fullest measure of guarantee should be given to the signatories in the scope of Articles 50, 51, 52 and 54 of the draft Convention or by other appropriate means.

3. Limitation and reduction of land and air armaments to be effected in such manner as to leave room for rectification of apparent defects in elements.

Certain Powers have availed themselves of special occasions to modernise, in a remarkable manner, their land and air forces, while in others these forces are still in the making. Again, advanced civil aviation enables some countries to foster military aviation, while such is not the case with some others. In an effort to reach agreement on the limitation and reduction of armaments, it is irrational to apply a uniform criterion to various countries whose peculiar conditions of armaments require careful consideration.

4. Prohibition of air bombardment of cities and towns and other methods of attack on civil populations.

Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising or injuring the civilian population, of destroying or damaging cities, towns and non-military establishments, should be prohibited, while a specific agreement should be reached concerning the objectives, outside the field of the operations of land forces, at which aerial bombardment may be directed in the unavoidable cases of military necessity.

5. Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

6. Reduction in the unit size of the capital ships and the calibre of their guns.

The maximum displacement of capital ships shall be reduced to 25,000 tons (25,400 metric tons), and the maximum calibre of their guns to 14 inches (355 mm.).

7. Reduction in the allotted tonnage of aircraft-carriers.

8. Prohibition of the fitting of aircraft-landing platforms or decks on naval vessels other than aircraft-carriers.

9. Total abolition of aircraft-carriers, provided that agreement is reached on the prohibition indicated in paragraph 8.

10. Limitation of arms and aircraft equipment on merchant vessels.

Provisions shall be incorporated in Article 19 of the draft Convention so as to prohibit :

(1) Fitting, on merchant vessels, of equipment for receiving aircraft on board from the air ;

(2) Mounting, on merchant vessels, of more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line ; or two, one on each broadside ;

(3) Design or adoption of merchant vessels for operating at sea more than three aircraft, if they are fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air.

Official No.: **Conf. D. 116.**

Geneva, April 15th, 1932.

## PROPOSALS OF THE AFGHAN DELEGATION

---

1. Abolition of every kind of heavy artillery, according to the definition of the Italian delegation.
2. Abolition of tanks and armoured cars.
3. Abolition of all bombing machines and prohibition of dropping bombs and any other objects and materials which may be used in achieving a military purpose, from aircraft, as well as all preparations to that effect without even a single exception.
4. Abolition of chemical and bacteriological weapons of every kind.
5. Construction and maintenance of the fortifications and all the means which are generally adopted near the frontier limits and give superiority to attack over defence should be forbidden.
6. With regard to limitation of forces, the equalisation as proposed by the Turkish Delegation, seems to us preferable.
7. Indirect limitation of arms by budgetary system does not appear to be applicable to non-producing countries, as such countries have to bear a heavy expenditure to meet their defensive requirements, maintain the reserve stocks and, especially in the event of an aggression, encourage their local manufacture. This difficulty is more noticeable in the case of the countries which, being situated in a distinctly disadvantageous position owing to absence of maritime conveyances and lack of a sea-harbour, are reduced to the necessity of importing their arms and ammunitions through the territories of other Powers.
8. For adoption of effectual measures for the adequate protection of the civil population, the revision of the existing laws of war is desirable.

---

Official No.: **Conf. D. 117.**

Geneva, April 25th, 1932.

## MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

---

In view of the resolution adopted by the General Commission at its meeting on April 20th to the effect that armaments must be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety, taking into account the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, the Soviet delegation proposes to take into account, *inter alia*, the following considerations :

### I.

1. Size of the territory.
2. Length of the land and sea frontiers.
3. Density of the population and equality of its distribution by regions.
4. Relation of the railway system to the size of the territory ; distribution of railways by regions.
5. Extent and condition of the road communications.



II.

1. Particulars of the railway system near the frontiers.
2. Communications between the different maritime docks adjoining the coasts ; distance between each.
3. Number of seaports and comparative facility of blockading the maritime outlets.

III.

1. Military alliances or conventions between the country concerned and other States.
2. Military alliances or conventions between neighbouring States or between the latter and third States.
3. State of political relations with other countries—in particular whether normal relations exist with the latter.
4. State of security since the end of the world war—namely, has the country concerned been invaded by foreign armed forces during that period for the purpose of (a) interfering in its internal affairs, organising or supporting a civil war ; (b) taking from it a part of its territory ; (c) for any other purpose.
5. The existence of neighbouring States which have violated international obligations designed to safeguard peace, have engaged in hostilities without declaring war, have sent land, sea or air armed forces to the foreign territory on the pretext of defending their citizens or their interests, and which consequently do not afford sufficient guarantees for the observance of the proposed convention for the reduction of armaments.

---

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.44.

*Official No.:* **Conf.D. 118.**

[Conf.D./C.G.18.]

[Conf.D./Bureau 9(1).]

Geneva, April 18th, 1932.

## CO-ORDINATION OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION AND OF THE PROPOSITIONS REFERRED TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON THE RESUMPTION OF ITS WORK

---

### REPORT OF THE BUREAU ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 18TH, 1932.

---

Rapporteur : M. BENEŠ.

In accordance with the proposal put forward on March 16th by the President of the General Commission and adopted by the latter, the President sent a circular letter to those delegations which had formulated proposals during the general discussion asking them to send to the Secretariat memoranda containing detailed explanations of those proposals and plans for their execution.

A large number of delegations responded to the President's request. Others have put forward, since we resumed our sittings, proposals, suggestions, resolutions of draft amendments related to the theses advanced by them during the general discussion.

When concluding the general discussion on Article I, the President proposed that the General Commission should instruct its Bureau to analyse and co-ordinate the various proposals and recommendations submitted in the above-mentioned memoranda and in the speeches delivered since last Monday, in order to adapt them to the synoptic table which had already been adopted by the General Commission (document Conf.D.102).

It is hardly necessary to say that the task entrusted to us is limited to this adaptation, and in no way involves changing an order which was established after prolonged consultation and was definitely adopted by the General Commission at its meeting on March 8th last. Accordingly the new proposals must *in principle* fall within the framework of the scheme which you have decided to regard as your agenda, so that there shall be no need to alter this arrangement.

The General Commission also decided that the suggestions made by its Bureau should be submitted to the Bureau of the Conference to be examined and referred to the Commission—doubtless after such amendments as the Bureau might think desirable had been introduced.

I have accordingly made an examination and analysis of : (1) the memoranda, (2) the draft resolutions and texts submitted during the general discussion on Article I, (3) the other suggestions put forward during the discussion, on which no formal proposals have been made. It is the result of this work that I lay before you hereunder.

## I. MEMORANDA PRESENTED BY CERTAIN DELEGATIONS.

### *Memorandum by the Afghan Delegation* (document Conf.D.116).

The Afghan delegation has submitted a memorandum containing eight points :

Point 1 relates to the abolition of every kind of heavy artillery. <sup>1</sup>

Point 2 relates to the abolition of tanks and armoured cars. <sup>1</sup>

Point 3 relates to the abolition of bombing machines and prohibition of dropping bombs. <sup>1</sup>

Point 4 relates to the abolition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. <sup>1</sup>

Point 5 relates to the abolition of certain fortifications. <sup>1</sup>

Point 6 relates to the equalisation of armed forces. <sup>1</sup>

Point 7 relates to the limitation of material by budgetary methods. <sup>2</sup>

Point 8 relates to the protection of the civil population. <sup>1</sup>

All these proposals relate to points already appearing in document Conf.D.102 and no new principle is involved.

### *Memorandum by the Argentine Delegation* (document Conf.D.107).

The Argentine delegation has submitted an amendment to its original proposal (document Conf.D.99, page 142) concerning capital ships, mentioned in point 5 on page 162 of document Conf.D.102. The purpose of this amendment is to co-ordinate different proposals of the same kind submitted by other delegations. <sup>3</sup>

No new principle is involved and no change is necessary in this connection in the General Commission's agenda.

### *Memorandum by the Chinese Delegation* (document Conf.D.111).

The memorandum gives the reasons for the Chinese delegation's proposals regarding the criteria of limitation already figuring in III(a), page 150, and in 3(b), page 151 of document Conf.D.102. <sup>4</sup>

It then deals with the abolition of aggressive arms. <sup>5</sup>

No new principle is involved and no change is necessary in the General Commission's agenda.

### *Memorandum by the Danish Delegation* (document Conf.D.112).

The memorandum contains six proposals.

(1) The first deals with the abolition of aggressive arms. The memorandum is supplemented on this point by a draft resolution (document Conf.D./C.G.16 (1)) which stipulates that the proposed abolition must be supplemented by a prohibition of the manufacture and preparation of the said arms and of training in their use. The principle of the prohibition of these arms, which figures in III(a) of the General Commission's agenda, seems to imply that of the prohibition of manufacture and preparation. On the other hand, prohibition of training in their use is a new complementary idea, which already figures in point 2, page 158 of document Conf.D.102, the principle of which can also be discussed under point III of the Agenda.

<sup>1</sup> Add to document Conf.D.102 the name of Afghanistan and a reference to document Conf.D.116, at the following places :

Page 149 under point I (a) ; page 159 under points 1, 7, 8, and 10 ; page 164 under point 6 ; page 165 under point 8 ; page 170 under point 4 ; page 171 under point 1.

<sup>2</sup> Insert the proposal in document Conf.D.102 on page 168 between points 1 and 2.

<sup>3</sup> The new Argentine proposal will have to be inserted between points 5 and 6 on page 160 of the co-ordinating table (document Conf.D.102). That figuring in point 5, page 162, should be deleted.

<sup>4</sup> Reference to document Conf.D.111 should be made under these points in document Conf.D.102.

<sup>5</sup> Add the name of China to Chapter C, 3, page 164, and Part V, point 4, page 170 of document Conf.D.102.



The memorandum enumerates the arms covered by the proposal and states the reasons for including them in the list.<sup>1</sup>

(2) Proposal II relates to the procedure to be employed in studying the internationalisation or control of civil aviation proposed by the Danish delegation and figuring in Article 28, point 3, page 167, of document Conf.D.102.<sup>2</sup> No new principle is raised. Nevertheless, the General Commission might refer this proposal immediately to the Air Commission, since it affects the latter's procedure and hence might be discussed by it.

(3) Proposal III is that the Special Commission should be asked to study the reductions in the level of armaments and expenditure resulting from the abolition of aggressive arms, with a view to applying the method of proportional reduction recommended by the Danish delegation and figuring under II (c), page 149 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>3</sup>

The principle of the method of reduction does not appear to be essentially affected. It will be for the General Commission to decide when it discusses this principle whether, before taking a decision, it desires to ask the Special Commissions to make the study suggested by the Danish delegation.

(4) Proposal IV reiterates, with reasons in support, the Danish proposal relating to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, which figures under Article 40, point 1, page 172 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>3</sup>

No new principle is involved in this proposal.

(5) Proposal V amplifies the Danish proposals figuring in Chapter V, Chemical Arms, points 3 and 5, page 170 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>3</sup> It is proposed in particular to set up a technical sub-committee to get into touch with the national cartels of chemical products.

No new principle is raised. The General Commission will have to decide, however, on the urgency of the proposal, which involves the setting up of a new body and consultations with bodies extraneous to the Conference. It should be noted that the General Commission has already considered the setting up of a special commission. This body, if set up, might study this Danish proposal.

(6) Proposal VI amplifies the same proposal relating to the preparation of the successive stages of disarmament which figures under II(c), page 149 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>3</sup> The principle of this proposal is on the General Commission's agenda under No. I(c) of document Conf.D.103.

No new principle is raised by this proposal.

#### *Memorandum by the French Delegation* (document Conf.D.115).

The memorandum is a study on the internationalisation of civil air transport, a question which figures under Article 28, point 1, page 166 of document Conf.D.102,<sup>4</sup> and the principle of which figures in the agenda of the General Commission under No. B.5(d) of document Conf.D.103.

The study has been submitted as a basis for discussion to the Air Commission and does not raise any fresh question of principle for the General Commission.

#### *Memorandum by the Italian Delegation* (document Conf.D.106.)

The memorandum amplifies the proposal of the Italian delegation with reference to the prohibition of aggressive war materials, which proposal figures under No. IV(a), page 150 of document Conf.D.102,<sup>5</sup> and the principle of which figures in the agenda of the General Commission under No. III(a) of document Conf.D.103.

The memorandum defines the arms covered by the proposal and the practical procedure for application.<sup>6</sup>

No fresh principle is raised by the concrete proposals themselves. At the same time § IV of the memorandum contains a suggestion which constitutes a principle supplementary to that of qualitative limitation and which might be discussed together with Point III(a) of document Conf.D.103. The additional suggestion is that States should establish a contractual undertaking not to employ the authorised means of warfare for purposes connected with means of warfare which have been abolished.

<sup>1</sup> Add the name of Denmark after the names of the countries having asked for the abolition of each of the said arms—i.e., to points 2, 6 and 7, page 159; Article 14, point 1, and Article 15, point 1, page 162; Article 16, point 1, page 163; point 23, page 162; Chapter C, points 1 to 3, page 164; and points 3, 8 and 12 page 171 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>2</sup> Reference to document Conf.D.112 should be made under this point in Document Conf.D.102.

<sup>3</sup> Reference to document Conf.D.112 should be made under this point of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>4</sup> Reference should be made under this point of document Conf.D.102 to document Conf.D.115.

<sup>5</sup> Reference should be made under this point of document Conf.D.102 to document Conf.D.106.

<sup>6</sup> Add the name of Italy in Chapter A, point 8, page 159 (document Conf.D.102), concerning the prohibition of armoured motor-cars and also in Article 28, point 4, page 167, concerning the control of civil aviation.

*Memorandum by the Japanese Delegation* (document Conf.D.114).

The memorandum submitted by the Japanese delegation consists of ten points.

Point 1 reads as follows: "Adoption of the draft Convention as a basis for discussion . . ." Failing other indications, it would appear that the Japanese delegation simply wished to repeat what it had said during the general discussion—namely, that its attitude would be to take the draft Convention as a basis. That would not be a concrete proposal which would have the preliminary effect of setting aside all other draft proposals. Such being the case, no question of principle would be raised by point 1.

Point 2 amplifies the reasons and means of applying the proposal which relates to the situation of States parties to the Convention in relation to States not parties to that Convention and States which might violate their obligations. This proposal figures in Part VI, point 1, page 172 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup>

Point 3 defines the proposal which relates to the taking into consideration of the particular conditions of the different countries. This proposal figures under Point III(b), page 150 of document Conf.D.102<sup>1</sup> and the principle appears on the agenda of the General Commission under point A.II (b).

Point 4 concerns the prohibition of bombardment from the air of civil populations which figures under point 10, page 171 of document Conf.D.102<sup>1</sup> and rules for bombing behind the front of the combatant troops.<sup>2</sup>

Point 5 concerns the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Point 6 relates to the reduction of the tonnage and the calibre of artillery of capital ships.

Point 7 deals with the reduction of the tonnage of aircraft-carriers.

Point 8 relates to the prohibition of the fitting of aircraft landing platforms or decks on vessels of war.

Point 9 concerns the conditional abolition of aircraft-carriers.

Lastly, point 10 refers to the limitation of arms and aircraft equipment on merchant vessels.

Points 5-10 are already included in document Conf.D.102 under Nos. 8, page 170 ; 3, page 162 ; 3, page 163 ; 4, page 163 ; Article 15, point 2, page 162 ; Article 19, point 1, page 163.<sup>3</sup>

No new principle is raised by points 2-10 inclusive.

*Memorandum by the Netherlands Delegation* (document Conf.D.108).

The memorandum contains detailed explanations of five proposals submitted by the Netherlands delegation.

(1) The first point relates to a proposal for the limitation and reduction of the armed forces immediately mobilisable—a proposal which comes under point VII on page 153 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>4</sup> The principle of this proposal appears on the General Commission's agenda under point A, VI of document Conf.D.103. The memorandum proposes three articles for the application of this idea to the limitation of personnel—the principle of which is included under points 4 and 6 on page 154 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>5</sup>

(2) Point 2 develops the proposal relating to the limitation of land material which figures in point 12 on page 159 of document Conf.D.102,<sup>5</sup> and the principle of which is included on the General Commission's agenda under point B.3(d) of document Conf.D.103. The memorandum proposes the text of an article to give effect to this proposal.

(3) Point 3 develops the proposal concerning the use of automatic contact mines in the open sea, which figures in Nos. 23, page 162, and 6, page 171 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>5</sup>

(4) Point 4 concerns the proposal for the abolition of air bombing which figures in points 6 on page 164, and 10 on page 171 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>5</sup>

(5) Point 5 concerns the proposal for the publicity of armaments which figures in point 1 on page 169 of document Conf.D.102,<sup>5</sup> and contains a draft article providing for publicity relating to the stocks of certain land, naval and air material.<sup>6</sup>

No new principle is raised by the memorandum.

*Memorandum by the Swedish Delegation* (document Conf.D.110).

The Swedish delegation's memorandum deals with four points of the previous Swedish proposals.

<sup>1</sup> Reference to document Conf.D.114 should be made under this point of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>2</sup> The second proposal should be inserted between points 11 and 12 on page 171 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>3</sup> Under each of the headings given in document Conf.D.102 a reference to (document Conf.D.114) should be inserted.

<sup>4</sup> Reference to document Conf.D.108 should be made under this point of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>5</sup> Reference to document Conf.D.108 should be inserted under these points of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>6</sup> Reference to this article should be inserted opposite Article 33 on page 169 of document Conf.D.102.



(1) The first point relates to the proposal for the limitation of trained reserves to be found in Part I, point 3, page 154 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup> The principle of this proposal is on the General Commission's agenda under B.1(c) of document Conf.D.103. For its application the memorandum first proposes the limitation of the annual contingent. This question already figures under point 6, on page 154 of document Conf.D.102<sup>1</sup> and on the General Commission's agenda under point B.1(d). It is also proposed to reduce the period of service for a certain part of the contingent.<sup>2</sup>

This latter proposal does not appear to raise any new principle to be placed on the General Commission's agenda.

(2) The second point deals with the proposal to combine quantitative and budgetary limitation to be found in Article 10, point 1, on page 160 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup> The principle of this proposal is on the General Commission's agenda under point B.3(e) of document Conf.D.103. The memorandum proposes the text of an article to this effect.

(3) The third point deals with the proposal to abolish heavy artillery, mortars and trench mortars and tanks, which figures under points 2, 6 and 7 on page 159 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup> The principle of this proposal is on the General Commission's agenda under points A.III(a) and B.3(a). A draft article is included in the memorandum.

(4) The fourth point concerns the proposal relating to budgetary limitation to be found in point 7 on page 168 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup> The memorandum proposes that this method should be applied to the limitation of military air material and of the subsidies granted for the purchase and maintenance of civil aviation material.<sup>3</sup>

None of these four points raises any new question of principle.

#### *Memorandum by the Turkish Delegation* (document Conf.D.113).

The Turkish delegation's memorandum relates to the proposal specified in point I(as) on page 149 of document Conf.D.102,<sup>4</sup> of which it constitutes an explanation, and, on point of detail, an amendment. The principle embodied in it, which is to be found in the General Commission's agenda under A.I(a) of document Conf.D.103 is not appreciably modified by the amendments.<sup>5</sup>

(1) As regards personnel, the memorandum proposes the fixing for all countries of an equal maximum for the annual contingent, the number of officers and non-commissioned officers, and the length of service.<sup>6</sup> This proposal would not, however, appear to raise any other question of principle than that of the equalisation of armaments upon which the whole scheme is based.

(2) The memorandum lays emphasis on the proposal for the abolition of heavy artillery and tanks, which is already to be found in points 4 and 7 on page 159 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>4</sup> It also recommends the abolition of military aviation.<sup>7</sup>

(3) The memorandum contains a proposal which raises a new principle, that of the internationalisation of armament factories.<sup>8</sup> It might be discussed by the General Commission under the item on its agenda concerning the trade in and manufacture of arms: point B.6 of document Conf.D.103.

(4) As regards chemical warfare, the memorandum proposes to destroy all appliances of chemical warfare and to internationalise the chemical industry. The first proposal is already contained in No. 4 on page 170 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>4</sup> The second raises a new principle which might be inserted in the agenda of the General Commission under Point B.8 of document Conf.D.103.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Insert under this point of document Conf.D.102 a reference to document Conf.D.110.

<sup>2</sup> This proposal should be inserted in Chapter B, page 158 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>3</sup> These proposals should be inserted between points 10 and 11 on page 169, and also as regards civil aviation at the end of point 8 on page 167 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>4</sup> A reference should be inserted after this point of document Conf.D.102 to document Conf.D.113.

<sup>5</sup> In consequence of the amendments made on points of detail, the wording of the texts relating to the proposal should be modified, in particular on page 149, point 1 (a); on page 155, Articles 2 and 3, point 2; and on page 160, point (b) of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>6</sup> These various points should be inserted as follows: the first between points 6 and 7 on page 154; the second between points 2 and 3 on page 155 and the third in Chapter B on page 158 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>7</sup> Turkey should be added to the list of States in point 3 on page 164 of document Conf.D.102, and a reference inserted to document Conf.D.113.

<sup>8</sup> This point should be inserted between points 2 and 3, Trade in and Manufacture of Arms, page 167 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>9</sup> Insert this proposal between points 4 and 5, page 170 of document Conf.D.102.

## II. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND TEXTS SUBMITTED.

### (I) *Draft Resolution of the Delegation of the United States of America* (document Conf.D./C.G.12).

The delegation of the United States of America has submitted a draft resolution which is primarily designed to prohibit certain land material, the details of its application to be studied by the Land Commission. The principle embodied in the proposal is already contained in the General Commission's Agenda under A.III(a) of document Conf.D.103. It has already been arranged to refer the question to the Land Commission as soon as the General Commission has decided the question of principle.<sup>1</sup>

As the general discussion related to the principle of the proposal, it may be thought that the details could be discussed under A.III of the Commission's Agenda (document Conf.D.103).

In the second place, the American delegation proposes that States should undertake not to make use of prohibited material in the event of war. The Political Commission might be entrusted with the duty of drawing up stipulations to this effect.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of prohibiting the use of certain material in time of war raises a new question of principle relating both to that of qualitative limitation and to that of the prohibition of other methods of warfare: aerial bombing, chemical warfare, etc. This principle, which is also related to the proposal of the Italian delegation that an engagement should be entered into not to employ authorised means of war for purposes proper to prohibited means of war, might, like the latter, be discussed under point A.III of the General Commission's agenda (document Conf.D.103) before being included, if necessary, in the agenda of the Political Commission.

### *Draft Article 1 of the Turkish Delegation* (document Conf.D./C.G.13).

The Turkish delegation has submitted a draft article which lays down in principle the method of reduction recommended by it, to be found under I (a) on page 149 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>3</sup> This proposal does not raise any new principle.

### *Draft Article 1 of the Soviet Delegation* (document Conf.D./C.G.11).

Similarly, the Soviet delegation has submitted a draft Article 1 which lays down in principle the method of reduction, recommended by it, to be found under No. I(b) on page 149 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>4</sup>

This proposal does not raise any new principle.

### *Draft Article 1 of the German Delegation* (document Conf.D./C.G.17).

The German delegation has submitted a draft Article 1 in which the High Contracting Parties agree to reduce and limit their respective armaments as laid down in the Convention. In the light of the explanations given by M. Nadolny in his speech on April 11th, this proposal does not appear to raise any different principle from that which figures in the German proposal under point I(c) on page 149 of document Conf.D.102<sup>5</sup> and under point A.I(b) of the General Commission's agenda, document Conf.D.103.

### *Draft Resolution of the Persian Delegation* (document Conf.D./C.G.14).

The Persian delegation has submitted a draft resolution concerning the internationalisation of all factories for the manufacture of arms and ammunition and war material. This proposal should be discussed together with that of the Turkish delegation under point B.6 of the agenda of the General Commission.<sup>6</sup>

The Persian delegation asks that the Land, Naval and Air Commissions should examine the methods for carrying out such internationalisation and should submit to the General Commission a practical proposal which shall pay due regard to the legitimate interests of the producing and non-producing countries. The General Commission will decide, when it discusses the principle of the matter, the action to be taken with regard to this proposal.

<sup>1</sup> The United States should be added to points 4 and 7 on page 159, and point 8 on page 170 of document Conf.D.102. Point 9 on page 170 should be deleted.

<sup>2</sup> This proposal should be inserted between points 4 and 5 on page 150 of document Conf.D.102.

<sup>3</sup> Add under this point a reference to document Conf.D./C.G.13.

<sup>4</sup> Add under this point of document Conf.D.102 a reference to document Conf.D./C.G.11.

<sup>5</sup> Insert under this point of document Conf.D.102, a reference to document Conf.D./C.G.17.

<sup>6</sup> Insert this proposal between points 2 and 3 of the chapter: "Trade in Arms", page 167 of document Conf.D.102.



*Draft Resolution of the Yugoslav Delegation* (document Conf.D./C.G.15).

The Yugoslav delegation submits three proposals :

Point I deals with the abolition of certain naval material. This proposal is already to be found in Chapter B, point 1 on page 160 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup> The general principle figures in the agenda of the General Commission under A.III(a) and under B.4(a) of document Conf.D.103. This point does not raise any new principle.

Point II deals with the limitation to present figures of heavy artillery and tanks, with a provision for placing them at the disposal of the League of Nations.<sup>2</sup> The principle involved might be included under A.III or under No. B.2 (b) of the General Commission's agenda (document Conf.D.103).

Lastly, point III relates to the prohibition of aerial bombing and chemical warfare and to the organisation of sanctions in the event of the violation of these prohibitions. This proposal figures, as regards chemical warfare, under point 6, page 170 (document Conf.D.102).<sup>1</sup> The principles of the prohibition of the use of chemical arms and of sanctions are to be found in the General Commission's agenda under B.8(a) and (c). As regards aerial bombing, this prohibition figures under point 6 on page 164 of document Conf.D.102.<sup>1</sup> However, this principle and the principle of sanctions in the event of the violation of this prohibition do not figure explicitly on the General Commission's agenda. They might be discussed with the similar provisions relating to chemical warfare.

*Draft Resolution of the Danish Delegation* (document Conf.D./C.G.16).

This draft resolution has already been examined in conjunction with the Danish Delegation's memorandum.

III. SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD DURING THE GENERAL DISCUSSION ON ARTICLE I.

*Speech by the Delegate of Spain.*

The delegate of Spain proposes to divide armaments into four categories :

Category 1 : Arms which would be entirely abolished.

Category 2 : Arms which would be exclusively at the disposal of the League of Nations.

Category 3 : Arms which the States would be allowed to retain on condition that the League might requisition them at any time.

Category 4 : Arms the full ownership of which would remain with States.

This proposal represents the combined application of the principles of qualitative limitation, the prohibition of certain material except under certain conditions and lastly the creation of an international force, principles which will be found respectively under Points A.III(a), III(b) and IV(b) of the agenda of the General Commission (document Conf.D.103). It might accordingly be discussed when the various points which it embodies are under consideration, without its being necessary to formulate a fresh principle.

The delegate of Spain proposes also that the Permanent Disarmament Commission be requested to examine the military programme of States Members of the League and of States signatories to the Paris Pact as regards the quantity and quality of the armaments. This proposal seems to link up with the Norwegian proposal to be found in point II(a) page 149 of document Conf.D.102. It does not appear to raise any new principle. Its object is to define the powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Finally, there is another question to which I desire to draw attention.

Before the Easter recess, the General Commission received a letter (document Conf.D./C.G.9) from the President of the Naval Commission, from which it appeared that the Naval Commission was referring back to the General Commission points 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 of its agenda, together with the proposals of the Argentine and Netherlands delegations. This request is in accordance with the procedure which we have adopted.

In support of the Naval Commission's request, M. Colban asked the General Commission on March 16th to remember, when it drew up its own agenda after Easter, that it would be desirable to deal as soon as possible with those questions which would facilitate the progress of the Naval Commission's work. In reply, our President assured M. Colban that, when it resumed its meetings, the General Commission would examine as soon as possible the report on the state of the Naval Commission's work.

As the General Commission has referred to the Bureau the new proposals which have been submitted, the occasion would seem to be suitable for considering also the action to be taken with regard to the Naval Commission's request.

<sup>1</sup> Reference should be made under this point of document Conf.D.102 to document Conf.D./C.G.15.

<sup>2</sup> This proposal should be inserted between points 3 and 4, page 158 of document Conf.D.102.

M. Colban has informed me that the Bureau of the Naval Commission is asking the General Commission to examine in addition point 19 of its agenda because this point, which deals with definitions of the categories of ships, is certainly connected with the questions concerning capital ships, aircraft-carriers and submarines, which figure among those sent back to us.

The Bureau may recommend the General Commission either to discuss first of all the points referred back by the Naval Commission or to consider these points at the moment when questions related to those submitted by M. Colban are dealt with, in their due order, by the General Commission.

I myself am rather in favour of the second solution and I would suggest that the Bureau should recommend the General Commission to incorporate in its agenda (document Conf.D.103) the questions sent back by the Naval Commission in the following manner :

1. At the end of the questions relating to Article 1, the following point should be added : " X. Restriction of the use of automatic contact mines." In connection with this point, the General Commission would examine the Netherlands proposal concerning the prohibition of the laying of automatic contact mines on the high seas ;
2. Point B.4 of the agenda is headed, " Chapter B, Naval Material ". With regard to this chapter, the General Commission would discuss points 4 and 12 of the Naval Commission's agenda. Point 4 is headed, " General Proposals of a Technical Character ", but many proposals which raise questions of principle are related to it ; point 12 deals with merchant vessels ;
3. All questions relating to points 7, 8, 9 and 19 of the Naval Commission's agenda, which deal with capital ships, aircraft-carriers, submarines and definitions would be considered in connection with point B.4(a) : " Prohibition of certain Material " in Chapter B.
4. As regards points 5 and 6 of the Naval Commission's agenda relating to the distribution of tonnage by categories and the transfer of tonnage between the various categories, the following sub-heading would be added to point B.4 : " (e) Distribution of Tonnage by Categories. — Transfer."

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.46.

*Official No.:* **Conf. D.120.**  
[Conf.D./A.C.B.16(1).]

Geneva, May 31st, 1932.

## CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS : SPECIAL COMMITTEE

### REPORT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION

*provided for under that Commission's Resolution of April 22nd and its Decision of  
May 10th, 1932.*

*Rapporteur:* M. RUTGERS (Netherlands).

1. The General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments adopted the two following resolutions at its meeting on April 22nd, 1932 :

" Without prejudice to other proposals which fall to be discussed under later heads of the agenda, the Conference declares its approval of the principle of qualitative disarmament—*i.e.*, the selection of certain classes or descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalised by means of a general Convention."

" In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution, the Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent Special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians."



As the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons and methods of warfare is one which is common to land, sea and air armaments, and does not belong specifically to any one of them, the General Commission, on May 10th, set up a Special Committee for the purpose of enquiring into the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the light of the second resolution regarding qualitative disarmament quoted above. The General Commission decided that this Committee should be composed of representatives of the following fourteen States : Australia, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States.<sup>1</sup>

The Committee held seven meetings from May 18th to May 31st, 1932. It appointed M. Pilotti Chairman and M. Rutgers Rapporteur. Separate study was given to the questions of chemical weapons and methods of warfare, bacteriological weapons, and in addition incendiary projectiles and flame-projectors.

