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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF ARMAMENTS

Co-ordinating Table
of the Draft Convention¹ and of the Propositions
referred to the General Commission

¹ *Note.* — Without prejudice to the reservations made by various delegations in regard to articles of the draft Convention which have not been withdrawn or modified since the opening of the Conference.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 1.</i></p> <p>Agreement to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce armaments as provided in the present Convention.</p>	<p>I</p> <p>(a) Reduction to an equal limit of peace-time armed forces (land, sea and air) of all countries. Reduction to be carried out within ten years. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 1.)</p> <p>(b) Reduction to be made at a rate directly proportional to the extent of the armaments of the various countries on a determined date, and to be less drastic in the case of the weakest States. The reduction of armed forces of the States which have contracted alliances or agreements of military assistance among themselves must be based on the total figures of the additional armed forces (by categories of armaments) of these States. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 34.)</p> <p>(c) Reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30.)</p> <p>II</p> <p>(a) A permanent Disarmament Commission to make preparations for further progressive disarmament. (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, para. 5.)</p> <p>(b) Idea of reduction by stages. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 52 (7).)</p> <p>(c) A permanent organisation to prepare a programme for reduction by stages, the details to be fixed by subsequent conferences and reduction to be continued under the programme until the principles of Article 8 of the Covenant have been carried out in their entirety. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, para. 6.)</p> <p>(d) If the aims can only be reached by stages, these stages should be spread over as short a period as possible. The Convention should represent a genuine advance to the farther possible limits in this direction and contain peremptory guarantees for the complete realisation of these aims within as short a time as possible. (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18 (4).)</p> <p>(e) Fixing of a percentage to serve as a general guide for the reduction, in the course of three years, of the existing level of armaments of countries which are not at present tied in the matter of armaments, subject to adjustments in particular cases. Reduction of military expenditure in a proportion corresponding to the reduction in the general level of armaments. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, para. 3.)</p>	<p>Principle of definitive reduction under a single Convention.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level.</p> <p>Reduction to be brought about by stages.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Proportional and progressive reduction based on the position of armaments at a specific date.</p> <p>Effective reduction from the first stage with peremptory guarantees in the first Convention of a complete realisation within a specific short delay.</p> <p>First stage: Proportional reduction on the basis of the <i>status quo</i>, with adjustments in particular cases.</p>

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<p><i>Article 1</i> (continuation).</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">III</p> <p>(a) The scale of armaments on land and sea and in the air shall be determined for each country by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Size of the territory. 2. Number of population. 3. Length and nature of land frontier and coast-line. 4. Facility of communications on land and sea and in the air. 5. Degree of security against external aggression. 6. National resources. <p>(China—Conf.D.99, p. 50.)</p> <p>(b) Limitation to be effected in such manner as to leave room for rectification of manifest defects in elements. (Japan—Conf.D.94, p. 53.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.)</p> <p>(c) Need for taking due account of the geographical situation and the special conditions of each State in the preparation of plans for the limitation of armaments. (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p> <p>(d) Computation of armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for internal order plus a contingent for defence, the former being absolute figures and the latter a relative figure. (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 49.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">IV</p> <p>(a) Preliminary examination by the Conference of the question of the prohibition of war materials of a specifically aggressive character. (Italy—Conf.D.99, pp. 18 and 33.)</p> <p>(b) Prohibition of certain material if the latter does not form the subject of an undertaking to place it at the disposal of the League of Nations. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 24.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">V</p> <p>Examination of further reductions subject to measures to be taken to ensure security. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 23.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14.)</p>	<p>Criteria for limitation or reduction.</p> <p>Taking into consideration of all the particular conditions of the different countries.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Method of computation of the effectives based on the absolute needs for internal order and relative needs for national defence.</p> <p>Preliminary discussion of the simultaneous application of a quantitative and qualitative limitation by the absolute prohibition of certain material.</p> <p>Prohibition of certain material except under certain conditions (placing at the disposal of the League of Nations).</p> <p>Reduction subject to measures to be taken in regard to the organisation of peace.</p>	

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<p><i>Article I</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>ENUMERATION OF THE CONDITIONS MENTIONED ABOVE AND OF THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL QUESTIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH.¹</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>A. Political Conditions.</i></p> <p>1. Placing at the disposal of the League of Nations or of another international authority of certain land and naval material and of civil aviation and bombing aircraft. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 23 (I and II).)</p> <p>The proposals in the matter connected with Part II, "Material", of the Draft Convention (provisions relating to land, sea and air material) are summarised under the respective chapters.</p> <p>2. (a) Creation of an international police force to prevent war. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25.)</p> <p>(b) Creation of a first contingent of coercionary forces to repress war and to bring immediate assistance to any State victim of aggression. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25.)</p> <p>(c) Establishment of a land, sea and air force of the League of Nations by a contribution from all the States belonging to it, to be fixed for each in proportion to the numbers of its population and to its national resources. Application of sanctions against signatory States that may refuse to furnish their contingents. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 32.)</p> <p>(d) Constitution of an international air police fleet. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51.)</p> <p>(e) Creation of an international army for the application of sanctions. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 15.)</p> <p>3. Moral Disarmament.</p> <p>(a) Necessity for moral disarmament. (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p> <p>(b) Abolition of the existing systems and measures calculated to encourage citizens to take up warlike pursuits, and to foster a warlike spirit among them. (China—Conf.D.99, p. 50.)</p>	<p>Placing at the disposal of the League of Nations, or of another international authority, of certain land and naval material and of civil aviation and bombing aircraft.</p> <p>Creation of an international force.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Should the General Commission consider it necessary that a detailed examination be made of the questions grouped under this head or of certain of those questions, they might be referred immediately to the Political Commission</p> <p>Discussion on the adoption of measures to ensure moral disarmament.</p> <p>The questions appearing under No. 3 (Moral Disarmament) might be referred to the Political Commission, which might, in its turn, refer it to a special sub-committee, in conformity with the Polish delegation's request.</p>

¹ Under this head are collected all proposals relating to this type of question, even when the delegations which submitted them did not make them a preliminary condition for the reduction of armaments.

