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LIVES
OF
THE LINDSAYS.

VOL. III.

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THE
RISE, PROGRESS, AND TERMINATION

OF

The Maroon War,

ILLUSTRATED BY A SELECTION FROM THE

PUBLIC DESPATCHES AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

OF

ALEX. EARL OF BALCARRES,

GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN JAMAICA.

NARRATIVES

OF THE

OCCUPATION AND DEFENCE OF ST. LUCIE, 1779;

AND OF THE

SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, 1782;

BY

THE HON. COLIN LINDSAY.

WIGAN:
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1840.



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A SELECTION
FROM THE
PUBLIC DESPATCHES AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE
OF
ALEXANDER, EARL OF BALCARRES,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, IN JAMAICA,
DURING THE
MAROON WAR,
1795—1796.



INTRODUCTION,

BY THE EDITOR.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN Jamaica was captured by the English in 1655, multitudes of the slaves belonging to the Spanish colonists fled to the mountains of the interior, and commenced a life of savage independence, supporting themselves partly by predatory incursions on the Europeans, and partly by the chase of the wild boar,—from which occupation they acquired the distinctive appellation of Maroons, or ‘hog-hunters.’ They occupied the mountains to the north and east of the island, and keeping up a constant communication with the plantation negroes, became a rallying point for all the disaffected, and a thorn in the sides of all the European settlers in that part of the country.

Thirty-five years afterwards, in 1690, a still more formidable insurrection took place among the slaves in the parish of Clarendon, on the southern side of the island. Taking possession of the mountain range to the rear of that district, they commenced a life precisely similar to that which distinguished the Maroons,—for that dreaded name was considered peculiar to the original refugees till the renewal

of hostilities on a more vigorous scale in 1730, when it became gradually extended to the whole body of insurgent negroes.

Previous to that year, the internal history of British Jamaica presents little but an uninteresting tissue of atrocities on the part of the blacks, and abortive attempts at their reduction by the English. The detail may be found in the valuable work of Mr. Long, whose summary (though it might be more briefly enunciated in the two words 'robbery' and 'murder') will sufficiently express the character of the struggle. "From the commencement of the war to this period," says that historian, "they had not once ventured a pitched battle, but skulked about the skirts of remote plantations, surprising stragglers, and murdering the whites by two or three at a time, or when they were too few to make any resistance. By night, they seized the favourable opportunity that darkness gave them, of stealing into the settlements, where they set fire to cane-pieces and out-houses, killed all the cattle they could find, and carried off the slaves into captivity. By this dastardly method of conducting the war, they did infinite mischief to the whites, without much exposing their own persons to danger—for they always cautiously avoided fighting, except with a number so disproportionately inferior to themselves, as to afford them a pretty sure expectation of victory. They knew every secret pass of the country, so that they could either conceal themselves from pursuit, or shift their ravages from place to place, according as circumstances required. Such were the disadvantages under which the English had to deal with these desultory foes."*

* Hist. of Jamaica, vol. 2, p. 341.

Wearied out at last, and in absolute self-defence, the legislature determined on more serious efforts to extirpate these banditti. Flying parties were employed on this service—but with more energy than effect. This, however, produced the union, in the south of Jamaica, of all the scattered bands of the Clarendon rebels, under the celebrated chief Cudjoe—who was also joined by the Cottawoods, a tribe of the original Maroons, and by another of distinct origin, character, and language, named Madagascars, runaways originally from the parish of St. Elizabeth. Cudjoe himself was a Coromantee negro, and the ultimate prevalence of the Coromantee language among the Maroons establishes the descent of the majority of the nation so designated, from that most ferocious and warlike of the tribes of Western Africa.*

“They now,” says Mr. Dallas, “began to pursue a more regular and connected system of warfare, and in their frequent skirmishes with the troops sent out against them, acquired an art of attack and defence, which, in the difficult and hardly accessible fastnesses of the interior of the island, has since so often foiled the best exertions of disciplined bravery. Plunder had been the original spring of their enterprises; but when they found themselves pursued and attacked in the very woods, every consideration became absorbed in the passion of revenge. Murder attended all their successes;

* The Coromantees, says Bryan Edwards, “may be said to represent the genuine and original unmixed negro, both in person and character.”—“The circumstances which distinguish them from all other negroes, are firmness both of body and mind, a ferociousness of disposition,—but withal, activity, courage, and a stubbornness, or what an ancient Roman would have deemed an elevation of soul, which prompts them to enterprises of difficulty and danger, and enables them to meet death, in its most horrible shape, with fortitude or indifference.”—*Hist. of West Indies*.

not only men, but women and children were sacrificed to their fury, and even people of their own colour, if unconnected with them. Over such as secretly favoured them, while they apparently remained at peace on the plantations, they exercised a dominion by the influence of Obeah, and made them subservient to their designs. By these Cudjoe was always apprised in time of the parties that were fitted out, and knowing the routes they must necessarily take, prepared his ambushes accordingly. As he frequently defeated his antagonists, his success was one means by which he supplied his men with arms and ammunition; nor was it the only one,—at that time there was no restriction in the sale of powder and fire-arms, and there can be no doubt that he had friends who made a regular purchase of them under pretence of being hunters and fowlers for their masters. Nay, a Maroon himself might, by carrying a few fowls and a basket of provisions on his head, pass unnoticed and unknown through the immense crowd of negroes frequenting the markets in the large towns. This is known to have been done in later times, and it must have been more easily effected formerly. The Maroons, too, were much more provident of their ammunition than the troops were, seldom throwing a shot away ineffectually. These circumstances account, in some measure, for Cudjoe's having been able to protract the war for so many years.”*

In 1733, on reviewing the proceedings of the last three years, the retrospect was unsatisfactory. The flying parties of the English had proved almost uniformly ineffectual, through the length of their marches, the difficulty of subsisting them in the woods for so long

* “History of the Maroons,” &c.

a time as the service required, and the facility with which the Maroons eluded their pursuit—while, on the other hand, Cudjoe's band had become greatly augmented, and he had established a general interest with the windward, or original Spanish Maroons, who, encouraged by the example of his activity and success, had become bolder and more enterprising in their hostilities.

The Assembly now devised a more effectual measure in erecting several barracks, with high walls and flanked with regular bastions, in different parts of the island, as near as possible to the favourite haunts of the Maroons; in every one of these they placed a strong garrison, who were regularly subsisted, and roads of communication were opened from one to another. These garrisons, says Bryan Edwards, “were composed of white and black shot [confidential slaves] and baggage negroes, who were all duly trained. They were subjected to rules and articles of war, and the whole body put under the governor's immediate order, to be employed, conjunctly or separately, as he should see occasion. Their general plan of duty, as directed by the law, was to make excursions from the barracks, scour the woods and mountains, and destroy the provision-gardens and haunts of the Maroons; and, that they might not return without effecting some service, they were required to take twenty days' provision with them on every such expedition. Every barrack besides was furnished with a pack of dogs, provided by the churchwardens of the respective parishes, it being foreseen that these animals would prove extremely serviceable, not only in guarding against surprises in the night, but in tracking the enemy.—This arrangement was the most judicious hitherto contrived for their effectual reduction; for so many fortresses, stationed in the

very centre of their usual retreats, well supplied with every necessary, gave the Maroons a constant and vigorous annoyance.”*

With similar views, the Assembly resolved on taking two hundred of the Musquito Indians into their pay. “They passed an act for rendering free negroes, mulattoes, and Indians more useful, and forming them into companies with proper encouragements. Some sloops were despatched to the Musquito shore, and that number of Indians were brought into the island, and formed into companies under their own officers.” Their thorough experience in that species of action termed in America *bush-fighting*, and their skill, especially in tracking the Maroons, proved highly serviceable; and by their endeavours, in conjunction with the black shot, most of Cudjoe’s settlements and provisions “were successively discovered and destroyed; not, however, without frequent skirmishes, which, though terminating in the defeat of the enemy, were always attended on the side of the assailants with the greater loss.”†

Without, however, an acquaintance, at least by description, with the extraordinary scene of this warfare, it is impossible to form an adequate idea of its peculiar character or difficulties. “The general object of a Maroon chief in war,” says Mr. Dallas, “was to take a station in some glen, or, as it is called in the West Indies, cock-

* “Account of the Maroon Negroes,” &c., printed with the “Historical Survey of the Island of St. Domingo,” 4to., 1801.