The Committee finally adopted the resolutions which are to be found at the end of the present report.

## I. CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND METHODS OF WAR.

2. The Committee gave consideration to the question of the special character of substances embraced by what may be described as the general idea of chemical warfare. These substances only become means of warfare through the use which is made of them in war. This marks a distinction between chemical means of warfare and ordinary weapons.

The same remark applies to a certain extent at least to the appliances and devices utilised for the employment of chemical substances in war. There are some appliances and devices that may be used equally well for chemical warfare and for peaceful purposes. Other appliances and devices may be used both for chemical warfare and for other war processes. A small number of appliances and devices are employed specifically for carrying on chemical warfare.

3. In order to carry out its instructions, the Committee had to consider whether chemical weapons and methods of warfare came under the three criteria laid down in the resolution of the General Commission on April 22nd, 1932, namely :

- (1) Whether they are the most specifically offensive in character ;
- (2) Whether they are the most efficacious against national defence ;
- (3) Whether they are the most threatening to civilians.

The Committee agreed unanimously that chemical weapons and methods of warfare undoubtedly answered to the third of these criteria. The characteristic of gas employed in chemical warfare is that when once it has been released it is no longer under the control of those employing it. It may reach civilians a considerable distance away from the spot where it was released. This character was brought out particularly clearly in a proposal made by the Spanish delegation.

As regards the two other criteria, there was some difference of opinion in the Committee. The majority of the members agreed that they applied to chemical weapons and methods of warfare. Other members, however, considered that these weapons and methods might be equally effective offensively and defensively, and both for and against national defence. The Committee did not feel that there was any point in discussing this question, since the general agreement that the third criterion was applicable was sufficient to justify an affirmative reply to the question asked by the General Commission.

4. The Committee endeavoured to specify what should be included in the general definition of chemical weapons and methods of warfare :

(a) As regards substances, it included all harmful substances, whether natural or synthetic, whatever their state, whether solid, liquid or gaseous ; poisons such as curare or snake-poison are thus included in the definition.

(b) The Committee was unwilling to undertake an enumeration of the various categories of substances according to their chemical composition. It was essential to draw up a definition which should apply to all substances, both those at present known and those which might be discovered subsequently. The Committee therefore adopted as its criterion the physiological effects of the substances on living creatures. All substances having a harmful effect were included in the definition.

No account was taken of the degree of harmfulness of these substances. It was thought that if certain gases less pronouncedly harmful in their effects were excluded from the field

<sup>1</sup> These States were represented by : Mr. SHEDDEN (Australia) ; M. J. C. DE MACEDO SOARES, Col. E. LEITAO DE CARVALHO, Commander A. DE VASCONCELLOS (Brazil) ; Captain C. M. BLACKMAN, Brigadier-General A. C. TEMPERLEY, Colonel A. G. C. DAWNAY, Group Captain T. L. LEIGH-MALLORY, Mr. DAVIDSON PRATT (United Kingdom) ; M. PURSCHEL, M. Jesper SIMONSEN (Denmark) ; Professor André MAYER, Captain VAUTRIN (France) ; Dr. GÖPPERT, Dr. UNGEWITTER, Major REINECKE (Germany) ; General DE MARINIS, M. PILOTTI, Professor G. A. DI NOLA, Major RIGHI, Captain RAPICAVOLI (Italy) ; Rear-Admiral W. KOMAKI, M. J. ENOMOTO, M. Jiro SOGAWA, Surgeon-Commander K. KOBAYASHI, M. T. SAKAMOTO, Major Y. HARADA (Japan) ; Professor V. H. RUTGERS, General C. VAN TUINEN, Colonel Baron J. J. G. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST, Captain V. E. WILMAR (Netherlands) ; M. Titus KOMARNICKI, Captain A. PONCET DE SANDON (Poland) ; General J. G. BENÍTEZ (Spain) ; M. HAEBERLIN, M. C. GORGÉ (Switzerland) ; M. Simon VENTZOFF, M. Vladimir EGORIEFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) ; Brigadier-General George S. SIMONDS, Major B. ORD (United States).



of qualitative disarmament, the practical value of the system would be considerably weakened. There would be practical difficulties in ascertaining the nature of the substances employed, and the use of these substances might lead in good faith to an unfounded allegation that a prohibition had not been observed.

Furthermore, a distinction between the various gases on the basis of their relative harmful effects would be a very long and difficult task, and would need to be kept constantly up to date.

While admitting the validity of these reasons against permitting the use of certain gases in international warfare to the exclusion of others, one delegation desired to point out that lachrymatory gases, considered separately, did not in fact answer to the third criterion of the resolution of April 22nd, 1932; that the use of these gases for police purposes could not be open to any objection; and that in some circumstances such a use of these gases would even be preferable to other methods which involved bloodshed. This point of view was accepted by the Committee, although it was still of opinion that lachrymatory gases should not be considered separately from the point of view of their use in warfare, since there were serious practical objections to any discrimination between gases.

The Soviet delegation was of opinion that mention of lachrymatory gases for police purposes lay outside the terms of reference of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

5. The Committee was of opinion that the prohibition should extend, not merely to substances harmful to human beings, but should include those harmful to animals, being of the opinion that the use of such chemical substances in general should be prohibited. No special reference was made to vegetables, because it was felt that in practice it would not be possible to employ, for the purpose of damaging vegetables, substances which were not also harmful to human beings or animals, or which were not likely to make the vegetables harmful to them.

The Committee considered that chemical substances in whatever way employed should be included in qualitative disarmament, and therefore adopted a general formula intended to cover all possible methods of use.

6. It is clear that qualitative disarmament only applies to the use of chemical substances if such use is designed to injure an enemy. They are not necessarily used during a military action properly so called; for example, the poisoning of wells or springs from which an enemy might possibly draw water would be prohibited. On the other hand, the use of chemical substances for the maintenance of armies—for example, the use of disinfectants and medicaments and the means of destroying harmful animals and parasites—is not in question.

7. The Committee considered it necessary to state very clearly what ought to be excluded from its definition.

(a) It had in mind, in the first place, explosives: the combustion of explosives may cause a discharge of noxious substances (such as carbon monoxide) which may, according to the circumstances, have more or less serious destructive effects. That is a consequence that cannot be prevented by any means short of prohibiting explosives. At the same time, any practice designed to increase the discharge of noxious substances must be condemned. Such a practice might consist either in introducing certain products into the explosives or in altering the constitution of the explosives, or in adopting a special method of manufacturing the projectiles.

(b) In the second place, the Committee had in mind smoke and clouds. Smoke can be used for various purposes: as a screen, or for signalling, etc. It is to be clearly understood that the smoke and clouds which are used must not be capable, in normal conditions of use, of producing harmful effects upon the organism.

8. The Committee desired to include among the objects of qualitative disarmament a class of weapons to which the Soviet and Italian delegations had drawn the attention of the Conference—namely, “all appliances, devices or projectiles specially constructed for the utilisation of the said noxious bodies, with a view to injuring an adversary”; it thus condemned material which can only be used for chemical warfare.

9. The Committee was anxious to keep strictly within its terms of reference, and therefore deliberately ignored the question of the methods whereby qualitative disarmament could be effected.

Obviously, the decision that will be adopted regarding these methods will be able to give practical effect to the resolutions submitted by the Special Committee. Consequently, the study of these methods and the decision to be taken in this matter are of paramount importance from the practical point of view.

The Committee was of opinion that the study of the above-mentioned question, which it considers desirable, could only be undertaken in virtue of a further decision of the General Commission.

10. The Soviet delegation asked that the following observation be inserted:

“The Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons’ reply to the General Commission’s questions regarding qualitative disarmament is given mainly from the point of view of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war time. This is tantamount to re-stating with a few supplementary details the essential ideas contained in the Geneva Protocol of June 17th, 1925, which up to the present is unfortunately still awaiting the ratification of several States.



“Such legal prohibitions are, however, inadequate and of merely secondary importance. The Soviet delegation has always attached and continues to attach paramount importance, not to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war time, but to the prohibition of preparations for chemical warfare in peace time. Consequently efforts should be directed not so much to the framing of laws and usages of war as to the prohibition of as many lethal substances and appliances as possible. This is the point of view which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to represent in the General Commission.”

For the reasons referred to in paragraph 9, sub-paragraph 1, the other delegations did not enter into a discussion of this declaration.

## II. BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND MEANS OF WARFARE.

11. The Committee felt that, on the question of bacteriological warfare, it need not confine itself strictly to the consideration of the three criteria mentioned in the resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

Bacteriological warfare unquestionably constitutes one of the methods of war most threatening to civilians, since epidemics, as they spread, attack all human beings indiscriminately, and there is no sure method of arresting their effects.

Moreover, bacteriological warfare ought to be included in qualitative disarmament quite irrespective of whether it answers to any of the criteria laid down in the General Commission's resolution. It is so particularly odious that it revolts the conscience of humanity more than any other method of warfare.

12. The Committee desired to give the fullest possible definition of bacteriological warfare and the methods of such warfare. As will be seen from the resolution below, reference is made to all methods of disseminating pathogenic microbes, filter-passing viruses or infected substances, wherever such dissemination takes place. It is immaterial whether the microbes in question are momentarily innocuous, if they are capable of again becoming virulent.

It is stated in the resolution that methods of bacteriological warfare may not be employed either against human beings, or against animals, or against plants.

13. Proceeding with respect to bacteriological weapons as it had done with respect to chemical weapons (paragraph 9), the Committee left on one side the question of the methods by which qualitative disarmament in regard to bacteriological warfare could be effected (see also paragraph 10 on this subject).

## III. INCENDIARY PROJECTILES AND FLAME-PROJECTORS.

14. There are certain important differences between incendiary weapons and ordinary weapons. The former, like chemical weapons, do not act by shock or trauma. They possess a specific means of action which assimilates them to chemical rather than to ordinary weapons.

For that reason, the Committee felt that it ought to deal with incendiary weapons, particularly since their prohibition had already been proposed to the Conference by the French, Danish and Swiss delegations.

15. The Committee considered whether incendiary projectiles answered to the three criteria established by the resolution of the General Commission of April 22nd, 1932.

It was felt that bombs, shells, grenades, bullets, arrows, pastilles and other incendiary projectiles were particularly threatening to civilians. In the first place, they are very effective in destroying urban centres and buildings in general. Secondly, whereas ordinary shells only cause damage at the point where they fall, the fires caused by incendiary projectiles are liable to spread considerably. Incendiary projectiles may be used to increase the horror of the effects produced by explosive projectiles. This threatening character is more pronounced as the range of the materials employed increases. This is particularly the case when inhabited places are bombarded by aircraft, since in such bombardments incendiary bombs are usually employed for the above-mentioned purposes.

Most of the delegations held that incendiary weapons are, moreover, particularly offensive.

16. The definition of incendiary projectiles given by the Committee excludes “projectiles of all kinds capable of producing incendiary effects accidentally”, to use the wording of the resolution below. This provision corresponds to a similar provision concerning the noxious substances given off by ordinary shells as a result of combustion. Just as it is impossible to prevent ordinary shells from giving off noxious substances, it is impossible to prevent them from accidentally causing incendiary effects.

The Committee also excluded from the definition of incendiary arms “appliances specially constructed to give light or to be luminous, and, more generally, pyrotechnics not intended

to cause fires". These appliances, which are used mainly for signalling purposes, are not intended to produce incendiary effects, and can only do so accidentally.

17. One exception has been specially provided for by the Committee. This relates to appliances specially designed for anti-aircraft defence. Incendiary projectiles are particularly effective in anti-aircraft defence, and to forbid the use of such projectiles against aircraft would be to give them a considerable advantage.

It is understood that the projectiles in question must be used exclusively for that purpose.

The exception would, of course, lose its point and might be allowed to lapse if the Conference took steps to prevent the use of aircraft for military purposes.

18. In dealing with incendiary weapons, the Committee was faced with the question of appliances such as flame-projectors designed to attack not objects but persons.

The Committee unanimously recognised that such appliances should be included in qualitative disarmament. Similarly, the Committee was unanimous in giving as the reason for this decision the cruelty inherent in the use of these appliances, which cause suffering that cannot be regarded as necessary from a military standpoint.

Moreover, the majority of the members of the Committee were of opinion that these appliances answer to the first of the three criteria mentioned in the resolution of April 22nd, 1932—that is to say, they possess a specifically offensive character.

19. Proceeding in regard to incendiary weapons as it had done in regard to chemical (paragraph 9) and bacteriological weapons (paragraph 13), the Committee left on one side the question of the methods by which qualitative disarmament in the matter of incendiary projectiles and flame-projectors could be effected (see also paragraph 10 on this subject).

#### RESOLUTIONS.

The Special Committee set up by the General Commission on May 10th, 1932, to examine the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the light of the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd last regarding qualitative disarmament, submits the following resolutions to the General Commission :

##### I. *Chemical Weapons and Means of Warfare.*

The Committee considers,

That chemical substances, whether elements or natural or synthetic compounds, as well as appliances or devices for releasing them, can be described as weapons or means of warfare only in virtue of the use that is made of them, for they may be employed or made with a view to entirely different and essentially peaceful uses ;

That, when used for the purpose of injuring an adversary, they answer to one or other of the criteria laid down in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932, and, in any case, more particularly to the third of those criteria.

It declares,

That, there should be included in qualitative disarmament the use, for the purpose of injuring an adversary, of all natural or synthetic noxious substances, whatever their state, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, whether toxic, asphyxiating, lachrymatory, irritant, vesicant, or capable in any way of producing harmful effects on the human or animal organism, whatever the method of their use.

It also declares,

That appliances, devices or projectiles specially constructed for the utilisation of the said noxious bodies with a view to injuring an adversary should be included in qualitative disarmament.

It observes,

That unless the use of explosives as such is included in qualitative disarmament, the above definition cannot be extended to the noxious substances arising from the combustion or detonation of explosives, provided that the latter have not been designed or used with the object of producing noxious substances.

It further observes that the above definition should not apply to smoke or fog used to screen objectives or for other military purposes, provided that such smoke or fog is not liable to produce harmful effects under normal conditions of use.

##### II. *Bacteriological Weapons and Means of Warfare.*

The Committee considers,

That the use of pathogenic microbes for the purpose of injuring an adversary is condemned by the conscience of humanity, quite apart from the fact that it answers to the criteria laid down by the General Commission in its resolution of April 22nd, 1932, and more particularly to the third of those criteria.



It declares,

That all methods for the projection, discharge or dissemination in any manner, in places inhabited or not, of pathogenic microbes in whatever phase they may be (virulent or capable of becoming so), or of filter-passing viruses, or of infected substances, whether for the purpose of bringing them into immediate contact with human beings, animals or plants, or for the purpose of affecting any of the latter in any indirect manner—for example, by polluting the atmosphere, water, foodstuffs, or any other objects—should be included in qualitative disarmament.

III. (a) *Incendiary Projectiles.*

The Committee considers,

That the use of incendiary projectiles involves a particularly grave menace to civilians.

It declares,

That projectiles specifically intended to cause fires should be included in qualitative disarmament.

It observes,

That this definition does not apply either to projectiles specially constructed to give light or to be luminous and, generally, to pyrotechnics not intended to cause fires, or to projectiles of all kinds capable of producing incendiary effects accidentally.

It considers,

That qualitative disarmament should not extend to projectiles designed specifically for defence against aircraft, provided that they are used exclusively for that purpose.

III. (b) *Flame-projectors.*

The Committee considers,

That the use of flame-projectors is calculated to cause needless suffering, quite apart from the question whether it answers to any of the criteria laid down by the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

It declares,

That appliances designed to attack persons by fire, such as flame-projectors, should be included in qualitative disarmament.

---

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.45.

*Official No.:* **Conf. D. 121.**

[Conf.D./C.N.30(1).]

Geneva, May 28th, 1932.

## REPORT OF THE NAVAL COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION

*called for by that Commission's Resolution dated April 22nd, 1932.*

---

*Rapporteur:* M. K. I. WESTMAN (Sweden).

---

### INTRODUCTION.

The General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments at its meeting on April 22nd, 1932, adopted the following resolution :

“ In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament as defined in the previous resolution, the Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians.”

For the purpose of determining the naval armaments which are, in accordance with the terms of the resolution, “ the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians ”, the Naval Commission met on April 26th, 1932.

After a general discussion, the Naval Commission adopted the agenda prepared by its Bureau in accordance with which it considered, first, capital ships and subsequently discussed aircraft-carriers, submarines and mines. The Commission also considered river gunboats and monitors.

In regard to the use of poison gases and bacteriological warfare, the General Commission has decided to confide the consideration of these questions to a special Commission constituted for this purpose.

The discussions which have taken place in the Naval Commission in pursuance of the resolution of the General Commission of April 22nd, 1932, have not been confined to the questions to which the text of the resolution relates directly. A number of delegations have thought well to develop their views, in more complete fashion than the actual terms of reference would have required, on naval problems in general and on the special needs and circumstances of their respective countries. They have been led in this way to indicate the fundamental considerations at the base of their attitude to the problems raised by the General Commission's resolution. Questions have thus been discussed in regard to the problem of the abolition of certain forms of naval armaments, reductions of tonnage and of the combatant power of units, the difficulties arising in connection with the application of the term "aggression", and problems in regard to the definition of "the relative offensive and defensive power" of the different types of war vessels.

The discussion indicated that one of the reasons for the divergent views expressed lies in a difference in interpretation of the terms of reference given by the General Commission. Certain delegations have found the terms of the General Commission's resolution sufficiently clear for them to be taken at once as the basis of the work of the Naval Commission. Other delegates, on the other hand, in view of the special conditions existing in the sphere of naval armaments, have thought it necessary to discuss and state clearly the sense in which the General Commission's resolution should be interpreted.

These latter delegations have, for their part, expressed the opinion that the instruction to consider the different naval armaments with a view to determining those weapons "whose character is the most specifically offensive" appears to pre-suppose the use of such weapons for purposes of a policy of aggression and that the naval operations to be considered are, consequently, primarily those directed towards the invasion and violation of the territorial sovereignty of a country. In other words, in order to define the task of the Naval Commission, the latter has, in their opinion, to consider whether there are weapons which, in the event of armed aggression directed suddenly against the territorial sovereignty of a State, offer, in virtue of their inherent specific character, greater advantages to the aggressor than to the nation which is the victim of aggression.

The delegations adhering to this view feel that this interpretation is the only one consonant with the origin and development of the resolution as shown by the discussion in the General Commission. Furthermore, they feel that to consider the offensive operations in question as embracing all the normal operations of war would lead directly into insoluble problems. Such a wider interpretation would likewise involve matters of principle which have not yet been dealt with by the General Commission.

Other delegations stated their opinion that, whenever a State adopts a policy of aggression, all naval armaments whatsoever, whether limitable or non-limitable within the meaning of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, are specifically offensive, but that, on the other hand, all these naval armaments whatsoever become defensive when employed by a nation which is being subjected to aggression.

Moreover, certain delegations, with the object of defining more closely the terms of reference to the Naval Commission, have been at pains to recall the resolution of April 20th, 1932, adopted by all the Members of the Conference, with exception of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (document Conf.D./C.G.24), under the terms of which the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations are to be applied for the purpose of determining the criteria for the limitation and reduction of armaments and have argued accordingly that it is necessary to reduce armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, taking into account at the same time the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State. The General Commission on these grounds decided that the application of these criteria and the methods by which the reduction and limitation of armaments would have to be effected should immediately be examined from a practical standpoint.

Other delegations, however, while anxious to be guided by the general lines laid down by the General Commission, have been at pains to emphasise the point that the object of the Conference is none other than the reduction and the limitation of armaments, and that all efforts should be directed to this object. In this connection, it is essential to bear in mind that the General Commission, by its resolution of April 22nd (document Conf.D./C.G.26(1)), adopted this very principle of qualitative disarmament—that is to say, the selection of certain categories or certain types of weapons the possession or use of which would be either completely forbidden to all States or internationalised by means of a general convention.

They take the view that all kinds of weapons are offensive when they are utilised in attacking other nations. It is, however, impossible to limit considerations of national defence to the eventuality of invasion or violation of territorial sovereignty. National defence is a much vaster problem. No definition of the term "national defence" has been recorded up to the present.



To sum up the results of the discussion and to define as closely as possible the task of the Naval Commission, the latter has agreed to the following resolution :

“ The Naval Commission having found that nearly all naval weapons possess to some extent both an offensive and defensive character at the same time ;

“ Being convinced that it is very difficult, if not impossible, from a purely technical point of view, to define the criteria of these arms so far as their mainly offensive or defensive character is concerned, since this character even varies according to the circumstances of the different countries ;

“ Has come to the conclusion that it can most usefully answer the questions put by the General Commission in giving them the following interpretation :

“ Supposing one State either (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression, or (b) undertakes offensive operations against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character, and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy or those operations to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion ? ”

It has been understood that the different States, in indicating the naval weapons which, in their opinion, are the most specifically offensive and the most efficacious against national defence, could indicate whether, in coming to their opinion, they have adopted the attitude indicated above under (a) or that indicated above under (b).

It has been felt at the same time that in their replies the States desiring to do so might refrain from distinguishing between the two criteria—viz., “ the most specifically offensive weapons ” and “ the weapons most efficacious against national defence ”—which are mentioned in the resolution of the General Commission.

\* \* \*

The *German* delegation stated that, while it accepted the text of the above resolution, in its opinion the provisions of the Versailles Treaty contain the reply to give to the questions put by the General Commission's resolution, seeing that these provisions have been laid down expressly for the purpose of rendering it impossible for Germany to proceed to a policy of aggression.

The *Soviet* delegation considers that the preamble to the report of the Naval Commission must conform strictly to the terms of reference given by the General Commission on April 22nd, and this is why it declares itself against any extension and revision of the full powers delegated to the Naval Commission, and against the discussion of questions touched upon in the Naval Commission (definition of aggression, the “ time factor ”, definition of the offensive and of the defensive, etc.). The Soviet delegation considers that any attempt to apply the principle of “ national security ” to the General Commission's decision of April 22nd nullifies any results that may be arrived at in regard to qualitative disarmament, and that, notwithstanding differences in geographical conditions, the technical-tactical criteria of present-day naval armaments clearly permit of a definite reply—and this in numerical terms—being given to the three questions put by the General Commission.

Efforts have been made to arrive at a single text, in regard to the various naval arms, acceptable to all the delegations. These efforts having proved unsuccessful, it has consequently been necessary to compile this report in the form in which it now appears—a series of statements by different delegations or groups of delegations, setting forth their particular points of view.

#### PART I. — CAPITAL SHIPS.

The *Australian*, the *United States of America*, the *Japanese* and the *United Kingdom* delegations consider that :

“ 1. While in many respects capital ships possess fighting qualities superior to other types of vessels, they are not so constituted that they can be effectively operated independently of other types.

“ 2. For certain countries having great maritime interests, vital lines of overseas communication, or long coast-lines to defend, and which are dependent to a large extent on their fleets for security, the capital ship constitutes the essential backbone of their defence forces.

“ 3. Capital ships are among the least efficient naval weapons for independent operations against merchant commerce.

“ 4. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable, whether the terms of reference are interpreted in accordance with either (a) or (b) or both of paragraph 4 of the Naval

Commission's resolution (see page 2), and the delegations concerned are accordingly of the opinion that capital ships.

- " (a) Are not most specifically offensive ;
- " (b) Are not most efficacious against national defence ;
- " (c) Are not most menacing to civilian populations.

" 5. Questions of reduction in displacement and gun calibre of capital ships are regarded as outside the present terms of reference, since they involve matters of principle to be first discussed by the General Commission."

The *Brazilian* delegation agrees with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the above statement by the Australian, the United States of America, the Japanese and the United Kingdom delegations, while considering, however, that, "in the case of an attack, the greater the tonnage of those ships and the greater the calibre of their guns, the more efficacious they are against naval and coast defences".

The *Italian* delegation stated that :

" Italy, which has to defend great maritime interests, vital lines of overseas communications and very long coast-lines, and whose security and very life depend on her fleet, while recognising that, in the present state of armaments, capital ships, as defined and limited by existing Treaties, constitute an important element in naval forces, considers that these ships :

- " Are specifically offensive ;
- " Are most efficacious against national defence, and
- " Indirectly, are most threatening to civil populations.

" The Italian delegation considers that a proposal aiming simply at the reduction of displacement and of gun calibre of capital ships is not within the terms of reference of the Naval Commission.

" In any case, the Italian delegation is of the opinion that a proposal of this sort will not only not achieve the object of the General Commission but would, on the contrary, lead to the creation of a new type of rapid armoured vessel, and consequently to a new competition in naval construction.

The *Chinese* delegation, in respect to China, supported the Italian delegation's statement above.

The delegations of *Germany, the Argentine, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, Siam, Sweden, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia* agree on the following conclusions :

" (a) In regard to capital ships the predominance of their offensive character over their defensive qualities increases with their tonnage and the calibre of their guns.

" (b) While admitting that capital ships may contribute efficaciously towards national defence, it must be stated that, in the case of an attack, the greater the tonnage of these ships and the higher the calibre of their guns, the greater is their efficacy against naval and coast defences.

" (c) In regard to the threat to civil populations, it must be stated that the greater the tonnage of these ships and the higher the calibre of their guns, the more they risk causing damage of these populations.

" Consequently, these delegations consider that capital ships exceeding a certain tonnage and carrying guns exceeding a certain calibre must be considered as being :

- " (a) Most specifically offensive ;
- " (b) Most efficacious against national defence ;
- " (c) Most threatening to civilians."

The following delegations, while agreeing to this last statement, have defined their attitudes as follows :

The German delegate has stated that, in accordance with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, capital ships of over 10,000 tons and carrying a gun of over 11-inch calibre come within the criteria stated in the General Commission's resolution.

He has further stated that the German delegation would be able to accept a unanimous resolution by the Naval Commission going even further than the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.



The Spanish and Roumanian delegates have proposed to characterise as coming under the three criteria all capital ships over 10,000 tons carrying guns of a calibre over 8 inches.

The French delegation considers that the tonnage above which capital ships come within the three criteria is that necessary to ensure to them a sufficient protection against present-day methods of attack.

The delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has stated that the basic list of offensive naval armaments should comprise all warships of a displacement over 10,000 tons, the maximum calibre of whose guns is over 12 inches (305 millimetres).

He further stated that, in his view, certain types of Washington cruisers possess certain qualitative properties which prevent their being included in the category of defensive armaments.

Further, the delegations of the *Argentine, France, Poland and Roumania* have stated that :

“ Whenever a State adopts a policy of aggression all capital ships are :

- “ (a) Specifically offensive ;
- “ (b) Efficacious against national defence ;
- “ (c) Threatening to civil populations.”

## PART II. — AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS.

In regard to aircraft-carriers, the Naval Commission draws attention to the Air Commission's Report (document Conf.D./123, Part I, paragraph I (d), and to the declarations relative to this paragraph in Part III).<sup>1</sup>

The delegations of the *Argentine, Australia* and the *United Kingdom* have expressed the following opinion :

“ The aircraft-carrier is a vessel which is more vulnerable than any other type of warship and serves solely as an aerodrome from which aircraft can be operated, and therefore cannot of itself be utilised for offensive purposes.

“ The question of whether or not the aircraft which are carried in aircraft-carriers can be classified as most specifically offensive, as most efficacious against national defence, or most threatening to civilians depends upon the type of machine carried and the conclusions of the Air Commission as to the offensiveness of different types of aircraft.”

The *United States* delegation believes that :

“ The terms of reference should be interpreted as regards the first two criteria in accordance with subdivision (a) of the fourth paragraph of the resolution adopted by the Naval Commission; that is to say, in connection with a situation characterised by a policy of armed aggression.

“ The aircraft-carrier is a particularly vulnerable type of warship. It serves only as an aerodrome from which aircraft can be operated.

“ The aircraft-carrier has been recognised by nations possessing that type of vessel as a legitimate type of naval weapon to operate as an auxiliary arm of the fleet. Its principal mission is in connection with fleet operations, particularly in reconnaissance and defence of the fleet against surprise attack.

---

<sup>1</sup> REPORT BY THE AIR COMMISSION.

### Part I.

I. (d) The offensive capacity of aeroplanes carried by aircraft-carriers or warships equipped with landing-platforms (or landing-decks) must be regarded as being increased by the mobility of the vessels which carry them.

### Part III.

Conclusion I (d) was adopted by 16 votes to 2 (United States of America and Portugal). In consequence of this vote, the United States delegation made the following declaration :

“ The delegation of the United States considers that the statement in Paragraph I (d) as to the increased possibility of offensive action of ship-based aircraft is inappropriate for inclusion in a report which deals with aircraft generally and which does not otherwise discuss specific types of aircraft or the influence of the base of action upon their offensive capabilities.

“ One of the tests already contained in the report is that of capability of arriving at an objective. Thus the mobility feature of ship-based aircraft is already taken into account and any further reference in the report which might give the impression that individual ship-based aircraft are more specifically offensive than individual aircraft taking off from bases close to land frontiers is misleading.”

The Portuguese delegation associated itself with this declaration, and the United Kingdom delegation stated that it shared the views therein expressed.

“ The air armament of an aircraft-carrier is limited in quantity and quality to such extent that it would be ineffective in attacks against the coasts of another country protected by shore-based aircraft.

“ Even if bombing were abolished, aircraft-carriers would still be needed for scouting and other purposes of a purely defensive nature.

“ The value of aircraft-carriers for defence is great, in that they furnish advance information of the approach from seaward of an attacking or invading force.

“ Because of the nature of their operations, aircraft-carriers alone cannot effectively control commerce.

“ The use of naval weapons in such manner as to endanger civilians has been restricted by international agreement for many years and there is no reason why all operations of aircraft-carriers should not be covered by such agreements.

“ In view of the above considerations, the delegation of the United States believes that aircraft-carriers do not come within the scope of the three criteria mentioned in the resolution of the General Commission.

“ Questions of reduction in displacement and gun calibre of aircraft-carriers are regarded as outside the present terms of reference, since they involve matters of principle to be first discussed by the General Commission.”

The *French* delegation made the following statement :

“ The question of bombing aircraft being provisionally reserved, these ships will in all cases carry machines destined for other purposes, especially for reconnaissance and scouting.

“ In these circumstances :

“ (a) They are not specifically offensive. On the other hand, they are extremely effective in defence for long-distance scouting for naval forces or convoys and for discovering the possible proximity of an attacking force.

“ (b) They are not particularly threatening to national defence. In the open sea, they are both defensive and offensive. In the neighbourhood of the coast, their aerial resources are usually inferior in quality and quantity to those of the coastal air-force. They are less dangerous to the defence in proportion as their guns are of smaller calibre.

“ (c) Without bombing machines, they are not particularly dangerous to the civilian population. Their power of injuring this population would be still further reduced if, instead of guns of 203 millimetres (8 inches), they only carried guns of 155 millimetres (6.1 inches), which are necessary and sufficient to repel the attacks of small vessels.

Further, the Argentine and French delegations have stated that :

“ Whenever a State adopts a policy of aggression, all aircraft-carriers are :

“ (a) Specifically offensive ;

“ (b) Efficacious against national defence ;

“ (c) Threatening to civil populations.”