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<p><i>Article I</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>A. <i>Political Conditions</i> (continuation).</p> <p>(c) Study of draft conventions relating to the following points:</p> <p>1. Prevention and punishment by national law of actions incompatible with satisfactory international relations (incitement of public opinion to warlike sentiments, false reports, etc.).</p> <p>2. Convening of a conference of journalists and publishers to examine moral disarmament, so far as the Press is concerned, and more particularly to study the proposals formulated in document Conf.D.16.</p> <p>3. International undertakings relating to the instruction of youth in international matters.</p> <p>4. Prevention in the sphere of broadcasting, the cinematograph and the stage of abuses which would be dangerous to a good international understanding.</p> <p>(i) Conclusion of a general convention on broadcasting.</p> <p>(ii) Prohibition of films and of plays which might embitter international relations, and, on the other hand, the encouragement of films and plays conveying propaganda in favour of peace.</p> <p>(Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 27.) (See also Conf.D.16.)</p> <p>(d) Conclusion of international conventions for the prevention and punishment of war propaganda and all individual acts likely to disturb relations among peoples.</p> <p>(Roumania—Conf.D.99, p. 20.)</p> <p>(e) Approval of the general idea of the Polish proposal.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 21.)</p> <p>B. <i>Legal Conditions.</i></p> <p>1. (a) General adoption of the system of justice organised by the League of Nations. Obligation to have recourse only to pacific means.</p> <p>(Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 21.)</p> <p>(b) Compulsory arbitration.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 21.) (France—Conf.D.99, p. 26.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.)</p> <p>(c) Compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court combined with a system of sanctions.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 21.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33.)</p> <p>2. (a) Necessity for a system of mutual assistance.</p> <p>(Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.)</p>	<p>Organisation of international arbitration.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Mutual assistance.</p>	

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<p><i>Article I</i> (continuation).</p>	<p>B. <i>Legal Conditions</i> (continuation).</p> <p>(b) Conclusion of a general pact of mutual assistance. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 15.)</p> <p>3. (a) Precise rules to be drawn up in regard to the operation of the sanctions for which the Covenant provides. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51.)</p> <p>(b) Guarantees as to the rapidity of the decision of the authority controlling the international force. Conformity of the action of such authority with international law. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 26.)</p> <p>4. Renunciation of the compulsive clauses embodied in the treaties for the benefit of a nation or group of nations, and modifications of the existing international regime. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">VI</p> <p>(a) The disarmament laid down in the treaties of peace must be regarded as an indication (model) for the reduction to be applied to all of the Members of the League of Nations. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p> <p>(b) Institution of a single system applicable equally to all States. Legal equality and equal security for all States. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 15.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p> <p>(c) Equality of right between all States and perequation of armed forces at the lowest levels. (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p> <p>(d) General reduction of armaments according to the principles of Article 8 of the Covenant applied to all nations. (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">VII</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of the whole of the armed forces immediately movable. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48.)</p>	<p>Mutual assistance.</p> <p>Organisation of sanctions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Readaptation of the international regime.</p> <p>The disarmament laid down in the treaties of peace must be regarded as an indication.</p> <p>Uniformity of methods of disarmament under the principle of the equality of rights of States.</p> <p>Equality of right between all States and perequation of armed forces at the lowest levels.</p> <p>Application of Article 8 to all States.</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of the whole of the armed forces immediately movable.</p>	

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<p><i>Article 1</i> (continuation).</p> <p>PART I. PERSONNEL.</p>	<p>VIII</p> <p>(a) A regional solution might be necessary in certain cases. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 20.)</p> <p>(b) From the point of view of the Latin-American continent, the reduction of armaments should be sought by means of regional agreements. The general draft should accordingly possess the necessary elasticity. (Chili—Conf.D.99, p. 16.)</p> <p>IX.</p> <p>Establishment of completely demilitarised zones or zones occupied by a limited number of effectives. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.)</p> <p>X.</p> <p>Relative agreement with regard to contraband of war. (Argentine—Conf.D.99, p. 53.)</p> <p>1. The personnel of the land forces and the naval personnel to be recruited only by means of voluntary enlistment. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, § 1 and p. 31, § 14.)</p> <p>2. Freedom to choose the system of military service. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 15.) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 22.)</p> <p>3. Limitation and reduction of trained reserves. (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 2 (a).)</p> <p>4. Limitation and reduction of trained reserves. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 2 (a).)</p> <p>5. Proportional reduction of trained reserves. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 40, Arts. 3, 5 (a) and 8 (b).)</p> <p>6. Limitation and reduction of the annual contingent. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 2 (a).)</p> <p>7. Contribution of effectives to the international force.</p> <p>(a) Constitution of a permanently available police force made up of contingents furnished by each of the contracting parties in a proportion to be determined.</p> <p>(b) Constitution of a coerciona-ry force of a strength varying according to the regions concerned, made up of contingents determined for each country and constantly available. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, III (a) and (b).)</p>	<p>Regional agreements within the framework of the general agreement.</p> <p>Demilitarised zones.</p> <p>Limitation of international law regulations with regard to blockade.</p> <p>Abolition of compulsory service.</p> <p>Freedom to choose the system of military service.</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of trained reserves.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Limitation and reduction of the annual contingent.</p> <p>Creation of an international force.</p>	<p>Principle already appearing in the part relating to Article 1. Details left for examination by the Land, Naval and Air Com-missions.</p>

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<p>PART I. PERSONNEL (<i>cont.</i>)</p> <p><i>Articles 2 and 3:</i> Definition and limitation of average effectives daily.</p> <p>TABLES RELATING TO LAND ARMED FORCES</p> <p><i>Table I.</i> — Maximum land armed forces stationed in the home country. <i>Table II</i> (optional). — Maximum land armed forces stationed overseas. <i>Table III.</i> — Maximum of the total land armed forces. (In each of the above tables a separate maximum is provided for total effectives, officers and regular soldiers.)</p>	<p>8. Mutual assistance force in proportion to the population and the national resources. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 1.)</p> <p>9. Constitution of an international police force consisting of an air fleet. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 7.)</p> <p>10. Creation of an international army for the purpose of applying sanctions. (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 15.)</p> <p>11. Demilitarised zones occupied by limited effectives. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.)</p> <p>1. Ascertainment of the most practical course for limiting the number of effectives. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 1.)</p> <p>2. Reduction to a maximum equal for all by means of an annual 10 % reduction of the difference between the actual strength and the maximum fixed. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 1.)</p> <p>3. Method of progressive and proportional reduction of peace effectives based on a classification of States according to the amount of their armaments. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 35 and 39; Arts. 1, 2, 3 and 4 (a).)</p> <p>4. Estimate of and adequate allowance for trained reserves. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, § 2.)</p> <p>5. Special conditions for States having a militia system. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, § 3.)</p> <p>1. Modifications in the tables: <i>Table I.</i> — Maximum home forces. <i>Table II.</i> — Maximum overseas forces stationed in the home country. <i>Table III.</i> — Maximum forces overseas. <i>Table IV.</i> — Maximum forces in the several overseas territories. <i>Table V.</i> — Maximum of the total forces. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 4(b).)</p> <p>2. The number of officers, non-commissioned officers and regular soldiers to be fixed in each of the above tables by units and corps. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 4(b).)</p> <p>3. The number of officers to be fixed at the lowest possible figure for all countries alike in terms of a percentage, the figure not to be increased. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, § 4.)</p>	<p>Creation of an international force.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Demilitarised zones.</p>	<p>Principle already appearing in the part relating to Article 1. Details left for examination by the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>The principle already appears in the Part relating to Article 1. When the principle has been decided, the question may be referred to the Land and Air Commissions.</p> <p>The principles raised in points (2) and (3) already appear in the Part relating to Article 1. Points 4 and 5, as well as Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention, can be referred immediately to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, which would submit to the General Commission any questions of principle they could not dispose of.</p> <p>Tables I, II and III and points 1, 2 and 3 of the draft Convention can be referred to the Land Commission, which will submit to the General Commission any questions of principle it cannot dispose of.</p>