† The Indians were liberally rewarded for their good conduct, at the peace of 1738, and three years afterwards the Assembly shewed a further mark of esteem for them in passing a bill, enacting “that all Indians imported into the island for sale, should be as free as any other aliens or foreigners; and that all such sales should, *ipso facto*, be void, and the buyer and seller be liable to a penalty of £50 each.”—*Long*.

pit, enclosed by rocks and mountains nearly perpendicular, and to which the only practicable entrance is by a very narrow defile. From the first cockpit there is a succession of them, running from east to west, on a line, in which they are passable from one to the other, though with more or less difficulty. There are also parallel lines of cockpits, but as their sides are often perpendicular, from fifty to eighty feet, a passage from one line to another is scarcely to be found practicable to any but a Maroon. The northern aspect is commonly the steepest, and often a solid perpendicular rock, so that if the opposite ascent were practicable, to descend into the parallel line would be impossible. . . Such are the natural fortifications in which the Maroons secured themselves in times of danger, and from which it has been ever found so difficult to dislodge them. Having but one common entrance, the way to it was so trodden by the frequent egress and ingress of their parties who go out in quest of provisions and plunder, that when a distant track was observed by a sharp-sighted guide, it hardly ever failed to lead to the mouth of the defile. At this mouth, which looks like a great fissure made through the rock by some extraordinary convulsion of nature, from two hundred yards to half a mile in length, and through which men can pass only in single file, the Maroons, whenever they expected an attack, disposed of themselves on the ledges of the rocks on both sides. Sometimes they advanced a party beyond the entrance of the defile, frequently in a line on each side, if the ground would admit; and lay covered by the underwood, and behind rocks and the roots of trees, waiting in silent ambush for their pursuers, of whose approach they had always information from their out-scouts. These, after a long

march, oppressed by fatigue and thirst, advance towards the mouth of the defile, through the track obscured by trees and underwood, in an approach of many windings, which are either occasioned by the irregularity of the ground, or designedly made for the purpose of exposing the assailants to the attacks of the different parties in ambush. A favourable opportunity is taken, when the enemy is within a few paces, to fire upon them from one side. If the party surprised return the fire on the spot where they see the smoke of the discharge, and prepare to rush on towards it, they receive a volley in another direction. Stopped by this, and undecided which party to pursue, they are staggered by the discharge of a third volley from the entrance of the defile. In the meantime the concealed Maroons, fresh, and thoroughly acquainted with their ground, vanish almost unseen before their enemies have reloaded. . . Such was the nature of the Maroon war, though it is reasonable to suppose that the people under Cudjoe had not arrived to the perfection of tactics displayed by his successors in the late contest. Indeed, it is known that for a considerable time his operations were carried on about Mouth River, Hector's River, and other tracts to the eastward of the greater cockpits, where, though the country was rugged and difficult, it was easy in comparison with the seat of war in the year 1795.

“Cudjoe,” continues Mr. Dallas, “finding his haunts accessible to the rangers, who were stationed at the harracks to the east of him, and the communication of his foraging parties with his old friends in the back parts of Clarendon cut off, resolved to change his position, and to seek a situation of greater security for his quarters, as well as a more extensive field for his operations. He

accordingly removed to a place in Trelawney, near the entrance of the great cockpits to the north-west, the first of which, called Petty River Bottom, now well known, was accessible by a very narrow defile. This cockpit was considered as a very large one, containing about seven acres of land, and a spring of water. Cudjoe displayed great judgment in chusing this position, as in case of alarm he could throw himself into the cockpit, whence no valour or force could drive him; and at the same time he placed the great range of cockpits between him and his former annoyers. The choice of the position was equally judicious in respect to predatory incursions, as the parishes of St. James, Hanover, Westmoreland, and St. Elizabeth, lay open to him, and, presenting more extensive and less defensible frontiers, afforded him opportunities of acting with smaller detachments, and of obtaining abundant supplies from different quarters. He sent out parties in various directions to a great distance, in order to deceive the government, and even kept up an alarm in the neighbourhood of his old position. Cudjoe now augmented a body he had placed under the command of his brother Accompong, and established them on the northern borders of St. Elizabeth, where the country afforded more cattle, but where also his men had to act against a greater number of inhabitants, prepared to defend their property. This station was above the mountains of Nassau, a place where there is still a town called Accompong after his name.

“In this situation did these people maintain themselves in a state of savage freedom for several years, living in indolence while their provisions lasted, and ravaging the country when excited by their wants. In their inroads they exercised the most horrid har-

barities. The weak and defenceless, whenever surprised by them, fell victims to their thirst of blood; and, although some were more humane than others, all paid implicit obedience to the command of a leader, when that was given to imbrue their hands in blood; but, murder once commenced, no chief ever had power to stay the hand of his meanest follower, and there is hardly an instance of a prisoner having been saved by them. The Maroons have been accused of torturing their prisoners, but there is no ground for this charge, as their eagerness to despatch a wounded enemy falling into their hands was such that he was soon released from his misery by one of the many cutlasses which on the sight of him were raised to cut off his head."

—Such is the testimony of Mr. Dallas—the apologist (as he may comparatively be termed) of the Maroons!

"Eight or nine years had now elapsed, since Cudjoe's renown had united all the fugitive negroes in the island, of whatever origin they were, in a general interest; and since the appellation of Maroons had been given indiscriminately to all the tribes of them. Force after force had been employed to subdue them in vain; their hostile operations against the inhabitants were carried on with unremitted vigour. At length the colonists resolved to make every sacrifice and use every exertion to put an end to so harassing a war. All who could carry arms volunteered their service, and a large body of the people were assembled under the command of Colonel Guthrie of the militia, and Captain Sadler of the regulars. Amidst these formidable preparations, there were great apprehensions entertained of the uncertainty of the most vigorous measures, the failure of which would not only encourage the enemy and

entail a perpetual war upon the island, but might operate on the minds of the slaves, who would be convinced of the power of the Maroons to maintain a successful opposition against the government. The governor, Edward Trelawney, was therefore urged by the principal persons of the country to offer them terms of peace.

“This being resolved upon, it was necessary that it should be done with the utmost expedition; for a treaty, the purport of which was to establish the freedom and independence of a body of negroes, could not be suffered to remain long pending in the contemplation of slaves, numbers of whom might be tempted to aim at obtaining the like advantage; Gutbrie and Sadler were accordingly directed to communicate the offers to Cudjoe as speedily as possible. They could not but be acceptable to the Maroons, who were equally tired of war, and to whom the objects of their hostilities were conceded. On receiving intelligence of the offers to be made, Cudjoe called in his detachments, which had already fallen back, hearing of the preparations made against them. The formidable state of these threw a great difficulty in the way of negotiation, for the distrust of the Maroons would not allow them to reconcile it with the offering of peace; and the sincerity of the government was doubted.

“Governed by this motive, the cautious Cudjoe collected his forces, and waited the approach of the peace-makers, on a spot the most favourable to action in his mode of war, and on which his people might defend themselves, were treachery intended on the part of the government. His men were placed on the ledges of rocks that rose almost perpendicularly to a great height, on a ground which, compared to those precipices, might be called a

plain, the extremity being narrowed into a passage, upon which the fire of the whole body might bear. This passage contracted itself into a defile of nearly half a mile long, and so narrow that only one man could pass along it at a time. Had it been entered by a line of men, it would not have been difficult for the Maroons from the heights to have blocked them up in the front and in the rear by rolling down large rocks at both ends, and afterwards to have crushed them to death by the same means. This defile, which has ever since retained the name of Colonel Guthrie, was one of the passages to the large cockpit called Petit River, already mentioned. The entrance was impregnable, the continuation of the line of smaller cockpits rendered the rear inaccessible, and nature had secured the flanks of her own fortification. In this dell were secured the Maroon women and children, and all their valuable things deposited. On the open ground before the defile the men had erected their huts, which were called Maroon-town, or Cudjoe's town, whence, in case of an alarm, the people could fly in a minute to the ledges of the rocks at the mouth of the cockpit; nor would their town have been a great loss had it been burnt. They did not, however, confide solely to the security afforded them by the cockpit, and the ease with which they made themselves masters of the defile; every approach to their mountains was, for a mile or two, at other difficult passes, well guarded by small advanced parties, who on the appearance of an enemy might alarm their straggling bodies by means of their horns, which were heard at a considerable distance, and gave timely notice for every one to repair to his post. Thus situated, Cudjoe patiently waited the arrival of the olive-branch, and clearly manifested his intentions

and his wishes for an accommodation, by ordering his advanced posts not to fire a shot. His parties therefore merely sounded their horns, and retired to the main body.