The *German, Chinese, Danish, Spanish, Finnish, Italian, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Roumanian, Siamese, Swedish, Soviet, Turkish* and *Yugoslav* delegations have intimated that they reply in the affirmative to the first as well as the second and third questions.

“ In practice, the aircraft-carrier being a mobile base for bombing aircraft puts within range of these aircraft a considerable number of objectives which otherwise would be outside the range of attack.

“ At the present time, these vessels carry fighter, reconnaissance and bombing aircraft. Even if they were designed for carrying only the two former classes, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the majority of reconnaissance aircraft can be employed for bombing purposes, especially if they be employed at the short distances and in the favourable circumstances which aircraft-carriers permit of being realised.”

The *German* delegation desired to add the following paragraph to the above declaration :

“ Aircraft-carriers are a particularly efficacious arm, in the sense of the three criteria, against countries which do not possess a sufficient air defence.”

The *Polish* delegation, while agreeing with the above declaration of the fifteen Powers, is of the opinion that :

“ The characteristics of aircraft-carriers must be above all considered in the light of the geographical situation and the special conditions of different parts of the world. It is clear that the characteristics stated in the above declaration are especially applicable in the case of narrow waters.”

The delegation of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* agrees with the above statement by the fifteen Powers, while at the same time considering that it applies equally to all other special means of transport for aircraft.



The *Greek* delegation adheres to the views expressed in the first paragraph of the above declaration by the fifteen Powers, from the words "In practice . . ." to ". . . range of attack".

The *Japanese* and *Siamese* delegations made the following statement :

" Aircraft-carriers and warships equipped with landing-on platforms or decks must be classed among the arms which are most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians.

" 1. Being highly mobile aerodromes and capable of acting independently of the fleet, these vessels are not only most suitable for making surprise attacks but are capable of working havoc upon inland regions far removed from the sea.

" 2. The existence of these vessels increases the points to be protected and complicates the relations between the national defence systems of the various countries.

" 3. These vessels enhance the capacity of a fleet for reconnaissance, observation, and especially for attack ; they also accentuate the aggressive character of a fleet, and enable it to operate in the neighbourhood of the coast of an adversary which even possesses coast-defence air forces.

" 4. The character of these vessels permits of their being employed more advantageously for aggressive than for defensive purposes.

" Coast-defence air operations can be carried out more effectively and more economically by a shore-based coast-defence air force than by aircraft-carriers.

" 5. Being a new arm, they may serve destructive purposes as yet unforeseen."

### PART III. — SUBMARINES.

The *Argentine*, the *Australian* and *United Kingdom* delegations have made the following declaration :

" (a) In the case of the submarine, we propose to deal first with criterion No. 3, ' most threatening to civilians ', since it is on this criterion that most of our discussion has turned.

" The submarine, a new-comer to naval warfare, has undoubtedly a worse record from the point of view of our criterion than have surface ships over the long period that they have been employed. Surface vessels, as well as submarines, were used in the world war for commerce destruction, and the difference in the manner in which these types of vessels were employed is known to all the world. We have asked ourselves whether this is merely due to chance or whether there are not underlying factors which led to this result.

" We are of opinion that there are such underlying factors.

" The submarine is a vessel of very special construction which leads to two principal results :

" First, she is unable either to accommodate sufficient naval ratings to enable a prize crew to be put on board with a view to sending a captured merchant vessel into port for examination or to accommodate the crews of vessels sunk (except for a very limited number), so that, after carrying out the normal procedure of visit and search, a submarine, unless she is to violate the accepted rules of warfare at sea, will frequently be obliged to set her prey free for lack of anywhere to put the crew and passengers.

" Secondly, she is a weak and vulnerable vessel on the surface, with the result that she cannot be sure of the outcome of an encounter with a merchant ship, should the latter make use of the historic right of all merchant ships to resist capture and endeavour to escape.

" The result of these two inherent limitations is that the submarine in many cases finds herself in the position in which, while she is on the scene of operations and can see the enemy merchant vessels passing by, she has either to abandon practically all efforts to interfere with those merchant vessels or else to adopt methods which are contrary to the historic rules of war at sea and to common humanity.

" Similar problems do not exist in the case of the surface ship, and it is this fact, in our opinion, which is largely responsible for the different manner in which the two types of vessel have been used.

" It has been contended that if all nations adhere to the rules for the conduct of submarines in war, laid down in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty, the differentiation between the surface ship and the submarine in their use against trade will disappear.

" It must be remembered, however, that these rules are not really new. The submarine, when it entered the field of naval weapons, was subject to exactly the same rules as were surface ships. What is noteworthy is that the surface ship followed those rules and the submarine did not.

"The Argentine, Australian and United Kingdom delegations do not wish to belittle the value of rules solemnly accepted in this manner, and they sincerely hope that the particular rules in question may be accepted by all nations. They must, however, stress the fact that no rules can alter the inherent limitations of the submarine mentioned above. The fact remains, therefore, that, should another war unfortunately take place in the future, the temptation to use the submarine in an inhuman manner will inevitably be greater than the temptation so to use surface ships.

"The Argentine, Australian and United Kingdom delegations are therefore forced to the conclusion that the submarine is a type of vessel which should be classed as 'most threatening to civilians'.

"(b) We come now to the first of our criteria, 'most specifically offensive'.

"The submarine, like all types of vessels, can be used in an offensive or defensive manner, according to the type of operation which is being undertaken.

"We do not, however, feel that the submarine can be selected as a weapon which will enable the attack of an aggressor rapidly to break down the defence of the State attacked, which, as we have already said, we have taken as our guiding principle in determining whether weapons are specifically offensive.

"Our answer to criterion No. 1 is accordingly, No.

"(c) 'Most efficacious against national defence'. The submarine used over a long period can be very efficacious against national defence if used in a manner contrary to the rules laid down in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty.

"We do not, however, feel that the submarine can be singled out from amongst other naval weapons as possessing qualities which make it most efficacious against national defence."

The *Canadian* delegation desires to associate itself with the above declaration of the delegations of the Argentine, Australia and the United Kingdom regarding submarines.

The *United States of America* delegation considers :

"(a) That the terms of reference, as regards the first two criteria, should be interpreted in accordance with subdivision (a) of the resolution adopted by the Naval Commission; that is to say, in connection with a situation characterised by a policy of armed aggression.

"Under this interpretation, no distinction need be drawn between the first two criteria.

"Historically, the outstanding stigmata of measures of armed aggression have been secret preparation and sudden attack, with or without formal declaration of war.

"Of all naval weapons, the submarine is best adapted, by reason of its specific character, to carry out secret preparations of decisive effect in sudden offensive operations against the naval defence forces of another Power. Submarines in the possession of the country suffering aggression do not afford adequate defence against such an operation.

"In view of the above, the United States delegation is of the opinion that the submarine is a naval weapon whose character is :

"(a) Most specifically offensive ;

"(b) Most efficacious against national defence.

"(b) With respect to the third criterion—i.e., 'whose character is most threatening to civilians'—it may be admitted that the submarine is relatively inoffensive in so far as concerns civilians on shore. The only civilians whose safety in war has ever given rise to apprehension in connection with the submarine are civilians at sea, including passengers and crews of non-combatant and neutral vessels.

"The submarine, because of her inherent limitations, is less able than any type of surface vessel to assure the safety of non-combatants in the exercise of the right of visit and search.

"The inability of submarines properly to exercise control over commerce, even when acting in good faith, probably would result in incidents, followed by retaliation and a repetition of the horrors of the late war.

"The provisions of Article 22—Part IV—of the London Naval Treaty do not ensure to civilians the same degree of safety that they formerly enjoyed when subjected to control by surface ships alone. Whereas the surface vessel of war was obligated with entire responsibility for their safety, the submarine, by these rules, is authorised to place this obligation upon the non-combatants themselves or upon some other ship in the vicinity over which the submarine exerts no authority. Furthermore, these rules tend to encourage the submarine to sink vessels at sea, a practice which formerly was permitted to surface ships only under exceptional circumstances.

"In view of the above, the United States delegation considers the submarine as a naval weapon whose character is specifically threatening to civilians.

"Questions of reduction in displacement and gun-calibre of submarines are regarded as outside the present terms of reference, since they involve matters of principle to be first discussed by the General Commission."



The delegation of *Brazil* agrees with the above opinion of the delegation of the United States of America, and wishes to add to it the following remarks :

“ In the first place, the idea of reduction of the tonnage of submarines, suggested by several delegations in order to give them a defensive character, must not be considered, because it would necessitate an examination, by the comparative method, of the natural features of the open sea or narrow waters as theatre of possible naval operations for all nations.

“ In regard to the mine-laying submarine, the mere idea that its purpose is to operate in foreign waters takes from it its defensive character. ”

The delegation of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* adheres to the above opinion expressed by the delegation of the United States of America, with the addition of the following remark :

“ Although the question of reduction of tonnage does not fall within the terms of reference given in the General Commission's resolution, all the considerations advanced by the United States delegation apply particularly to submarines of over 600 tons.”

The delegations of *Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Roumania, Siam* and *Venezuela* have put forward the following opinion :

“ (a) Submarines possess at the same time the character of either an offensive or a defensive arm. They are able to co-operate usefully in coastal waters or in the open sea, in many defensive operations (protection of a coast against bombardment or a disembarkation, protection of convoys, etc.). They are particularly qualified for the defensive duties of patrolling and protection.

“ (b) They contribute at the same time to the naval defence of a given country and to the sea-borne attack, or the blockade, of an enemy country.

“ (c) They are not particularly threatening to non-combatants, on the understanding that all States will have to adhere to the rules laid down in Part IV of the Treaty of London.”

The above delegations recall several of the remarks they have already put forward during the discussions.

“ Submarines have, in regard to merchant vessels, the same rights and the same duties as surface vessels. They will exercise their rights only if they can at the same time acquit themselves of their duties. It must be conceded that the commanding officer of a submarine will obey the instructions of his Government as implicitly as will the commanding officer of a surface vessel.

“ The submarine has the same rights as other vessels to search merchant ships. Capture, seizure and destruction can only take place in accordance with the conditions laid down by international law. A submarine escorting a captured ship may be obliged to release it and flee from surface patrols ; but this is also true for a surface captor encountering in the same circumstances a hostile ship stronger than itself.

“ It may here be remarked that submarines of large tonnage are those with the greatest facilities for taking on board personnel which has had to abandon its ship for any reason.

“ It is not possible, on the basis of the case of the last war, to draw general conclusions from particular circumstances. The special use which was made of submarines arises, not from their innate characteristics, but from the instructions they have received, which have, moreover, varied from time to time. The reason for this is not a technical one but political. The duties of ships of all categories, including submarines, have already been restated and definitely laid down. They are, in this respect, the subject of repeated declarations, the value and effectiveness of which cannot be called in question.

“ In those circumstances, the reproach of inhumanity with regard to non-combatants cannot be adduced against submarines.

“ The submarine is chiefly intended to act against warships. It is essentially suitable for operating against them and in conjunction with naval forces of all kinds. The history of the war provides numerous examples of such action and shows the importance of the part which the submarine plays or can play in collective operations of a purely naval character.

“ The submarine which attacks from close quarters is not more liable to commit errors than surface vessels attacking by gunfire at night or in thick weather, or at a great distance in clear weather.

“ By its very existence and by the uncertainty as to the place and degree of the danger which it constitutes, the submarine is the best defence of small or medium navies. As several delegations have emphasised, its abolition would be equivalent to increasing the inequality between the weak and the strong.”

The delegations of *Finland, France, Latvia, Poland, Roumania* and *Venezuela* conclude that the defensive character of the submarine is clearly preponderant and thus it is indispensable to the defence of certain Powers.

These delegations consider that, in consequence, the submarine :

“ (a) Is not a specifically offensive arm ;

“ (b) Is not an arm particularly efficacious against national defence ;

“ (c) Is not an arm threatening to civilian populations.”

The *Spanish* delegation, while supporting the above conclusions of the delegations of Finland, France, Latvia, Poland and Roumania, considers that submarines of large displacement can take part in offensive fleet operations, and, in certain cases, in the blockade of distant countries, and that submarines of a displacement exceeding 1,000 tons are most specifically offensive.

The delegations of *China* and *Italy* consider that the offensive character of submarines would become preponderant if capital ships did not exist. Consequently :

“(a) If capital ships form part of fleets, the construction of submarines is necessary for defensive reasons.

“(b) If capital ships do not form part of fleets, the construction of submarines would have a specifically offensive character.”

The delegations of *Finland*, *France*, *Italy* and *Venezuela* consider that displacement is not a criterion for defining the more or less offensive character of submarines. Actually, in narrow waters, small submarines can be as efficacious as those of large tonnage, and, in the case of a defensive action having to be prosecuted to a considerable distance from the submarine's proper bases, these latter are the only ones which can take part in it.

Further, the *Argentine* and *French* delegations consider that, whenever a State adopts a policy of aggression, submarines are :

“(a) Specifically offensive ;

“(b) Efficacious against national defence.”

The *Japanese* delegation makes the following statement :

“As compared with surface craft, the submarine is a far less effective weapon whether afloat or submerged, it being only upon the approach of an enemy vessel into close proximity that a submarine can show its power of attack. The submarine is therefore a defensive weapon, one which is indispensable for the defence of a Power with an inferior navy.

“Any fear that the submarine might be so used as to endanger civilians has been removed by the rules of international law.

“In view of the foregoing, it cannot be said that the submarine is :

“(a) Specifically offensive ;

“(b) Efficacious against national defence ;

“(c) Menacing to civil populations.

“The defensive character of the submarine does not alter according to its size. The type of submarine best adapted to a given country naturally varies with its peculiar conditions and, for Japan, the maximum unit size should not be less than 2,000 tons.”

The *German* delegation has pointed out that the authors of the Treaty of Versailles have, by the terms of this Treaty, characterised the submarine as a specifically offensive arm.

The delegations of *Denmark*, *Greece*, *Norway*, the *Netherlands*, *Portugal*, *Sweden*, *Turkey* and *Yugoslavia* are of opinion that :

“Submarines of large tonnage, and the most heavily armed both as regards torpedoes and guns, are the most capable of operating in an offensive manner and the most efficacious against national defence. The capacity of submarines to operate in these directions diminishes in proportion to their tonnage and their armament.

“Submarines of lesser tonnage, and especially those whose tonnage does not exceed that strictly necessary to ensure to them sufficient qualities of security and habitability, are predominantly defensive in character.

“As regards civil populations, it cannot be said that submarines are particularly threatening to them, so long as they conform, in the same way as other vessels, to the rules of international law.

“Consequently, these delegations consider that :

“(a) Submarines of large tonnage are most specifically offensive ;

“(b) Submarines of large tonnage are most efficacious against national defence ;

“(c) Submarines are not specifically threatening to civil populations so long as they conform, in the same way as other vessels, to the rules of international law.”

“The *Portuguese* delegation, while accepting the above declaration, considers that the limit of tonnage sufficient to permit of the employment of submarines specially for coast and harbour defence—having regard to the necessity of their possessing adequate arrangements for the protection of their crews—should not exceed 1,200 tons on the surface.”



PART IV. — AUTOMATIC CONTACT MINES.

At the request of a number of delegations, the Naval Commission also considered whether automatic contact mines come within the series of naval armaments referred to in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd.

In this connection, the Naval Commission would call attention to the fact that the eighth Convention of the second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907 laid down rules for the use of contact mines at sea. In virtue of the said rules, it is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they be so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after those who laid them have lost control over them, and to lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings. It is also forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation. It is further prescribed that, when anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful navigation. The belligerents undertake to provide, as far as possible, for these mines becoming harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and, where the mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger-zones, as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through diplomatic channels.

The experience of the great war showed, however, that these rules had not prevented great loss of life among non-combatants.

The General Commission's resolution, which is submitted to the Naval Commission, has appeared to provide the latter with a suitable opportunity for reverting to the problems relating to the laying of contact mines at sea.

In the course of the discussion in the Naval Commission, several delegations laid stress on the specifically offensive character of mines laid outside a coastal zone to be defined, pointing out the essential difference which exists between automatic contact mines and other naval weapons, in view of the fact that once mines have been laid they entirely escape the control of those who have laid them.

Certain delegations, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that mines laid within the coastal zone to be determined are a definitely defensive weapon, essential to the defence of coasts and sea-ports. Any regulations concerning mines should proceed from the idea that the coast defences should possess special facilities.

The Naval Commission examined also the question whether contact mines should be regarded as a weapon particularly efficacious against the national defence of a country. This question was answered in the negative.

As regards the third criterion indicated by the General Commission—that of the threatening character of certain naval arms to the civilian population—the Naval Commission is of the opinion that automatic contact mines laid outside a coastal zone to be defined expose non-combatants to very serious dangers, especially when these mines have been laid without the usual notification or on a sea-route which is necessary to free navigation.

The *French* and *Roumanian* delegations have suggested that the gun-range of modern ships should be taken as the limit of the coastal zone in which automatic contact mines might be laid.

The *German* delegation has, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that, in view of the great range of modern large-calibre guns, a limit thus fixed would not reduce sufficiently the dangers to which non-combatants are exposed.

The *French* and *Roumanian* delegations have suggested that all mines should be marked by the Government which employs them.

The *Argentine*, the *United States of America*, the *Italian* and the *United Kingdom* delegations, while supporting the proposal to regard the use of automatic mines in the open sea as specifically dangerous to non-combatants, desired to state that they regarded mines laid in the open sea as a very effective defence against submarines. Hence they could only recommend their prohibition on the condition that submarines should also be abolished.

The delegation of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* makes the following statement :

“ The Soviet delegation, returning to the first proposal of the Netherlands delegation contained in document Conf.D./C.N.26, which reads :

“ ‘ The Naval Commission is of the opinion that submarine automatic contact mines laid in the open sea are extremely threatening to civilians ’ .

“ Considers that to this question it is necessary to give a simple reply. From this point of view, it is possible to agree entirely with the formula given by the Netherlands delegation in this document.

“ As the further close examination and detailed investigation of the matter does not follow from the duty assigned to us by the General Commission and, firstly, leads to the discussion of a series of problems having no reference to qualitative disarmament, and, secondly and lastly, compels us to discuss questions which require preliminary solution in principle by the General Commission, the Soviet delegation abstains from accepting a more detailed document.”

The *United Kingdom* delegation has made the following statement :

“ The original proposal of the Netherlands delegation was to prohibit the laying of contact mines in the ‘ open sea ’.

“ It was on this basis that discussions took place in the Naval Commission, and the United Kingdom delegation, seeing no reason for the substitution of the words ‘ outside a coastal zone to be determined ’ for the words ‘ open sea ’, wish to place on record that, in associating themselves with the finding of the Commission, it is on the understanding that in their case the words ‘ open sea ’ must be substituted for ‘ outside a coastal zone to be determined ’.”

The *Netherlands* delegation, considering that the Naval Commission has unanimously agreed with its proposal declaring that automatic contact mines laid “ in the open sea ” as among the arms most threatening to civil populations, regrets that, in the present report, the words, “ in the open sea ” have been replaced by the words “ outside a coastal zone to be determined ”.

It appears from the discussions that this substitution cannot be considered as having for its object the modification of the meaning of the declaration, nor to endanger the principle of the freedom of the seas on which it is based.

Consequently, the Netherlands delegation wishes to state that, in the determination of the coastal zone, this principle must be strictly respected.

#### PART V. — RIVER WAR VESSELS.

With reference to the resolution of the General Commission of April 22nd, two arguments have been upheld in the Naval Commission in regard to the nature of monitors and river craft.

The *Hungarian* delegation, supported by the delegations of *Germany*, *Italy* and the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, is of the opinion that surface river vessels, specially built for service on European rivers, are most capable of offensive action and of contributing efficaciously in offensive operations of which the purpose is to break down the national defence. The offensive capacity is relatively greater in the larger types of these vessels and decreases proportionately with the tonnage and armament.

Large river craft carrying relatively heavy artillery are the vessels which are most likely to cause the greatest damage to civilian populations.

These States therefore consider that surface river vessels specially constructed for use on European rivers with a standard displacement exceeding 250 tons and artillery of more than 105 millimetres (4.1 inches) calibre should be regarded as :

- (a) Specifically offensive ;
- (b) Specially efficacious against national defence ;
- (c) Most menacing to civil populations.

The *Polish*, *Roumanian* and *Yugoslav* delegations, on the other hand, hold that river craft do not come under any of the three headings mentioned in the resolution of the General Commission. Such craft, they claim, should be regarded as defensive weapons, in view of their special construction, limited field of action and lighter armament.

For certain countries whose naval forces are insufficient to ensure the defence of their maritime frontiers, certain river craft serve as floating batteries for the defence of estuaries and deltas against attacks from ocean-going vessels. It is perfectly logical that such river craft should be supplied with artillery comparable to that of sea-going vessels, which are considered, in the opinion of all the naval Powers, as being of a specifically offensive nature. Furthermore, the effective power of their artillery, compared with land artillery of the same calibre, and their vulnerability, particularly to mines, lead these delegations to the conclusion that river craft cannot be regarded as specifically offensive nor particularly efficacious against national defence, nor as most menacing weapons to civil populations. The *Roumanian* delegation has stressed the desirability of the question of river war vessels being discussed in taking into consideration all existing river war vessels on the rivers of all the continents.



The Naval Commission has carefully examined the questions whether monitors and river craft come under the categories of arms covered by the resolution of the General Commission. It was obliged to find that, according to the proposal of the Hungarian delegation, the problem has arisen only in regard to European rivers.

However, in view of the general terms of reference of the General Commission, it seems to the Naval Commission difficult to restrict the discussion of the problem purely to surface river craft specially constructed for use on European rivers. Indeed, it seems unavoidable, for the purpose of replying to the questions put by the General Commission, that the question should be examined under a broader aspect, since the categories of vessels in question exist in other continents also.

Moreover, the Naval Commission considered that a discussion on the general plane could not be usefully entered upon without taking into consideration the particular situation existing in other parts of the world where vessels of the categories in question are also in use. In order to take into due account all these special conditions liable to influence the problem, the Naval Commission would require data which it does not possess and which is all the more necessary in that the question of monitors and river craft implies problems concerning, not only the naval forces properly so-called, but also certain land armaments and coast artillery.

The Naval Commission has, therefore, decided not to give any opinion on the subject of monitors and river craft, and to confine itself to bringing the foregoing details to the attention of the General Commission.

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.47.

*Official No.:* Conf. D. 122.

[Conf.D./C.T.45(1).]

Geneva, June 7th, 1932.

## REPORT OF THE LAND COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION

*under the Terms of that Commission's Resolution of April 22nd, 1932.*

*Rapporteur:* M. BOURQUIN (Belgium).

### INTRODUCTION.<sup>1</sup>

I. The General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, at its meeting on April 22nd, 1932, adopted the following resolution :

"In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution (document Conf.D./C.G.26(1)), the Conference is of opinion that the

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet delegation makes the following reservation with regard to the present report :

"The present report, instead of giving direct answers to the questions put by the General Commission, merely enumerates the opinions of the various groups of delegations, as formulated by the Experts when questions concerning artillery and armoured vehicles were under consideration.

"The Land Commission had instructions to determine what calibres of artillery and what classes of armoured vehicle answered to the three criteria laid down by the General Commission on April 22nd. The Land Commission was to answer these questions ; it was to say whether these classes of armament should be subject to qualitative reduction, and, if so, to what extent.

"Instead of answering the questions, the Land Commission, by repeating the opinion expressed by the Committee of Experts in an interminable series of technical arguments, is still further complicating the task of the General Commission. Land armaments, especially armoured vehicles and heavy artillery, offer sufficient material to be submitted to the General Commission for its decision in regard to qualitative disarmament. The Land Commission's voluminous report is full of arguments about the relative value of different calibres of artillery, the impossibility of making an absolute distinction between a tank and a motor vehicle, and the efficacy of artillery and tanks against permanent fortifications ; but all this is merely preparing the ground for bringing the whole principle of qualitative disarmament into question. Public opinion is beginning to realise this, and numerous protests are now being heard from every side against this tendency, which is visible in all the Commissions.

"The Soviet delegation quite realises that this total absence of positive results is not due to any bad work on the part of the Experts. The Experts are only expressing the ideas and wishes of their respective delegations. Be that as it may, the Soviet delegation cannot associate itself with this refusal to give any specific reply to the questions put, and is therefore unable to pronounce in favour of the report.

"While making this general reservation, the Soviet delegation proposes to continue to uphold its own view in the General Commission, maintaining that the following classes of arms should be subject to qualitative disarmament : all guns and howitzers of calibre exceeding about 100 mm., firing shells weighing more than 16 kg. and having a range exceeding 15 km., and all armoured vehicles—tanks, cars, and trains."

range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians."

2. The Land Commission met on April 26th in response to the request thus addressed to it.

It was of opinion that generally for land materials the weapons which are "most efficacious against national defence" should be considered as being those whose character is "the most specifically offensive", and that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might thus be held to form one single criterion.

3. The Commission rapidly decided that, instead of dealing successively with the whole series of land armaments, it would, without prejudice to the question, be effecting a considerable saving of time if it confined its examination to certain of those armaments already designated as requiring special treatment under the concrete proposals submitted to the Conference.

That was the case as regards: (1) artillery, (2) armoured vehicles, (3) certain fortifications, (4) chemical warfare gases.

The General Commission having decided, at its meeting on May 10th last, to entrust the study of that last item to a special committee, the Land Commission was able to confine itself to the first three categories of armaments.

## I. ARTILLERY MATERIAL.

4. The general discussion which took place on the subject soon revealed the necessity of entrusting to a committee of experts the preliminary examination of certain technical aspects of the problem. That Committee, on which all the delegations were entitled to be represented, had to consider a questionnaire, to which it replied in the terms appearing in the documents attached hereto (documents Conf.D./C.T.8., 8a, 8b, and 8c (Appendix 1)).

5. The report of the Committee of Experts having been communicated to the Land Commission, the latter employed the material which it contained for the purpose of informing the General Commission. The discussion which took place on those lines resulted, on May 23rd, in the unanimous adoption of the following text:

"Basing its opinions upon the conclusions embodied in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire submitted to it, the Land Commission offers the following recommendations for consideration by the General Commission:

"(a) All artillery can be used for offensive and for defensive purposes, but its offensive capacity becomes greater as its effectiveness increases as far as defensive organisations and the civilian population are concerned—*i.e.*, with the increase of its power and its range.

"(b) Subject to such solutions as may hereafter be found by the General Commission for the questions raised by the fact that the fixed artillery of permanent fortifications and mobile artillery can be rendered interchangeable, the Land Commission is of opinion that the types of mobile artillery most threatening to national defence are those which are capable of destroying permanent fortifications of considerable strength, namely:

"(1) In the case of permanent fortifications of great strength, artillery of a calibre exceeding 320 mm. firing projectiles exceeding 500 kg. in weight.

"(2) In the case of permanent fortifications of medium strength, artillery of a calibre of about 250 mm. and above, firing projectiles exceeding 200 kg. in weight.

"(c) In a lower category of inferior power should be included pieces of a calibre between 250 and about 100 mm.<sup>1</sup>

"As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield.

"Artillery of a higher calibre—particularly of about 150 mm., which is the calibre most commonly employed—and up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive, is capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield, which can be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material. The necessary calibre may even reach 250 mm. when the time, personnel and material available have permitted the increase of the resisting power of the position.

<sup>1</sup> The German delegation includes under the terms "about 100 mm." guns of a calibre of 77 mm. and over.



“(d) It was not possible to obtain unanimity either as to the threatening character in relation to national defence of this second category of artillery (referred to in Section (c) above), nor as to the calibre above which this character exists.

“Whilst certain delegations consider that this category of artillery is more necessary<sup>1</sup> for national defence than threatening to it, a first group of other delegations places at about 100 mm. the limit above which artillery is threatening to national defence, a second group places it at 155 mm. and a third group at 220 mm.

“The lowest limit of calibre above which artillery possesses an essentially offensive character is, moreover, a relative one.<sup>2</sup>

“Certain delegations consider that the limit of calibre above which the artillery of a State is of an essentially offensive character is lower in proportion as the means at the disposal of the defender are weaker.

“Other delegations consider that the problem is more complex. In their opinion, the limit of calibre above which artillery need be regarded as possessing an essentially offensive character depends on the power (calibre and range) of the artillery capable of resisting it ; it also depends on the nature and the protection of the objectives on which it is to fire, and more generally on the whole of the activities brought to bear on the one side and on the other. This limit also depends on the strategic situation then existing, which situation generally varies according as the offensive is launched by a defender by way of counter-attack on an aggressor who has penetrated the defender's territory, or is undertaken by an aggressor with the intention of invading the territory of another State. Lastly, the limit in question also varies according to the nature of the system to which artilleries of higher calibre may be subjected.

“(e) As regards the third element of the resolution of the General Commission, the replies of the Technical Committee to questions 1 and 2 of Section III of the questionnaire lead to the conclusion that, in the view of certain delegations, artillery material of over 200 mm. calibre having an effective range of more than 25 km. is the most menacing to the civil population. Other delegations attribute this character to artillery of calibre over 105 mm. with an effective range of over 15 km. ; they would not go further than this figure, seeing that beyond that distance are situated objectives of military importance (places for the assembling of reserves, with motor transport, railway stations, air-ports, armament factories, etc.), for which, as regards the distance from the battle front, it is impossible, in existing circumstances, to indicate a limit, and that it is therefore necessary that in this zone the protection of the civil population should be regarded as more important than military requirements.

“Other delegations, on the other hand, think it necessary to include in the zone of the battlefield tactical reserves capable of joining in the battle in a few hours with the aid of motor transport and which may be 50 km. away from the front ; these delegations consider that artillery designed to fire beyond the corresponding range is more dangerous to the civil population than to military objectives, and is consequently the most menacing to the civil population.”

## II. ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES.

6. The Commission adopted for this category of material the same procedure as for artillery. A Committee of Experts was first requested to answer a series of technical questions relating to : (a) tanks, (b) armoured cars, (c) armoured trains, (d) mobile armoured cupolas. Its replies form the subject of document Conf.D./C.T.34 attached hereto (Appendix 2).

7. The question was then discussed in the Commission itself, with a view to extracting from those replies positive and practical conclusions which might be submitted to the General Commission.

Since, however, a very marked divergence of views had been apparent from the outset and since that divergence had diminished but little during the discussions, it seemed impossible to arrive at a unanimous vote in the matter, and the Commission deemed it preferable to state the main groups of opinion into which it was divided.

8. A first difficulty arose as regards the distinction to be established between tanks and armoured cars.

The Committee of Experts expressed itself on the subject as follows :

“Tanks and armoured cars are armoured and armed self-propelled vehicles. Although it is not possible to draw a precise technical distinction between tanks and armoured cars, it may be said that tanks possess to a higher degree the power of moving across any

<sup>1</sup> The delegations of Afghanistan, Germany, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Italy, Turkey and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics make a reservation in regard to this phrase on the ground that the terms of reference of the Land Commission, as defined in the General Commission's resolution, do not include the examination of the weapons necessary for national defence.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet delegation makes a reservation on this point on the ground that no reference should be made to this question of relativity.



terrain (due particularly to the use of tracks) and that they are capable, to a degree varying with the particular type, of crossing trenches and overthrowing obstacles. Armoured cars, on the other hand, are not specially designed with a view to their employment on an organised battlefield. There are two kinds of armoured car : one which keeps to the road, the other capable of moving across country.