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<p>TABLES RELATING TO SEA ARMED FORCES.</p>	<p>1. A percentage of officers and warrant officers to be fixed as a maximum limit. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 15.)</p>		<p>Table VI in the draft Convention and point 1 can be referred to the Naval Commission with instructions to submit to the General Commission any matters of principle on which it may have difficulty.</p>
<p>TABLES RELATING TO AIR ARMED FORCES.</p>	<p>1. Abolition of air forces. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, §§ 17 and 19 (a) and (b).)</p>	<p>Prohibition of the maintenance of military air force personnel.</p>	<p>Principle discussed in connection with the more general question of the abolition of all military aviation. When matters of principle have been decided, Tables VIII, IX and X and point 2 in the draft Convention can be referred to the Air Commission.</p>
<p><i>Table VI.</i> — Maximum sea armed forces. (Only total effectives are limited.)</p>			
<p><i>Table VIII</i> (optional). — Maximum air armed forces stationed in the home country.</p>			
<p><i>Table IX</i> (optional). — Maximum air armed forces stationed overseas.</p>	<p>2. The effectives of the military air forces must be reduced in proportion to the decrease in the number of machines in service.</p>		
<p><i>Table X.</i> — Maximum of the total effectives.</p>	<p>(U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 45, Art. 28.)</p>		
<p>FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.</p>			
<p><i>Article 4.</i> Definition of formations organised on a military basis and of mobilisation.</p>	<p>1. Prohibition of civil bodies organised on a military basis by specialised instructors drawn from the army and of the military training of the civilian population at the instance of civil associations. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 5(b).)</p>		<p>Articles 2 and 4 of the draft Convention and points 1 to 5 can be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, which may, if necessary, submit any questions of principle giving rise to special difficulties to the General Commission. These Commissions ought more especially to examine the following questions:</p>
<p><i>Article 2.</i> Limitation of the average daily effectives in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis.</p>	<p>2. Police forces, gendarmerie and similar organisations not to be utilised for military purposes. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, § 5.)</p>		<p>Definition of formations organised on a military basis. Total prohibition of certain formations organised on a military basis. Prohibition of the utilisation of police and similar forces for military purposes.</p>
<p></p>	<p>3. The strength and armament of police and gendarmerie forces and Customs guards to be fixed by special commissions in accordance with each country's needs. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 5.)</p>		<p>Method of limiting police and similar forces by special convention or by average daily effectives.</p>

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<p><i>Article 2</i> (continuation).</p> <p>TABLES RELATIVE TO FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS</p> <p><i>Table IV.</i> — Maximum figures for effectives stationed in the home country.</p> <p><i>Table V.</i> — Maximum figures for effectives stationed overseas.</p> <p>These two tables provide for a separate limitation of the total number of effectives, officers or officials ranking as officers and regular personnel.</p> <p><i>Table VII.</i> — Maximum figures for sea formations organised on a military basis. Limitation of the total only.</p> <p><i>Table XI.</i> — Maximum figures for air effectives stationed in the home country.</p> <p><i>Table XII.</i> — Maximum figures for air effectives stationed overseas.</p> <p>These two tables provide for separate limitation of the total number of effectives and of the total number of regular effectives.</p>	<p>4. The number of the police forces organised on a military basis, gendarmerie, Customs guards, train guards, forest guards and other armed corps organised for the needs of the Customs preventive service to be determined by Convention. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 40, Art. 1, Remark 1.)</p> <p>5. Police forces, gendarmerie and similar organisations to be limited. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, para. 5.)</p> <p>1. Proportional and progressive reduction and limitation of the number of units and corps of each arm and service. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 40, Art. 4.)</p>		<p>Method of limiting police and similar forces by special convention or by average daily effectives.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Tables IV, V, VII, XI and XII can be referred respectively to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions, which may, if necessary, submit any questions giving rise to special difficulties to the General Commission.</p> <p>Reduction and limitation of the number of units and corps. This question can be referred to the Land Commission, which may, if necessary, submit any questions of principle giving rise to special difficulties to the General Commission.</p>

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<p>CHAPTER B. PERIOD OF SERVICE.</p> <p>Articles 5 to 9 and Table.</p>	<p>Limitation of the period of service. (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p>		<p>This question can be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions with instructions to submit to the General Commission any matters of principle on which they may have difficulty.</p>
<p>PART II. MATERIAL.</p>	<p>1. Prohibition in general terms of material deemed to be of an aggressive character. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 13.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (China—Conf.D.99, p. 50.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51.) (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33.) (Hejaz—Conf.D.99, p. 54.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 17.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 18.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51.) (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 19.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50.)</p> <p>2. Prohibition of undefined material deemed to be offensive with prohibition of their manufacture, use and training with a view to their use. (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of certain material of a presumed specifically aggressive character and referred to in treaty of peace. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51.) (Germany—(Conf.D.99, p. 30.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p> <p>4. Contribution of material forming part of the normal armament of the police force contingents, material forming part of the normal armament of coercionary forces and heavy artillery and armoured implements by States which possess such material. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, III (b).)</p> <p>5. Demilitarised zones. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.)</p> <p>6. Direct limitation of all war material by a combined system comprising a convention on trade, a convention on private manufacture and an inventory of stocks, the whole controlled by the Permanent Disarmament Commission. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.)</p> <p>7. Limitation on the lines of the treaties of peace. (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18, § 3.)</p> <p>8. Direct limitation wherever practicable. (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 2.)</p>	<p>Absolute prohibition of certain classes of material.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Constitution of an international force.</p> <p>Demilitarised zones.</p> <p>Direct limitation with control of trade and manufacture and controlled inventory of stocks.</p> <p>Direct limitation on the lines of the treaties of peace.</p> <p>Possibility of applying different methods for the different States.</p>	<p>This principle figures already in the section relative to Article 1.</p> <p>Principle already included in the part concerning Article 1. When the principle has been decided, the question may be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>When the principle has been decided, the question can be referred to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