“At this solemn juncture, Colonel Guthrie advanced unmolested with his troops, through situations in which the Maroons might have greatly annoyed him, even with the large force he then had under him. Making, however, the best disposition of his troops that the nature of the ground would admit, he marched on with confidence, and, judging of the distance he was from the Maroons by the sound of their horns, he continued advancing till he thought he could make them hear his voice; he then halted, and, observing the smoke of their huts within a few hundred yards, though he could not see one of them, called in a loud tone that he was come by the governor’s order, to make them an offer of terms, and treat for peace, which the white people sincerely desired. An answer was returned, declaring that the Maroons wished the same, and requesting that the troops might be kept back. This request being apparently dictated by suspicion, Colonel Guthrie proposed to them to shew the confidence he had in their sincerity, by sending a person to them to assure them that the white people were sincere on their part, and to inform them of the particulars relative to their freedom and security, which the government had authorised him to propose to them.

“This being readily consented to, Dr. Russell was selected for that purpose. He advanced very confidently towards their huts, near which he was met by two Maroons, whom he informed of the purport of his message, and asked if either of them were Cudjoe. They replied in the negative, but said that, if he would

stay a little while, and no man followed him, he would see Cudjoe. They then called out in the Coromantee language to their people; on which several bodies of them, who were before invisible, appeared on the rocks above. Being within the reach of the voice, Dr. Russell addressed himself to them, and begged particularly to have a conversation with Cudjoe, of whom he spoke in high terms, saying, that if he were with them, he was sure that, as a brave and good man, he would come down, and shew a disposition to live in peace and friendship with the white people.

“Several Maroons now descended, and among them it was not difficult to discover the chief himself. Cudjoe was rather a short man, uncommonly stout, with very strong African features, and a peculiar wildness in his manners. He had a very large lump of flesh upon his back, which was partly covered by the tattered remains of an old blue coat, of which the skirt and the sleeves below the elbows were wanting. Round his head was tied a scanty piece of white cloth, so very dirty, that its original use might have been doubted. He had on a pair of loose drawers that did not reach his knees, and a small round hat with the rims pared so close to the crown that it might have been taken for a calabash, being worn exactly to the rotundity of his head. On his right side hung a cow’s horn, with some powder, and a bag of large cut slugs; on the left side he wore a mushet, or couteau, three inches broad, in a leather sheath, suspended under his arm by a narrow strap that went round his shoulder. He had no shirt on, and his clothes, such as they were, as well as the part of his skin that was exposed, were covered with the red dirt of the cockpits, resembling ochre. Such was the chief, and his men were as ragged and

dirty as himself; all had guns and cutlasses. Cudjoe constantly cast his eyes towards the troops with Colonel Guthrie, appeared very suspicious, and asked Dr. Russell many questions before he ventured within his reach. At last Russell offered to change hats with him as a token of friendship, to which he consented, and was beginning to converse more freely, when Colonel Guthrie called aloud to him, assuring him of a faithful compliance with whatever Dr. Russell promised. He said that he wished to come unarmed to him with a few of the principal gentlemen of the island, who should witness the oath he would solemnly make to them of peace on his part, with liberty and security to the Maroons on their acceding to it.

“Cudjoe, after some hesitation, consented to their coming forward, and persuaded his people to come down from the rocks, which a few did, but not without their arms. As the gentlemen approached Cudjoe, he appeared to be in great trepidation, but whether caused by joy or fear was doubtful, though he was certainly under the protecting fire of his own men, and the negotiators were unarmed. Colonel Guthrie advanced to him, holding out his hand, which Cudjoe seized and kissed. He then threw himself on the ground, embracing Guthrie’s legs, kissing his feet, and asking his pardon. He seemed to have lost all his ferocity, and to have become humble, penitent, and abject. The rest of the Maroons, following the example of their chief, prostrated themselves, and expressed the most unbounded joy at the sincerity shewn on the side of the white people. Colonel Guthrie and Captain Sadler repeated the offers that had been communicated by Dr. Russell, which were accepted with joy; and, confidence being established on

both sides, the parties intermixed, exchanged hats and other tokens of congratulation, and reciprocally testified their satisfaction."

If this be true—"O most lame and impotent conclusion!"—But, can it be true?—I question not the good faith of the historian, but I may be permitted to whisper a doubt as to the accuracy of his informants, and to avow boldly that proofs strong as Holy Writ would scarcely convince me that the object of Colonel Guthrie's expedition was peaceful in the outset, or that the terms offered by him to the rebel chief, into whose fastness he had penetrated, were voluntary in the conclusion.

Lord Balcarres's statement of this affair, (in a letter to the duke of Portland, retracing the history of the Maroons about two years after their reduction,) possesses at least as much authenticity and more probability. "The last attempt," he says, "which was made to reduce these people, was in 1738, by Colonel Guthrie, who marched through an immense tract of woods, now cleared away—got into the town lately known by the name of the Trelawney Maroon Town—but, pursuing an advantage which he supposed he had gained, he pushed on a little further, and marched into the first cockpit, where, finding himself entangled, he was forced to make a treaty, whereby the Maroons got everything they asked, and were put into legal possession of all the strongholds in the island."*

* Mr. Long's account of the steps which preceded the treaty is as follows:—"In 1739, Governor Trelawney, by the advice of the principal gentlemen of the island, proposed overtures of a peace with the Maroon chiefs. Both parties were now grown heartily wearied out with this tedious contest. The white inhabitants wished relief from the horrors of continual alarms, the hardship of military duty, and the intolerable burthen of maintaining an army on foot. The Maroons were not less anxious for an accommodation,—they were hemmed in and closely beset on all sides; their

By this most injudicious treaty, fifteen hundred acres of land were yielded to Cudjoe and his followers, otherwise the Trelawney Maroons, with supreme jurisdiction within the tribe, and the power of inflicting any punishment short of death for crimes committed within its pale, to that chief and his successors, who, after the death of himself and four other captains then living, were to be nominated by government. On the other hand, their aid against all internal rehels and foreign invaders was stipulated for; in case of any injury committed by Cudjoe or his people against a white person, he was to submit himself, or deliver up the offender, to justice; and all runaway slaves who should in future join them, were to be restored immediately to the magistrates of the next parish. Cudjoe and his successors were to wait on the governor or commander-in-chief every year, if required, and two white men were constantly to reside with them, to maintain a friendly correspondence with the inhabitants of the island.*

About a year afterwards similar terms and one thousand acres of land were granted to the Maroons of Charlestown, Scott's Hall, and Nanny or Moore Town, under their captain, Quao. These three tribes are usually spoken of as the windward Maroons, in contradistinction to the two kindred tribes of Trelawney and Accompong, to leeward, in other words, to the west of Jamaica.

provisions destroyed, and themselves reduced to so miserable a condition by famine and incessant attacks, that Cudjoe (whom I conversed with many years afterwards) declared, if peace had not been offered to them, they had no choice left but either to be starved, lay violent hands on one another, or surrender to the English at discretion. The extremity, however, of their case was not at that time known to the white inhabitants."—*Hist. Jamaica, Vol. II. p. 344.*

* The treaty is printed at length in the works of Bryan Edwards and Dallas.