"Some types of tanks, and especially armoured cars, are capable of great speed and a considerable radius of action."

9. A large number of delegations were of opinion, however, that it is possible to establish between the two categories of vehicles a clearer and more definite distinction. In their view, while it is difficult to find for such vehicles definitions applicable to all cases, owing to the fact that there is no clear technical distinction between light tanks and armoured cars, it may, however, generally speaking, be said that :

"Tanks are fully armoured, armed, self-propelled vehicles designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks, and to overcome obstacles encountered on the battlefield. They are primarily intended for employment actually on the battlefield, but the lighter types of tanks are also utilised for reconnaissance.

"Armoured cars are armoured, self-propelled, wheeled fighting vehicles primarily for employment on roads, with the possible addition of limited cross-country capacity conferred by multi wheels, four-wheel drive or semi-track device. Their chief characteristics are great range and speed on roads, but they have only a slight capacity for crossing trenches. Their rôle is reconnaissance and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position."

10. Some delegations pointed out that, failing a perfect scientific definition of the two categories of material under consideration, it might perhaps be possible to agree on a conventional definition, sufficient to specify the obligations to be assumed in regard to them.

11. Certain delegations consider that if a distinction was sought between tanks and armoured cars it should be sought rather in the direction of a difference of use than in that of a difference of definite technical characteristics. These delegations point out that, in such circumstances, in the absence of effective means of control it will always be possible to use these weapons for purposes different from those for which they were theoretically designed. In the opinion of these delegations, the only category of armoured vehicles of combat in regard to which a sufficiently definite technical distinction could be established would be that of armoured motor-cars which have not more than four wheels, only two of them being driving wheels, to the exclusion of caterpillars, and which are obliged to keep to roads.

12. The replies of the Committee of Experts relating to the characteristics of mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains received general endorsement from the Commission.

13. The Commission was, however, divided on the fundamental point as to whether, and if so to what extent, the different kinds of armoured vehicles answer to the criteria named in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

Various opinions, sometimes very divergent from one another, sometimes differing only on minor points, were expressed. In order to convey a faithful picture of them, and one which would at the same time be of practical assistance to the General Commission, the best plan would seem to be to consider in succession the four categories of vehicles with which the discussion dealt, and to note for each of those categories the main currents of opinion which appeared.

#### (1) *Tanks.*

14. A large number of delegations is of opinion that all tanks should be included in the list of weapons to which the resolution of April 22nd applies.

They consider that the possession of such vehicles considerably facilitates offensive operations based on surprise, operations which are in the highest degree dangerous to national defence. While recognising that other factors (such as the transport of infantry by means of motor vehicles of all kinds) may also play a part in surprise operations, supporters of the above-mentioned opinion consider that the danger presented in this respect by tanks is incomparably greater.

Several of them point out that even modern fortifications are exposed to the attack of tanks because, while it is always possible to protect fortified works sufficiently to resist those attacks by the use of natural or artificial obstacles, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the action of tanks may strengthen considerably infantry attacks against troops and objectives placed at intervals either in front of or between those works, and, on the other hand, that the establishment, which is always very costly, of a complete system of artificial obstacles for the protection of forts is impossible in peace-time in certain districts, such as those under cultivation.



Certain delegations point out, moreover, that if, as the Committee of Experts<sup>1</sup> has stated, even light tanks can usually cross trenches and make breaches in the usual wire entanglements of the battlefield, while they are capable of effective action against certain strong organisations of the latter, that statement is particularly disturbing to countries which do not possess the necessary anti-tank weapons, or do not possess any tanks.

It has been pointed out within the same group of delegates that whatever the utility that tanks might sometimes offer for defensive purposes,<sup>2</sup> the menace which they constitute to the defence within the hands of the aggressor outweigh the advantages which they might confer on the defence, and that, in any case, such a menace was sufficiently serious to be regarded as decisive.

15. All the delegations belonging to the first group agree that tanks, of whatever type, are particularly efficacious against national defence and should, in consequence, be regarded as specifically offensive. These delegations cease to be unanimous, however, when it comes to deciding whether tanks should be included among the weapons most dangerous to civilians. Some delegations affirm that that is the case. They point out that tanks, owing to their mobility, enable the aggressor, either by stealing a march on the adversary or by outflanking his defences, to penetrate deep into the country invaded and not only to expose the civilian population to grave material danger but also to produce so intense a psychological effect as seriously to cripple the defence and even in the end to render it impossible.

Others, on the contrary, are of opinion that tanks, considered in themselves, and unless the party employing them can be credited with an illicit intention of terrorising the civilian population, do not constitute particularly dangerous weapons, since their action can be regulated with precision and confined to the military objectives deliberately selected.

16. A second large group of delegations establishes between tanks distinctions based essentially on the criterion of weight and includes among the weapons to which the resolution of April 22nd applies only tanks exceeding a certain tonnage.

17. Those delegations—like the delegations belonging to the previous group—admit that the principal danger of armoured fighting vehicles to the national defence lies in their power to carry out a surprise attack with the intention of delivering a rapid knock-out blow. They point out that, with the help of tanks, for example, a surprise attack carried out at the beginning of a war of aggression, when neither occupied permanent fortifications nor an organised battlefield exist, acquires a greatly enhanced degree of effectiveness, power of penetration and chance of success.

They hold, however, that this power of surprise is not confined to tanks, but is shared by armoured cars and even by commercial motor vehicles converted to military uses.

18. For the purposes mentioned above, tanks, they add, possess, in varying degrees, the characteristics of speed and radius of action, armour, and a capacity for carrying arms and for passing over or reducing obstacles. Each of those factors affects the weight of the vehicle, weight thus constituting the principal element whereby the power of the latter may be determined with any precision.

19. On the basis of this criterion distinctions may be established, which some delegations define as follows :

(a) Heavy tanks of a weight from about 25 tons upwards. These are heavily armed and armoured vehicles of sufficient weight and solidity to give them great powers of crushing obstacles and with comparatively wide trench-crossing capacity, which increases in proportion to their size.

(b) Medium tanks of a weight between about 20 tons and about 10 tons. These are less heavily armed and comparatively lightly armoured vehicles with considerably restricted trench-crossing capacity and limited crushing power. Their special characteristics of range and speed render them of great value as a mobile reserve and in counter-attack against troops which have pierced a defensive position.

(c) Light tanks (below 10 tons in weight), with which may be included armoured cars. These are lightly armed and armoured scouting vehicles essentially designed for reconnaissance.

---

<sup>1</sup> The United Kingdom delegation in the Committee of Experts, dissented from this statement unless the trenches had been previously damaged by shell fire.

<sup>2</sup> The Italian and Soviet delegations, reiterating a reservation which they had already put forward in connection with the text relating to artillery material, expressed the opinion that any decision as to the arms required for the purposes of national defence was outside the Land Commission's competence.

20. Taking account of these observations and taking account also of the nature of the defensive organisations likely to be encountered on a modern battlefield, as well as of the frontier defences, which vary very greatly in strength as between different States, the delegations belonging to the second group are of opinion that the heaviest category—namely, tanks of a weight from approximately 20 to 25 tons upwards—possess offensive qualities to a degree which should render them liable to qualitative disarmament within the meaning of the resolution of April 22nd.

On the other hand, they are of opinion that tanks of a lower weight are definitely less offensive in character and should not come under such a regime. Certain delegations stressed, in this connection, the police purposes for which light tanks are employed in some countries and their great value in the maintenance of public order.<sup>1</sup>

21. In the view of delegations belonging to the second group, tanks, whatever their type, are not particularly dangerous to civilians. They can, on the other hand, be employed for attacking military objectives, even beyond the battlefield, with a minimum of accidental risks for the said civilians.

22. The French delegation expressed its views in the following terms :

“ The following opinion, based upon the conclusions (document D./C.T.34 (Appendix 2)) contained in the replies of the Committee of Experts to the questionnaire addressed to it by the Land Commission, is submitted by the French delegation to the General Commission for consideration :

“ A. No armoured fighting vehicle of the nature of those contemplated for armies in the field is capable of assaulting a modern fortified work of even medium strength. Only tanks specially designed for this purpose and of a minimum weight of 70 tons could be effective against permanent fortifications. The same applies to armoured trains carrying artillery capable of similar effective action—*i.e.*, of a calibre exceeding 250 mm.

“ B. Apart from tanks and armoured trains possessing the above defined characteristics, there is no technical reason for stating that armoured fighting vehicles are more specifically offensive, more efficacious against national defence or more threatening to civilians than any other means of warfare.

“ 1. As regards efficaciousness against national defence, armoured fighting vehicles are used, not only by an aggressor desiring to invade the territory of another State and penetrating more or less far into that territory according to the mobility, speed and radius of action of the said vehicles, but also in counter-offensive operations conducted by a defender on the front, flanks or rear of an aggressor who has penetrated into his territory and entrenched himself there. The characteristics as regards armament, armour, mobility, the power of crossing obstacles and the radius of action of these vehicles, most of which are primarily intended to accompany the infantry and to save it from losses, correspond to the prevalent conditions in both cases.

“ The use of armoured vehicles, particularly tanks, in the course of a defensive action is, moreover, tending to become more and more important :

“ (a) In order to support a counter-attack when it is difficult to provide artillery support owing to ignorance of the exact position of the assailant and the point of departure of the infantry making the counter-attack ;

“ (b) Because the anti-tank weapons which are being perfected can easily, in an organised position, be arranged so as to provide a complete and effective system of defence, whereas it is much more difficult for them to accompany an offensive, so that troops which are attacking are more vulnerable to the armoured vehicles of the defenders than troops established in a defensive position are to the tanks of the attackers ;

“ (c) In the defence of a permanent system of fortification, to act as mobile fortresses capable, thanks to prepared routes, of advancing to any points which are particularly threatened or of stopping any breach which may be made by the assailant in the defensive arrangements.

“ The fact that the last-mentioned use is strictly defensive, requiring heavily armed and armoured tanks which are consequently very heavy and can with difficulty be moved away from the area prepared for their action suffices to show that any discrimination between armoured vehicles according to weight, designed to prove that the heaviest tanks are most offensive, would not be technically justified. It is, moreover, impossible to make distinctions based upon the question of weight, as it is well known that very light tanks have been able to exercise effective action against important battlefield constructions. On the other hand, if tanks are exposed to the action of anti-tank weapons or enemy tanks, it may

---

<sup>1</sup> The Italian and Soviet delegations are of opinion that the question of the utilisation of tanks for police purposes and the maintenance of order is outside the competence of the Disarmament Conference.



be necessary for their own protection, whether passive (armour) or active (armament), that their weight should be considerably increased if they are to be usefully employed on the field of battle, without reference to the offensive or defensive character of such employment.

“Armoured fighting vehicles of less than 70 tons in weight and armoured trains with armaments of a calibre inferior to 250 mm. cannot therefore be regarded as being offensive rather than defensive in purpose, and cannot be included among the weapons *most* menacing to national defence.

“2. As regards the characteristic of being threatening to civilians, armoured vehicles, with the exception of armoured trains, as to which the reply must depend upon the artillery which they carry, should be regarded as among the weapons least menacing to civilian populations. The small range of their guns and the fact that they are normally only employed against visible military objectives enable them to concentrate entirely on the objective, with the least risk of accident for the neighbouring civilian population.”

## (2) *Armoured Cars.*

23. Certain delegations declared themselves in favour of including armoured cars of all types in the list of weapons covered by the resolution of April 22nd. They point out that, like tanks, armoured cars considerably facilitate surprise actions, that they may sometimes prove effective against field works and, furthermore, that their suitability for rapid penetration into the interior of a country makes them threatening to civilians.

All these delegations belong to the group which classes all tanks among the most specifically offensive weapons. It should be noted that the converse is not true.

24. Some of the delegations, which hold that all tanks should be subject to qualitative disarmament, adopted the formula submitted by the Netherlands delegation according to which armoured cars should only be regarded as most specifically offensive when they were “provided with special appliances rendering them capable of being used on the battlefield”.

25. Other delegations, finally, while in favour of including all tanks in the list of specially offensive weapons, unreservedly excluded armoured cars.

26. This is naturally the conclusion arrived at on the latter point by those delegations which refuse to include tanks in the category of weapons covered by the resolution of April 22nd, or which include only the heaviest tanks weighing from about 20 to 25 tons or more.

27. It was urged in support of this view that the effectiveness of armoured cars against organisations of the battlefield is very limited; that it is usually easy, when armoured cars are confined to the road, to paralyse their offensive action by cutting the routes they have to use; that they cannot go far away from the troops with which they are operating; that they are only lightly armoured, and, finally, that certain countries regard them as essential for maintaining order in the vast territories under their jurisdiction.

## (3) *Mobile Cupolas and Armoured Trains.*

28. According to the Committee of Experts, the above “are only effective against entrenchments, field works, etc., in so far as the guns which they carry are able to reach them”. In the Committee’s opinion “mobile cupolas are not capable of any action outside the battlefield. As regards armoured trains, their possibilities of action against military objectives outside the battlefield and against the civil population depend on the range of their artillery and the action of any personnel they may carry.”

29. Generally speaking, the Commission adopted this view and therefore concluded that neither armoured trains nor mobile cupolas correspond to the criteria laid down in the resolution of April 22nd. Some delegations, however, took the opposite view.

## (4) *General Remarks.*

30. The Committee then discussed the difficulties which might arise if motor vehicles normally used for agricultural or commercial purposes could be converted into armoured fighting vehicles.

31. Some delegations felt that it would be useless to prohibit or restrict the light classes of tanks and armoured cars, in view of the ease with which these could be replaced, after effecting a few changes, by certain vehicles used for economic purposes.

32. Other delegations applied the argument to all armoured fighting vehicles. They urged, further, that, if these vehicles were subjected to qualitative disarmament, countries possessing a powerful metallurgical industry would be given an advantage and might possibly have an incentive to encourage the construction of non-military vehicles containing certain features which, it might justifiably be said, would enable them more adequately to discharge their pacific mission but which were really planned with a view to facilitating their conversion to military purposes.

33. Other delegations held that, though industrial development undoubtedly enhanced the military potentialities of a country, the importance attached by some parties to the agricultural tractor as a possible weapon was highly exaggerated. Such a vehicle would always be definitely less effective than an appliance specially constructed for fighting purposes.

34. Certain delegations asked that the attention of the General Commission should be drawn to this point. In the words of the motion submitted by the Polish delegation, they held that :

“Should the General Commission decide to apply certain measures of qualitative disarmament to tanks, it would be absolutely essential to take simultaneous action with a view to preventing :

“(1) The conversion of agricultural and other tractors into tanks ;

“(2) The utilisation of tractor factories for the manufacture of tanks.”

### III. FORTIFICATIONS.

The German delegation submitted a note expressing its point of view on this question to the Land Commission.

Certain other delegations also submitted, in writing, their observations on this proposal. The Commission, realising that it would be extremely difficult for it to arrive at practical conclusions for the time being on this point, decided to forward to the General Commission the above-mentioned documents for any necessary action (document Conf.D./C.T.46 attached) (Appendix 3).

#### Appendix 1.

Conf. D./C.T.8, 8(a), 8(b), 8(c).

#### REPLY BY THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE LAND COMMISSION CONCERNING ARTILLERY.

##### I.

(1) *What is meant by fixed and mobile artillery ?*

Fixed artillery includes all artillery which, in view of its special technical construction, cannot, without the use of special appliances or materials, be used outside the fortified land or sea frontier position in which it was originally placed.

Mobile artillery includes all artillery except artillery which is covered by the above definition.

(2) *What are the existing possibilities of rendering fixed artillery mobile and vice versa ?*

Generally speaking, the guns of fixed and mobile artillery can be made interchangeable. The convertibility of fixed artillery to mobile use depends primarily upon the mount required for mobile use. The time element involved depends upon the kind and amount of preparation, the size of the gun, the existence storage and distribution of the mounts, and the availability of means of handling the material. This time element varies from a few hours, if mobile mounts are in existence, to two or three months if no prior preparation has been made (assuming that the country concerned has sufficiently developed metallurgical industry). In the absence of such an industry, rapid conversion would not be possible unless the necessary material were already in store.



## II.

(1) *What are the characteristics of artillery necessary for effective action against the essential organs of permanent fortifications (a) weight of the projectile, (b) weight of explosive, (c) calibre, etc. ?*

Field artillery of all calibres may be employed in attacking fortified works ; it may be used against the intervals between forts and, in particular, against unprotected personnel or material, or it may, in exceptional cases, produce some effect on the armament of one of the works—for example, by a fortunate direct hit on or in an embrasure.

But in order to break down a system of permanent fortification, it is indispensable to destroy at least a certain number of its essential works. The efficacy of artillery against the permanent fortification therefore depends on the degree of strength of the essential works of such fortification and the penetrating power of the projectiles which may be employed for the purpose.<sup>1</sup>

Taking these two factors into account, the following may be distinguished :

(a) Permanent fortification of *great strength* (thickness of concrete about 2 m., armouring or organisations under rock). — In order to act effectively against the essential elements of such fortification use must be made of projectiles weighing more than 500 kg. and calibres over 320.

(b) Permanent fortification of *average strength* (thickness of concrete about 1 m., or depth of earth of more than 2 m.). — The characteristics of the guns required to act effectively against the essential elements of this fortification are, in accordance with the data given in the artillery rules of various States as a result of experience, at least the following :

Weight of projectile about 200 kg.  
Weight of explosive about 35 kg.  
Calibre about 250 mm.  
Range at least 10 km.

(c) Permanent fortification with *little protection* (thickness of concrete less than 1 m., or thickness of earth less than 2 m.). — Against this kind of permanent fortification variable results may be obtained according to the kind of projectile, the nature of the fire (flat trajectory or high-angle trajectory), thickness of earth or concrete, with calibres varying from 105 to the calibres defined in paragraph (b) above.

(2) *What are the characteristics of artillery necessary for effective action against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield ?*

As a rule, artillery of a calibre up to about 100 mm. can only be effectively used against the least strongly protected personnel and objectives of the battlefield.

Artillery of a higher calibre—particularly of about 150 mm., which is the calibre most commonly employed—and up to a calibre of 220 mm. inclusive, is capable of effective action against most entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield which can be organised and constructed in a short time with limited personnel and material.

When the time, personnel and material at the disposal of the defence are increased, the degree of resistance of the position may be that of permanent fortification with little protection (II, 1, c), and require the same means for its reduction.

## III.

(1) *In modern warfare, what is the depth over which the troops and services and their equipment engaged in battle are distributed ?*

(a) *Reply of the Belgian Delegation :*

In modern warfare :

(1) The depth of the field of battle may extend to about 20 km. ;

(2) The depth over which troops and services and their equipment capable of being engaged in the battle within one day are distributed is 50 km. or more.

---

<sup>1</sup> As an indication, we may mention that the 155 projectile, weighing 43 kg., has a penetrating power in concrete of only 45 cm. ; the 280 projectile, weighing 200 kg. with 36 kg. of explosive, penetrates only 65 cm. into concrete. The armoured cupolas can be effectively attacked only with the 320 at least. Finally, to reach a depth in the ground of 2 m. in average soil, at least 220 is required.

(b) *Reply of the Austrian, Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, Italian and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Delegations:*

The depth over which the troops and services and their equipment to be regarded as engaged in the battle are distributed is 15 km. and may extend to about 20 km. on either side.

Beyond that distance are situated objectives of military importance (places for the assembling of reserves, with motor transport, railway stations, air ports, armament factories, etc.) for which, as regards the distance from the battle front, it is impossible, in existing circumstances, to indicate a limit.

(c) *Reply of the following Delegations: Brazil, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, United States of America, Yugoslavia:*

The troops engaged in the battle are distributed over a depth of about 20 km.

Beyond that distance and up to about 50 km. from the front line there may be essential military objectives such as tactical reserves, which, if motor transport is available and roads are practicable, may be placed 50 km. from the line, while still being capable of use at a required point within five or six hours. Depots, and especially ammunition dumps, are normally at similar distances.

To sum up, the depth over which the troops and their services and equipment engaged in the battle are distributed is 15 to 25 km., if one does not include tactical mechanised reserves and munition depots, and may reach 50 km. if one includes them.

(2) *What are the characteristics of the artillery capable of firing beyond that depth?*

For firing beyond the depth over which the troops and services and their equipment engaged in a battle are distributed, it is necessary to have guns with a range amounting to that depth plus the distance of the gun emplacements of one of the parties from the front line of the other party. This distance is at least 10 per cent of the range. This distance may be as much as 10 km. in the case of guns on railway mountings, or when practicable means of communication are insufficient, or when the artillery must be distributed in depth, particularly when on the defensive.

Considering the minimum distance as 10 per cent of the range and considering the effective range of normally constructed guns at present existing, it is to be observed that:

(a) Only guns of over 105 mm. calibre have a range of 15 km. beyond the front line;

(b) Only guns of over 155 mm. calibre have a range of 20 km. beyond the front line;

(c) Only guns of over 200 mm. calibre have a range of 25 km. beyond the front line.

As regards ranges of 50 km. beyond the front line, there is no technical obstacle to the construction of a gun with such ranges.

If the characteristics of such a gun, which is not a current model, had to be determined, it would be necessary to consult specialists in artillery construction. This would also be necessary in order to ascertain what general restrictions should be imposed to prevent abnormal ranges being obtained with any calibre.

---

LETTER FROM GENERAL VAN TUINEN, EXPERT OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION, TO THE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS OF THE LAND COMMISSION RELATING TO  
QUESTION 2, SECTION II OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONNAIRE.

In order to avoid holding up our work, I will not raise any objection at the moment to the reply given to Question 2 of Section II.

I should like to state, however, that in my opinion this reply differs to an appreciable extent from the question asked and is too similar to the reply given to Question 1 of this same Section. Question 2 does not, I think, refer to the organs of permanent or semi-permanent fortifications, but merely to temporary works constructed on the battlefield—that is to say, more or less hastily. There is thus a clear distinction between the artillery necessary for effective action against those objectives and the artillery intended to be used against fortifications of a permanent or semi-permanent character.

In my opinion it is not necessary to contemplate the destruction of concrete shelters on the battlefield selected by the aggressor, as, including the time needed for their construction,



it would take four or five weeks for the concrete to harden sufficiently. Field works with such elaborate entrenchments which could withstand the aggressor's fire to that extent could not be made in time in an invaded territory. In such a case, therefore, we should only have to deal with constructions organised in *war time* on the national soil—which means that they would be of a purely defensive character—and against which a strengthening of the means of aggression would be contrary to our efforts in the matter of disarmament.

Consequently, I am of opinion that the characteristics of the guns necessary for effective action against entrenchments, etc., of an improvised character to which, I think, Question 2 refers, are : 155 mm. maximum calibre, 45 kg. maximum weight of projectile, with 9 kg. of explosive.

---

NOTE BY THE DELEGATIONS OF NORWAY AND SWEDEN CONCERNING THE REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO SECTION III, QUESTION I, OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONNAIRE.

The delegations of Norway and Sweden consider that :

The words of the questionnaire “ engaged in the battle ” should not be interpreted as meaning “ capable of becoming engaged in the battle ” and should only refer to troops situated on the battlefield itself ;

The depth over which these troops are distributed is generally from 15 to 20 km. on either side, according to the number of troops engaged ; and

Troops situated at such a distance from the battlefield that they could not be engaged in the battle without motor transport—the possibility of which depends in any case on the road system and the state of the existing roads at a given moment—should not be regarded as “ engaged in the battle ”.

Nevertheless, those delegations, recognising that in its summary the text of the majority of the delegations states that the depth of the true battlefield is from 15 to 25 km. if these more distant troops are not reckoned, and wishing to facilitate as far as possible unanimity among the experts, have thought it proper to accept this majority text.

---

**Appendix 2.**

Conf.D./C.T.34.

REPLY OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE LAND COMMISSION CONCERNING ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES.

(I) *What are the general characteristics of :*

- (a) *tanks,*
- (b) *armoured cars of all kinds,*
- (c) *mobile armoured cupolas,*
- (d) *armoured trains ?*

(a) and (b). Tanks and armoured cars are armoured<sup>1</sup> and armed self-propelled vehicles. Although it is not possible to draw a precise technical distinction between tanks and armoured cars, it may be said that tanks possess to a higher degree the power of moving across any terrain (due particularly to the use of tracks) and that they are capable, to a degree varying with the particular type, of crossing trenches and overthrowing obstacles. Armoured cars, on the other hand, are not specially designed with a view to their employment on an organised battlefield. There are two kinds of armoured car : one which keeps to the road, the other capable of moving across country.

Some types of tanks and especially armoured cars are capable of great speed and considerable radius of action.

(c) *Mobile armoured cupolas.* — As distinct from armoured cars, mobile cupolas have remarkable characteristics as regards armour and equipment, but their mobility is very limited. They are, in short, a kind of heavy tank with very limited mobility.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Committee agreed that the word “ armoured ” must be reasonably understood by “ as well armoured as possible ”. In other words, the given definition could not apply to a partially-armoured vehicle. The United Kingdom delegation would have preferred that this idea should be conveyed by the words “ fully armoured ”, but the word “ fully ”, which is not as strong as “ completely ”, would have been difficult to translate into French. In these circumstances, in order that the two texts should correspond, the United Kingdom delegation has agreed to withdraw their proposal, subject to the present explanation being given.

Like heavy tanks themselves, they are specially suitable either for filling the gaps in the permanent defensive organisation or, in the defence of a position, for blocking up a breach in which the enemy may have penetrated.

(d) *Armoured trains.* — Armoured trains are very powerful, armed and strongly equipped weapons ; but instead of being able to cross any ground their movement depends upon the existence of a railway. They are particularly suitable for the defence of land frontiers and sea coasts.

(2) *What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against permanent fortifications ? Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the latter ?*

No armoured machine of the nature of those contemplated for armies in the field is capable of assaulting a modern fortified work of even average strength,

Moreover, any modern system of fortification exposed to attack by tanks can be rendered almost invulnerable to their attack by the use of natural obstacles or by the construction of artificial obstacles or defences (deep, wide ditches, blocks of concrete, mines, etc.).

In answer to Question II(a) and (b), therefore, it may be said that no armoured fighting vehicle will be effective for assault against a permanent system of fortifications provided that a complete system of natural or artificial obstacles exists.

As regards armoured trains, their action is no more and no less than that of the artillery which they carry.

#### Notes.

1. The French delegation consider that the attack of permanent fortifications can only be attempted by tanks armoured powerfully enough to be proof against projectiles shot by weapons mounted in first-line fortifications.

They consider that such tanks would weigh at least 100 tons ; the lowest weight of tanks of this kind, making very ample allowance for possible technical improvement in construction, may be put at 70 tons.

2. The delegations of Austria, United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden add the following explanation to the reply given by the Committee :

While the destruction and neutralisation of the fortified works and artillery of the defence are the task of the heavy and super-heavy artillery, it is for tanks to assist the infantry in attacking troops and other objectives distributed in front of the fortifications and between them.

This being so, as regards the attack of permanent fortifications also, tanks take on a character menacing to national defence which increases in proportion to their weight and capabilities.

3. The delegations of Austria, Hungary, Italy and Netherlands add the following explanation to the reply given by the Committee :

The preparation of a complete system of artificial obstacles as here described against attack by tanks would in a number of cases be impossible in a line of permanent fortifications situated in cultivated country. In such cases, even a modern system of fortifications would, at the beginning of a war, be very vulnerable to attack by tanks.

Furthermore, the addition to a system of permanent fortifications of artificial obstacles to attack by tanks would involve supplementary expenditure which would often be very considerable.

(3) *What is the effectiveness of the various categories of the above against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield ? Is there any type of these appliances incapable of breaking through the elements of national defence referred to above ?*

Tanks are capable of effective action on an organised field of battle, and some armoured cars are capable of such action where the organisations are improvised or not continuous.<sup>1</sup>

Even light tanks can usually cross trenches and make breaches in the usual wire entanglements of the battlefield. It is asserted that very light tanks (7 tons) have been capable of effective action against strongly organised battlefields.

If, however, tanks are exposed to the fire of anti-tank weapons or enemy tanks, their own protection, whether passive (armour), or active (armament), may involve a considerable

<sup>1</sup> The German, Hungarian and Soviet delegations add to this paragraph that this applies particularly in the case of a defence which does not dispose of adequate anti-tank weapons and tanks.



increase in their weight if they are to be used effectively in defence as well as offence on the battlefield.<sup>1</sup>

Armoured cupolas and trains are only effective against entrenchments, field works, etc., in so far as the guns which they carry are able to reach them.

(4) *Are there any characteristics of armoured fighting vehicles which make them specially menacing:*

(a) *to the civil population;*

(b) *to military objectives outside the zone of the battlefield properly so-called?*

(a) and (b). — If we exclude the hypothesis of direct and deliberate action, contrary to international law, against the civil population, tanks and armoured cars could only be specially menacing to them if, when acting against military objectives, they risked at the same time injuring the civil population.

On the contrary, since they can act only at very short range and generally against visible objectives, which makes them as accurate as can be desired, they can attack military objectives even outside the zone of the battlefield with less risk to the civil population than is represented by aeroplane and artillery projectiles, which can much more easily fall on some point other than the objective aimed at. This characteristic, together with their speed and radius of action, makes certain armoured fighting vehicles particularly suited to attack military objectives outside the battlefield, and enables the battle to be extended to the rear and flanks of the forces engaged. All motor-driven vehicles<sup>2</sup> of similar speed and radius of action which are able to carry troops also possess this quality in varying degrees. The essential quality to carry out such missions is the mobility of the vehicle. So long as the fire-power can be conveyed to the place required, it is immaterial whether the conveyance is itself armoured and armed or not.

Mobile cupolas are not capable of any action outside the battlefield. As regards armoured trains, their possibilities of action against military objectives outside the battlefield and against the civil population depend on the range of their artillery and the action of any personnel they may carry.

(5) *To what extent and in what time can any vehicle be converted into:*

(a) *a tank;*

(b) *an armoured car;*

(c) *an armoured train?*

(a) and (b). — There exist in many countries a considerable number of vehicles, tracked or otherwise, which could rapidly be turned into tanks or armoured cars.

A converted tractor would be less efficient than a tank constructed as such.<sup>3</sup> For constructional reasons they are unlikely to be fitted with turrets, unless special arrangements have been made for this purpose, and therefore all-round fire would not be practicable.

<sup>1</sup> The United Kingdom delegation substitutes for the first three paragraphs the following text:

“The effectiveness of tanks against entrenchments, field works and other objectives of the battlefield depends upon their ability to cross ditches and trenches. As the object of the question is to elicit the performance of these vehicles without the assistance of other weapons, it is assumed that the ditches and trenches have not already been partially destroyed by shell-fire. The following are examples of the capacity of different types of tanks:

“A tank of about 35 tons is required to cross a gap from 2.4 to 3 metres wide. A tank of 16 tons could, under favourable circumstances, cross a gap 2.2 metres wide. A tank below 10 tons in weight is not capable of crossing a gap more than 1.5 metre wide.

“It will be seen from the above that tanks below 10 tons are incapable of crossing any but the most narrow field entrenchments. Armoured cars, on the other hand, are usually incapable of crossing any undamaged trench.”