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<p>CHAPTER A. LAND ARMAMENTS.</p>	<p>1. Prohibition of all kinds of heavy artillery.</p>	<p>Absolute prohibition of certain classes of land material.</p>	<p>When the principle has been decided, the question can be referred to the Land Commission.</p>
	<p>(Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 33.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 18.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 6.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>2. Prohibition of mobile heavy artillery.</p> <p>(Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 22.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 2 (c).) (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 2.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>3. Prohibition of heavy long-range artillery.</p> <p>(Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 6.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>4. Prohibition of heavy artillery above an as yet unspecified calibre.</p> <p>(China—Conf.D.99, p. 50, III.) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 2.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>5. Prohibition of heavy and field artillery above a specified calibre.</p> <p>(Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30, § 6.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>6. Prohibition of mortars and trench mortars above a specified calibre.</p> <p>(Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 6.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>7. Prohibition of tanks.</p> <p>(Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (China—Ditto, p. 50, III.) (Germany—Ditto, p. 31, § 6.) (Italy—Ditto, p. 33.) (Latvia—Ditto, p. 18.) (Spain—Ditto, p. 22.) (Sweden—Ditto, p. 48, § 2.) (Switzerland—Ditto, p. 50, § 6.) (Turkey—Ditto, p. 29, Art. 2.) (U.S.S.R.—Ditto, p. 41, Art. 6.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>8. Prohibition of armoured motor-cars.</p> <p>(Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 2.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
	<p>9. Prohibition of the stocking of heavy high-power artillery except in the case of countries undertaking to place it at the disposal of the League of Nations, in the event of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant.</p> <p>(France—Conf.D.99, p. 24.)</p>	<p>Prohibition of certain classes of material except subject to certain conditions. (Certain classes of material to be placed at the disposal of the League of Nations.)</p>	<p>The principle involved in this proposal already figures in the section relative to Article 1. On decision of the question of principle, the matter may be immediately referred to the Land Commission.</p>
	<p>10. Prohibition of the construction and maintenance of fortresses, field works and works which constitute a direct menace to the neighbouring country and might possibly obstruct measures taken for the prevention of war.</p> <p>(Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 8.)</p>	<p>Prohibition of certain land fortifications.</p>	<p>When the principle has been decided, the question may be referred to the Land Commission.</p>
	<p>11. Quantitative limitation of land material.</p> <p>(Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.)</p>	<p>Quantitative limitation.</p>	<p>When the principles have been decided on, points 11 to 16 inclusive may be referred to the Land Commission.</p>
<p>12. Direct limitation of the whole of land material.</p> <p>(Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 2.)</p>	<p>Direct limitation of land material including stocks.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations	
CHAPTER A. LAND ARMAMENTS (continued).	13. Quantitative limitation by category, with a uniform percentage for necessary replacements. Authorisation of stocks for countries with no arms factories. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 7.)	Quantitative limitation with adjustments.	When the principles have been decided on, points 11 to 16 inclusive may be referred to the Land Commission.	
	14. Limitation in numbers of certain categories defined in proportion to peace effectives and trained reserves. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Arts. 8 and 9.)	Limitation and direct reduction of war material.	Ditto.	
	15. Special restriction of mobile heavy artillery and tanks. (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 49, § 8.)	Restrictions relating to certain materials.	Ditto.	
	16. Prohibition against alteration of existing patterns. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 6.)	Principle of direct qualitative limitation.	After preliminary discussion in the General Commission, this question might be referred to the Land Commission for an opinion.	
	<i>Article 10.</i> Limitation of material by budgetary method.	1. Combination of quantitative and budgetary limitation. (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 2(b).) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 3.) (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 49, § 9.)	Combination of quantitative and budgetary limitation.	The question may form the subject of a preliminary discussion by the General Commission, which could, if necessary, refer it to the Land Commission or Commission on Expenditure for an opinion.
		CHAPTER B. NAVAL ARMAMENTS.	1. Abolition of all naval forces the purpose of which is to make war at a distance—thus capable of aggressive war—and restrict to what is necessary for defence of national coastline. (Yugoslavia—Conf.D.99, p. 22.)	Abolition of aggressive naval forces and limitation of forces to strict needs for coastline defence.
2. Limitation of shells and torpedoes and destruction of quantities in excess. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 44, Arts. 18 and 19.)	Limitation and direct reduction of certain material.		Ditto.	
3. Maximum tonnage of various types of vessels to be reduced simultaneously with a proportional reduction in total tonnage. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 9.)	Method of reduction in naval armaments (in accordance with the principles of the London and Washington Naval Treaty or otherwise.		Ditto.	
4. No warships in future to exceed 10,000 tons or carry guns exceeding 280 mm. (11"). (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 9.)	Ditto.		Ditto.	
5. No warships in future to exceed 10,000 tons or carry guns exceeding 203 mm. (8"). (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.)	Ditto.		Ditto.	
6. When equal limit of land, sea and air forces of all countries is fixed, the building and use of warships carrying guns over y cm. and displacing over z tons to be forbidden. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Arts. 1 and 2.)	Ditto.		Ditto.	
7. Consideration of the most practical method of reducing size of warships and the maximum calibre of guns carried by them. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 4.)	Ditto.		Ditto.	

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CHAPTER B. NAVAL ARMAMENTS (<i>continued</i>).	8. Extension of age-limits of various categories. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16 (a).)	Method of reduction in naval armaments (in accordance with the principles of the London and Washington Naval Treaties or otherwise).	When question of principle settled, refer to Naval Commission.
	9. Maximum standard displacement of a war vessel to be fixed at 10,000 metric tons. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16 (b).)		
	10. Existing vessels of over 10,000 tons to be struck off when they reach the specific age-limits, and in any case not later than . . . without prejudice to the right of disposal before the expiry of the said time-limit but without right of replacement. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16 (b).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	11. Maximum calibre of guns mounted to be 12" (304.8 mm.). (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16 (c).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	12. Appliances for carrying aircraft not to be fitted in any warship. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16 (d).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	13. Classes of categories—Limitations (<i>vide</i> Draft Convention, Table II, Annex to Chapter B of Part II). (See also Article 12.) Maximum standard displacement. Maximum gun-calibre. Age limit. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16 (e).)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	14. Inclusion of fuel and reserve feed water for engines and boilers in the calculation of the standard displacement. (See also Annex III, page 17.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16, Note.)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	15. Landing platforms or decks in vessels other than aircraft carriers — prohibition. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 8.)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	16. Washington and London Naval Agreements; prolongation of these as soon as they are completed by the adherence of France and Italy. (U.S.A.—Conf.D 99, p. 49, § 2.)		Naval Commission.
	17. Washington and London Naval Agreements; proportional reductions from figures laid down when all parties to the Washington Agreement have entered this framework. (U.S.A.—Conf D.99, p. 49, § 3.)		Ditto.
	18. Non-floating material — limitation. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 13.)		Ditto.
	19. (a) Coast defence fortifications. (b) Fortifications controlling natural waterways between two open seas. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 16.)	Prohibition of certain coastal fortifications.	
	20. Free and unhampered passage through natural waterways between two open seas. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 16.)	Ditto.	