I cannot better close the present, or preface the following chapter of this introductory memoir, than by the few expressive words in which Lord Balcarres states his opinion as to the merits of this convention:—"It cannot be denied that the consequence of the treaty of 1738 was internal tranquillity to the island for a series of years; but the temporary advantage the island derived from the services of the Maroons, was more than balanced by the ruinous consequences of a country submitting to an *imperium in imperio*, by establishing them in the strongholds, and giving to them dominion over that country which affords the sustenance for man—for such are the mountains of Jamaica as contradistinguished from the plains."

CHAPTER II.

THE following account of the Trelawney Maroons, subsequent to their legal establishment, is extracted for the most part from the work of Mr. Dallas, which I should have preferred, if possible, exclusively resorting to, as a more favourable representation of their character and conduct than that of Bryan Edwards.

“ We have seen that, by the treaty made with Cudjoe, fifteen hundred acres of land in the parish of Trelawney were granted to him and the body of Maroons under his command. On this land stood the town, about twenty miles to the south-east of Montego Bay. Let your imagination help me to convey you up to immense mountains, successively towering one above the other, presenting tangled forests, or immense precipices of barren rock. The habitations of the Maroons of Trelawney were so placed as to form two towns, the Old and the New Town, at the distance of half a mile from each other. . . The two towns were similar in most respects,—the Old Town was more open and extended than the New one. The communication between the towns was through a very narrow neglected defile, or path, half a mile in length, running through the wood. . . . The elevated region, on which the settlement was established, is cool and healthy. The site of the New Town commands a prospect in which the charms of the sublime and of the beautiful are united,

and presents subjects that would have been worthy of the Italian pencil in the age of Leo, and are worthy of the English one under George III. . . . The fog of the West India mountains is not unwholesome. It collects in the course of the night, envelopes hill and valley, appears at daybreak in gently undulating motion to the eye above it, and completely conceals all that it covers. Being up before the sun, how wild and picturesque the scenery that lies before you! From the eminence which you have gained, you see the upper parts of the town, encompassed by rocky precipices and caves, irregular clumps of plantain-trees interspersed throughout the little inclosures which surround the houses, and here and there plants of coffee, cassava, and the broad-leafed cocoa. As the morning advances, the fog gradually sinks, and you have before you an ocean, diversified with a variety of little islands, broadening every minute at the base, as they are left by a tide which in its ebb discovers, not sands, but the beauties of wooded hills and vales. At length the sun is on the horizon, evaporation quickens, the remaining mists are dispersed by the warmth of his beams, and your eye travels over an immense country of descending mountains plumed with wood, catches the lively scenery of succeeding plantations, and extends the sight to the town on the coast, to the ocean, to bays and promontories, diminishing as they recede, till it is compelled to rest at last on an uncertain expanse of sea and sky.

“It is not to be doubted that the climate of these mountains, (which is seldom less than ten degrees cooler than the low-lands of the island,) the mode of life of the inhabitants, the constant exercise of their limbs in ascending and descending, and their cus-

tom of exploring the vast mountains and precipices of the interior of the country in pursuit of the wild hoar, contributed to produce the strength and symmetry in which the Maroons of Trelawney Town and Accompong Town (who were the same race of men) far excelled the other negroes of every description in Jamaica.

“In their person and carriage the Maroons were erect and lofty, indicating a consciousness of superiority; vigour appeared upon their muscles, and their motions displayed agility. Their eyes were quick, wild, and fiery. They possessed most, if not all, of the senses in a superior degree. They were accustomed, from habit, to discover in the woods, objects, which white people, of the best sight, could not distinguish, and their hearing was so wonderfully quick, that it enabled them to elude their most active pursuers; they were seldom surprised. They communicated with one another by means of horns, and, when these could scarcely be heard by other people, they distinguished the orders that the sounds conveyed. It is very remarkable, that the Maroons had a particular call upon the horn for each individual, by which he was summoned from a distance, as easily as he would have been spoken to by name, had he been near. . .

“They spoke, in general, like most of the other negroes in the island, a peculiar dialect of English, corrupted with African words; and certainly understood our language sufficiently well to have received instruction in it. I cannot be of opinion, that a sincere and fervent endeavour to introduce Christianity among them would have failed. It is true, that a prejudice in favour of the magic of Obeah prevailed among them, as among other negroes; but it is no less true, that the influence of this prejudice operated differently,

according to the strength of their understanding and experience. The greatest dupes to it were the most ignorant; and it was a generally received opinion, that the charm of Obeah could have no power over any negro who had been baptised,—not but that the weaker ones, whether Maroons or others, dreaded the arts of Obeah even after baptism. . . They continued to believe, like their forefathers, that Accompong was the God of the heavens, the Creator of all things, and a Deity of infinite goodness; but they neither offered sacrifices to him, nor had any mode of worship.

“It is not to be supposed that an illiterate body of people, among whom ambition was unknown, and who spent their lives chiefly in hunting, raising provisions, and traversing the woods in pursuit of runaways, would attend to nice regulations for their internal government. There was no public revenue to manage, no army to maintain, though the whole formed a military body, under appointed officers; right and wrong were supposed to be understood, without being defined. The town consisted of a certain number of families collected together under a chief; and among them resided a superintendent and four other white men as appointed by the colonial legislature. Subject to the laws made for them in their relative situation, as dependent on the government of the island, they were in other respects at liberty to pursue the dictates of their own minds, and they consequently followed the customs of their fathers. All their disputes were subject to the determination of their chiefs, to whom they looked up with implicit confidence, and whom they usually obeyed without argument. The superintendent, likewise, took an active part in adjusting their altercations, which chiefly arose from their pro-

pensity to gaming, and from drunkenness. . . . The successors of Cudjoe maintained a degree of influence and authority equal to his own. Till the death of Furry, who built the New Town, and went to reside in it with a certain number of the Maroons, they were governed in a very despotic manner by their chiefs and some of the older captains. The last of these chief Maroons was named Montague," their nominal leader in the rebellion of 1795. . .

"After the treaty with Cudjoe, the Maroons became the subject of successive laws, consisting of regulations respecting runaways, trials, punishments, making roads, and a variety of minute affairs. Being careless whether they brought in a runaway alive, or only his head, a law was passed, with great policy, allowing, besides the usual reward, mile-money for every runaway produced alive. Inveigling slaves and harbouring runaways, were punishable by transportation: that is, the offender was sold to foreigners on other islands, or on the continent of America. . . They were not to quit their town without leave; and if they staid seven days beyond the time allowed them, they were liable to be taken up and sent home for trial. They were not permitted to purchase or possess slaves. . . . Lastly, there was a law which, in considcration of their increasing population, gave them the liberty of relinquishing their rights as Maroons, and residing in any other part of the island, except the Maroon towns, no longer subject to the superintendent, but enjoying the privileges of free people,—in which case they were bound to enlist in the militia.

"To some of these laws very little attention was paid. The Maroons bought slaves without any notice being taken of it. Parties of them were suffered to wander about the island, and many

of them formed temporary connexions with the female slaves on the different plantations in the country. Whole families of them left their towns, and were permitted to establish themselves on the back settlements of the planters, without complying with the forms required by the law respecting such removals,—from which” most unfortunate “consequences resulted.”

“Agriculture among the Maroons,” proceeds Mr. Dallas, “was a very simple science. They had few wants, and the supply of those required neither great knowledge nor much labour. They placed a considerable dependence on hunting, and on their rewards for taking fugitives; but they did not therefore entirely neglect the cultivation of land, and were by no means so averse to the toil it demands as they have been represented. Many of them were negligent of the more certain modes of labour, for they were strangers to the passions which stimulate superfluous industry; but none could be said to be indolent, for their lives were passed in unusual personal exertions, which, as I before observed, conduced to their strength and symmetry. A provident disposition, however, was spreading itself among them; they began to feel the advantages afforded by money, and large parties of them, of their own accord, frequently hired themselves to the planters and new settlers, to clear and plant large tracts of land for certain wages; and several families of them, as I have already observed, settled by sufferance on back lands which they cultivated for themselves.