<sup>2</sup> The German and Soviet delegations make the following observations as regards the end of this paragraph, from the words: “All motor-driven vehicles”:

“It is impossible to make a comparison between an ordinary motor conveyance and tanks or armoured cars. It is of decisive importance that tanks should be armoured, that they should be able to move off the roads, that they should possess weapons always in readiness for firing, and that all these qualities should be contained in as small a space as possible.

“The same may be said in a lesser degree of armoured cars the effectiveness of which is very much greater than that of any other motor-car.

“The possibility of attacking military objectives outside the battlefield properly so-called and of extending thus the battle to the rear and flanks of the forces engaged in front depends, taking into account purely military considerations, on the protection which can be given to convoys of troops by tanks and armoured cars.”

These delegations interpret in this sense the last two sentences of the second paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> Some delegations consider that certain types of tractor, however, may be more efficient after conversion than tanks of old patterns.

Armoured cars could be improvised to a degree of effectiveness comparable to that of an armoured car designed for the purpose. The road speed and fighting capability would possibly be less, but, as armoured cars are primarily vehicles for reconnaissance, improvised cars would adequately fulfil this duty.

It is understood that the possibility of effecting the conversions mentioned above, and the effectiveness of such converted vehicles, depends essentially on the industrial resources of each country.

The time required for conversion would depend upon the existence of semi-skilled labour, engineering resources and suitable armour in stock. The manufacture of bullet-proof plate is a lengthy process, but even if none were available, ordinary mild steel plate, which can readily be obtained commercially, might be employed as an improvised measure and, by increasing the thickness, sufficient bullet-proof protection could be achieved. A certain amount of protection can be given to a vehicle in a few hours if the necessary technical preparations have been made beforehand.

As a general rule, the time is less for a given vehicle in proportion as :

(a) More complete arrangements have been made at the time of its construction to facilitate the conversion,

(b) The conversion has been more completely prepared especially as regards the stock of essential parts and necessary engineering resources.

Under favourable circumstances the production in quantity of tanks, improvised on these lines, could commence within three weeks, and that of armoured cars within a week or ten days.<sup>1</sup>

If engineering resources and the necessary armour-plating are available, a train could be armoured within a few weeks. However, the organisation of an armoured train, specially equipped with powerful artillery, would require a longer time and a considerable previous stock of special material.

---

### Appendix 3.

Conf. D/C.T.46.

#### EXAMINATION OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION OF APRIL 22ND, 1932 (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)) : DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE AND DRAFT REPLY CONCERNING FORTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

##### *Introduction.*

The German delegation has taken as the basis of its draft questionnaire and replies, given below, the following general question :

“ Supposing one State either (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression or (b) undertakes offensive operations against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character, and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy, or those operations, to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion ? ”

The delegation was, moreover, guided by the following paragraph of the report of Sub-Commission A to which it desires to draw the attention of the Land Commission :

“ The category of organisations which can only be used for territorial defence cannot be said to include :

“ (1) Organisations the principal purpose of which is obviously to enable long-range artillery or air attack to be brought to bear on the communications of a neighbouring country or its exposed points near the frontier, and which are not indisputably justified by the necessity of protecting specially exposed points in the country concerned.”

.....

---

<sup>1</sup> The Italian delegation is of opinion that in view of the great variety of ordinary vehicles that may lend themselves to conversion into armoured fighting vehicles, which in turn vary greatly in the multiplicity of their characteristics, it does not seem possible to fix exact or even approximate limits for the possibility of such conversion and the time it will require.



*Questionnaire and Replies.*

*Question 1.* — What are the characteristics of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the extreme limit of their organisations) which must be considered as offensive and which constitute a threat to the national defence of the neighbouring State ?

With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration :

- (a) The possibility of accommodating troops and material for the purposes of an attack ;
- (b) The range and efficacy of their artillery ;
- (c) Distance from the frontier.

*Reply.* — The Land Commission considers the “ extreme limit ” of the organisations of a fortress to be the points at which the most advanced organisations of any kind capable of firing are situated.

(a) Any fortress, owing to its considerable possibilities for lodging and protecting troops, enables men and material to be held in reserve. It follows that, in addition to its defensive importance, it must be regarded as having offensive possibilities, which are the more important in proportion as the frontier is near.

(b) If the range of the artillery in the fortress is sufficient for effective fire across the frontier of the neighbouring State, it will prejudice that State's defence. The effect against that defence is naturally increased in the case of guns of large calibre.

(c) If a fortress is so close to the frontier that the troops assembled there can rapidly cross the frontier of the neighbouring State by starting from the extreme limit of the fortress, and if the range of the artillery enables it to fire across the frontier, the fortress must be regarded as specifically offensive and threatening to national defence.

*Question 2.* — What are the characteristic features of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the extreme limit of their organisations) which constitute a threat to the civilian population of the neighbouring country ?

With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration :

- (a) The moral effect on the population of the neighbouring country in peace time ;
- (b) The range and efficacy of their artillery, with special reference to populous territories and to dense populations and to their vital centres and centres of communication ;
- (c) Distance from the frontier.

*Reply.* — (a) The qualities referred to under 1 are sufficient to be a considerable menace to the population of the neighbouring State. The mere idea of a sudden and unforeseen attack by the troops of the aggressor and the fear that the national defence may be paralysed produces an unfavourable moral effect upon the civilian population.

(b) This menace is all the greater when, owing to the range and effectiveness of the fortress's artillery, the life of the civilian population of the neighbouring State, its residential and business places and its centres of communication are threatened, and when the frontier territory in question is densely populated or industrial.

(c) As regards the distance of a fortress from the frontier, the remarks contained under 1 (c) also apply as regards the threat to civilians.

*Question 3.* — What is the influence of the characteristics mentioned under 1 and 2, when

(a) The opponent has no permanent fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works or has only weak fortifications, etc. ;

(b) The opponent can rely only on prepared or improvised field fortifications for the defence ?

*Reply.* — (a) When there are no permanent fortifications or even weak fortifications on the frontier territory of the neighbouring State, the qualities referred to under 1 and 2 are all the more important in proportion as a surprise attack from a fortress close to the frontier, meeting with no prepared resistance, might penetrate deeply into the country ; it would thus be not only most efficacious against national defence but also particularly threatening to civilians.

(b) The same remarks apply where the other party has only prepared or improvised field fortifications, since the defensive power of such fortifications is much less than that of permanent fortifications ; the former, owing in particular to the possibility of a surprise attack by a fortress close to the frontier, must be distant from the frontier and cannot be completed, occupied and put in a state of defence within the time necessary.

*Conclusion.*

It follows from the above that fortresses possessing such characteristics are of an offensive nature, that they are specially efficacious against national defence and particularly threatening to civilians.

*Observations by the Afghan Delegation.*

The Afghan delegation, in its declaration of April 26th, stated that :

“ Although, generally, fortifications on the frontier lines of countries are constructed for defensive purposes, those which may be situated opposite countries which have no means of defence and no fortifications comparable with those of their neighbouring countries can more directly command the other's frontiers, and should be counted within the sphere of aggressive means and measures.”

At this time, when all the resolutions adopted by the Land Commission are in course of being collectively submitted to the General Commission, the Afghan delegation reaffirms its previous statement and emphasises that the very existence of strongly protected fortresses, with their connected means of communication near the frontiers of a less-protected country with no possible means of adequate communications, is efficacious against national defence and threatening to the civilians of that neighbouring country, and this danger is further increased by the possibility of a sudden attack being launched from such fortifications.

With this point of view, the Afghan delegation supports the above draft reply submitted by the German delegation.

*Observations by the Argentine Delegation.*

The Argentine delegation does not consider it necessary to formulate, for its part, observations on the questionnaire submitted by the German delegation on the subject of fortifications near frontiers, as the Argentine Republic has no permanent fortifications on the frontiers which it has in common with Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay, respectively.

The Argentine Republic, faithful to its pacific sentiments, signed a treaty with the Republic of Chile on July 23rd, 1881, delimiting their frontiers in the south, and in that treaty perpetual neutrality and the free navigation of the Strait of Magellan for all the flags of the world are established in the following terms :

“ To secure this freedom and neutrality, no fortification or military defence work capable of endangering the object in view shall be constructed ”.

*Observations of the Belgian Delegation.*

1. The Belgian delegation is of opinion that no permanent fortification is to be regarded as particularly offensive or as representing a threat to the defence of the neighbouring State.

The military power of a State consists of two factors : its field army and its fortresses.

In order to conduct an offensive war and threaten the defence of the neighbouring State, it is necessary to invade the territory of that State. In such an operation, only the field army is concerned ; fortresses, being fixed, have no appreciable influence.

On the other hand, in the conduct of a defensive war, the fortresses have to be reduced by the aggressor just as much as the field army, and hence represent a factor highly favourable to the national defence.

Fortresses are almost valueless in offensive warfare, but most valuable in defensive warfare, because their reduction immobilises large attacking forces.

Consequently, the more purely defensive are the intentions of a country, the greater will be the proportion of its resources that it devotes to fortresses ; and, on the other hand, if its intentions are aggressive, it will keep almost all its resources for the field army.

2. The Belgian delegation is further of opinion that the fortifications of a State do not constitute a threat to the population of a neighbouring State unless the range of their artillery enables it to fire across the frontier.

It must be observed that modern fortifications are provided with artillery only in very small quantities, owing to its high cost, and that the calibre of such artillery seldom exceeds 105 millimetres—i.e., the calibre of light field artillery.

Naturally, the sense of security of the civilian population of frontier areas is always less great than that of the civilian population of the interior ; but this is due, not to the frontier fortresses, but to the assembling of the opposing field army, which is rendered possible by the proximity of the frontier, and to the relative strength of that field army.



Concentrations of troops and material can be carried out under the protection of frontier garrisons with a speed and to an extent depending not on the fortresses but on the system of communications leading up to the frontier.

*Conclusion.* — It follows that all fortresses are of a specifically defensive character, that they favour the national defence, and that they are not intrinsically threatening to the civilian population of the neighbouring State unless their artillery can fire across the frontier.

*Observations of the Danish Delegation.*

On the subject of fortifications, the Danish delegation would make reference to page 2, paragraph 3 of its Memorandum of April 13th last (document Conf.D.112), in which the delegation explains its views.

*Observations of the Spanish Delegation.*

Sub-Commission A, in its report (document C.P.D.28, page 141), unanimously specified the armaments which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State's territory. The location of fortifications depends on topographical considerations, more especially the position of the junctions and lines of communication between two neighbouring States.

Fortifications, considered in themselves, are defensive in character, but they may indirectly favour the offensive by making it possible to economise forces in the fortified area and use them *en masse* elsewhere.

The position of the most advanced forts, based on the above considerations, may be close to the frontier, so that the range of their artillery may enable them to fire on points in the territory of the neighbouring country.

These possibilities are, generally speaking, reciprocal.

*Observations of the French Delegation.*

1. As the experts of Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission unanimously recognised, "the following can only be used on the spot for the defence of a State's territory : all parts of defensive systems which are in the nature of obstacles and cover for troops ; permanent works for the use of armaments, such as gun-platforms ; and, in exceptional circumstances, certain armaments which are in turrets or cupolas",

It is therefore not possible to attribute *a priori* a "specifically offensive" character to a permanent defensive system. The question can only arise as applied to the artillery in such a system if that artillery should have a calibre greater than the limit fixed for "specifically offensive" artillery, regard being had to the possibility of rendering fixed artillery mobile.

2. Permanent defensive systems situated in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers—as they generally are, because their normal purpose is frontier defence—could not be "specifically threatening" to the national defence and civilian population of the neighbouring country unless they were designed for that purpose.

The sites on which permanent defensive systems are constructed are determined, however, by quite different considerations :

(a) They depend upon the ground, and are therefore placed where the ground is most favourable to the defence ;

(b) Their location depends primarily on the point (a large and important city, a vital centre of communications, an industrial area, etc.) which they are intended to protect. If this point is very close to the frontier, the system designed for its protection is also necessarily close to the frontier.

3. The possibility of action by the garrisons or armaments of permanent defensive systems on the territory or against the civilian population of a neighbouring State is undoubtedly less than the possibility of action of troops that can be brought up into the frontier zones only when needed. A State contemplating an attack, whose best chance of success would be surprise, would have every interest in using, not the known and located means of action in permanent defensive systems, but means of action brought up at great speed with the aid of lines of communication prepared for that purpose, especially motor transport.

4. Consequently, permanent defensive systems are not :

(a) The most specifically offensive,

(b) The most threatening to national defence,

(c) The most threatening to civilians,

within the meaning of the terms of reference given to the Land Commission by the General Commission.

*Observations of the Italian Delegation.*

1. Any fortification, fortified town or fortified work (with special reference to the exterior limit of its organisation) situated close to the frontier should, as a general rule, be regarded as defensive in character, seeing that its main object is to prevent the aggressor from crossing the frontier, and that it thus constitutes a real obstacle intended to bar the most dangerous lines of approach to the territory.

As a general rule, the fortifications of the two neighbouring countries are situated on such lines of approach, owing to the fact that their situation is determined by the geographical configuration of the frontier line.

2. In order that these fortifications may be considered exclusively defensive in character, it is necessary, however, that the two neighbouring countries should possess approximately the same number of fortifications, that the latter should be approximately equal in power and that they should be situated, on either side, close to the frontier.

3. The defensive character of a country's fortifications becomes modified and the latter gradually assume an offensive character when the fortified works of the neighbouring country are much inferior in power, even to the extent of being non-existent, or when, for special reasons, the said fortifications are so distant from the frontier as to leave a completely undefended zone of territory outside the range of action of their armaments.

4. The offensive character of the fortifications does not, of course, lie in the whole system of concrete or steel works, in view of their absence of mobility, but consists, on the other hand, of the two elements contained therein—namely, the artillery or the troops for which they may furnish a safe shelter during the process of concentration, a favourable *point d'appui* for an offensive or counter-offensive and a base for the subsequent development of operations.

5. Excluding the case referred to in number 2, in which it is clear that each system of fortifications assumes a defensive character as against the action of the other, the offensive character of a fortification is determined :

(a) By the effective protection of the process of concentration and the support of troops to be employed in the offensive or counter-offensive ;

(b) By the action of its own artillery of different calibres designed primarily to destroy with ease the adversary's works with a low power of resistance and, secondly, to support effectively (owing to the strong protection thus ensured) troops that are to be used in the offensive ;

(c) By actions designed as a menace to civilians when the fortress or fortified works are so close to the frontier that their artillery can reach the closely populated industrial centres or important centres of communication in the neighbouring territory.

To sum up :

1. Fortifications or permanent fortified works are, generally speaking, defensive in character.

2. Frontier fortifications may, on the other hand, be regarded as more or less offensive in character, and hence more specifically efficacious against national defence, when the territory of the neighbouring State possesses no fortifications or permanent fortified works whatever, or only possesses field works or improvised works, or possesses fortified works situated so far inland as to be unable to protect the frontier zone over a given depth.

3. Frontier fortifications may be particularly threatening to civilians when the fortress or fortified works are so close to the frontier that their artillery can reach those zones in the territory of the neighbouring State over which thickly populated industrial centres are scattered and which are also indispensable for the military organisation.

*Observations by the United Kingdom Delegation.*

The following observations upon the German proposal regarding fortifications are submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation :

They draw attention to the speech of the United Kingdom delegate on June 2nd, which pointed out that the German proposal was, in effect, not a question of the abolition of fortresses near the frontier, but of a restriction of the right to station troops or guns in its vicinity. The technical aspect of guns and their offensive possibilities has already been fully dealt with by the Land Commission.

For these reasons, the United Kingdom delegation sees no utility in discussing the questionnaire, nor do they find themselves able to accept the German proposal regarding fortifications. They suggest that the latter should either be put to the vote without further discussion, or that it should be forwarded to the General Commission with the names of such delegations as find themselves able to support it.

---



Geneva, June 8th, 1932.

## REPORT OF THE AIR COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

*Called for by that Commission's Resolution dated April 22nd, 1932.*

---

*Rapporteur:* M. BOHEMAN (Sweden).

The questions put to the Air Commission by the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932, were the following:

What are the air armaments:

- (a) Whose character is the most specifically offensive;
- (b) Which are the most efficacious against national defence;
- (c) Which are the most threatening to civilians?

Although it was made clear in the discussions in the Air Commission that the offensiveness of the air armaments, their efficacy against national defence, and the threat that they represent to civilians vary considerably on account of the wide differences in the geographical position of different countries, the location of their vital centres, and the state of their anti-aircraft defences, and that any qualitative question in connection with air armaments is closely bound up with quantitative considerations, the Commission found it possible to set down certain general conclusions, which form Part I of this report. The Commission also undertook a technical study of the efficacy and the use of air armaments. The results of this study form Part II of the present report. Part III contains several comments in regard to Parts I and II, and Part IV contains statements by various delegations, with an introduction.

### PART I.

These conclusions are as follows:

I (a) All air armaments can be used to some extent for offensive purposes, without prejudice to the question of their defensive uses.

If used in time of peace for a sudden and unprovoked attack, air armaments assume a particularly offensive character. In effect, before the State victim of the aggression can take the defensive measures demanded by the situation, or before the League of Nations or States not involved in the conflict could undertake preventive or mediatory action, the aggressor-State might in certain cases be able rapidly to obtain military or psychological results, such as would render difficult either the cessation of hostilities or the re-establishment of peace.

(b) Civil aircraft, to the extent that they might be incorporated into the armed forces of a State, could in varying degrees subserve military ends.

(c) Independently of the offensive character which air armaments may derive from their use, their capacity for offensive action depends on certain of their constructional characteristics.

(d) The possibilities of offensive action of aeroplanes carried by aircraft-carriers or warships equipped with landing-platforms (or landing-decks) must be regarded as being increased by the mobility of the vessels which carry them.

(e) The capacity for offensive action of air armaments resulting from such constructional characteristics should first be considered from the point of view of the efficacy of such armaments against national defence, and secondly from the point of view of the threat offered thereby to the civilian population.

## EFFICACY AGAINST NATIONAL DEFENCE.

II (a) The aircraft forming a part of the air armaments of a country that may be regarded as most efficacious against national defence are those which are capable of the most effective direct action by the dropping or launching of means of warfare of any kind.

(b) The efficacy against national defence of an aircraft forming part of such armaments, and considered individually, depends upon its useful load and its capability of arriving at its objective.

(c) The efficacy against national defence of means of warfare of every kind launched from the air depends upon the material effect which they are capable of producing.

## THREAT TO CIVIL POPULATION.

III (a) The aircraft forming part of the air armaments of a country which can be regarded as the most threatening to the civil population are those which are capable of the most effective direct action by the dropping or launching of means of warfare of any kind; this efficacy depends primarily upon the nature of the means of warfare employed and the manner in which they are employed.

(b) The degree of threat to the civil population represented by an aircraft forming part of those armaments, and considered individually, is in proportion to its useful load and its capability of arriving at its objective.

(c) The means of warfare, intended to be dropped from the air, which are the most threatening to the civil population are those which, considered individually, produce the most extended action, the greatest moral or material effect; that is to say, those which are the most capable of killing, wounding and immobilising the inhabitants of centres of civil population or of demolishing them, so far as concerns immediate consequences, and so far as concerns future consequences, of impairing the vitality of human beings. Among these means the Commission specially mentions poisonous gases, bacteria and incendiary and explosive appliances.

IV. The useful load of aircraft and their capability of arriving at their objective are determined by a large number of variable factors. Where useful load is concerned, the Air Commission has noted among these variable factors, for purposes of examination, the unladen weight, the horse-power and the wing area for aeroplanes, the volume and the horse-power for dirigibles.<sup>1</sup>

## PART II.

The offensive character of air armaments cannot be determined arbitrarily and must depend on the examination of the conditions they must fulfil in order to be effective against whatever objectives may be assigned to them, and on the defence requirements which they meet.

Moreover, the General Commission will not be in a position to take decisions relating to the qualitative limitation of air armaments until the technical factors which are indispensable to enable it to form a reasoned opinion have been brought to its notice.

The Air Commission accordingly submits the following considerations which seem to it to meet the intentions of the General Commission. It would, however, emphasise that the figures given in Section III below are purely for purposes of indication; they are not absolute, and in no way bind the delegations in the matter of any proposals for qualitative limitation which they may submit elsewhere.

### I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. While the efficacy of air armaments against the different objectives which may be assigned to them depends on the vulnerability of those objectives and the useful load<sup>2</sup> which the aircraft can carry, on the other hand, the radius of action needed for such direct intervention and for scouting operations, particularly at sea, and communications with and between overseas territories depends essentially on the geographical situation and the special conditions of each country.

In particular, the effects of using air armaments cannot be the same for all countries; for example, those with a small area, with their vulnerable points near the frontiers of other States, and those surrounded by a wide expanse of water.

2. The efficacy of air armaments against national defence depends on the possibility, in the event of an act of aggression, and independently of aerial means of defence, of their destroying

<sup>1</sup> For the result of this examination see page 256.

<sup>2</sup> By "useful load" is meant all that an aircraft can carry in addition to its "unladen weight", as defined in Annex I of this report.



the obstacles to the advance of the aggressor, attacking lines of communication, centres of military production and supply depots, air and naval bases, etc.

It is also necessary to examine the conditions governing the use of air armaments against mobile forces and other objectives of the land and naval battlefield in order to decide whether their offensive possibilities are greater than the requirements of defence.

3. The discussions of the Air Commission revealed the fact that for many countries the effectiveness of air armaments against national defence was due principally to the circumstance that aircraft could attack the vital centres of a State (towns, centres of population, etc.) and weaken the internal resistance. Leaving aside considerations regarding international engagements, it was thought desirable to examine the conditions governing their effectiveness.

## II. SPECIAL POINTS.

For information purposes it should be noted that the useful load of the heaviest aircraft at the present time is about 27,000 kg. for civil aircraft and 15,000 kg. for military aircraft.

### *Observations relating to the General Conditions of Use.*

1. At present, military aircraft must have a crew varying from 1 to 5, together with the arms and ammunition necessary for their own defence. Nevertheless, only aircraft seating more than one and with a crew of at least three men to ensure their defence and an adequate radius of action are capable of flying long distances over other countries and may, in certain cases, offer a more offensive character than others.

2. The radius of action—that is to say, the total distance which can be flown—should take into account not only the absolute distance of the objective but also the additional distance which may have to be covered for tactical reasons or owing to atmospheric conditions.

In general, the radius of action necessary for air armaments depends on the special situation of the countries concerned.

In particular, against countries of small area and great density of population, or against countries whose vulnerable points are situated near their frontiers, air armaments might be effective with a small radius of action, especially if they were employed against the vital centres of these countries.

3. Under the normal conditions of inaccuracy of aerial aim at an objective of small dimensions, results cannot be obtained by the launching of a single projectile, however powerful.

A single aircraft cannot hope to obtain appreciable results from its action except by launching a salvo containing enough bombs to obtain at least one impact capable of causing serious damage. The dimensions, the nature and resistance of the objective, the altitude of the aircraft, the nature of the defence and the atmospheric conditions influence the precision of the bombardment and determine the characteristics and number of the bombs which must be carried in one and the same load.

If, however, the objective attacked is very extensive—in particular, when air armaments take the centres of population of a country as their objective—precision of aim becomes less necessary, and even aircraft of low power but in large numbers may prove very effective owing to the moral, if not the material, results which they can obtain.

4. The effectiveness of attack by air against an objective increases with the number of aircraft employed, provided that these aircraft taken individually are effective against that objective.

## III. EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST NATIONAL DEFENCE.

### *A. Action against Permanent Fortifications.*

As the greater part of air armaments are at present ineffective against permanent fortifications, it would be unreasonable to use a single military aeroplane in an attempt to destroy such objectives.

It is pointed out, however:

(1) That aircraft capable of carrying a useful load of 5,000-6,000 kg. would be capable of producing serious results against permanent fortifications.

(2) That aircraft capable of transporting a useful load of from 3,000-5,000 kg. would be capable of producing appreciable results, in particular against dug-outs, but without decisive consequences.

### *B. Action against Vital Centres.*

If, regardless of international engagements, air armaments are employed against vital centres of population of a country, they may, both by the moral and material effects which they are capable of producing, exercise very important indirect action against its national defence.

In general, this action may be all the greater, the smaller the country attacked and the denser its population, or if the vital centres are situated near the frontier. It may even be of capital

importance if it is directed against the works which, in certain cases, assure the life and existence of a country against a permanent natural menace.

As, however, the centres of population form extensive objectives, particularly vulnerable to the action of gas and especially incendiary bombs, and as the latter may cause very great damage even with a small tonnage, all aircraft having a sufficient radius of action and capable of transporting any useful load in addition to its pilot may, if such projectiles are employed, be effective against the vital centres of a country.

### C. *Action against Lines of Communication.*

In addition to direct action against convoys and troops upon the battlefield, which will be examined below, aircraft may also be used against troops in centres of mobilisation and against railway junctions and bridges. Where such objectives are in centres of population, aircraft attacking them constitute a menace to the civilian population in the immediate vicinity.

To be effective against troops in centres of mobilisation, aircraft must have a tonnage at least as great as those which can be used against columns on the march, and must be equipped with bombs each weighing from 50 to 100 kg.

To be effective against railway junctions and bridges, aircraft must carry the greatest possible number of bombs of from 100 to 500 kg. each.

### D. *Action against Munition Factories and Supply Depots.*

Munition factories and supply depots which would become important objectives in the case of prolonged warfare are not likely to be attacked by aircraft at the beginning of hostilities. At that stage of the war the principal military objectives of the aggressor are the destruction of the defence forces and the occupation of centres or lines of communication and of territory.

The aircraft best adapted for bombarding munition factories, etc., are similar to those required for attacking lines of communication.

### E. *Action against Air and Naval Bases.*

To be effective against military air bases, aircraft must be able to carry from 20 to 40 bombs of from 50 to 100 kg. Consequently, since the distance of one belligerent's air base from that of another belligerent will make it necessary for them to have a radius of action of from 1,200 to 1,500 km., they must carry a useful load of at least three tons.

To be effective against naval bases, aircraft must be able to carry from three to ten bombs of about 450 kg. each. Their radius of action depends essentially on the geographical situation of each country.

### F. *Use in Battle.*

The use of aircraft in battle does not give them a specifically offensive character. They are useful to the aggressor both to prepare his attack and to facilitate its development; but they are indispensable to the defence, whether for the purpose of obtaining information as to the dispositions of attack, in regard to which the assailant has the initiative, or for rapid intervention by direct action to delay the progress of attacking columns advancing on open ground or to prevent the offensive action of fleets.

#### 1. *Direct Action.*

(a) Aircraft which can be effectively employed against objectives of the land battlefield that are unprotected or only slightly protected, particularly against columns of troops in the open or against convoys and means of transport and food-supply, must be capable of carrying 40 to 50 bombs of 10 kg. or 20 to 30 bombs of 50 kg., and must have a radius of action of at least 500 km. Their useful load must amount to between 1,200 and 3,000 kg. according to circumstances.

(b) To be effective against naval forces, aircraft must carry either a torpedo of 800-1,000 kg. or a load of bombs of at least 1,250 kg. for attacking surface vessels (*i.e.*, 3 bombs of 450 kg. for attacking capital ships, or 5 bombs of 250 kg. for attacking light vessels), and 600 kg. (4 bombs of 150 kg.) for attacking submarines.

Their radius of action depends essentially on the geographical situation of each country. The minimum radius of action enabling aircraft of coast or land bases to take part in defensive operations of the fleet against coastal attack may be taken as about 1,500 km.

Such aircraft, with their crew of five, maritime equipment and military defence armament (machine-guns), have a useful load of at least 4,500 to 5,000 kg.

#### 2. *Scouting Operations.*

Certain aircraft used for scouting purposes must be capable of carrying a crew of at least five persons and their own defensive armament, and should have a radius of action enabling them to travel at least 500 km. from their bases over the land and at least 1,000 km. over the sea—



that is to say, taking the wind into account, a radius of action of 1,200 to 2,500 km.; the useful load which such aircraft must be able to carry is 3,000 to 6,500 kg.

#### G. *Action of Pursuit (Chaser) Aeroplanes.*

Pursuit (chaser) aeroplanes possess an offensive character when used to facilitate aggression by bombing aeroplanes, but both meet defence requirements when used against an aggressor.

#### H. *Miscellaneous Uses.*

Certain aircraft needed for communication with and between overseas territories must have a radius of action of at least 2,000 km. and must carry a crew of not less than 5, which, with the reserves necessary for the safety of the machine and the crew, means a useful load of about four or five tons.

Aircraft for the transport of troops, which are particularly useful for the maintenance of order in peace-time in overseas territories, must also have a useful load of three to six tons.

### IV. MENACE OF AIR ARMAMENTS TO CIVILIANS.

All aircraft, without alterations of any kind and whatever their tonnage, may constitute a danger to civilians, whether used directly to attack civilians or against military objectives situated in densely populated areas.

This threat is due chiefly to the fact that aircraft can make their action felt in the interior of a country in zones beyond the radius of action of land and naval armaments. They can act against a much larger part of the population; but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the material effects they are capable of producing in the zone of the battlefield are far less than those caused by land or naval armaments.

Actually, the extent of the danger depends essentially on the nature of the projectiles used. Projectiles containing harmful gases or bacteria, and incendiary projectiles, though of small tonnage, may be highly efficient and produce a considerable moral effect. Explosive projectiles may produce a more or less considerable moral effect, but they are not capable of causing serious material damage unless used in large quantities.

### PART III.

The conclusions in **Part I** of this report give rise to the following comments:

In the first place, the German delegation submitted an amendment referring to all the foregoing conclusions, as follows:

“ All military aviation, and especially the dropping of means of warfare of every kind from the air, come into the three categories. ”

In order to specify the material of air armaments for this purpose, the German delegation, on the basis of the arguments advanced during the discussion, desired to supplement the above amendment as follows:

“ By military aircraft are to be understood all aircraft (*e.g.*, aeroplanes, dirigibles, free and captive balloons):

- “ (1) Which are identified by identity-marks as military aircraft, or
- “ (2) Which have military specifications: that is to say, installations to receive means of warfare of every kind such as guns, machine-guns, torpedoes, bombs, or instruments for aiming or launching such means of warfare, or
- “ (3) Which are manufactured for the armed forces of a country, or
- “ (4) Which are manned by a military pilot or a military crew having orders to that effect, or
- “ (5) Which form part of the equipment of an armed force or are requisitioned by such force. ”

The primary reasons given by the German delegation for this amendment was that for a country which has no means of anti-aircraft defence, either in the air or on the ground, all air armaments without any distinction must be regarded as answering to the three questions put by the General Commission's resolution.

A number of delegations which opposed the German proposal pointed out that only certain air armaments could be regarded as answering to these questions, while other delegations, which also could not see their way to accept the German proposal, expressed the view that in any case different forms of air armaments answered to these characteristics in different degrees.

The German amendment was rejected by 22 votes to 7—those of Austria, Bulgaria, China, Germany, Hungary, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In consequence of this

vote, the Austrian and German delegations, though taking part in the discussion, abstained from voting on points I (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), II (a), (b) and (c), and III (a), (b) and (c).

In connection with the conclusion numbered I (a), first paragraph, the Italian delegation proposed the omission of the words: "without prejudice to the question of their defensive uses". As, however, this amendment was rejected by 18 votes to 12, the Italian, Turkish and Soviet delegations made an explicit reservation against the retention of these words, on the ground that the question of the use of air armaments for defensive purposes was outside the terms of the General Commission's resolution.