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
CHAPTER B. NAVAL ARMAMENTS (continued).	21. Contributions to an international force. Only Powers undertaking to place them at the disposal of the League of Nations in specified eventualities to have the right to possess: Capital ships carrying guns exceeding 8" (203 mm.) or 10,000 (W.T.) tons. Submarines exceeding <i>n</i> tons. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 24, II.)	International Force.	Principle to be discussed under Article 1 of the draft Convention. Subsequent discussion in Naval Commission.
	22. To provide the League with an organised land, sea and air force. (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 1.)	Ditto.	Ditto.
	23. Automatic contact mines in the open sea — prohibition. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 6(b).)		Naval Commission.
Article 11. Limitation of global tonnage.	1. Proportional and progressive reduction of tonnage. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 42, Arts. 12, 13 and 14.) 2. Equalisation of forces. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 1.)	Method of reduction of naval armaments. Ditto.	To be discussed in connection with Article 1 of the draft Convention. (Soviet and Turkish proposals.)
Article 12. Distribution of global tonnage per categories.	1. Categories. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 12.) 2. Categories. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.99, p. 43, Art. 16, e.)		Naval Commission. Ditto.
Article 13. Transfer of tonnage between categories.	Right of transfer to vary inversely as the ratio of reduction of the respective fleets. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 42, Art. 12, a, b and c.)		Naval Commission and subsequent reference to General Commission if necessary.
Article 14. Capital ships. Maximum displacement; maximum gun-calibre.	1. Abolition. (China—Conf.D.99, p. 50, III.) 2. Conditional Abolition. (Simultaneous abolition of capital ships and submarines.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 33.) 3. Reduction in size; reduction in gun-calibre. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, II A.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 6.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16.) 4. Extension of age-limit. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16a.)	Absolute or conditional abolition. Ditto.	Naval Commission.
	5. Undertaking by the non-signatories of the Washington and London Treaties not to construct or acquire capital ships above 10,000 tons. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 52.) 6. Conditional right to possess capital ships exceeding a specified tonnage or gun-calibre. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 24, II.)	Application to non-signatories of the principles of the London and Washington Naval Treaties. International Force (see No. 21).	Naval Commission when question of principle is settled.
Article 15. Aircraft carriers. Maximum displacement and maximum gun-calibre. Number of guns carried.	1. Abolition. (China—Conf.D.99, p. 50, III.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 10.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 33, § 2.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 36, Art. 12 D and p. 43, Art. 16 d.) 2. Conditional Abolition. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 9.)	Abolition of aircraft carriers. Ditto.	

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<i>Article 15</i> (contd.).	<p>3. Reduction in tonnage allotted by existing treaties. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 7.)</p> <p>4. Landing platforms or decks in vessels other than aircraft-carriers. — Prohibition. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 8.)</p>	<p>Reduction in tonnage allotted by existing treaties.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Naval Commission.</p>
<p><i>Article 16.</i> Submarines: maximum displacement, maximum gun-calibre.</p>	<p>1. Abolition. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (China—Conf.D.99, p. 50, III.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 11.) (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 3.) (U.S.A.—Conf.D.99, p. 49, § 4.)</p> <p>2. Conditional Abolition (simultaneous abolition of capital ships and submarines.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 33.)</p> <p>3. Conditional right to possess submarines exceeding a certain tonnage. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, II.)</p> <p>4. Reduction in size; reduction in gun-calibre; extension of age-limit. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16(e).)</p> <p>5. Reduction in size; reduction in radius of action. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.)</p>	<p>Abolition of submarines.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>International Force. (See No. 21, page 15.)</p>	<p>Once the principle has been decided to be sent to Naval Commission</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Naval Commission.</p>
<p><i>Article 17.</i> General undertaking. (No vessel exceeding limitations prescribed to be acquired by or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party.)</p>	<p>1. Contracting Parties not to build or allow to be built on their territories any warship exceeding the prescribed limits. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 44, Art. 17(c).)</p> <p>2. Not to cause new vessels to be constructed in foreign yards over and above the limits laid down for each Contracting State. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 44, Art. 17(d).)</p>		<p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Article 18.</i> Rules for replacement.</p>	<p>Only replacement vessels to be built. Age-limits for replacement. Replaced vessels not to be used for warlike purposes. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16, 1st § and § (a), and Art. 17(a).)</p>		<p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Article 19.</i> Rules re arming merchant vessels.</p>	<p>1. Limitation of arms and aircraft equipment in merchant vessels. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 10.)</p> <p>2. Prohibition. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 17.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 44, Art. 17(e).)</p>		<p>Naval Commission, which will refer to General Commission if necessary.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Article 20.</i> Use of war vessels constructed for another Power.</p>			<p>Naval Commission.</p>
<p><i>Article 21.</i> Cession of war vessels to another Power.</p>	<p>o handing over or sale of warships to another Power if such Power can use them as warships supernumerary to its prescribed establishment. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 44, Art. 17(b).)</p>		<p>Ditto.</p>

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<p><i>Article 22.</i> Rules <i>re</i> disposal of war vessels.</p>	<p>Rules for disposal. Disarmament of warships; what this comprises. Procedure for striking ves- sels off the establishment and rendering them unfit for warlike purposes. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 42, Art. 14.)</p>		<p>Naval Commission.</p>
<p><i>Article 23.</i> Hulks or training establishments.</p>			<p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Annex I.</i> Exempt vessels.</p>			<p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Annex II.</i> Special vessels.</p>			<p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Annex III.</i> Definitions.</p>	<p>1. Amended definitions. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 12.) 2. Standard Displacement. Amended definition. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 43, Art. 16, note.)</p>		<p>Ditto. Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Article 24.</i> Limitation of na- val expenditure.</p>			<p>Naval Commission and Defence Expendi- ture Commission.</p>
<p>CHAPTER C. AIR ARMAMENTS.</p>	<p>1. Prohibition of the maintenance of air forces of any kind. Destruction of existing material except those arma- ments which may be reincorporated in the quantities allowed for land and naval forces. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 17.) 2. Total prohibition of military avia- tion, as well as the manufacture, prepa- ration and entraining with regard to military aviation. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 2 (a).) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 3 (a).) 3. Total abolition of military air- craft: (Hejaz—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 2.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18.) 4. Within one year all military diri- gibles (lighter than air) shall be disarmed and placed in a position precluding their utilisation for military purposes. The disarmament of aircraft belonging to the armed forces includes the removal of guns, machine-guns and special applian- ces for the discharge of bombs and other instruments of destruction. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 44, Art. 20.) 5. Abolition of military aviation combined with the internationalisation of civil aviation. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.) 6. Abolition of air bombing. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48.) 7. Practical examination of the whole problem of aerial bombing in its widest sense. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 5.)</p>	<p>Abolition of mili- tary aircraft (aero- planes). Ditto. Ditto. Abolition of mili- tary aviation (dirigi- bles). Abolition of mili- tary aviation com- bined with the inter- nationalisation of civil aviation. Abolition of aerial bombing.</p>	<p>Refer to the Air Commission after de- cision of the principle has been taken by the General Commission. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Ditto. Refer to the Air Commission.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>CHAPTER C. AIR ARMAMENTS (<i>continued</i>).</p> <p><i>Article 25.</i> Limitation of the number and total horse-power of aero- planes.</p> <p>TABLES ANNEXED:</p> <p><i>Table I.</i></p> <p>(a) Total aero- planes of the armed forces. (b) Aeroplanes station- ed in the home country (optional). (c) Aeroplanes station- ed overseas (op- tional). (d) Aeroplanes in aircraft-carriers.</p> <p><i>Table II.</i></p> <p>(a) Total aero- planes of the forces organised on a mili- tary basis. (b) Aeroplanes station- ed in the home country (optional). (c) Aeroplanes station- ed overseas.</p>	<p>8. Abolition of bombing aircraft. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (China—Conf.D.99, p. 50, III.) (Hungary—Conf.D.99, p. 18.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 34.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 6.)</p> <p>1. Reduction of the peace-time air armed forces of all countries to an equal limit, to be attained within ten years. (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 1.)</p> <p>2. Progressive and proportional reduction varying according to the num- ber of aircraft in the possession of the States and amounting to as much as 50 per cent of the existing aircraft. The total engine-power of each aeroplane shall not exceed 600 h.p. on the ground. Reserve machines, and engines for these machines, up to a number not exceeding 25 per cent of the total number of aero- planes in service after their reduction, may be maintained in the establishment of the air forces. Destruction of existing material.</p> <p>Tables relating to the maximum armed air forces stationed in the home country, in each colony, dominion or other over- sea possession and total. Supplementary Convention on the limitation to be imposed on the manufacture and trade in war aeroplanes in proportion to the legiti- mate requirements fixed by the maxima. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, pp. 36 and 44.)</p> <p>3. (a) Grouping of military aero- planes in three categories according to tonnage (aeroplanes and hydroplanes) or to their volume (dirigibles).</p> <p>(b) Conditional on preliminary inter- nationalisation of civil aerial transport (aeroplanes and hydroplanes above a specified tonnage, dirigibles above a certain volume). Military air-machines of the lowest category are placed at the disposal of national air forces. Military air-machines of the intermediary cate- gory are left to the national air forces on condition that the League of Nations can dispose of them in case of the applica- tion of Article 16 of the Covenant. The military air-machines of the highest category are prohibited in military air forces. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 23, I, II and III.)</p>	<p>Abolition of aerial bombardment.</p> <p>Reduction of air ar- maments to an equal limit for all States. Progressive reduction.</p> <p>Progressive and pro- portional reduction on the basis of material existing at a specific date.</p> <p>Internationalisation of civil aviation.</p> <p>Placing at the dis- posal of the League of military air-ma- chines above a certain tonnage or a certain volume.</p> <p>Creation of an inter- national air force.</p>	<p>Air Commission for preliminary examina- tion.</p> <p>The principle raised in point 1 is already found in Article 1.</p> <p>The principle is al- ready found in Ar- ticle 1.</p> <p>The principle is al- ready found in Article 1 for decision by the General Commission. Limitation of unladen tonnage, definition of that tonnage, and de- tails to be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>The principle is al- ready found in Article 1 for decision by the General Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