“Their provision-grounds consisted of a considerable tract of unequal land, from which was produced a stock not only sufficient for their own use, but so superabundant as to enable them to supply the neighbouring settlements. Plantain, Indian corn or maize,

yams, cocoas, toyaus, and in short all the nutritious roots that thrive in tropic soils, were cultivated in their grounds. In their gardens grew most of the culinary vegetables, and they were not without some fine fruits; for though to these, in general, the soil of their mountains was unfavourable, being either moist or clayey, yet they had some valuable fruit-trees, among which the Avocado, or Alligator-pear, ranked foremost. Mammees, and other wild but delicious fruits, were at their hand, and pine-apples grew in their hedges. They had cattle and hogs, and raised a great quantity of fowls. When to this domestic provision of good and wholesome food, we add the luxuries afforded by the woods, the wild boar, ring-tail pigeons and other wild birds, and the land-crab, which some esteem the greatest dainty in the West Indies, we may doubt whether the palate of Apicius would not have received higher gratification in Trelawney Town than at Rome.

“The women chiefly were employed in the cultivation of their grounds; but this they did not account an imposition upon them by the men. We are not to imagine that what would be real cruelty in a refined state of society, is cruelty or even hardship in a rough and unpolished people, among whom every individual depends upon his own exertions for his support. . . If the Maroon women were employed in burning trees and in tillage, the men, besides hunting and pursuing runaways, were employed in fencing the grounds, building and repairing houses, attending to their cattle and horses, of which they had about two hundred head, and carrying on their petty commerce. They were none of them mechanics, all their knowledge of that kind was confined to the art of erecting a house, and repairing a gun.

“Their traffic consisted in the disposal of the increase of their stock of all kinds, their jirked [smoked] hog, and superfluous provisions, which enabled them to purchase other commodities, and to put money by. They made a considerable profit by manufacturing tobacco. . .

“The Maroon marriages, or contracts of cohabitation, were attended with no religious or judicial ceremonies, the consent of the woman to live with the man being sufficient. . . A plurality of wives was allowed. A man might have as many as he could maintain; but very few had more than two, and most of them confined themselves to one. It was very expensive to have several wives; for the husband, on making the marriage present to a new one, was obliged to make an equal gift to each of the others. Each wife lived in turn with her husband two days, during which time the others cultivated their grounds, or carried their provisions to market; the property of each was distinct from that of the others, but the husband shared with all. The children of the different women were to be noticed by their father only on the days when their respective mothers sojourned with him. A breach of this decorum would have inflamed the injured mother with jealousy; a passion, however, in every respect confined to the temporary dame, for to the others all the extra-gallantry of the man was a matter of indifference. If the men sometimes behaved with brutality to their wives or children, it was generally the effect of intoxication.”

Comparing this statement of Mr. Dallas with that of Bryan Edwards, that “the Maroons regarded their wives as so many beasts of burthen—felt no more concern at the loss of one of them, than

a white planter would have felt at the loss of a bullock, and always treated them with brutality"—there does not appear so very wide a discrepancy as to justify the repeated protests of the former writer against its accuracy. By his own testimony, moreover—(and he expresses himself still more emphatically on that subject than Mr. Edwards,) the utmost disregard to female purity prevailed amongst the Maroons—and where such is the case, the accusation of indifference and cruelty can create no surprise.

Finally, as regards the usefulness of the Maroons in a military point of view, and their observance of the pledge of cooperation against rebels, these authorities are equally at variance—differ, in fact, *in toto*; nor does, in my opinion, the testimony of the notorious Major James, adduced by Mr. Dallas in their favour, strengthen the argument deducible from their good conduct on one occasion on which they appear to have won the good-natured approbation of Mr. Quarrell—the only authority, except Major James, cited by him.

Mr. Edwards, on the other hand, speaks as an eye witness—an advantage in which the cotemporary historian does not appear to have shared. That the whites, in general, entertained an opinion of the usefulness of the Maroons, he admits, but adds emphatically, that “no part of their conduct, at any one period, confirmed” that opinion. The following anecdote of the rebellion of 1760, attested as it is, appears conclusive,—illustrating, as it does, his opinion both as to their wilful inefficiency and their general character of ferocity.

. . . “Some days after this, as the Maroons, and a detachment of the 74th regiment, were stationed at a solitary place sur-

rounded by deep woods, called Downs's Cove, they were suddenly attacked in the middle of the night by the rebels. The sentinels were shot, and the huts in which the soldiers were lodged were set on fire. The light of the flames, while it exposed the troops, served to conceal the rebels, who poured in a shower of musketry from all quarters, and many of the soldiers were slain. Major Forsyth, who commanded the detachment, formed his men into a square, and by keeping up a brisk fire from all sides, at length compelled the enemy to retire. During the whole of this affair the Maroons were not to be found, and Forsyth, for some time, suspected that they were themselves the assailants. It was discovered, however, that, immediately on the attack, the whole body of them had thrown themselves flat on the ground, and continued in that position until the rebels retreated, without firing or receiving a shot.—A party of them, however, had afterwards the merit (a merit of which they loudly boasted) of killing the leader of the rebels. He was a young negro of the Coromantee nation, named Tackey, and, it was said, had been of free condition, and even a chieftain, in Africa. This unfortunate man, having seen most of his companions slaughtered, was discovered wandering in the woods without arms or clothing, and was immediately pursued by the Maroons in full cry. The chase was of no long duration; he was shot through the head; and it is painful to relate, but unquestionably true, that his savage pursuers, having decollated the body in order to preserve the head as a trophy of victory, roasted and actually devoured the heart and entrails of the wretched victim!

“These circumstances,” adds Mr. Edwards, “are partly founded

on my own knowledge and personal observation, having been myself present, and partly on the testimony of eye-witnesses, men of character and probity. The shocking fact last mentioned, was attested by several white people, and was not attempted to be denied or concealed by the Maroons themselves. They seemed indeed to make it the subject of boasting and triumph.”—It will not appear incredible to the reader who has previously learned from Mr. Dallas’s information that, in 1739 when the envoy of peace visited them, the women of the Maroons to windward (the more civilized, at least in late years, of the two divisions of the nation) wore—and Mr. Dallas mentions it with the view of shewing the “deadly hatred” they bore the Europeans—rows of the teeth of white men as ornaments.

These are facts that I would not dwell on, but for the illustration they convey of a character little, if at all, changed in 1795, and which ought to be rightly understood in justice to those concerned in the final and successful struggle with them which then took place.

The Trelawney Maroons, I may add, had in that year increased in numbers, from 276, living in the year 1749, to 660, exclusive of their numerous children by female slaves residing on the low plantations.* It was not their numbers, however, so much as the

* Such—observes Lord Balcarras, in the letter to the Duke of Portland, already quoted,—such was originally “their pride and the rooted hatred of the slaves towards them, that no intercourse subsisted between them, and the population of the Maroons was kept up solely by cohabitation among their own tribe. This continued until twenty-five years ago, when, by the country being cleared away, many sugar estates were established at a very small distance from their towns,—of course that hatred became lessened; connexions were formed between the young people, and at the

impregnable character of the position they occupied, that rendered them so formidable.

beginning of the Maroon war, in 1795, no fewer than twenty slave-wenches on the estates of York and Canaan had Maroon husbands, and those on the adjacent estates were disposed of nearly in the same manner." Of the slaves who joined the Maroons in rebellion, the greater number were related to them.

CHAPTER III.

A FEW observations on the situation of Jamaica as affected by the consequences of the French revolution, and on the state of mind of the Maroons, at the period of Lord Balcarres's arrival, will sufficiently prepare the reader for the consideration of the war in which those savages were at last reduced.

"In St. Domingo," says Mr. Dallas, "as in old France, the horrors that rose to view in every quarter of the country," on the French revolution, "caused an immense emigration. Many thousands of the inhabitants fled for refuge to various parts of the continent of America; many sought an asylum in Jamaica, and a number of the principal planters went to England. So early as in the end of the year 1791, application had been made by many of these planters to the British government, to send an armament and take possession of St. Domingo; but the ministry, cautiously watching the progress of the revolution, and anxious to preserve our country from every involvement in it, paid no attention to this application. The time, however, soon came when the National Assembly of France, withdrawing the mask of moderation, avowed their enmity against all the regular governments; and, observing in the British ministry an inflexible determination of supporting the constitution of Great Britain, and of opposing such innovations in the general

system of Europe as tended to alter her situation in the scale of political influence, declared war against this country.