After a discussion in some detail, the Commission, not wishing to go at present into the question of the internationalisation or control of civil aviation, adopted conclusion I(b), with the two abstentions already mentioned. The Hungarian delegation made a declaration maintaining that the civil aircraft of a country which has no military aircraft cannot be incorporated in its armed forces. The Soviet delegation made a declaration to the effect that it held that all military aircraft were specifically offensive in character, whether they were built specially for military purposes or were subsequently converted to such purposes; and that it saw no need to mention civil aircraft in the report, as they could not be regarded as a weapon.

Conclusion I(d) was adopted by 16 votes to 2 (United States of America and Portugal). In consequence of this vote, the United States delegation made the following declaration:

"The delegation of the United States considers that the statement in Paragraph I (d) as to the increased possibility of offensive action of ship-based aircraft is inappropriate for inclusion in a report which deals with aircraft generally and which does not otherwise discuss specific types of aircraft or the influence of the base of action upon their offensive capabilities.

"One of the tests already contained in the report is that of capability of arriving at an objective. Thus the mobility feature of ship-based aircraft if already taken into account and any further reference in the report which might give the impression that individual ship-based aircraft are more specifically offensive than individual aircraft taking off from bases close to land frontiers is misleading."

The Portuguese delegation associated itself with this declaration, and the United Kingdom delegation stated that it shared the views therein expressed.

As regards the *efficacy of air armaments against national defence*, the following delegations: South Africa, Argentine Republic, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, India, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, United States of America and Yugoslavia, voted for the inclusion in the text of the following statement:

"The air armaments most efficacious against national defence may also in certain circumstances be the most efficacious for their own national defence."

Twenty-two other delegations—Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—though they did not deny the truth of this statement, considered that it was unnecessary to insert it in the reply to the General Commission.

In its consideration of the question of the *threat to civilians* constituted by air armaments, the Commission constantly bore in mind the existence of certain international undertakings for the protection of civilians in time of war. It considered, however, that its reply to the questions asked by the General Commission must be prepared solely from the point of view of technical possibilities, and apart from any legal or political considerations.

During the discussion on the question as to *which criterion or criteria* should be adopted among those considered by the Commission and set out under IV of Part I—namely, unladen weight, horse-power and wing area for aeroplanes, volume and horse-power for dirigibles—a profound difference of opinion was manifested in the Commission. It was generally felt that there were great difficulties in the way of establishing formulæ which, in view of the constant progress made in technique, were subject to modification. It was nevertheless agreed that unladen weight was an essential criterion for aeroplanes and volume for dirigibles and must be adopted.

A provisional definition of unladen weight was unanimously accepted by the Commission, and figures as Annex I to the present report.

Eighteen delegations—South Africa, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, the United States of America, Yugoslavia—considered that for purposes of practical comparison unladen weight alone was an adequate criterion. They held that the addition of two other criteria for aeroplanes would considerably complicate the question owing to the facility with which wing area and especially horse-power could be modified. They added that they thought it impossible to obtain a satisfactory definition of horse-power and to form a practical estimate of its value and of the value of wing area, and, further, that the adoption of these two criteria might hinder the sound development of technique.



Twenty-one delegations—Afghanistan, Argentine, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—held that unladen weight alone was inadequate, and that horse-power and wing area should also be adopted. Certain of the delegations mentioned above considered that in dividing aeroplanes into categories it was necessary to take into consideration, not only the unladen weight, but also the horse-power and the ratio between horse-power and wing area, as criteria of equal value. They pointed out that unladen weight as the sole criterion could not give satisfactory results, since, even were the unladen weight constant, the useful load could vary considerably if there were a more powerful engine or a different wing area.

As regards the definitions of horse-power and wing area, the Commission's discussions have shown that sufficient light has not yet been thrown on the technical aspect of these questions to enable a number of the delegations in favour of the three criteria to express an opinion on the definitions to be established for the two criteria mentioned above.

As regards horse-power, certain of those delegations referred to the conclusions of the report of the Committee of Experts to fix rules for the adoption of a standard horse-power measurement for aeroplane and dirigible engines (document C.259.M.115.1931), while the Italian delegation submitted a slightly different definition, which is annexed (Annex III) to the present report.

As regards wing area, proposed definitions have been furnished by the Spanish and Italian delegations and figure as Annexes II and III to the present report.

Certain delegations who declared themselves in favour of the three criteria added that they considered that both horse-power and wing area could be computed with sufficient accuracy (though less accurately than unladen weight) to enable them to be effectively used in the comparative measurement of the useful load of aircraft, and that three criteria, however imperfect, would be more reliable than one.

Other delegations among the group favouring the three criteria considered that the question whether a single criterion should be adopted or whether the two others should be added as auxiliary criteria could not be finally settled until the Commission had come to a definite decision as to the figures to which those criteria would apply.

\* \* \*

The technical study of which **Part II** consists was undertaken as the outcome of a questionnaire and draft reply thereto submitted by the French delegation.

The result of this study was not included in the report until a vote had been taken by the Air Commission, 23 delegations (South Africa, the Argentine, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, India, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, Spain, Sweden, United States of America, Yugoslavia) voting in favour of its inclusion and 12 against (Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The reasons which led the minority to vote against it are clearly shown by the general reservations of the Austrian, Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, Italian and Soviet delegations.

Among the delegations which voted in favour of the inclusion of the study in question in the report or who abstained, the delegations of Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Estonia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland made reservations in regard to the figures given in this part of the report, and also stated that they entirely reserved their opinions as to the conclusions to be drawn from the findings contained therein.

#### PART IV.

Although certain delegations maintained that in view of the General Commission's three questions it was impossible to draw a distinction between the different kinds of air armaments,<sup>1</sup> it will nevertheless be seen from its deliberations that the Commission was unanimously of opinion that air bombardment is a grave threat to civilians.

In this connection, certain delegations which were in favour of the absolute prohibition of air bombardment contemplated the possibility of designating bombing aeroplanes as the most specifically offensive air arms, the most efficacious against national defence, and the most threatening to civilians. The Commission was unable to accept this solution, however, for the following reasons: The technical explanations given in different quarters have shown that bombing aeroplanes cannot simply be designated by name, as the same aeroplanes may be used for entirely different purposes. Thus, in several important countries, exactly the same aeroplanes form part of bombing and scouting units.

After considering the aeroplanes at present in service in the air armaments of different countries, however, certain delegations thought it would be possible to fix a limit based on technical

---

<sup>1</sup> Declarations by the delegations of Austria, Bulgaria, Germany and Hungary (see pages 252 and 253) and of Persia (see page 255).

data, above which the majority of aeroplanes were, in the opinion of these delegations, specially suitable for air bombardment.<sup>1</sup>

It should be noted that one delegation put forward definite proposals suggesting a very low limit, based on technical data, above which it considered that all military aviation answered to the General Commission's three criteria.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, it should be noted that one delegation proposed to classify among arms which are the most offensive, the most efficacious against national defence, and the most threatening to civilians, all kinds of air bombs and all appliances for the aiming and launching of such bombs.<sup>3</sup>

#### DECLARATION BY THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

##### *I. Reservation relating to the Findings contained in Part I of the Report.*

The German delegation was not in a position to accept the "findings" of the Air Commission's report. The Air Commission, in accordance with the General Commission's decisions, should have considered what are the arms which, in view of their specific character, are most likely to lead rapidly to success, assuming that a State adopts a policy of armed aggression.

The German delegation considers that military aviation as a whole should be regarded as aggressive from this point of view. This consideration applies in particular to a country which possesses no military air force, or which has already abolished it by disarmament, and which has also no means of defence against aircraft either in the air or on the ground. In view of the situation of such a country, the German delegation considers that it is not possible to draw a distinction between the different categories of air arms according to their more or less offensive character, or their greater or lesser efficacy against national defence, or their greater or lesser threat to civilians. In the case of such a country, the air arm as a whole, without any distinction, comes, for purely technical reasons, under the three heads into which the question raised by the General Commission is divided. Germany, who was disarmed under the Treaty of Versailles, also bases her conception on the technical disarmament clauses which form part of that treaty.

The German delegation also wishes to point out that, in compiling its report, the majority of the Air Commission considered that the offensive character of air arms could only be determined after an examination of the degree of their efficacy against national defence and the extent of the threat constituted by them to civilians. However, after carrying out this examination, the Air Commission failed to reply to the first and most important of the questions asked by the General Commission, and did not reach any definite decision as to the arms which have a specifically offensive character.

Lastly, the German delegation considers that means of warfare of every kind capable of being launched from the air should be regarded in general as specifically offensive, particularly efficacious against national defence, and specially threatening to civilians. This applies *a fortiori* to a country without any anti-aircraft defence.

##### *II. Reservations concerning Part II of the Report.*

With reference to the foregoing reservation, the German delegation states that:

At the plenary meeting of the Air Commission the German delegation stated that it was opposed to the proposal to submit the General Commission's three questions to a thorough examination by a discussion of the French questionnaire—a procedure which would take a good deal of time in view of the necessity of clearing up these problems from the point of view of the science of warfare. It considered that this study was unnecessary in order to give a clear and adequate reply to the questions put by the General Commission. However, the Air Commission having decided that the French questionnaire should be discussed by a sub-committee, and the French delegation having itself submitted a draft reply to that questionnaire, the German delegation endeavoured, with a view to co-operating in this examination, to amend the draft reply in order to take into account the position of countries which do not possess any military air force, and have no means of defence against aircraft.

Since the second point of this report as it results from the somewhat brief discussions in the Sub-Committee does not take into account the position of those countries, the German delegation does not consider it possible to accept this point.

#### DECLARATION BY THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION.

In the course of the discussion in the Air Commission, the Austrian delegation demonstrated that in certain conditions the capacity of an aircraft to attain its objective is decisively increased. In Austria's case, this increased capacity results from the present geographical and military circumstances of the country. These circumstances confer an offensive character even on aircraft

<sup>1</sup> Declaration of Belgium, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (see page 253).

<sup>2</sup> Italian declaration (see page 254).

<sup>3</sup> Netherlands declaration (see page 255).



which would be completely unfitted to act against the national defence or the civil population of another country.

Consequently it is impossible to make a *general* classification of aircraft corresponding to the three questions put by the General Commission.

The Austrian delegation urges that it is absolutely essential to take into account the present circumstances of each individual country, if any accurate definition of the offensiveness of aircraft is to be arrived at.

The Austrian delegation therefore associates itself with the reservation made by the German delegation.

#### DECLARATION BY THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION.

The Bulgarian delegation considers that the answers to the three questions put by the General Commission present a different aspect in the case of countries which have no military air force and no anti-aircraft defence, thus:

1. For countries which have no anti-aircraft defence, all military aircraft are covered by the three criteria laid down by the General Commission.
2. For countries which have no military air force, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make use of civil aircraft, owing to the absence of personnel trained for the purpose.

#### DECLARATION BY THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION.

From the beginning of the proceedings in the Air Commission, the Hungarian delegation has felt that the Commission was working on lines that could not lead to a satisfactory result. Instead of enquiring into the fighting force represented by the air arm as a whole and the destruction which, as a whole, it is capable of causing, the Commission has devoted chief attention to highly complicated technical details which have, no doubt, great scientific value, but whose relation to the problem set is exceedingly vague.

The essential object of the Disarmament Conference should be to bring under international regulation all such arms as are calculated to favour sudden and unexpected attacks. Now it is not unreasonable to ask whether there is any arm possessing more properties calculated to favour such attacks than the air arm as a whole. Convinced that this was so, the Hungarian delegation associated itself with the German proposal, and deeply regrets that that proposal was not accepted by the majority of the Commission.

The Hungarian delegation has continued none the less to take part in the proceedings of the Air Commission, in the hope that its collaboration might induce the Commission to decide upon an acceptable text.

Unhappily, the proposals that the Hungarian delegation had the honour to put forward during the discussion were not accepted by the Commission. The latter decided to submit to the General Commission a reply which, in the Hungarian delegation's view, cannot result in a radical reduction of air armaments. The Hungarian delegation therefore sincerely regrets that it was unable to accept the texts established by the Commission and was forced to vote both against the conclusions in Part I of the report and against the inclusion of Part II in the report.

The Hungarian delegation must therefore again state that:

"For Hungary, who is disarmed in the air and excessively vulnerable to air attacks, aircraft as a whole constitute:

"The most offensive of all weapons;

"A weapon that could easily crush her too feeble national defence, and that would expose:

"(a) Her civil population, deprived of anti-aircraft defence, to certain death;

"(b) Her capital and her industrial areas, situated only a few kilometres from the frontier, to complete destruction; and

"(c) All movement on her system of communications to an abrupt stoppage."

#### DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATIONS OF BELGIUM, MEXICO, THE NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND.

The delegations of Belgium, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,<sup>1</sup> Sweden<sup>1</sup> and Switzerland<sup>2</sup>:

Having examined a large number of aeroplanes at present in use in various countries with a view to finding numerical criteria to determine what aeroplanes come under the three categories indicated by the General Commission—namely:

The most specifically offensive,

The most efficacious against national defence,

The most threatening to civilians,

<sup>1</sup> The Spanish and Swedish delegations state that their participation in the attempts to find as precise as possible a technical reply to the questions asked by the General Commission does not prejudice their attitude regarding the total abolition of military aviation, accompanied by the internationalisation or strict control of civil aviation.

<sup>2</sup> The Swiss delegation had in mind a lower figure for the limit proposed under (1) — namely, 1,200 kg.

have come to the following conclusions:

(1) *There is a limit, based on technical data, above which almost all aeroplanes possess the three characteristics mentioned above;*

(2) There is a limit below which no aeroplane can be deemed to possess these three characteristics;

(3) For aeroplanes the characteristics of which lie between the two limits, it is impossible to lay down a simple rule enabling those possessing the three above-mentioned characteristics to be distinguished with certainty.

The limit under (1) might be fixed at an unladen weight of 1,500 to 1,600 kg. (with the addition of 300 to 400 kg. for seaplanes).

The limit under (2) might be fixed, in general, at an unladen weight of 600 kg., a horse-power of 200, and a wing area of 25 sq.m., on the understanding that any aeroplane exceeding any one of these three limits would come under the category of (3) above.

#### RESERVATION BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION.

The Italian delegation took no part in the discussion and drafting of the second part of the report.

It considers that the statements and figures given in this part do not correspond to the present situation of mobilisable military aviation, and that, by leading the General Commission astray, they render more difficult the decisions which it will be called upon to take.

The Italian delegation considers that, among the means of aerial warfare at the disposal of military aviation, the following should be regarded as being the most specifically offensive, the most efficacious against national defence, and the most threatening to civilians:

(1) Dirigibles of any volume whatsoever.

(2) Aeroplanes seating two persons and over; always excepting two-seater aeroplanes used in schools, provided that their unladen weight does not exceed 400 kg. and the horse-power 100, and that the ratio between horse-power and wing area is not less than 4 to the square metre.

(3) Seaplanes seating two persons and over, always excepting two-seater seaplanes used in schools, provided that their unladen weight does not exceed 450 kg. and their horse-power 100, and that the ratio between horse-power and wing area is not less than 4 to the square metre.

(4) Aeroplanes which, although single-seaters, are of over 650 kg. unladen weight, over 200 h.p. and with a ratio between horse-power and wing area of less than 16 to the square metre.

(5) Single-seater aeroplanes of unladen weight less than 650 kg., which, although of horse-power between 200 and 100, have a ratio between horse-power and wing area less than that obtained by linear interpolation:

Between 16 and 12 h.p. to the square metre for machines of horse-power between 200 and 150;

Between 12 and 5 h.p. to the square metre for machines of horse-power between 150 and 100.

(6) Seaplanes which, although single-seaters, are of over 700 kg. unladen weight, over 200 h.p. and with ratio between horse-power and wing area less than 16 to the square metre.

(7) Single-seater seaplanes of unladen weight less than 700 kg., which, although of horse-power between 200 and 100, have a ratio between horse-power and wing area less than that laid down in paragraph 5.

#### DECLARATION BY THE BOLIVIAN DELEGATION.

In accordance with the declaration made by the Bolivian delegation at a plenary session of the Air Commission, it makes a reservation regarding the whole idea of figures; this reservation is due to Boliva's special geographical situation, and in particular to its altitude (averaging 4,000 metres). The delegation would merely point out that the fixing of figures would have a negative value where aircraft beginning to operate at that altitude were concerned.

#### DECLARATION BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

The Chinese delegation, in view of the fact that the Air Commission is to submit its report to the General Commission without achieving a unanimous decision, wishes to place on record the following declaration:

The Chinese delegation maintains its original standpoint that all military aircraft are by nature offensive armaments, while bombing aeroplanes are armaments whose character is



most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence, and most threatening to civilians, thus combining all the three characteristics mentioned in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

The Chinese delegation considers that the proposal of the Belgian, Mexican, Netherlands, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss delegations (see page 253), which provides for the division of all military aeroplanes into three categories, is acceptable. It is, however, of the opinion that the limit fixed in the said proposal is somewhat high. The Chinese delegation is, in this connection, inclined to support the suggestion of the Swiss delegation that the limit set for unladen weight should be 1,200 kg. instead of 1,500 to 1,600 kg., in the interest of those countries whose air defence is still inadequate and whose undefended towns and cities are in consequence exposed to the dangers of aerial bombardment.

The Chinese delegation would further reiterate its proposal that all aerial bombardment as a means of carrying on civilised warfare should be abolished (see document Conf.D.88).

#### DECLARATION BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION.

The French delegation considers that the statements of fact contained in the second part of the Commission's report show how impossible it is from the technical point of view to draw a clear dividing line between defensive aircraft and those more specifically offensive in character. Even if it is possible to fix a limit above which aircraft cannot be considered purely defensive, there is on the other hand a whole zone covering both specifically machines threatening to the civil population and machines indispensable for national defence.

The French delegation would state that these were the considerations which led it to submit its proposals of February 5th last, and to fix for the capacity of aircraft two series of limits which it has reserved the right to define later: the first—the higher—above which no machine may be retained in a national air force; the second—the lower—below which the use of military aircraft shall be subject only to those restrictions arising out of the quantitative limitation provided for in the convention to be drawn up and already laid down in the Preparatory Commission's draft.

All the aircraft included between these two limits, whether their predominant character be offensive or defensive, may only be retained by national air forces subject to a preliminary undertaking to place such machines at the disposal of the League of Nations in the event of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant.

#### DECLARATION BY THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.

##### *On Part I.*

The Netherlands delegation considers that bombing aircraft, all types of aerial bombs, and all instruments for aiming or launching such bombs, should be designated as weapons most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence, and most threatening to civilians.

##### *On Part II.*

The Netherlands delegation states that the division of the load of bombs required for effective action against a certain objective among as large a number of aeroplanes as possible would result in lower tonnage figures for aircraft than those given in the report. These figures would be still further decreased if the radius of action of aircraft were reduced.

#### DECLARATION BY THE PERSIAN DELEGATION.

Since the Persian delegation has, since the outset of the Commission's work, made it clear that it is in favour of the abolition of military aviation provided civil aviation be regulated by international statute, it is impossible for it to express an opinion on the aggressive character of military aviation alone, since the General Commission has as yet taken no decision regarding civil aviation. For this reason, the Persian delegation abstained from voting on Part II of the report.

#### DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

As the moment has come to draw conclusions from the Air Commission's work carried out in response to the three questions asked by the General Commission, the Soviet delegation feels bound to make the following declaration:

" (1) The Air Commission has not found it possible to recognise the soundness of the statements of certain delegations—among them the Soviet—that all military aviation comes under the head of the General Commission's questionnaire. Nevertheless, the Air Commission has not indicated the limits above which military aeroplanes acquire the properties which

bring them into the category of armaments envisaged in the General Commission's questionnaire.

" (2) The drafting of certain articles, as well as certain statements in the report, which, moreover, exactly correspond to the declarations made by the different delegations, show that the majority of the Commission considers that air armaments are only offensive and threatening to national defence and the civil population when used for purposes of aggression or attack on specified localities. The Soviet delegation is firmly opposed to this point of view, considering that it is the technical characteristics of aircraft which determine the offensive properties of military aviation, and that the very existence of military aircraft, as well as of aerial bombs and other means of warfare intended to be dropped or launched from the air, are a danger to national defence and constitute a threat to the civil population.

" (3) For the above reasons the Soviet delegation is unable to support the view that the offensive character of military aviation can only be determined after a review of the possibilities of its employment for defensive purposes. The Soviet delegation feels that it is the Air Commission's duty to determine the aggressive characteristics of air armaments, and not to defend such armaments by mere reference to the various possibilities of their defensive use.

" (4) The references to be found in the report to the necessity for taking into account the geographical situation and special circumstances of each country, as well as atmospheric conditions and other factors, seem to the Soviet delegation to be an attempt to divert the questions asked by the General Commission into a discussion very far removed from the concrete task assigned to the Air Commission.

" (5) Without raising any objection to the view of the majority of the Commission that aeroplanes become more aggressive and dangerous to national defence and the civil population with any increase in their useful load (provided they be considered singly), the Soviet delegation, basing its view on a technical study of the properties of military aircraft, once more declares that all military aircraft clearly come within the three categories referred to by the General Commission. The Soviet delegation is thus the less able to support the view that only large bombing aircraft should be considered offensive, even if the figures contained in the report are only given for purposes of indication. It feels that such a classification is far removed from reality, and can but prejudice qualitative disarmament.

" In view of the foregoing, the Soviet delegation desires to state that the Air Commission, in confining itself to general statements, has failed to reply to the three questions asked by the General Commission. The Soviet delegation is therefore obliged to continue, in the General Commission, to defend its view as expressed in the present declaration as well as in earlier discussions."

---

## Annex I.

### DEFINITION OF UNLADEN WEIGHT.

The unladen weight of an aeroplane is the weight of the aeroplane complete with all the elements necessary for flying but without crew, fuel, oil, cooling liquids, or military equipment. The unladen weight of an aeroplane comprises exclusively the weights of the following parts:

Complete aeroplane without engine (wings, movable or fixed, without safety slots, fuselage or hull, undercarriage or floats);

Power plant or plants complete; empty motor or motors<sup>1</sup>, propeller or propellers with all the necessary accessories<sup>2</sup> required for their immediate operation and control;

---

<sup>1</sup> The empty motor comprises the motor proper with all the accessories necessary for its immediate operation, which form an integral part of it—that is to say:

Carburettor, with controls, feed pipes, ignition and connections, cooling liquid and oil pumps with piping on the motor, charging or supercharging gear forming part of the motor, various attachments for revolution counters and auxiliaries forming part of the motor, reduction gear and propeller hub.

<sup>2</sup> Accessories to power plant:

- (a) Motor controls complete.
- (b) Fixed self-starters and accessories, starting magneto, claws and handles, and tanks.
- (c) Fuel supply system; pumps not forming part of the motor, piping accessories, intermediate tanks, and various indicators.
- (d) Lubrication system; pipes not forming part of the motor, radiators, shutters and controls.
- (e) Cooling system; piping not forming part of the motor, radiators, shutters and controls, ventilators and ventilator shutters in the case of air-cooled motors, and their controls.
- (f) Transmissions of propellers.
- (g) Accessories; various instruments, revolution-counters, and fixed extinguishers.



Empty tanks, with release or drainage appliances (if any), but excluding supplementary tanks.

Permanent fixtures required for mounting instruments and equipment of all kinds.

## Annex II.

### DEFINITIONS OF WING AREA PROPOSED BY THE SPANISH DELEGATION.

#### *First Definition.*

The wing area is that of the lifting areas contained in the wing unit, wing flaps included, in its maximum extension.

#### *Second Definition.*

The wing area is the geometrical area of the projection of each lifting area contained in the wing unit, wing flaps included, on the plane of their greatest extension.

---

## Annex III.

### DEFINITION OF HORSE-POWER AND WING AREA PROPOSED BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION.

#### *Horse-power.*

The power index of an engine given by the Experts' formula in document C.259.M.115.1931 might be adopted as a first approximate criterion for qualitative disarmament purposes.

This formula is  $W_i = \sqrt{K \cdot U \cdot P_i}$

The Italian delegation considers, however, that it would be desirable to improve the method by adopting for the constant K different values according to the basic types of engines and to take into account in measuring the weight the material used in the fixed parts.

It therefore proposes the constants  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  for liquid-cooled engines with and without reduction gear respectively;  $K_3$  and  $K_4$  for air-cooled engines with and without reduction gear respectively;  $K_5$  and  $K_6$  for Diesel engines, liquid and air cooled respectively.

For surcharged engines these values will have to be multiplied by a coefficient depending on the supercharging system and the degree of compression produced by the supercharger.

#### NOTES.

1. Liquid-cooled engines are distinguished from air-cooled engines because in measuring the weight due allowance cannot be made for the radiators.

2. The values  $K_1$ ,  $K_2$ ,  $K_3$ , etc., and the supercharging coefficient cannot be fixed until the maximum value of the horse-power has been determined, and in fixing these values technical and statistical considerations will be taken as bases. It is also desirable to establish the equivalence between aluminium alloys and magnesium alloys used in the fixed parts (about 1.4), in order that a change from one of these materials to the other may not unfairly affect the measurement of the horse-power.

3. The Diesel engine will no longer be handicapped if it is considered separately.

#### *Wing Area.*

(1) The supporting surface of a wing mounted on an aeroplane is the normal projection of its perimeter on a plane passing through the chord traversing the span centrally and perpendicular to the longitudinal plane of symmetry of the aeroplane.

(2) The wing area of an aeroplane is the sum of the supporting surfaces in its wing unit.

#### NOTES.

I. The surface of the ailerons in the rest position is included in the wing area.

II. In the case of wings having a safety beak, the projection of the wing itself must be taken with the safety beak in the rest position.

III. In the total, the surfaces must be calculated in excess per square metre. Wings which are partly or wholly cut away to allow for the fuselage or nacelles, etc., are regarded as continuous.

IV. In the case of a wing with a variable area, the area must be calculated at its maximum extension.

V. Horizontal tail units and any other supporting surfaces included in the air frame are excluded, provided that their total surface, calculated in the same way as that of the wings, does not exceed 2% of the wing area of the wing unit.

VI. The wing profile chord mentioned in the definition is that established by the C.I.N.A. at its sixth meeting (March 1924) and communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Geneva, June 14th, 1932.

## PROPOSAL OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION CONCERNING QUALITATIVE DISARMAMENT.

The General Commission;

Having noted the reports submitted by the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, and by the Special Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons concerning the execution of the task which the General Commission had entrusted to them by its resolutions of April 22nd and May 10th, 1932, with the object of assisting it in determining how the principle of qualitative disarmament might be applied;

Recalling its resolution of April 19th, 1932, under the terms of which the present Conference is to accomplish the first decisive stage in a general reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level;

Recalling the questions raised in its resolution of April 22nd, with a view to the practical application of the principle of qualitative disarmament adopted by it;

Being of opinion that the first two of these questions could be most usefully answered by interpreting them as follows:

“ Supposing that one State either (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression, or (b) undertakes offensive operations against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character, and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy or those operations to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion ? ”

Decides:

That qualitative disarmament shall include:

A. Land armaments:

- (1) Artillery material of a calibre of more than approximately 100 mm. or of a useful range of more than 15 km.;
- (2) Tanks of every kind and armoured cars capable of moving across any terrain;
- (3) Armoured mobile cupolas and armoured trains equipped with artillery material of a calibre of more than 100 mm. approximately or of a useful range of more than 15 km.
- (4) Fortresses, field-works and works in respect of which the outer limit of the most advanced organisations is situated at a distance of less than 15 km. from the frontier of the country.

B. Naval armaments:

- (1) Capital ships of more than 10,000 tons;
- (2) Aircraft-carriers;
- (3) Submarines;
- (4) The laying of automatic contact-mines in the open sea.

C. Air armaments:

- (1) All military land or naval aircraft.

By military aircraft are to be understood all aircraft:

- (a) Which form part of the equipment of an armed force or are requisitioned by such force; or
- (b) Which are manufactured for the armed forces of the country; or
- (c) Which are manned by a military pilot or a military crew commissioned to that effect; or
- (d) Which have military specifications—that is to say, armour or installations to receive means of warfare of every kind, such as guns, machine-guns, torpedoes, bombs or instruments for aiming or launching such means of warfare; or
- (e) Which are identified by identity marks as military aircraft.

- (2) Arms and means of warfare of every description destined to be utilised by aircraft as well as means of warfare or instruments constructed for such utilisation.

D. Chemical and bacteriological arms:

- (1) The use, for the purpose of injuring an adversary, of all natural or synthetic noxious substances, whatever their state, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, whether toxic, asphyxiating, lachrymatory, irritant, vesicant, or capable in any way of producing harmful effects on the human or animal organism, whatever the method of their use;

- (2) Appliances, devices or projectiles specially constructed for the utilisation of the said noxious bodies, with a view to injuring an adversary;



(3) All methods employed for the purpose of injuring an adversary and consisting of the projection, discharge or dissemination in any manner, in places inhabited or not, of pathogenic microbes in whatever phase they may be (virulent or capable of becoming so), or of filter-passing viruses, or of infected substances, whether for the purpose of bringing them into immediate contact with human beings, animals or plants, or for the purpose of affecting any of the latter in any indirect manner—for example, by polluting the atmosphere, water, food-stuffs, or any other objects;

(4) Projectiles specifically intended to cause fires;

(5) Appliances designed to attack persons by fire, such as flame-projectors.

---

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.49.

*Official No.:* **Conf. D. 126.**

Geneva, June 22nd, 1932.

**DECLARATION BY Mr. GIBSON (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)  
AT THE MEETING OF JUNE 22nd, 1932, OF THE  
GENERAL COMMISSION.**

---

I am desired by the President of the United States to communicate to the Conference the text of a statement which he is giving out at this moment. It is his hope that the public statement of such a programme will fire the imagination of the world and lead all nations to consider deeply and state openly how much they can contribute to a great general programme.

**Statement of the Instructions issued by President Hoover to the American Delegation to the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, read by Ambassador Gibson before the General Commission, Wednesday, June 22nd, 1932, 4.30 p.m.**

The delegations at the World Conference on Disarmament at Geneva are now engaged in discussions as to methods by which more comprehensive efforts can be made toward disarmament.

The following is the substance of instructions which have been given by the President to the American delegation for guidance in the discussions which are now occupying them. They are published in order that the American people may be fully and accurately informed.

“ The time has come when we should cut through the brush and adopt some broad and definite method of reducing the overwhelming burden of armament which now lies upon the toilers of the world. This would be the most important world step that could be taken to expedite economic recovery. We must make headway against the mutual fear and friction arising out of war armament which kill human confidence throughout the world. We can still remain practical in maintaining an adequate self-defence among all nations. We can add to the assurances of peace and yet save the people of the world from ten to fifteen billions of wasted dollars during the next ten years.

“ I propose that the following principles should be our guide:

“ First: The Briand-Kellogg Pact to which we are all signatories can only mean that the nations of the world have agreed that they will use their arms solely for defence.

“ Second: This reduction should be carried out, not only by broad general cuts in armaments, but by increasing the comparative power of defence through decreases in the power of the attack.

“ Third: The armaments of the world have grown up in mutual relation to each other. And, speaking generally, such relativity should be preserved in making reductions.