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<p><i>Article 26.</i></p> <p>Limitation of the number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles.</p> <p>TABLES ANNEXED:</p> <p><i>Table III.</i></p> <p>(a) Total dirigibles of the armed forces. (b) Dirigibles stationed in the home country (optional). (c) Dirigibles stationed overseas (optional). (d) Dirigibles in aircraft carriers (optional).</p> <p><i>Table IV.</i></p> <p>(a) Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis. (b) (Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country. (c) (Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas.</p> <p><i>Article 27.</i></p> <p>Horse-power shall be measured according to the following rules. . . . The volume of dirigibles shall be expressed in cubic metres.</p> <p>Report of the Committee of Experts to fix Rules for the Adoption of a Standard Horse-Power Measurement for Aeroplane and Dirigible Engines. (Document C. 259. M. 115. 1931. VIII.)</p> <p>Committee of Experts to fix Rules for the Adoption of a Standard Horse-Power Measurement for Aeroplane and Dirigible Engines. (Document C. 260. M. 116. 1931. VIII.)</p> <p><i>Article 28.</i></p> <p>Civil aviation: relations with military aviation.</p>	<p>1. Internationalisation of civil air transport under a regime to be organised by the League. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 23, I.)</p>	<p>Internationalisation of civil aviation: international air transport to be placed at the disposal of the League.</p>	<p>To be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>To be referred to the Air Commission after the General Commission has decided regarding the principle</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 28</i> (continued).</p>	<p>2. Internationalisation of civil aviation: (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 22.)</p> <p>3. Internationalisation or strict international control of civil aviation: (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 2 (b).) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 3 (b).)</p> <p>4. Civil aviation to be under international control: (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 4.)</p> <p>5. All arming of civil aircraft and all fittings enabling them to be armed or to be utilised for war are prohibited. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 19.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 45, Art. 25.)</p> <p>6. Any instruction and training of any person in aviation having a military character or a military purpose to be prohibited. Prohibition of any instruction or training of members of the army or navy in civil aviation. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 19.)</p> <p>7. Prohibition of the construction, maintenance, importation or putting into commission of aircraft which is in any way armoured or protected or supplied with devices for the reception of warlike armament of any kind, such as guns, machine-guns, torpedoes, bombs, or which are supplied with gunsights or devices for the dropping of bombs and with similar warlike instruments. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 19.)</p> <p>8. Prohibition of the maintenance of any relation between the military or naval administration and civil aviation for any military purpose. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 19.)</p> <p><i>Trade in and Manufacture of Arms, Ammunition and War Material.</i></p> <p>1. Prohibition of the trade in arms, except for non-manufacturing States, within the limits of their needs. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 21.)</p> <p>2. Adoption of agreements, unspecified, relating to the trade in arms. (Czechoslovakia — Conf.D.99, p. 52, § 3.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 4.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 8.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of the manufacture of material elsewhere than in specified private or State factories. Publicity regarding these factories and limitation of their production through the Governments. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 22.)</p> <p>4. Direct limitation of the total quantity of all kinds of war material found on the territory of each High Contracting Party. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 10.)</p>	<p>Internationalisation or control of civil aviation</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Prohibition of the trade in arms.</p> <p>Supervision of the trade in arms.</p> <p>Limitation of the manufacture of arms, ammunition and war material.</p>	<p>To be referred to the Air Commission after the General Commission has decided regarding the principle.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>To be referred to the Air Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>To be considered at an opportune time by the General Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 28</i> (continued).</p> <p>PART III.</p> <p><i>Article 29. — Limitation of total annual expenditure.</i></p> <p>See also Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions (document C. 182. M. 69. 1931.IX).</p>	<p>5. Supervision, unspecified, of the private and Government manufacture of arms. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 52, § 3.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 4.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 8.)</p> <p>6. International and national supervision of private and Government manufacture by a system of licensing and publicity in accordance with the principles in the Mixed Temporary Commission's report (document A.16. 1924.IX). Incorporation in the Disarmament Convention of the 1925 Convention on the supervision of the trade in arms. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.)</p> <p>1. Inexpediency of the limitation of expenditure in view of the abandonment of the gold standard and the resultant changes in purchasing power. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 23, note.)</p> <p>2. Approval of the limitation of the aggregate expenditure allocated to armed forces, together with formations organised on a military basis in the broadest sense of the term. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p> <p>3. Examination of the ratios to be established between the expenditure of countries which have had the advantage of an uninterrupted organisation of their defence system and that of countries which have been obliged to build up a national defence system in the last few years. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p> <p>4. In the case where the budgetary limitation is accepted, necessity to provide for the reinforcement of means of defence of countries the least protected and unprovided with fortifications and insufficiently equipped from an industrial point of view. (Persia—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p> <p>5. Reduction of expenditure proportional to the amount of direct reduction. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 46, Arts. 34 and 35.)</p> <p>6. Reduction of expenses to a proportion corresponding to the level of the reduction of general armaments. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 3.)</p> <p>7. Thorough examination of the budgetary method, more especially with a view to its application in the event of fluctuations in purchasing power. (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 4.)</p> <p>8. Approval of budgetary limitation as general method in conjunction with direct limitation of certain classes of material. (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 3.)</p> <p>9. Approval of the budgetary limitation combined with direct limitation constituted by the control of trade and manufacture and by the inventory of stocks. (See Trade and Manufacture of Arms, p. 21, § 6. Spain.)</p>	<p>Supervision of the private and Government manufacture of arms, ammunition and war material.</p> <p>Principle of control of trade and of control of manufacture combined with inventory of stocks and the whole considered as a system of direct limitation. (See p. 11.)</p> <p>Is it desirable to reduce and limit armaments by budgetary methods?</p> <p>Combination of both methods, direct and indirect.</p>	<p>To be considered at an opportune time by the General Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>As soon as the questions of principle in preceding columns are resolved, points 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 can be referred to the Expenditure Commission.</p> <p>Point 7 could be referred immediately to the Expenditure Commission, which in its turn could set up an <i>ad hoc</i> Committee for the examination of this question.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 29</i> (continued).</p> <p>PART IV. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.</p> <p><i>Article 30.</i> Publicity of average daily number of effectives. Tables I to XII.</p> <p><i>Article 31.</i> Publicity relating to compulsory preparatory military training.</p> <p><i>Article 32.</i> Publicity relating to period of service.</p> <p><i>Article 33.</i> Publicity relating to the annual expenditure on land and sea material.</p> <p><i>Article 34.</i> Publicity relating to the building of vessels of war.</p> <p><i>Article 35.</i> Publicity relating to merchant ships whose decks have been stiffened.</p> <p><i>Article 36.</i> Publicity relating to military aircraft. Tables I to IV.</p> <p><i>Article 37.</i> Publicity relating to non-military aviation.¹</p>	<p>10. Limitation both of aggregate expenditure and expenditure under particular chapters (including expenditure on aviation). (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 2.)</p> <p>11. Abolition of secret funds. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 46, Art. 35.)</p> <p>12. Unification of the military budget. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 46, Art. 35.)</p> <p>1. Complete publicity of armaments, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 3.) (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 22.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 5.)</p> <p>2. Complete publicity of reduced armaments. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 47, Art. 45.)</p> <p>Publicity relating to non-military aviation. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 47, Art. 45.)</p>	<p>Complete publicity of armaments, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant.</p> <p>Complete publicity of reduced armaments.</p> <p>Publicity relating to non-military aviation.</p>	<p>Points 10, 11 and 12 may be immediately referred to the Expenditure Commission.</p> <p>The principle of publicity being governed by Article 8 of the Covenant, the method of publicity in the various spheres could be referred to the Special Commissions as noted hereunder.</p> <p>Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Land Commission.</p> <p>Land, Naval and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Land and Naval Commissions and Commission on National Defence Expenditure.</p> <p>Naval Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Air Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