“Overtures were then again made by the planters of St. Domingo to the British ministry, who were now not unwilling to listen to them; and M. Charmilly, one of the planters, obtained despatches to General Williamson, the lieutenant-governor and commander-in-chief of Jamaica, authorising him to adopt such measures as in his discretion he might think proper, for the purpose of taking possession of those parts of St. Domingo that were disposed to surrender to his majesty’s arms, and to detach a sufficient force from the troops under his command—to replace which, as well as to aid the operations in St. Domingo, speedy and effectual reinforcements from England were promised. More than half of the force in Jamaica was despatched to St. Domingo.

“There are two points in which this disastrous expedition bears a connexion with Jamaica. In the first place, it drained the island of the troops that were to protect the inhabitants,—and [secondly] it gave birth to the French proclamation abolishing all manner of slavery. It was impossible for the inhabitants to contemplate the dreadful events passing in an island almost within sight, without trembling for their own safety; and they watched with horror the progress of doctrines, the objects of which were to subvert all the known governments, and to put an end to the colonial existence of the West Indies. The colony remained thus in an awful state of tranquillity during the remainder of the administration of General Williamson, who, in the end of the year 1794, was appointed governor-general and commander-in-chief of his majesty’s possessions in St. Domingo, whither he repaired and took upon him the govern-

ment in the month of May, 1795, being succeeded in that of Jamaica by Alexander earl of Balcarres, who had arrived in the island in the month of April preceding, with the appointment of lieutenant-governor."

Such was the situation of Jamaica at the moment when the Maroon rebellion broke out. Mr. Dallas, I may observe, considers that rebellion as having arisen solely from internal discontent. Lord Balcarres's opinion, both during and subsequent to the period in question, was very different. His letters to the Duke of Portland, of July 18, 1795, and October 1, 1796, and the extracts from a paper written long afterwards, appended in a note to the first of these letters, will substantiate this. In that paper, he expressly ascribes the Maroon rebellion to the intrigues of French emissaries from St. Domingo, and adds that he "had occasion to trace the causes of that war into the cabinet of M. Fauchet at New York, and proved the combination that rebellion had with the armament of seven ships of the line, then blocked up in Cadiz harbour, under the command of M. Richery, and also with several levies of people of colour at New York, Boston, and Philadelphia."

The immediate causes of—what afterwards turned out to be—the premature outbreak of the Maroons, will be found stated in the letter of the magistrates of Trelawney to Lord Balcarres, dated July 18, 1795.

"The chief of these immediate causes hinged," according to Mr. Dallas, "on the esteem and affection of the inhabitants of Trelawney Town for" Major John James, once their superintendent, but who had been dispossessed of that office and succeeded by a Captain Craskell. If Mr. Dallas's description of this man be cor-

rect, he was indeed a character fitted to captivate the affections of the Maroons. He had been appointed superintendent of Trelawney Town, about the year 1763. "He was the son of John James, who, previous to the treaty with Cudjoe, had been captain of the corps of Rangers, and their most formidable, active, and enterprising enemy,—a man who, from the many dangers to which he had exposed himself in the first war, was by them considered as invulnerable by balls, and possessing an Obeah-protecting power against bullets. The father had also been superintendent, and no man, his son excepted, ever possessed so great a degree of influence over the Maroons. The high opinion they entertained of the father's bravery and activity descended to the son, in whom they beheld all they so much respected and admired in their old enemy and friendly superintendent. As they supposed the former invulnerable, they deemed the latter invincible. Nature never produced a form more calculated for vigour and activity. Barefoot, he equalled the speed of the hardiest Maroons over rocks and precipices, darting on with an agility peculiar to himself. He was indefatigable in every pursuit to which the Maroons were accustomed, and nothing that he pursued escaped him. Hunting the wild boar had been his earliest amusement and employment. His constitution of course was vigorous, and his body hardened; and with these he possessed an intrepidity of mind that seemed to court danger. When dreadful disputes took place among the Maroons, their cutlasses brandished against one another, and serious mischief likely to ensue, he would run among the thickest of them, knock down the most refractory, put them into irons, and afterwards punish them. In these cases, they would often themselves determine the punishment to be in-

flicted, which, being too severe, he was obliged to exert his authority to mitigate. They loved, venerated, and feared him. He arranged and settled their accounts for their labour, adjusted differences, and neither suffered them to be imposed upon nor to impose upon others. Had he been born a Maroon, he could not have been better acquainted with their character, disposition, and prejudices. If he could not boast of the greater refinements of education, he had sufficient to be fully competent to the business of his office, in which a knowledge of accounts was necessary; and if his talents were not those that might have been expected had his mind been more cultivated, they were such as well suited his employment. Although at times seemingly ferocious, he possessed an excellent disposition and forbearing temper, particularly in the company of gentlemen, with whom he frequently associated, being himself of one of the best families in the island, and a man of independent fortune. In the year 1791 he was appointed superintendent-general over the whole of the Maroon towns in the island, with the rank of major, and his son appointed to act under him in Trelawney Town. Such was Major John James, of whom it was necessary to speak thus particularly.

“For upwards of thirty years after the treaty with the Trelawney Maroons, a succession of captains, from old Cudjoe to the death of Furry, as I have before observed, exercised a despotic authority over them, and supported the superintendents, whenever they thought it necessary to enforce their commands. After Furry’s death, the respect attached to the office of chief Maroon captain gradually declined, and at length entirely sunk into the show of a few exterior ceremonies. Old Montague was the last captain of

Trelawney Town. He wore a gaudy laced red coat, and a gold-laced hat with a plume of feathers. None but their captains and officers sat in his presence, except upon the ground. He was the first helped at meals; no woman ate with him, and he was waited on by the young men. He presided in the councils, and exercised an authoritative tone of voice to enforce order, which, however, he seldom effected; for he was, in fact, considered in no better light than an old woman, but to whom a shadow of respect was to be paid, as he bore the title of chief.

“For a time the expiring authority of the chiefs seemed transferred to their superintendent, Major John James, with double vigour, which increased while he continued in the office,—and when he abandoned it, he retained their affection. He and his family were considered by the Maroons as having a kind of hereditary right to the superintendency over them. It was not by resignation that he quitted it. He had held that of Trelawney Town for many years, and, it is certain, executed the duties of his office with diligence and propriety, till his attention was called from it by concerns that required the greater part of his time. When, therefore, the law of residence was enforced, he complained of the insufficiency of the salary annexed to his office, and paid no regard to that law, being engaged in the settlement of an estate at the distance of twenty-five miles from the Maroon Town. At length the Maroons, who were delighted to have him with them, became discontented with his absence, and for several years, during the sessions of the House of Assembly, preferred repeated complaints against him. He certainly had no desire to lose his appointment,—but, influenced by prospects of more substantial advantage, or indulging

in amusements, (for he was no enemy to dissipation and pleasure,) he persisted in absenting himself from his place of duty, and the House of Assembly, being no longer able to overlook his neglect, he was removed from his office of superintendent-general, and his son from the superintendency of Trelawney Town,—to the latter of which Captain Craskell was appointed.

“ Captain Craskell was an officer in the regular service, son of the former engineer of the island of Jamaica, and a very reputable young man. Were the propriety of the appointment to have been determined by character alone, he would have had no occasion to fear a comparison; but, unfortunately, in a competition of greater talents for an administration of so singular a kind, he sunk before his predecessor into a comparative insignificance. The Maroons became uneasy at the measures they had taken against Major James, for their object had been to compel him to the residence required by law, and not to have had him superseded; they sincerely loved him; no other appointment could satisfy them while he lived, and they saw, with regret, the remedy that had been the result of their application to the House of Assembly. They contrasted, according to their judgment, the abilities and habits of James and Craskell; and, as the former rose in their estimation, the latter fell into contempt. What offers might have induced Major James to continue in the discharge of the office with his son under him, cannot be ascertained; but it was undoubtedly the interest of the island to humour prejudices which had grown up through the laxity of discipline, and which no pains had been taken to rectify. James was sore at the deprivation of the office, and it was regretted by the whole country; but the measure was deemed unavoidable. Had it

been consistent with propriety and the dignity of the legislature, to recede from the determination they had been compelled to adopt, Major James might have been suffered to remain superintendent-general, to be called upon only as it should have been found needful; but such a concession, even allowing that it would have averted the storm of which his removal was the chief and immediate cause, could not possibly be expected, nor can the wisest human foresight always suggest the surest expedients of counteracting the hidden evils of futurity.