“ Fourth: The reductions must be real and positive. They must effect economic relief.

“ Fifth: There are three problems to deal with—land forces, air forces and naval forces. They are all inter connected. No part of the proposals which I make can be dissociated one from the other.

“ Based on these principles, I propose that the arms of the world should be reduced by nearly one-third.

#### *Land Forces.*

“ In order to reduce the offensive character of all land forces as distinguished from their defensive character, I propose the adoption of the presentation already made at the Geneva Conference for the abolition of all tanks, all chemical warfare and all large mobile guns. This would not prevent the establishment or increase of fixed fortifications of any character for the defence of frontiers and sea-coasts. It would give an increased relative strength to such defence as compared with attack.

“ I propose, furthermore, that there should be a reduction of one-third in strength of all land armies over and above the so-called police component.

“ The land armaments of many nations are considered to have two functions. One is the maintenance of internal order in connection with the regular peace forces of the country. The strength required for this purpose has been called the ‘ police component ’. The other function is defence against foreign attack. The additional strength required for this purpose has been called the ‘ defence component ’. While it is not suggested that these different components should be separated, it is necessary to consider this contention as to functions in proposing a practical plan of reduction in land forces. Under the Treaty of Versailles and the other Peace Treaties, the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria were reduced to a size deemed appropriate for the maintenance of internal order, Germany being assigned one hundred thousand troops for a population of approximately sixty-five million people. I propose that we should accept for all nations a basic police component of soldiers proportionate to the average which was thus allowed Germany and these other States. This formula, with necessary corrections for Powers having colonial possessions, should be sufficient to provide for the maintenance of internal order by the nations of the world. Having analysed these two components in this fashion, I propose, as stated above, that there should be a reduction of one-third in the strength of all land armies over and above the police component.

#### *Air Forces.*

“ All bombing-planes to be abolished. This will do away with the military possession of types of planes capable of attacks upon civil populations and should be coupled with the total prohibition of all bombardment from the air.

#### *Naval Forces.*

“ I propose that the treaty number and tonnage of battleships shall be reduced by one-third; that the treaty tonnage of aircraft-carriers, cruisers and destroyers shall be reduced by one-fourth; that the treaty tonnage of submarines shall be reduced by one-third and that no nation shall retain a submarine tonnage greater than 35,000 tons.

“ The relative strength of naval arms in battleships and aircraft-carriers as between the five leading naval Powers was fixed by the Treaty of Washington.

“ The relative strength in cruisers, destroyers and submarines was fixed as between the United States, Great Britain and Japan by the Treaty of London. For the purpose of this proposal it is suggested that the French and Italian strength in cruisers and destroyers be calculated as though they had joined in the Treaty of London on a basis approximating the so-called accord of March 1st, 1931.

“ There are various technical considerations connected with these naval reductions which will be presented by the delegation at Geneva.

#### *General.*

“ The effect of this plan would be to effect an enormous saving in cost of new construction and replacements of naval vessels. It would also save large amounts in the operating expense in all nations of land, sea and air forces. It would greatly reduce offensive strength compared to defensive strength in all nations.



" These proposals are simple and direct. They call upon all nations to contribute something. The contribution here proposed will be relative and mutual. I know of nothing that would give more hope for humanity to-day than the acceptance of such a programme with such minor changes as might be necessary. It is folly for the world to go on breaking its back over military expenditures, and the United States is willing to take its share of responsibility by making definite proposals that will relieve the world. "

\* \* \*

The significance of the President's statement will be apparent to all. It is clear, self-contained, and comprehensive. I am well aware that everyone here will wish to study it in detail. There are, however, certain clarifications and explanations which I can make at once in order to clear up one or two points.

With reference to cruiser strength, it is proposed that the 25 per cent reduction of the total tonnage of the United States and Great Britain should be calculated on the present total London Treaty tonnage of Great Britain—namely, 339,000 tons. Furthermore, the total tonnage allowed under that Treaty for eight-inch-gun cruisers shall be limited to 150,000 tons each for the United States and Great Britain and the proportionate 90,000 tons for Japan.

I also feel that there should be a clarification on the subject of submarines. In order to make the acceptance of such a sweeping reduction possible, the President's communication is on the basis that no nation, whether or not a party to existing naval treaties, shall retain a tonnage in submarines greater than 35,000 tons or more than 40 submarine units of which no single vessel shall exceed 1,200 tons.

In view of the reductions suggested for the five leading naval Powers under the President's plans, it seems evident that the other Powers should here agree to corresponding sacrifices through the reduction or limitation of their naval armaments.

I have not laboured here all these months with my colleagues present to-day without becoming convinced of their earnestness of purpose and their desire to see the greatest possible accomplishment in disarmament. Therefore, I am sure that the principle of maximum accomplishment to which each nation makes substantial contributions, as my country is doing by the provisions of the text which I have just read, will appeal to them.

In our most powerful arm, the navy, we are prepared, as a part of this general programme, to scrap over 300,000 tons of existing ships and to forgo the right to build over 50,000 tons. In land material our proposal would affect over a thousand heavy mobile guns and approximately 900 tanks, and in aviation about 300 bombardment aeroplanes.

The American delegation is at your disposal for further explanations and clarifications as they may become necessary, and these points will, no doubt, be forthcoming as the conversations in which we are now engaged progress. These very real sacrifices of strength which the United States is willing to make in a predominant arm as part of a world scheme cannot fail, I am convinced, to find equally generous response.

---

Official No.: **Conf.D.127.**

Geneva, June 23rd, 1932.

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE PERSIAN DELEGATE  
CONCERNING THE REPORT OF THE NAVAL COMMISSION.  
(Document Conf.D.121.)**

[*Translation.*]

Geneva, June 16th, 1932.

I have the honour to inform you that, on reading the opinions of the various delegations on naval armaments, I have observed that the report to the General Commission contains no mention of the views expressed by the Persian delegation.

At the Naval Commission's meeting on May 3rd, Colonel Riazi gave his opinion on the whole of the naval questions on the agenda.

This statement made it clear that Persia was prepared to accept the lowest naval armaments and recognised *a priori* as non-offensive only submarines of small tonnage, provided that, in the use of these vessels, the international humanitarian restrictions imposed by the Treaty of London were rendered general and strictly observed.

I should therefore be very much obliged if you would have these general ideas inserted in the report as the opinion of the Persian delegation and, should it not be possible to modify the final report, append this declaration to the report to be sent to the General Commission and inform the other members of the Commission of its tenor.

(Signed) A. SÉPAHBODI.

Geneva, June 23rd, 1932.

## APPLICATION OF THE QUANTITATIVE PRINCIPLE.

### LETTER FROM THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE, DATED JUNE 17TH, 1932.

1. The proposal which is made on behalf of the Australian delegation can best be introduced by asking the following question:

(a) Is the Disarmament Conference proceeding upon the basis that it is now endeavouring to reach an agreement fixing a limit of armaments which is never to be exceeded, or

(b) Is the Conference endeavouring to reach an agreement for a limited period, after the expiration of which all States are to be free, subject to any further agreement which may hereafter be made by them?

2. The position is not as clear as it ought to be.

Resolutions have been passed by the General Commission approving a programme of reduction in armaments by successive revisions, the reduction being described as the reduction "provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations". (Resolution of General Commission of April 19th, 1932.)

I am aware that Article 8 has been variously interpreted and I am not basing this suggestion upon any contention that the interpretation to which I proceed to refer must be accepted as correct. I only submit that it is a possible interpretation which should be kept in mind as a possibility when the subject of disarmament is under consideration under the auspices of the League.

Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Covenant provides for the formulation by the Council of the League of plans for reduction.

Paragraph 3 provides that such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

It appears, therefore, that the "plans" contemplated in Article 8 are *permanent* plans, to be reconsidered and revised at least every ten years. Thus, in fifty years, the plans should be revised at least five times. The article does not contemplate an agreement which expires at the end of a specified period, but a plan which continues, unmodified, unless, after reconsideration, it is revised. Any such "revision" must be as the result of an agreement by *all the parties*. The provision can hardly mean that any one party can arbitrarily "revise", leaving the others bound by the agreement according to its original terms.

Paragraph 4 makes the position clear as to possible increase of armaments. It provides that, after the plans have been adopted by the Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council. This provision necessarily applies during the currency of the "plans", which, as above stated, is permanent, subject only to agreed revision.

The result is that, if the particular method specified in Article 8 (upon this interpretation) is to be applied, all States must take the responsibility of specifying the strengths of defensive forces which they are prepared to accept as *ultimate strengths*—i.e., as not to be increased without the concurrence (which must be unanimous) of the Council of the League.

3. In endeavouring to fix such figures, a Government must *provide for all contingencies of the future* which it regards as practical in character. I doubt whether any Government is prepared really to accept such a responsibility, particularly at a Disarmament Conference.

Illustrations of the difficulty of arriving at any reasonable solution of this problem could be given, not only by countries which fear aggression in the near or remote future, but also by relatively young and undeveloped countries which confidently anticipate a great increase of population, and by countries which, at the present time of economic depression, are compelled to limit their defensive forces to what financial stringency dictates rather than to what considerations of national safety would prescribe.

If the figures of what I have called "ultimate strength" were published, I believe that they would, as a whole, astonish and horrify the world. The Conference would appear to many to be more like a Rearmament Conference than a Disarmament Conference.

4. Passing from Article 8 to the draft Convention, one sees that Articles 57 to 60 really involve the same idea of specifying ultimate strengths. Article 57 provides that the Convention is to remain in force for  $x$  years and thereafter until amended, superseded or denounced under the following articles. The Convention can be amended or superseded only by agreement. Certainly



it can be denounced under Article 60. But a State denouncing the Convention would find itself in the position, by its own action, of bringing the whole Convention to an end, because other parties could not be expected to hold themselves bound after a State of any importance had freed itself from all its obligations under the Convention.

Accordingly, in order to avoid being placed in such a position with the risk of odium which would naturally be incurred, there will be a strong and almost irresistible tendency for a Government to make itself safe by providing against all contingencies, and, therefore, specifying figures which would really represent ultimate strengths.

5. There is, therefore, ground for belief, or, at least, suspicion, that, in agreeing to disarmament at this Conference, a Government is binding itself to a limit of armaments which cannot be exceeded except by either the unanimous consent of the Council or by the Government facing the invidious and odious responsibility of denouncing the whole agreement made. So long as this belief or suspicion exists, it will be difficult and almost impossible to achieve any real result.

6. It is therefore urged that a definite decision should be taken by the Conference that any agreement reached should be binding only for a definite term of years, and that another Conference should be held before the expiry of the agreed period. Then it will be clear that Governments are not purporting to bind their people for ever. The figures submitted will bear some relation to reality, instead of representing a speculation upon the basis of all kinds of imaginable contingencies. The precedents of Washington and London will be followed, and at least one obstacle to the success of the Conference will be removed.

7. I desire particularly to add that the procedure which I suggest would, in proportion as there is a real faith in the necessity and efficacy of progressive disarmament, lead by degrees to a position when it would become possible to apply Article 8 of the Covenant in the fullest sense. Any proposal which may help towards the attainment of this objective should, I venture to say, receive careful consideration.

8. In view of the fact that my return to Australia at a very early date is imperative, I can hardly with propriety ask for an immediate meeting of the General Commission for the purpose of enabling me to take a personal part in the discussion of a proposal which, I recognise, has many aspects. I do, however, submit these observations for consideration and circulation to delegations with the hope that the Conference may see its way to accept a resolution which would give effect to the proposal made.

I suggest that a resolution in some such terms as the following would be appropriate:

“The General Commission records its decision that any agreement now to be made for the reduction and limitation of armaments should bind the parties only for a fixed term of years, and that a further Conference should be held at a convenient time before the expiry of that period for the purpose of making a new agreement for further reduction and limitation.”

(Signed) J. G. LATHAM,  
*Minister for External Affairs.*

---

Official No.: **Conf. D. 131.**

[Conf.D./Bureau. 13.]

Geneva, July 4th, 1932.

## QUANTITATIVE DISARMAMENT.

---

### OBSERVATIONS OF THE POLISH DELEGATION ON THE LETTER FROM MR. J. G. LATHAM, AUSTRALIAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

(Document Conf.D.128.)

The Polish delegation, after a very careful examination of the letter from Mr. J. G. Latham, Australian Minister for External Affairs, dated June 17th, 1932 (document Conf.D.128), wishes to express its complete approval of the principles and conclusions set forth in this document, which represents an extremely valuable contribution to the work of our Conference.

I. I should first like to quote the following extract from Mr. Latham's letter:

"All States must take the responsibility of specifying the strengths of defensive forces which they are prepared to accept as *ultimate strengths*—*i.e.*, as not to be increased without the concurrence (which must be unanimous) of the Council of the League.

"3. In endeavouring to fix such figures, a Government must *provide for all contingencies of the future* which it regards as practical in character. I doubt whether any Government is prepared really to accept such a responsibility, particularly at a Disarmament Conference."

I fully share the legitimate apprehensions expressed by Mr. Latham, especially as at the present time, when over-rapid changes are taking place, it is very difficult not only to provide for all contingencies of the future, but also to ascertain the actual position of other Powers, sometimes even of those which are our neighbours. Moreover, account must be taken of the fact that the work in connection with disarmament is merely at its initial stage. We are on the threshold of an important evolution in the history of mankind.

We have not yet arrived at adequate methods of determining the efforts of the various countries in the matter of national defence, or more particularly of comparing those countries one with another (professional soldiers, conscripts, etc.). I am convinced that in the course of our work we shall succeed in finding a fair and uniform definition of effectives and, generally speaking, of armed forces and in establishing an equitable method for budgetary limitation and reduction, etc. That, however, may be a lengthy operation. Only the existence of a permanent supervisory body (the Disarmament Commission) with the sincere and unreserved support of all the Governments can ensure and impose unity of doctrine. In the meantime we have to reckon now with the fact that the first agreement in the sphere of disarmament cannot be based on sufficiently reliable documentary material or upon uncontested data. It cannot, therefore, constitute a precedent and will have, in the not very distant future, to undergo adjustments when once unity of doctrines and a uniform practice have been established by the Permanent Commission.

II. I fully support also the following sentence in Mr. Latham's letter:

"Illustrations of the difficulty of arriving at any reasonable solution of this problem could be given, not only by countries which fear aggression in the near or remote future, but also by relatively young and undeveloped countries which confidently anticipate a great increase of population, and by countries which, at the present time of economic depression, are compelled to limit their defensive forces to what financial stringency dictates rather than to what considerations of national safety would prescribe."

By thus limiting the field of application of this principle to certain categories of countries—a procedure which would have the full approval of the Polish delegation in the actual interests of peace and international security—Mr. Latham proposes to reserve for this category of countries the possibility of adapting their means of defence to their *de facto* situation, which is undergoing considerable change. Two cases must be distinguished here: that of countries whose system of defence does not at present correspond to their requirements in regard to national security, and that of countries which, while possessing at present a fully developed system of defence, foresee, as a consequence of a certain dynamic element in their national life, the necessity of adapting their system of defence to their increased economic and demographic importance.

The countries referred to above, by subscribing to a first agreement in the matter of disarmament, will certainly not wish to remain indefinitely in a state of manifest inferiority from the standpoint of national defence (absence of fortresses, very low cost of maintaining troops, absence of navy).

It would be better to establish a procedure which could be adapted to the varied requirements of different countries rather than to agree that any substitute for armed forces, not provided for in the treaties, might be created by indirect means, to the detriment of neighbouring countries. I directed the attention of the Conference to this danger in my speech on February 10th at the plenary meeting of the Conference.

In supporting the principles contained in Mr. Latham's letter, I desire to express my conviction that it is on these lines that practical solutions of the question of quantitative disarmament should be sought, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant, which forms the basis of all our work in the matter of disarmament.

(Signed) A. ZALESKI,

Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.



Geneva, July 7th, 1932.

**STATEMENT OF VIEWS OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED  
IN PRESIDENT HOOVER'S DECLARATION.**

**(Document Conf.D.126.)**

---

*Communicated by the United Kingdom Delegation.*

---

1. The Disarmament Conference has reached a stage when we must review the present position of our discussions and co-operate without loss of time in reaching and registering practical conclusions. The Government of the United Kingdom most cordially welcome President Hoover's declaration as a contribution to this end. We welcome it alike because it calls for a really substantial measure of disarmament and because it seeks to apply the two principles of quantitative and of qualitative limitation. As President Hoover says: "Reduction should be carried out, not only by broad general cuts in armaments, but by increasing the comparative power of defence through decreases in the power of the attack". We desire to associate ourselves with these conceptions and to contribute all that we can to secure their practical application. The United Kingdom Cabinet has considered President Hoover's declaration in this spirit, and what I am about to say on certain practical points is said with a deep desire to promote co-operation and agreement.

Success at Geneva depends upon general agreement, and the American delegation has made it plain that President Hoover's proposals are put forward as a contribution to an agreed general programme. The United Kingdom Government have already advanced wide suggestions of their own. These, while they differ in some important respects as to method or measure, are inspired by the same purpose, and a comparison will show that already there is a substantial area of common ground.

Without interrupting or anticipating detailed discussions which must take place with the other delegations represented at Geneva, it is convenient at this moment to set out in broad outline the main characteristics of the United Kingdom proposals. They in their turn should be regarded, as I have said, not as a declaration of isolated action, but as a contribution to general agreement.

2. First, the Government of the United Kingdom desire to put on record their agreement with President Hoover on the further principle that the three problems of military, naval and air disarmament are interconnected. International agreement cannot be attained without an adequate contribution from all three sources. Inasmuch as Britain, like the United States of America, finds her strongest arm in the navy, the contribution which concerns her most is to be found in this sphere, in which, as is well known, contributions to disarmament on the largest scale have already been made in advance of the General Disarmament Conference. Nevertheless, the Government of the United Kingdom now offer a further contribution as part of a general world settlement.

3. It is now proposed to set out under the necessary heads of land, sea and air the manner in which the Government of the United Kingdom would suggest that these principles could be applied.

**LAND PROPOSALS.**

4. In the realm of land disarmament, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom find themselves very largely in accord with President Hoover's proposals. Naturally, it will be necessary carefully to examine details before expressing a final opinion on their suitability to the situation in each country.

5. To consider in turn the four categories to which these proposals relate:

(a) In regard to the strength of land armies, His Majesty's Government have consistently placed in the forefront of their proposals for land disarmament the examination of measures for reduction of effectives to the lowest level compatible with national safety. So far as their own forces are concerned, His Majesty's Government have not only abolished conscription, but have already effected reductions to the minimum numbers required for the preservation

of internal order and for the defence of their overseas possessions and communications. If we take account of the whole British Army, including not only British troops in Great Britain and her Colonies, but also those maintained in India, the personnel has been reduced, as compared with the year before the war, from 259,000 to 207,000, and this has been effected by the disbandment of nine regiments of cavalry, sixty-one batteries and companies of artillery, twenty-one companies of Royal Engineers, twenty-one battalions of infantry and six battalions of colonial and troops locally enrolled.

The United States proposal for a division of land forces into a " police component " and a " defence component " will require very careful examination; but, so far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand the implication of the suggested basis of calculation, the result will be to show that the British land forces have already been reduced substantially below the number recognised to be necessary for the maintenance of internal order, without making any allowance for the forces needed for the lines of communication between the United Kingdom and territories overseas.

(b) In regard to chemical and bacteriological warfare, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have already joined in rejecting the use of these methods of warfare and therefore cordially welcome the United States proposals under this head.

(c) In regard to land guns, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have proposed the abolition of all mobile guns of a calibre greater than 155 mm. (6.1 inches calibre). Under this head, also, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom find themselves, therefore, in general agreement with the proposals of the United States Government.

(d) In regard to tanks, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom find themselves entirely at one with President Hoover in desiring the application of the principle that specifically offensive weapons should be prohibited. His Majesty's Government have already advocated the abolition of all tanks above a weight of 20 tons, which by their characteristics are especially suitable for offensive employment in battle. Tanks of the lighter type cannot be regarded as specifically offensive weapons. Their comparatively light armour and their reduced capacity for crossing trenches render them unsuitable for the assault of highly organised defences. Moreover, in a small voluntarily enlisted army like our own, they constitute an essential compensation for lack of numbers which it would be impossible to surrender. As far as this country is concerned, in view of its worldwide responsibilities, any general prohibition would require an increase in our present land forces in terms of man-power, and thus, as a measure of disarmament, would tend to defeat its own ends.

6. It will be seen, therefore, that in the realm of land disarmament the proposals of the United States Government, so far as they relate to matters which directly touch the land forces of the United Kingdom, approximate very closely to those favoured by His Majesty's Government; and that, in the total of their effectives, His Majesty's Government have been able already to put into practice a measure of disarmament which more than conforms to the standards proposed by President Hoover.

#### NAVAL PROPOSALS.

7. These proposals cover all types of vessels—capital ships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

It is essential that proposals that are intended to be adopted by general agreement should make due provision for varying circumstances. Having regard to the widely scattered responsibilities of the British Navy, it is not practicable for us to cut down the number of naval units beyond a certain point. Occasions may arise when these responsibilities call for the presence of ships simultaneously in parts of the world far removed from one another. It is essential to bear in mind in this connection the very large reduction in the numbers of ships of all categories which has already been effected. If a comparison is made with the year before the war it will be found that, taking account of completed vessels of the United Kingdom and other members of the British Commonwealth possessing vessels of any of the categories mentioned, capital ships have been reduced from 69 to 15; cruisers from 108 to 52; destroyers from 285 to 147; and submarines from 74 to 52. Numerical reduction in the British Navy has therefore already been applied on a very large scale, and, indeed, cruiser numbers will require special consideration hereafter. But, though there is, for the reasons already pointed out, a limit to numerical reduction, it is perfectly possible, and in the highest degree desirable, to adopt a mode of treatment which will secure by other means the large diminution in naval armaments at which we are all aiming. The present treaty limits of size and gun calibre are far too high, and the United Kingdom Government consider that very large reductions amounting to about one-third, both in the case of capital ships and cruisers, can be made in future construction.

8. As regards capital ships, the position under existing naval treaties is that, as between Britain, the United States and Japan, no further capital ship construction could be undertaken in any event until the year 1937. The maximum size for any future construction has been fixed



at 35,000 tons, and the gun at 16 inches. The total tonnage of the category of ships can be reduced either by diminishing their number or by diminishing their size. In regard to number, the considerations which the United Kingdom Government are bound to bear in mind have already been stated. The American proposal would leave the size of these enormously expensive vessels, and the calibre of their guns, untouched in any future construction of capital ships. Every figure involved in these huge dimensions—initial cost, upkeep, personnel, ammunition, stores, docks—would be maintained at the highest level. The United Kingdom proposal, while securing no less reduction in total tonnage, evades these consequences by (1) reducing the size of the gun, and (2) reducing the size of the ship. For example, if the calibre of the gun is reduced to 12 inches, the maximum size of the ship can be reduced from 35,000 to 25,000 tons, and an immense saving is effected under both heads, both initially and consequentially.

9. But the Government of the United Kingdom are prepared to go beyond this. They are ready to apply the same principles to cruisers, and to reduce their maximum size and gun-calibre by international agreement from the present figure of 10,000 tons and 8 inches to 7,000 tons and 6.1 inches. It would then be possible to reduce the dimensions in the case of capital ships still further and fix a maximum of 22,000 tons with 11-inch guns. This will nearly halve the initial cost of any future capital ship and greatly reduce the cost of maintenance. Thus, the whole scale would come down together, and there would be a definite return to smaller dimensions. On this basis, the United Kingdom proposal would effect an ultimate reduction in capital ship tonnage alone of 195,000 tons; the comparable figure under the United States proposal would appear to be about 175,000.

10. As regards aircraft-carriers, the Government of the United Kingdom are in substantial agreement with President Hoover's proposals. They propose a reduction in the size of the aircraft-carrier from 27,000 to 22,000 tons, with consequent reduction in total tonnage from 135,000 to 110,000 tons.

11. Special reference must be made to the submarine. The United Kingdom view has been, and is, that the submarine should be entirely abolished. If its abolition can be secured this would, in our view, at once make possible a reduction of approximately one-third in destroyer tonnage. If international agreement to abolish submarines is found impossible of attainment, ocean-going submarines should be got rid of by limiting the size to 250 tons, and the total tonnage to the lowest figure upon which agreement can be reached.

12. Consequently, the Government of the United Kingdom put forward for immediate adoption by international agreement the following set of proposals relating to the navies of the world:

(1) Reduce the maximum size of any future capital ship to 22,000 tons, and the maximum calibre of the guns carried to 11 inches.

(2) Reduce the maximum size of cruisers hereafter constructed to 7,000 tons, and maximum calibre of guns to 6.1 inches.

(3) If international agreement on point (2) cannot be secured, the Government of the United Kingdom would still urge that the maximum size of capital ships should be reduced to 25,000 tons and their guns to 12 inches as a maximum.

(4) Reduce the maxima for aircraft-carriers to 22,000 tons with 6.1-inch guns.

(5) Abolish submarines.

(6) Reduce destroyer tonnage by approximately one-third, this depending on the abolition of submarines.

(7) If submarines cannot be completely abolished, fix their maximum surface displacement at 250 tons, with a strict limitation both of total tonnage and number of units.

#### AIR PROPOSALS.

13. There is no aspect of international disarmament more vitally urgent than the adoption without delay of the most effective measures to preserve the civilian population from the fearful horrors of bombardment from the air. The Government of the United Kingdom would be prepared to go to any length, in agreement with other Powers, to achieve this object, and, if more drastic measures are proposed from any other quarter and are shown to be practicable, they will examine them with the utmost sympathy.

They propose that the contracting parties should agree between themselves in respect of their air forces that there should be:

(i) The complete prohibition of all bombing from the air, save within limits to be laid down as precisely as possible by an international convention. Attacks upon the civilian population would be entirely prohibited.

(ii) A strict limitation in the unladen weight of all military and naval aircraft (troop-carriers and flying boats excepted).

(iii) A restriction in the numbers of all kinds of military and naval aircraft.

14. In this last connection, the United Kingdom Government wish to add an observation. They sincerely desire to see numbers of military and naval aircraft restricted, and here, again, regard must be had to the course of recent events. In 1913-14, air armaments were negligible, and no comparison with that date can usefully be made. At the end of the war, Great Britain was one of the two leading air Powers in the world. Her colonial possessions are widely scattered and, since the war, her responsibilities have been increased by her various mandates from the League of Nations. More than any other Power, she relies upon aircraft to discharge her mandatory duties and to police and control undeveloped regions. Yet, in 1932, her first-line aircraft had been reduced to little more than 20 per cent of her post-war strength, with the result that the United Kingdom now stands, in the number of its military and naval aeroplanes, only fifth in the list of States. Of aircraft authorised for home defence in 1923 by the United Kingdom Government with the approval of Parliament, 20 per cent have not, in fact, been constructed.

15. Great and far-reaching as these reductions in all three arms have been—beyond comparison greater than any which have been effected elsewhere outside the countries disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles—His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are ready and eager to join in the further measures of disarmament for which general agreement can be attained. The proposals which, accordingly, are now made constitute an additional contribution, practical and extensive, to the effort to relieve the heavy burdens which the maintenance of existing standards imposes upon the world and which the world expects us, by a great common effort, effectively to diminish.

---

*Official No.: Conf. D. 136 (I).*

[Conf.D./C.G.31 (I).]

Geneva, July 22nd, 1932.

## RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON JULY 23rd, 1932.

---

### I.

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments,

Profoundly convinced that the time has come when all nations of the world must adopt substantial and comprehensive measures of disarmament in order to consolidate the peace of the world, to hasten the resumption of economic activity, and to lighten the financial burdens which now weigh upon the peoples of the world;

Desirous of avoiding a competition in the power of armaments which would be both ruinous to the peoples and threatening to their national defence;

Recalling its resolutions of April 19th, 20th and 22nd, 1932;

Firmly determined to achieve a first decisive step involving a substantial reduction of armaments, on the basis of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and as a natural consequence of the obligations resulting from the Briand-Kellogg Pact;

Welcoming heartily the initiative taken by the President of the United States of America in formulating concrete proposals for a substantial reduction of armaments by the prohibition of certain methods of warfare, by the abolition of certain material, and by reductions varying in magnitude and amounting for certain armaments to the proportion of one-third;

Bearing in mind also the draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission, the statements and proposals made to the Conference by a number of delegations, and the reports and resolutions of the various Commissions of the Conference:

Decides forthwith and unanimously, guided by the general principles underlying President Hoover's declaration:

1. That a substantial reduction of world armaments shall be effected to be applied by a general Convention alike to land, naval and air armaments;
2. That a primary objective shall be to reduce the means of attack.



## II. CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE.

The Conference, noting that agreement has now been reached on a certain number of important points, decides, without prejudice to more far-reaching agreements hereafter, to record forthwith the following concrete measures of disarmament, which should form part of the general Convention to be concluded. The Conference also decides to establish certain principles as the basis for further reductions of armaments, and to determine the procedure necessary for the active prosecution of its work.

### I. AIR FORCES.

The Conference, deeply impressed with the danger overhanging civilisation from bombardment from the air in the event of future conflict, and determined to take all practicable measures to provide against this danger, records at this stage of its work the following conclusions:

1. Air attack against the civilian population shall be absolutely prohibited;
2. The High Contracting Parties shall agree as between themselves that all bombardment from the air shall be abolished, subject to agreement with regard to measures to be adopted for the purpose of rendering effective the observance of this rule.

These measures should include the following:

(a) There shall be effected a limitation by number and a restriction by characteristics of military aircraft;

(b) Civil aircraft shall be submitted to regulation and full publicity. Further, civil aircraft not conforming to the specified limitations shall be subjected to an international regime (except for certain regions where such a regime is not suitable) such as to prevent effectively the misuse of such civil aircraft.

### 2. LAND ARMAMENTS.

#### (a) *Land Artillery.*

1. All heavy land artillery of calibres between any maximum limit as determined in the succeeding paragraph and a lower limit to be defined shall be limited in number.

2. The limitation of calibre of land artillery shall be fixed by the Convention.

Subject to an effective method being established to prevent the rapid transformation of guns on fixed mountings into mobile guns, different maxima for the calibre of land guns may be fixed as follows:

(a) A maximum limit for the calibre of coastal guns, which shall not be less than the maximum calibre of naval guns;

(b) A maximum limit for the calibre of guns in permanent frontier or fortress defensive systems;

(c) A maximum limit for the calibre of mobile land guns (other than guns employed for coastal defence).

#### (b) *Tanks.*

The maximum unit tonnage of tanks shall be limited.

### 3. CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL AND INCENDIARY WARFARE.

Chemical, bacteriological and incendiary warfare shall be prohibited under the conditions unanimously recommended by the Special Committee.

### 4. SUPERVISION.

There shall be set up a Permanent Disarmament Commission with the constitution, rights and duties generally as outlined in Part VI of the draft Convention submitted by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, with such extension of its powers as may be deemed by the Conference necessary to enable the Convention to be effectively applied.

### III. PREPARATION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE.

The Conference requests the Bureau to continue its work during the period of adjournment of the General Commission, with a view to framing, with the collaboration (if necessary) of a Drafting Committee, draft texts concerning the questions on which agreement has already been reached. Such texts will be communicated to all delegations as soon as they are drafted, and will then be submitted to the Commission.