¹ See in this connection document C.95.M.47.1932.VIII: Study concerning the Present Situation in regard to Publicity of Civil Aviation and Collection of Provisions in Force concerning the Exchange or Publication of Information relating to Civil Aviation.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 38.</i> Publicity of total annual expenditure.</p> <p>PART V. CHEMICAL ARMS.</p> <p><i>Article 39.</i> Prohibition of the use of asphyxiating and toxic gases and liquids and bacterio- logical methods of warfare.</p>	<p>1. Conversion to other uses of industrial undertakings engaged in the preparation of chemical and bacteriological arms. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 45, Art. 32.)</p> <p>2. Prohibition of the manufacture of chemical arms. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 5.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 18.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of the preparation of, and training in the use of, chemical arms. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 5.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 20.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33, § 3.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 34.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 5.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 5.) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 3.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 45, Art. 31.)</p> <p>4. Destruction of all appliances of chemical aggression and bacteriological warfare. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 45, Art. 31.)</p> <p>5. Control of the manufacture of chemical products. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 5.)</p> <p>6. Prohibition of the preparation and the use of chemical and bacteriological arms even in the case of legitimate defence conditionally on the outlawry of the aggressor and of the application in his case of the sanctions provided for in Art. 16 of the Covenant. (Yugoslavia—Conf.D.99, p. 22.)</p> <p>7. Preparation of a more complete system for the prohibition of chemical arms, supplemented by a system of penalties. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 52, §§ 4 and 5.)</p> <p>8. Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological arms. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 13.) (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Bulgaria—Conf.D.99, p. 15.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 5.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 20.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33, § 3.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 34.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 5.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 18.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 5.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) (Roumania—Conf.D.99, p. 21.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 7 (a).) (Turkey—Conf.D.99, p. 29, Art. 4.) (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 45, Art. 33.)</p> <p>9. Prohibition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare. (United States of America—Conf.D.99, p. 49, § 6.)</p>	<p>Prohibition of the preparation of chemical and bacteriological arms.</p> <p>Control of manufacture.</p> <p>Penalties.</p> <p>Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological arms.</p> <p>Prohibition of the use of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.</p>	<p>Commission on National Defence Expenditure.</p> <p>When decisions on the principles of these questions have been taken, the proposals may be referred to a Commission to be appointed in due course. These proposals could also be referred for an opinion to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions prior to any decision on the principle.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
	<p style="text-align: center;">PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION</p> <p>1. Protection of the civilian population enunciated in general terms. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14, § 3.) (Italy—Conf.D.99, p. 34.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 4.) (Latvia—Conf.D.99, p. 18.) (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 41, Art. 7.)</p> <p>2. Agreement to exclude foodstuffs from articles which are declared contraband of war. (Argentina—Conf.D.99, p. 53.)</p> <p>3. Prohibition of bombardment by land artillery by means of shells which contain poison gases or are specifically incendiary. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, IV.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 7.)</p> <p>4. Prohibition of bombardment by artillery behind the battle area. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, IV.)</p> <p>5. Prohibition of submarines. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54, § 3.)</p> <p>6. Prohibition of the use of automatic contact mines in the open sea. (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 6.)</p> <p>7. Regulation of the use of naval artillery in conformity with the provisions of the Hague Convention. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, IV.)</p> <p>8. Prohibition of the use by naval artillery of projectiles which contain poison gases or are specifically incendiary. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, IV.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 7.)</p> <p>9. Total prohibition of the use of missiles of any kind from air machines and of all preparations for this means of warfare. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 31, § 18.)</p> <p>10. Prohibition of the bombardment from the air of the civilian population. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 52, § 4.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33, § 3.) (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 4.) (Netherlands—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 6.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 7.) (United States of America—Conf.D.99, p. 49, § 5.)</p> <p>11. Prohibition of bombardment from the air behind the battle area or behind a zone of a certain depth along the coast. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, IV.)</p> <p>12. Prohibition of the use of projectiles which contain poison gases or are specifically incendiary. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 25, IV.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 7.)</p> <p>13. Organisation of sanctions in the event of any violation of undertakings relating to the protection of the civilian population. (France—Conf.D.99, p. 26, IVe.)</p>	<p>Protection of the civilian population.</p>	<p>Once decisions have been taken on the question of principle noted, the proposals can be referred to a commission which will be indicated in due course.</p> <p>These proposals could also be referred for an opinion to the Land, Naval and Air Commissions prior to any decision on the principle.</p> <p>Sanctions.</p>