“From the appointment of Captain Craskell, the insubordination of the Maroons, (which had been gradually taking place since James’s dereliction of his duty, and the succession of unqualified chief captains, unable to enforce authority without his assistance,) began rapidly to increase. The weight of influence fell into the hands of seven or eight of the inferior captains, who were unalterably attached to James, and whom nothing short of his re-appointment would satisfy. These frequently visited him, complained of Craskell’s being unfit for the command, and made comparisons highly gratifying to James, whose language, it is said, contributed more to irritate, than appease their discontent. He might, perhaps, have felt an illaudable gratification in these petty triumphs, the consequences of which he did not foresee; but he must be entirely acquitted of the slightest design of promoting a rebellion, the success of which, had it been possible, must have ruined him and every part of his family, with the rest of the colonists.”—

— Enough of this:—“Major James,” writes Lord Balcarres to the duke of Portland, on the close of the Maroon war, “I have ever looked upon as the head of that rebellion; and I had it in

serious contemplation, in conjunction with the attorney-general, to prosecute him for high treason."

And, on closing this volume, the reader will determine how far Mr. Dallas is correct in his assertion that "the sole object the Maroons had then in view, was the restoration of Major James,"—that "the whole of their refractory conduct, their violence and insolence, had no other tendency, and shewed their anxiety to effect it,"—that "it was this that suggested their murmurs for the want of land, and their complaint of the treatment they received from the white people;—and this that led to the seizing of an occasion to dismiss their new superintendent."*

I pause here.—That the revolt originated in French revolutionary agitation—that between the alternatives of ruin and massacre on the one hand, and the adoption of the means employed for its suppression on the other, there lay no medium—that those means adopted were strictly legitimate—that the final expatriation of the Maroons was but justice to the colony, and more than mercy to themselves; the boon, in fact, which, under the circumstances of their reduction, they most coveted—and, finally, that Jamaica did not cast them forth, unpitied exiles, to the mercy of circumstances, heedless that they had been nursed at her breast and were

* Let me premise here, once for all, that wherever Lord Balcarras's statements and opinions can be elucidated or illustrated by the works of Bryan Edwards and Mr. Dallas, I shall quote them freely,—but I do not consider myself called upon to enter into controversial argument on such points of opinion respecting the Maroon war as are debated between those writers, or on which the latter and Lord Balcarras are at variance. Much, I apprehend, will be gained to courtesy, and nothing lost to truth and candour, by this forbearance.

once her children, but provided liberally for their future subsistence and comfort as a free and independent people—will, I think, be sufficiently evident on the perusal of the following papers.

They consist of such selections from Lord Balcarres's public despatches and private correspondence, as convey a clear, vivid, and authentic picture of the vicissitudes of the struggle, and of his own individual exertions, during every stage of its progress. I have divided them into three parts or sections—acts, they might be termed, of the drama, of which the meditated ruin and providential preservation of Jamaica is the plot, and Lord Balcarres the hero. Of these acts or parts, the rise and progress of the war occupies the first; its prosecution and successful close, the second; and the curtain falls on the departure of the vanquished and the vindication of the victor.

“Equidem beatos puto quibus, Deorum munere, datum est,
aut facere scribenda aut scribere legenda;
beatissimos vero quibus utrumque.

Horum in numero

A V U S
meus.”

A SELECTION,

&c. &c.

*To the duke of Portland, K. G., Secretary of State for
the Home Department.*

“ Jersey, Sept. 27, 1794.

“ My Lord Duke,

“ I am this instant honoured by your grace’s
letter of the 18th.

My uniform wish has been to acquire the good opinion
of my sovereign, and the height of my ambition to
merit his royal confidence.

I am afraid that his majesty has overrated my abilities
and capacity to serve him in the high trust to which I
am unexpectedly named.

It is enough for me to know that I am under the
protection of his majesty, and it is only a secondary
consideration with me whether I discharge the duties
allotted to me in the island of Jamaica, in the presence
or in the absence of Lieut. Governor Williamson.

I shall be extremely proud to serve under his com-
mand, and I shall resign my trust to him whenever he
is disposed to resume it.

I have the honour to be

Your grace’s, &c.

BALCARRES.”

PART I.

PART I.

To the duke of Portland.

“ 30 May, 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

Since the attempt to burn Kingston in the beginning of April, I have kept the most watchful and vigilant eye upon the whole body of French emigrants. I have not a doubt in my mind that it was a deep digested plan to feel the pulse of this valuable island. I did not see the report of Sir Adam Williamson to your grace upon it, but, having formed my own opinion upon it, I have, in consequence, taken up different French people, from time to time. Several attempts have also been made to bribe my secretary, and immense sums have been offered for his interest to procure the release from the prison-ships of many *very innocent* prisoners. I ordered him to give into the idea, on purpose to know where the danger lay, and I am completely up to the business. Although there is every appearance of happiness and contentment among the slaves in Jamaica, that has not deterred the agents of the Convention from introducing

persons of various descriptions into the interior of the country, and particularly mulattoes and negroes from St. Domingo.

The steps I have taken have so frightened and alarmed the banditti at Kingston, that they are now giving most immense sums to procure their passage to America, which proves (what I before suspected) that the French gold had found its way into this island in abundance. The ferocity and revenge of these people induce them to say and to exclaim that the next attempt will probably be more successful.

I think the gentlemen of the country shew a supineness and a carelessness upon this point. I take every opportunity to point out their danger to them. I shall allow no foreigner whatsoever to remain on this island, unless I know what he is, and where he is; and I positively will not suffer any man capable of bearing arms to remain here. And my suspicions will be proved well-founded, when the bulk of these people depart for America and not for St. Domingo.

Although attempts have been made with much assiduity to introduce French principles into this island, I think they have made no impression at all, and it shall be my anxious care to suffer no inlet whatsoever for their doctrines.*

* A belief soon discovered to be fallacious.—This letter ought to ring as a *sotto voce* accompaniment in the reader's ear during the whole period of the Maroon war.

The militia all over the island are very active at this moment, and much progress will be made in their discipline.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

The following sketch by Lord Balcarres, of his policy towards the French emigrants and emissaries then congregated at Jamaica, occurs in a paper written several years after the above letter:—

"On my arrival in the island of Jamaica in April, 1795, I found a vast assembly of French emigrants, who had recently fled from the horrors of St. Domingo. They were composed of all ranks, qualities, and colours.

Many of the *noblesse* of France, numbers of ladies of the highest condition and consideration, accustomed to every delicacy and luxury, and who had saved nothing from the general wreck of their fortunes, excepting their menial female slaves attendant upon their persons, and a few trusty male domestics, who to save the lives of their mistresses had endangered their own—these persons formed one class of those unfortunate people.

A multitude of slaves and of handicraft men of colour, with great numbers of brown women, formed another class."

A third consisted of "an immense roll of French prisoners of war, of the most alarming description. These were confined on board of hulks moored near the shore; among them were bands of incendiaries who had been sent to Jamaica by the French Directory of St. Domingo, through the medium of the prison-ships; the object of these people was, to introduce themselves by bribery and artifice into the island for the purposes of destruction, conflagration, and revolt; they were furnished with profusion of gold, and had been too successful in finding the means of effecting their escape from those hulks, and getting into the interior of the island.

An attempt had been made, on the morning previous to my arrival,

*To Sir Adam Williamson, K.B., Governor-General and
Commander-in-Chief of H. M's. Possessions
in St. Domingo.*

“Jamaica, July 18, 1795.

“Dear Sir Adam,

I must condole with you upon the arrival of the Sampson, and the force destined for St. Domingo, at this post.

to set fire to the town of Kingston, and the combustible materials were exposed to view. Shortly afterwards, the town of Montego Bay was burnt to the ground. Those circumstances, with the burning of Philadelphia, prove the system that prevailed with the Directory of France and her sub-directories at that period. . . .