Points which call for detailed examination will be examined by the Bureau or by the appropriate Committees, with the assistance of the Governments concerned, in order that definite conclusions may be reached as soon as the General Commission meets again.

The questions which will form the subject of such examination are the following:

#### I. EFFECTIVES.

A strict limitation and a real reduction of effectives shall be brought about.

For this purpose, the Conference invites the Bureau to examine, with the collaboration of such delegations as it considers necessary, the proposal of President Hoover relating to effectives. These studies should take into consideration, in the case of each country, the actual conditions of defence and the number and character of its forces.

#### 2. LIMITATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.

(a) The Conference shall decide on the resumption of its labours, taking into account the special conditions of each State, what system of limitation and publicity of expenditure on national defence will provide the peoples with the best guarantee of an alleviation of their financial burdens, and will prevent the measures of qualitative and quantitative disarmament to be inserted in the Convention from being neutralised by increases or improvements in authorised armaments.

(b) With a view to the decisions to be taken under this head, the Conference requests the Committee on National Defence Expenditure and its technical Committee to continue and complete the work entrusted to its organs and to submit their report as soon as possible. The Conference requests its Bureau to draw up, on the basis of this report, a plan accomplishing the purpose aimed at and taking into consideration the special conditions of the various States.

#### 3. TRADE IN AND MANUFACTURE OF ARMS.

The Bureau will set up a special Committee to submit proposals to the Conference, immediately on the resumption of its work, in regard to the regulations to be applied to the trade in and private and State manufacture of arms and implements of war.

#### 4. NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

As regards the proposals made by President Hoover and other related proposals concerning naval armaments, the Conference invites the Powers parties to the Naval Treaties of Washington and London, which have already produced important results, to confer together and to report to the General Commission, if possible before the resumption of its work, as to the further measures of naval reduction which might be feasible as a part of the general programme of disarmament.

The Conference further invites the naval Powers other than the Powers parties to the above Treaties to make arrangements for determining the degree of naval limitation they are prepared to accept in view of the Washington and London Treaties and the general programme of disarmament envisaged in the present resolution.

The Bureau will be kept informed of the progress of these negotiations, which it will be its duty to co-ordinate within the framework of the General Convention in preparation for the comprehensive decisions of the General Commission.

#### 5. VIOLATIONS.

Rules of international law shall be formulated in connection with the provisions relating to the prohibition of the use of chemical, bacteriological and incendiary weapons and bombing from the air, and shall be supplemented by special measures dealing with infringement of these provisions.

#### 6. FUTURE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE : PROCEDURE.

Pending the resumption of the meetings of the General Commission, the Bureau will keep the delegations informed of the progress of the work.

It will be for the Bureau to fix the date of the next meeting of the General Commission with one month's notice. The meeting of the General Commission shall take place not later than four months after the resumption of the work of the Bureau, which will meet during the week beginning September 19th, 1932.



#### IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

The present resolution in no way prejudices the attitude of the Conference towards any more comprehensive measures of disarmament or towards the political proposals submitted by various delegations.

#### V. ARMAMENTS TRUCE.

In order to ensure that, pending the resumption of the meetings of the General Commission and during the second phase of its work, no steps shall be initiated by any Power which might prejudice the preparation of the General Disarmament Convention, the Conference decides to recommend to the Governments to renew for a period of four months from November 1st, 1932, the truce provided for by the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of September 29th, 1931.

---

*Series of Publications:* 1932.IX.52.

*Official No.:* **Conf. D. 138.**

[Conf.D./C.D.M.24.]

Geneva, July 25th, 1932.

### MORAL DISARMAMENT

---

*Note by the Secretary-General:*

In accordance with the request of the President of the Conference, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the delegations of the Conference a letter, dated July 20th, from M. Perrier, President of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, and the report of the Committee annexed to it.

#### I. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE.

Geneva, July 20th, 1932.

I have the honour to send you herewith the report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament indicating the state of its labours at the end of the first session of the Conference.

On behalf of the Committee, I am expressing the hope that you will be good enough, after having taken note of the report and provided you see no objection thereto, to have it distributed to the delegations at the Conference.

(Signed) PERRIER,

*President of the Committee for Moral Disarmament.*

#### II. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON MORAL DISARMAMENT AT THE END OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

At its meeting on March 15th, 1932, the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference, mainly in the light of the proposals submitted by the Polish Government in its memoranda dated September 23rd, 1931, February 13th and March 15th, 1932, and recognising the obvious connection which exists between material and moral disarmament, set up a Committee to study the various aspects of this question. Under the presidency of M. Perrier (delegate of Switzerland), and with the assistance of M. Szumlakowski (Poland), as Rapporteur, and M. Romarnicki (Poland), his substitute, this Committee endeavoured first of all to define the various fields it should explore.

For this purpose, it instructed a Sub-Committee to prepare the agenda of its work, taking into account the suggestions put forward by certain delegations, and a communication addressed by the President of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation to the President of the Disarmament Conference.

Having approved the proposals of its Sub-Committee, the Committee for Moral Disarmament established its agenda as follows, and grouped under three headings the various categories of questions which, it felt, ought to be examined:

1. Questions concerning intellectual co-operation and technical means of spreading information, including the problems of education, utilisation of cinematography and broadcasting;
2. Questions concerning the co-operation of the Press;
3. Questions of a legal character.

In the following paragraphs, an account is given, with regard to each of these groups of questions, of the work which the Committee has already accomplished, the provisional conclusions at which it has arrived, and the programme of the work it proposes to carry out subsequently.

#### I. INTELLECTUAL CO-OPERATION, EDUCATION AND TECHNICAL MEANS OF SPREADING INFORMATION.

The Committee appointed a Sub-Committee to study these questions. The Sub-Committee has held several meetings and has examined memoranda received from the Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation and the Rome International Educational Cinematographic Institute, and proposals submitted by several delegations.

Following on this enquiry, it proposed that the Commission should adopt as a basis of discussion a draft text prepared by the Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation which it had itself modified. This draft took into account the various proposals laid before the Committee, and, when adopting it as a basis of discussion, the Committee was careful to make every reservation concerning the final form which might be given to the text it was about to draw up. This draft, which includes a Preamble and four chapters, contained suggestions on the following points:

- (1) Education of the younger generation;
- (2) Co-operation of the intellectual world;
- (3) Utilisation of technical means of spreading information;
- (4) Ways and means of giving effect to possible undertakings.

After a general discussion on the whole draft, the Committee suspended its enquiry in order to allow its members to consult their Governments before they proceeded to examine the matter in greater detail.

On resuming its labours, it discussed carefully and in detail each of the articles of the draft at a first reading. Numerous amendments and improvements were made in the original text, and a special Drafting Committee will bear these alterations in mind with a view to preparing a new text which will, if necessary, be discussed at a second reading.

The Committee has now terminated this first stage of its work.

#### 2. CO-OPERATION OF THE PRESS IN THE WORK OF MORAL DISARMAMENT.

Following the same methods, the Committee also appointed a Sub-Committee to examine a draft resolution submitted by the Polish Government concerning the assistance which the Press might afford to the work of moral disarmament. Having accepted this draft resolution as a basis of discussion, the Sub-Committee deemed it desirable to hear representatives of international groups of journalists.

After this exchange of views, the Sub-Committee proceeded to prepare a preliminary statement, which, as soon as it is ready, will be submitted to the Committee when the Conference resumes its work.

#### 3. QUESTIONS OF A LEGAL CHARACTER.

At its first meetings, the attention of the Committee had been specially drawn to the importance of questions of a juridical and constitutional nature which arise in connection with the problem of moral disarmament.

In view of the complexity of these problems, the Committee appealed to the great experience of M. Pella, delegate of Roumania, who was good enough to lay his knowledge unreservedly at the Committee's disposal. A special Sub-Committee has been set up to examine a comprehensive memorandum in which M. Pella has set out all the data and bases of discussion necessary for a detailed study of the question. This study will be undertaken as soon as the Conference resumes work.

#### THE COMMITTEE'S PROGRAMME OF WORK DURING THE SUSPENSION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

In view of the stage at which the Committee has arrived in its work, the Committee decided that, in order to facilitate the resumption of its labours, it would be desirable, while the Conference was in adjournment, to instruct a Sub-Committee to conduct certain preparatory enquiries. This



Sub-Committee will meet at the time deemed to be most opportune, when convened by its chairman. It will proceed to adapt the texts already examined at the first reading, and will, mainly on the basis of the recent proposals put forward by the British and American delegations, prepare suggestions as to the best form in which the Committee may subsequently submit its recommendations to the Political Commission.

---

**Conf.D./C.G.9.**

Geneva, March 15th, 1932.

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL  
COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.**

---

At the request of the President, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the General Commission the following letter which the President of the Naval Commission addressed to him on March 14th, 1932.

Geneva, March 14th, 1932.

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a report—to which is attached a draft agenda—which was submitted to-day to the Naval Commission by its Bureau and approved.

The Naval Commission has, therefore, established an agenda and has already begun the discussion thereof.

Two matters not referred to in the report—

Argentine proposal (copy attached, see page 275);

Netherlands proposal (copy attached, see page 275)—

are considered by the Bureau of the Naval Commission, in agreement with the respective delegations, to require discussion by the General Commission before they can be discussed by the Naval Commission.

(Signed) Erik COLBAN,  
*President of the Naval Commission.*

**REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF THE NAVAL COMMISSION.**

In accordance with the decision taken by the Naval Commission at its second meeting, March 9th, its Bureau met at 4 p.m. on March 10th to consider the list of questions referred to the Naval Commission by the General Commission (see document Conf.D.103, page 179) and:

- A. To divide these questions into groups showing:
  - (a) Questions of which the discussion could be begun forthwith in the Naval Commission;
  - (b) Questions of which the discussion could only be begun in the Naval Commission after their previous discussion by the General or other Commission.
- B. To decide on the order in which the questions coming under A (a) above should be discussed.

Proposals in regard to these matters were sent in by the delegations of:

Argentine Republic,  
United Kingdom,  
Germany,  
Japan,

Netherlands,  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
United States of America.

The delegations of these States, together with those of States which had taken part in the discussion in the Naval Commission on March 9th, were requested to attend—should they so desire—the meeting of the Bureau, and the delegates of:

Argentine Republic,  
United Kingdom,  
France,  
Germany,

Italy,  
Netherlands,  
United States of America,

were present at the meeting.

It was agreed to recommend to the Commission that the questions shown in the list given in document Conf.D.103 (see page 179) should be dealt with as follows:

Items

- |     |   |  |
|-----|---|--|
| 1.  | } | Defer until after consideration of the corresponding questions by the Land Commission.   |
| 2.  |   |  |
| 3.  |   |  |
| 4.  |   |  |
| 5.  | } | Refer to the General Commission for previous consideration.  |
| 6.  |   |  |
| 7.  |   |  |
| 8.  |   |  |
| 9.  | } | Discuss forthwith in the Naval Commission.   |
| 10. |   |  |
| 11. |   |  |
| 12. |   | Refer to the General Commission for previous consideration.  |
| 13. | } | Discuss forthwith in the Naval Commission.   |
| 14. |   |  |
| 15. |   |  |
| 16. |   |  |
| 17. |   | Discuss forthwith in the Naval Commission. It was agreed that the reservation made in the first line of Annex I of the draft Convention—regarding previous Conventions—should not be dealt with by the Naval Commission. |
| 18. |   | Defer for subsequent discussion in the Naval Commission after decisions have been reached in the General Commission in regard to items 7, 8 and 9.   |
| 19. |   | Discuss forthwith in the Naval Commission.   |
| 20. |   | Defer until after consideration by the Expenditure Commission.   |
| 21. | } | Defer until after discussion of items 1, 2 and 3 above.  |
| 22. |   |  |
| 23. |   | Defer until after discussion of item 20 above.   |
| 24. |   | Discuss forthwith in the Naval Commission.   |
| 25. |   | Defer for subsequent discussion in the Naval Commission after a decision has been reached in the General Commission in regard to item 12.  |

From the above it will be seen that it is considered that the following questions can be discussed forthwith in the Naval Commission. The order of discussion proposed is that set out below:

Items 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24.

The attached draft agenda shows in detail the questions for discussion and the order in which it is proposed they should be taken.

The President will keep in touch with the Presidents of the other Commissions and will keep the Naval Commission informed of the progress of events of interest to it in the other Commissions.

### DRAFT AGENDA.

*Notes.* — 1. The number in parentheses in the left-hand column is the item number in the list of questions given in document Conf.D.103 (see page 179).

2. The wording in columns 2 and 3 is taken from the tables in document Conf.D.102.
3. Questions will, as a general rule, be discussed in the order shown below.

#### DRAFT CONVENTION.

##### 1 (10). *Article 17.*

General undertaking. No vessel exceeding limitations prescribed to be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party.

##### 2 (11). *Article 18.*

Rules for replacement.

#### RELEVANT PROPOSALS.

1. Contracting Parties not to build or allow to be built on their territories any warships exceeding the prescribed limits.

(U.S.S.R. — Conf.D.87, Article 17, paragraph (c).)

2. Not to cause new vessels to be constructed in foreign yards over and above the limits laid down for each contracting State.

(U.S.S.R. — Conf.D.87, Article 17, paragraph (d).)

Only replacement vessels to be built. Age-limits for replacement. Replaced vessels not to be used for warlike purposes.

(U.S.S.R. — Conf.D.87, Article 16, first paragraph and paragraph (a), Article 17(a).)



DRAFT CONVENTION (*continued*).

RELEVANT PROPOSALS (*continued*).

3 (13). *Article 20.*

Use of war-vessels constructed for another Power.

4 (14). *Article 21.*

Cession of war-vessels to another Power.

No handing over or sale of warships to another Power if such Power can use them as warships supernumerary to its prescribed establishment.

(U.S.S.R. — Conf.D.87, Article 17, paragraph (b).)

5 (15). *Article 22.*

Rules *re* disposal of war-vessels.

Rules for disposal. Disarmament of warships; what this comprises. Procedure for striking vessels off the establishment and rendering them unfit for warlike purposes.

(U.S.S.R. — Conf.D.87, Article 14.)

6 (16). *Article 23.*

Hulks or training establishments.

7 (17). *Annex I.*

Exempt vessels.

8 (19). *Annex III to Chapter B of Part II.*

Definitions.

1. Amended definitions.

(Germany. — Conf.D.79, II. A.12.)

2. Standard displacement. Amended definition.

(U.S.S.R. — Conf.D.87, Article 16, Note.)

9 (24). *Article 34.*

Publicity regarding the construction of war-vessels.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION.

The Argentine delegation, having proposed to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments that the countries non-signatories of the Washington and London Treaties should engage not to build or acquire capital ships of over 10,000 tons during the period of the Convention, request that this question be referred to the General Commission as a preliminary question of principle, which should be determined in advance and which might be inserted as paragraph (a) of Item 4, Chapter B, "Naval Material", of Part B of the questions to be referred to the General Commission (document Conf.D.103; see page 177).

COMMUNICATION FROM THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.

In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, its proposal concerning the prohibition of the laying of automatic mines in the open sea should be placed on the list of questions to be discussed, in the first instance, by the General Commission, from the point of view of principles.

**Conf.D./C.G.30.**

[Conf.D./Bureau. 11 and 12.]

Geneva, July 6th, 1932.

GENERAL COMMISSION.

**EFFECTIVES.**

In accordance with the decision of the Bureau, which met on July 5th, 1932, the Secretary-General has the honour to distribute to the General Commission the following documents:

I. Document Conf.D./Bureau.11: Communication from the President of the Committee on Effectives to the President of the Conference, dated June 9th, 1932.

II. Document Conf.D./Bureau.12: Draft Resolution submitted to the Bureau by M. de Brouckère, M. Beneš and Mr. Gibson, in execution of the Bureau's Decision of June 14th, 1932.

# I. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EFFECTIVES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE, DATED JUNE 9TH, 1932.

I have the honour to bring the following to your knowledge, for such action as you may deem appropriate.

The Committee on Effectives was set up by the resolution of the General Commission of May 10th, 1932, which reads as follows:

“ Since the question of ‘ effectives ’ is upon the agenda to be considered by the Conference in the near future; and

“ Since any reasonable, just and acceptable steps for the mutual limitation and reduction of effectives must be based upon comparable figures; and

“ Since the various countries, in submitting their figures in regard to the strength of average daily effectives and formations organised on a military basis, have not interpreted the terms employed in the same sense; and

“ In consequence, since no figures on a comparable basis are available for the use of this Conference:

“ It is the opinion of the Bureau that there be set up a Technical Committee for the purpose of studying all pertinent information relating to figures for effectives, with a view to preparing a report as to the numerical strength on a comparable basis of effectives maintained by each country, for submission to the General Commission. The Committee will invite representatives of each country concerned to appear before it in connection with the study of any figures submitted by that country, in order to aid in reaching the desired conclusion.”

The Committee established its programme of work, the first point being the definition of terms employed. It began with the definition, to be used as a basis for the comparative tables, of the average daily effectives of the armed forces in service (actual or realised). It was not found possible to obtain unanimity on certain points of that definition, and consequently the Committee adopted the following text:

“ Whereas certain reservations have been made on certain points of paragraph 1 (b) and to paragraph 5 of document Conf.D./Effectives.6 (3) concerning the bases of calculation for a comparison of actual or realised effectives;

“ Whereas the points on which the reservations have been formulated have only been adopted by a majority of the Committee and that, in consequence, they must be submitted to the General Commission for a final decision:

“ The Committee decides that, pending that decision and, if found opportune, the receipt of such supplementary indications as might be deemed necessary, the furnishing by States of the requested figures on the points having been made the object of reservations shall be optional and that any final conclusion on the possibility of rendering the figures of effectives comparable shall be suspended.”

As a consequence of the adoption of this resolution, the points referred to in its first paragraph are submitted for decision to the General Commission.

The first difference of opinion concerns the first sentence of paragraph 1(b)—namely, the passage printed in italics in the following text:

“ 1. It is understood that effectives (actual or realised) in service in land, sea and air armed forces consist of:

“ (a) . . . . .

“ (b) *All persons receiving military training other than pre-military training, wherever and however given.*

“ It is particularly understood that the effectives in reserve undergoing a period of training are to be included in the calculation of effectives in service during this period.”

The Soviet delegation proposed to substitute for the words “ wherever and however given ” the following:

“ In units, military schools and other organisations under the control of the Departments of National Defence.”

This amendment was defeated by 7 votes to 5.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet delegation refers in this connection to the second and third paragraphs of its letter to the President of the Committee (Appendix 3).



The second difference of opinion concerned paragraph 5, relative to preliminary instruction. This paragraph gave rise to two proposals: one by the French delegation, stating:

“ That the term ‘ pre-military instruction ’ applies only to persons who have not as yet reached the age of physical maturity most generally accepted in the various armies—*i.e.*, 18 years of age ”;

the other by the Italian delegation, reading as follows:

“ Pre-military instruction is instruction, whether obligatory or voluntary, given to young men who have not reached the requisite age for recruitment or voluntary engagement in the armed forces of the State, in order to submit them to a first rudimentary preparation of an essentially physical and athletic nature with the purpose of preparing them morally and physically for military service.”

The Committee, by 7 votes to 4, favoured the principle of the French proposal, which was finally drafted as follows:

“ It is understood that the term ‘ pre-military instruction ’ applies only to persons who have not as yet reached the age at which voluntary engagements are most generally accepted in the various armies—*i.e.*, 18 years of age. Young men of at least 18 years of age receiving military instruction may be separately classified if such instruction is given to them outside schools and units of the armed forces properly so-called. ”

The Committee decided, moreover, to submit to the General Commission a certain number of questions which had not as yet come up for discussion and which relate to the jurisdiction of the Committee. These questions figure in the documents annexed hereto [“ Proposal of the French Delegation ” (Appendix 1); “ Questions submitted to the General Commission by the Italian Delegation ” (Appendix 2); “ Letter from the Soviet Delegation ” (Appendix 3); “ Letter from the German Delegation ” (Appendix 4)].

The Committee would be very grateful if you would be good enough to take measures which would allow it to receive as soon as possible the decision requested, and to be in a position to bring its work to a successful conclusion.

(Signed) DE BROUCKÈRE,  
*President of the Committee.*

#### Appendix 1.

##### PROPOSAL BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION.

The French delegation proposes that the General Commission should be asked to decide that for purposes of equitable comparison between effectives of land, sea and air armed forces, the following should be counted separately in the particulars already supplied, in accordance with the tables of Article 30 of the draft Convention, and in order to take into account the different characteristics of the various systems of armed forces:

- (a) Recruits not having completed their elementary training—*i.e.*, with less than six months' military training;<sup>1</sup>
- (b) Officers;<sup>2</sup>
- (c) Other ranks of land, sea and air armed forces having completed at least two years of service;<sup>2</sup>
- (d) Effectives of land and air armed forces stationed in the home country;
- (e) Effectives of land and air armed forces stationed overseas.

The particulars asked for in paragraphs (b), (d) and (e) are specifically referred to in the draft Convention and have been repeatedly explained. In particular, it seems essential to the French delegation to show separately the effectives which States are obliged to maintain so as to keep order in large oversea territories, in order that an equitable comparison may be made between the effectives of these States and those of countries which have not the same responsibilities.

The French delegation proposes six months for the duration of the elementary training of recruits, because this period corresponds with the rules in force in numerous countries, and in

<sup>1</sup> In the case of armed forces recruited by voluntary engagement, when entry into service may take place at any time in the year, the information referred to in paragraphs (a) and (c) may be given approximately by means of a percentage.

<sup>2</sup> These particulars apply to armed land forces. Special provisions may be laid down for air forces—for example, as regards the numerical data of paragraphs (c) and (d).

the report of Sub-Commission A (page 39) it was unanimously recognised by the experts of all delegations that:

“ . . . generally speaking, individuals who have had six months' or less training must be given a relatively lower rating than individuals who have undergone longer periods of training. ”

As regards the minimum period of two years' service for other ranks referred to in paragraph (c) above, this period is smaller than that provided for in the draft Convention—*i.e.*, than the maximum period of service in force in conscript armies. As far as it is concerned, however, the French delegation accepts the figure of two years, because it regards it as possible to utilise the majority of soldiers of this category, whether conscripts or volunteers, as cadres or as instructors for recruits; but the French delegation is ready to accept a figure in excess of two years if this is found to be necessary to meet the requirements of other delegations.

On account of the different constructions that have been placed in the Committee on the scope of its terms of reference, the French delegation proposes that the General Commission be asked to make those terms of reference clearer on the two following points:

(a) Is the Committee to confine its examination to the information contemplated in Article 30 of the draft Convention and in columns (a) and (b) of the tables annexed to that article, or may it extend its field of operations to all questions concerning effectives, no matter to what article of the draft Convention they relate, with the single exception of questions on which the Preparatory Commission gave a negative decision, and of which no technical examination could be undertaken except upon a new decision by the General Commission ?

(b) In the course of its efforts to find equitable bases for comparison in regard to effectives, may the Committee consider whether such rules as it has accepted are equally capable of practical application to limitation undertakings, and may it formulate proposals on this subject, if it so desires ?

---

## Appendix 2.

### PROPOSAL BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION.

#### *Questions to be submitted to the General Commission.*

##### 1. *Effectives.*

What are the kind or kinds of effectives (legal, realised, budgetary) which will have to be considered by the Committee in calculating effectives ?

##### 2. *Preparatory Military Training.*

For the purposes of No. 51 of the report annexed to the draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, should preparatory military training be regarded as any training given previous to enlistment (by conscription or voluntary enlistment), or only as that given between certain age-limits before such enlistment ?

##### 3. *Untrained Recruits.*

Should untrained recruits be mentioned in a separate column in addition to their inclusion in the figure of total effectives ?

Within what time-limits should recruits be regarded as untrained ?

##### 4. *Soldiers who exceed a Given Length of Service.*

Should soldiers, other than officers, who exceed a given contractual period of service be shown separately ?

What should be the duration of the contractual period of service for this calculation ?

##### 5. *Professional Soldiers.*

In calculating effectives, should any consideration be given to the different military value of conscripts, professional soldiers, or those who in any way exceed a given contractual period of service ?

##### 6. *Armed Forces in the Home Country or overseas.*

Should the effectives of the land and air armed forces stationed in the home country be indicated separately from those stationed overseas ?

Should the effectives of the land and air armed forces stationed overseas be given in the aggregate, or separately for each colony, or separately in two groups, one relating to colonies near the home country and the other relating to distant colonies ?

---



### Appendix 3.

#### LETTER FROM THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS DELEGATION.

As at this moment our Committee is requesting the President of the Conference to place on the agenda a number of questions the solution of which is absolutely indispensable if the work of the Committee on Effectives is to continue, I should like, further to the observations I have had occasion to make in the Committee itself, to define the views of the Soviet delegation with regard to the present situation.

The Soviet delegation does not think that the Committee on Effectives has encountered any really material obstacles in the task assigned to it by the General Commission. A comparison of the figures in the special edition of the *Military Year-Book* is quite feasible in the light of the definitions already unanimously adopted by the Committee on Effectives. I refer to the constituent parts of the armed forces quoted in Article 1 (a) of document Conf.D./Effectives.6(3) with the addition of reservists liable to be called up for further training, counting the days of service.

The Soviet delegation is bound to note that the interruption of the work of our Committee is due to the opinion expressed by certain delegations concerning the necessity of taking into account several other factors which other delegations, the Soviet delegation included, do not think it possible to take into account in view of the limited terms of reference assigned to us by the General Commission.

In opposing the consideration of the supplementary factors set out in document Conf.D./Effectives.6(3), which were not unanimously adopted by our Committee, the Soviet delegation believes that it is necessary to continue the work of the Committee on Effectives on the lines indicated and to proceed immediately to examine the figures submitted by the various States. The Soviet delegation also believes that it would be very desirable to submit the following important questions to the General Commission, with a view to reduction in conformity with the principles of the future Convention:

1. Militarily trained reserves.
2. Persons subject to pre-military training.
3. Persons studying military questions in public or private organisations.

(Signed) LANGOVOY,  
Delegate.

### Appendix 4.

#### LETTER FROM THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

The German delegation is convinced that the Committee on Effectives is in a position to continue the work entrusted to it by the General Commission's resolution of May 11th, 1932,<sup>1</sup> provided it confines itself, in accordance with that resolution, to the particulars asked for in columns (a) and (b) of Tables I to VII and in column (a) of Tables VIII to XII annexed to Article 30 of the draft Convention. In this connection, the German delegation assumes that the explanations requested in Article 30 will be given, and that, in accordance with the draft Convention, the particulars to be inserted in Tables II and V will be furnished separately for the different colonies.

If, however, other delegations considered it necessary to supplement the particulars already given by Governments by additional data for purposes of comparison, and if the Committee decided to submit the questions which then arise, independently of the continuation of its original work, to the General Commission in the form of a decision, the German delegation would feel obliged to attach to it the following questions, in so far as they are not raised by other delegations beforehand:

1. Do the average daily effectives of effectives with the colours alone constitute a basis of comparison of the military value of the effectives of the armed forces of a country, or should there be taken into account, for purposes of comparison, besides the annual contingent, trained reserves which, after completing their service with the colours, continue to be registered and liable by law for military service? Moreover, should all the effectives, including all the trained reserves, be estimated according to their military value? (See German reservations No. 79, last paragraph, and No. 187 (a) and (b), of the report of the Preparatory Commission; see pages 38 and 49 of this series.)
2. Should "preparatory training" include all training prior to enrolment, or only training given below a certain age? (See Nos. 51 and 192 of the report of the Preparatory Commission, document C.690.M.289.1930.IX; see pages 36 and 50 of this series.)
3. In filling up column (b) of the tables annexed to Article 30, is it necessary, should particulars be requested of other men who have performed  $x$  months' service, also to give the

<sup>1</sup> See second paragraph of document Conf.D./Bureau.11, above.

particulars corresponding to column (d) (effectives whose period of service has exceeded the legal period, but is less than  $x$  months) ? (See No. 61 of the report of the Preparatory Commission; see page 37 of this series.)

4. Should the armed forces stationed overseas be shown separately from those of the home country, and, in particular, should they be shown separately according to the various oversea territories, or should the armed forces in territories near the home country be added, for purposes of comparison, to those of the home country ? (See German reservation No. 73 of the report of the Preparatory Commission; see page 38 of this series.)

(Signed) SCHÖNHEINZ.

Conf.D./Bureau.12.

## II. DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU BY M. DE BROUCKÈRE, M. BENEŠ AND MR. GIBSON IN EXECUTION OF THE BUREAU'S DECISION OF JUNE 14TH, 1932.

In consideration of the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Effectives, dated June 9th, 1932 (document Conf.D./Bureau.11);

Noting that the letter and its annexes raise various questions regarding the elements which should or should not be taken into account in comparing effectives in service or undergoing training in the various countries;

Leaving it to the General Commission to give a reply on these questions;

The Bureau:

1. Requests the General Commission to give a decision on the questions raised in the letter from the Chairman of the Committee on Effectives and its annexes in time to enable the Committee to pursue its task without interruption;

2. Recommends that the Committee should establish, according to a uniform method of calculation for the elements enumerated in the provisional agenda given below and in the order laid down in that agenda, the average daily actual (or real) effectives in service or undergoing training.

### I. *Armed Forces.*

1. Effectives of the units and formations (troops, schools and services) of the armed forces proper stationed in the home country.

(a) Officers;

(b) Recruits not having completed their elementary training—*i.e.*, having less than six months' military training;

(c) Soldiers other than officers, cadets, non-commissioned officers and men (including persons of equivalent rank) having completed more than two years of service.

(d) Total effectives of officers, cadets, non-commissioned officers and men (including persons of equivalent rank).

*Note.* — It is understood that, pending a decision by the General Commission, communication of the figures asked for under letters (b) and (c) will be optional.

2. Effectives of units and formations (troops, schools and services) of the armed forces proper stationed overseas:

(a) }  
(b) } as above.  
(c) }  
(d) }

*Note.* — Same remark as for 1.

3. Reserve effectives undergoing a period of training:

(a) Officers;

(b) Other effectives.

The General Commission will be called upon to pronounce, among other points, upon the question whether figures will have to be established with regard to the following elements. If, when the Committee has finished establishing the figures relating to the elements referred to under Nos. 1, 2 and 3 above, the General Commission has not yet taken a decision on this subject, the Committee will draw up a report to the General Commission stating its opinion in this connection.

It is expressly understood that, pending a decision by the General Commission, any final conclusion on the possibility of making the figures of effectives comparable will be suspended.

4. Youths under 18 receiving pre-regimental training.



5. Other effectives not included above and receiving military training, in whatever place and in whatever form, outside the regular formation of the armed forces proper.

II. *Formations organised on a Military Basis.*

6. Effectives of formations organised on a military basis participating in the maintenance of order and stationed in the home country:

- (a) Officers;
- (b) Other ranks.

7. Effectives of other formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country:

- (a)
- (b)

8. Effectives of formations organised on a military basis participating in the maintenance of order and stationed overseas:

- (a)
- (b)

9. Effectives of other formations organised on a military basis stationed overseas:

- (a)
- (b)

When the Committee has finished establishing the figures relating to real effectives, it is recommended to establish in the same way the figures relating to legal effectives.

---