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
PART VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.	1. Assurances to be provided for with a view to safeguarding each contracting party from menaces caused by the armaments of one or more States not party to the Treaty or by the non-observance of treaty obligations on the part of one or more of the contracting parties. (Japan—Conf.D.99, p. 53, § 2.)		
CHAPTER A. PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.	1. Creation of a "Permanent International Commission of Control". ¹ (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 46, Arts. 39, 40, 41, 42 and 46.) 2. Creation of an International Commission for the Supervision of Armaments. ¹ (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 4.) (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 5.) (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 9.) 3. Great importance attached to the creation of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. (United Kingdom—Conf.D.99, p. 54.)		Political Commission.
<i>Article 40.</i> Creation and membership of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.	1. Commission to consist of representatives of all signatory States. (Denmark—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 4.) 2. Representation on the Commission of all the Powers in rotation. (Portugal—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) 3. Organisation of a Commission representing all signatory States on a possibly larger basis than the League of Nations. (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.)		Ditto.
<i>Article 41.</i> Convocation and meeting of Commission.			Ditto.
<i>Article 42.</i> Rules of Procedure.			Ditto.
<i>Article 43.</i> Quorum.			Ditto.
<i>Article 44.</i> Representation of countries not having a member on the Commission.			Ditto.
<i>Article 45.</i> Voting.			Ditto.
<i>Article 46.</i> Consultation of persons.			Ditto.

¹ On the question of supervision, see end of this chapter.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 47.</i> Minority reports.</p> <p><i>Article 48.</i> Reports, to whom to be communicated, and publication of.</p> <p><i>Article 49.</i> Communication of information received.</p>	<p>ADDITION TO CHAPTER A OF PART VI: JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.</p> <p>1. Proposal to invest the Permanent International Commission of Control with the right to carry out investiga- tions on the spot; proposal for a labour control. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 47, Arts. 43 and 44.)</p> <p>2. Exclusion of personnel belonging to the forces and persons interested in war industries. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 47, Art. 42.)</p> <p>3. Attention to be directed to mili- tary preparations of all kinds; prepar- ation for industrial aggression, air aggression, etc.; need for ensuring that the provisions of the Convention cannot be rendered inoperative by some re- adaptation of the system of military organisation. (Poland—Conf.D.99, pp. 19 and 20.)</p> <p>4. Prepared to accept a more com- plete supervision than that proposed in the draft Convention. Proposal to extend supervision to the trade in and manufacture of arms. (Czechoslovakia—Conf.D.99, p. 52, § 3.)</p> <p>5. Need for effective international supervision. (Belgium—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Finland—Conf.D.99, p. 16.) (Haiti—Conf.D.99, p. 33.) (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 4.) (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 19.) (Roumania—Conf.D.99, p. 20.) (Sweden—Conf.D.99, p. 48, § 6.)</p> <p>6. Urges control equally applicable to all countries. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 24.)</p> <p>7. Accepts control upon certain con- ditions. (Argentine—Conf.D.99, p. 13, § 2.)</p> <p>8. The Permanent Disarmament Commission to be responsible also for the preparation of further stages in disarmament.¹ (Norway—Conf.D.99, p. 51, § 5.) (Switzerland—Conf.D.99, p. 50, § 9.)</p>	<p>Labour control.</p> <p>Exclusion of per- sonnel belonging to the forces and persons interested in war in- dustries.</p> <p>The methods of dis- armament to be uni- form in accordance with the principle of the equality of rights of States.</p>	<p>Political Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>Political, Land and Air Commissions.</p> <p>Political Commission.</p> <p>Ditto.</p> <p>This question to be discussed in the Gen- eral Commission in con- nection with Article 1.</p> <p>Political Commission.</p>

¹ See on this subject the Danish proposal II c, page 2.

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p>CHAPTER B. DEROGATIONS.</p> <p><i>Article 50.</i> Conditions, notification.</p>			Political Commission.
<p>CHAPTER C. PROCEDURE REGARDING COMPLAINTS.</p> <p><i>Article 51.</i> Violation: concern to all.</p> <p><i>Article 52.</i> Procedure regarding complaints.</p>	<p>1. The repression of infringements of undertakings relative to limitation of armaments should be considered. Application of Articles 50 and 52 in the case of a grave violation of the Convention or of another undertaking with regard to reduction and limitation of armaments constituting a threat to the national security of one of the High Contracting Parties. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p>		Ditto. Ditto. Ditto.
<p>CHAPTER D. FINAL PROVISIONS.</p> <p><i>Article 53.</i> Maintenance of previous treaties.</p> <p><i>Article 54.</i> Differences relative to the interpretation or application: arbitral procedure.</p> <p><i>Article 55.</i> Ratification and entry into force.</p> <p><i>Article 56.</i> Measures to be taken for the execution of the Convention.¹</p>	<p>1. Provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning Disarmament to be replaced by the new Convention. (Austria—Conf.D.99, p. 14.) (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 30.)</p> <p>1. Proposals regarding the ratification and entry into force of the Convention. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 47, Arts. 47 and 49.)</p> <p>1. Provision for transitional measures for the adaptation of existing armaments to those provided for in the Convention. (Germany—Conf.D.99, p. 32, § 25.)</p> <p>2. The reduction of armaments (in so far as immediate reductions are not provided for in previous instruments) to be carried out in two years, the first being devoted to preparatory work and the second to the actual process of reduction. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 46, Arts. 37 and 38.)</p> <p>3. Fixing of a time-limit for the ratification of the supplementary conventions provided for in the Soviet draft. (U.S.S.R.—Conf.D.99, p. 47, Art. 48.)</p>	<p>Uniformity of methods of disarmament in conformity with the principle of the equality of State rights.</p>	<p>The question will be discussed in General Commission in connection with Article 1.</p> <p>Political Commission.</p> <p>Ditto</p> <p>Ditto.</p>

¹ The Haitian delegation proposes that the States be recommended to bring the provision of their national constitutions and the texts of the Covenant (which would stand in need of revision) into harmony with the new principles of the Convention

1 Subject of the parts, chapters and articles of the draft Convention	2 Proposals relating to the heads of column 1	3 Questions of principle raised	4 Observations
<p><i>Article 57.</i></p> <p>Duration of the Convention.</p>	<p>1. It ought not to be possible to denounce but merely revise the Convention. (Spain—Conf.D.99, p. 27.)</p>	<p>Denunciation or revision of the Disarmament Convention.</p>	<p>General Commission.</p>
<p><i>Article 58.</i></p> <p>Subsequent examination and possible revision of the Convention.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>
<p><i>Article 59.</i></p> <p>Revision in the event of special circumstances.</p>	<p>1. Interdependence of civil and military aviation. (Poland—Conf.D.99, p. 19.)</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>General Commission, and Ai Commission.</p>
<p><i>Article 60.</i></p> <p>Denunciation.</p>	<p>See under Article 57.</p>	<p>Ditto.</p>	<p>General Commission.</p>