Such was the first *coup d'œil* which I had of this people at the period of my landing,—the prospective was still more gloomy.

The people of Jamaica had the greatest dread of the consequences which might eventually befall the island, should a want of success of our army serving in St. Domingo, create the necessity of the numerous French corps falling back upon the island of Jamaica.

In this situation, and with these sentiments, the legislature of Jamaica would not discriminate, but passed colonial laws, the effect of which was the confounding everything that was noble and deserving with that which was vile and dangerous.

To my understanding the duty imposed upon me seemed difficult, but extremely obvious. National honour, and every sentiment of humanity, dictated to me the propriety of protecting with firmness and vigour the first class, and keeping a most vigilant eye on the conduct of the others.

Having seen the necessity of bringing the whole of these French emigrants into order and form, I determined to connect their money

As all these troops were sent out in loaded merchant-ships, it becomes impossible for them to carry the troops to St. Domingo; and indeed it is obvious that the contract by their charter party is expired.

In this situation nothing remains for me to do but to make every exertion in my power to forward them to you. I have been everywhere this morning, and find that I can obtain passage for seven hundred and fifty men in the government vessels,—one hundred and fifty more

allowance with some system of police, whereby each individual might be known and traced, and his occupation and description be duly registered. This kind of arrangement was not new to me, as I had been entrusted with a similar charge when I administered the government of Jersey, where I had some thousands of French emigrants under my authority and regulation.

. . . The admission of the French emigrants into the island of Jamaica, and its consequences, form the history of my administration in that island.

I had hardly fixed myself in the seat of government, when the apprehensions which had alarmed me on my arrival, respecting the unfortunate admission of some of these French emigrants into the interior of the island, proved but too well founded, by the breaking out of the Maroon rebellion, an event which nearly lost to his majesty this most valuable possession of Jamaica.

I had occasion to trace the causes of this war into the cabinet of Monsieur Fouchet at New York, and proved the combination that rebellion had with the armament of seven ships of the line, then blocked up in Cadiz harbour, under the command of M. Richery, and also with several levies of people of colour at New York, Boston, and Philadelphia," &c. &c.

The feelings with which the higher class of French emigrants bade

by the Penelope merchant ship,—and the Sampson, with the Success and Penelope frigates, may take near four hundred. I expect that the vessel now charged with the French emigrants may convey them up to St. Do-

Lord Balcarres adieu, on his resignation of the government, were expressed in a few simple but touching lines sent to him anonymously just before his departure. I cannot refrain from adding them here :—

“ Chacun sur ta prochaine absence
 Exprime ses justes regrets ;
 De ta valeur, de ta prudence,
 On aime à publier les traits ;
 Et chacun forme des souhaits
 Dictés par la reconnaissance,
 Pour ton bonheur et tes succès.
 Sur tes vertus que l'on encense
 Penses-tu que les cœurs François
 Puissent conserver le silence,
 Ayant éprouvé les effets
 Répétés de ta bienfaisance ?

Si le guerrier, l'homme d'état,
 Par ses hauts faits se rend illustre,
 Il est des vertus sans éclat
 Dont il reçoit un nouveau lustre.

Avoir su conserver la paix
 Dans l'isle à tes soins confiée,
 Et déconcerté les projets
 D'une multitude effrénée,
 Qui menaçait dans ses progrès
 De dévaster cette contrée—
 Voilà le mérite éclatant ;—
 Ces faits sont liés à l'histoire,

mingo,—this must be done, right or wrong, for here they cannot remain. I trust that I shall be able to dispatch this motley fleet in three days.

. . . I feel the arduous situation you are placed in from the great blunder that has been committed. I can only

Et ton nom cher à la victoire
 Vivra dans les fastes des temps.
 Mais d'une peuplade étrangère
 Avoir adouci le malheur ;
 Contre un préjugé trop sévère
 Avoir su prémunir ton cœur ;
 Dans le sein flétri, d'une mère,
 Par le besoin et la douleur,
 Versé des dons consolateurs ;
 Du fils, de l'époux, et du père,
 Par des secours, tari les pleurs—
 Voilà ce qu'en toi je révère
 Plus que la gloire et la valeur."

These lines were enclosed in the following letter :—

" Milord,

Vous me connaissez à peine ; je n'ai jamais reçu aucune faveur de vous—ma famille n'étant jamais venue dans cette isle, n'a par conséquent jamais reçu de secours du gouvernement,—je n'attends rien de vous. La flatterie n'a point dicté les vers que je joins ici, et que je vous prie de recevoir avec bonté.

Depuis long-temps ce que j'ai exprimé était dans mon cœur, et je n'hésite pas à dire que nombre de familles vous doivent *litteralement* leur existence.

C'est sous votre protection, milord, que je me suis établi dans cette isle. Je vous dois indirectement le bien-être dont j'y jouis. Il peut un jour faire celui de mes enfans.

Veuillez agréer, &c. &c.

A. D."

exert myself to repair the mischief, as far as our resources here may go.

The season of the year is unfavourable for such an expedition. My only hope is, that the sea-breezes have been so strong for a duration of time, that there may be a faint chance of more moderate weather.*

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

Letter from the magistrates of St. James's.

"Montego Bay, 18 July, 1795.

"My Lord,

We are sorry to find that a very serious disturbance is likely to break out immediately with the Maroons of Trelawney Town. They have obliged the superintendant to quit the town. They have threatened the destruction of the two plantations nearest them. All the people belonging to the town have been called in; the women are sent into the woods; and, between this and Monday, they propose to kill their cattle and their children, who may be an incumbrance.

The chief of this we have in evidence from various individuals, but, for the information of your lordship, we enclose the last letter from the superintendent.

* This providential blunder, as I may call it, it will be seen hereafter, saved Jamaica.

Since this letter was written, the letter from the magistrates to them, in answer to a proposal they made, was sent them, and we expect an answer this morning to it, but your lordship must well know the difficulty of quelling such a body of men, after they have once committed themselves, and their spirits roused.

We have despatched a letter to General Palmer, to call out the troop, and Colonel James has ordered out two companies of militia for the immediate protection of the plantations in the neighbourhood, and we hope the next intelligence will render unnecessary calling out the rest.

Mr. Vaughan also informs us he has sent an express to Colonel Swaby, custos of St. Elizabeth, to have the militia in readiness for action, and to inform the neighbouring parishes on the south side, and has given the same intelligence to the custos of Trelawney.

We beg leave to suggest to your lordship's consideration the propriety of a company of the Light Horse being sent on each side of the country, in case the militia are generally called out,—to overawe the negroes during the absence of the militia, or for any other necessary duty.

The immediate cause of this disturbance was the inflicting the punishment of flogging on two Maroons, who had been convicted, by the evidence of two white people, of killing tame hogs.

Since writing the above, Mr. Schaw, inhabiting their boundaries, has informed us that they expect this day to

be joined by Accompong Town; but they have delayed their attack till to-morrow or Monday, when it will be by two parties, one on each parish,—and that they expect to be joined by some negroes of some particular estates.

We have the honor, &c.

WILLIAM DUNCAN, DONALD CAMPBELL,
GEORGE MAC LENNAN, J. ROBERT JAMES,
SAM. VAUGHAN, JUN. JOHN PERRY,
MACLAURIN GILLIES, JOHN INGRAM.

P.S. We are in want, as the custos formerly advised, of both arms and ammunition."

Proposals of the magistrates of St. James's to the Maroons of Trelawney Town.

"Saturday, 18th July, 1795.

"The magistrates of St. James's propose to send four of the oldest justices to meet four chosen Maroons at Vaughan's Field, or Haddington, to-morrow—to settle all differences.

(Signed)

DONALD CAMPBELL,
JOHN PERRY.

The four magistrates will be General Reid, Colonel James, Mr. C. Mowat, and Mr. Cuninghame, if it is possible to find them,—or else, others."

Answer of the Maroons to the proposals of the magistrates of St. James's.

“Gentlemen,

The Maroons wishes nothing else from the country but Battle; and they desires not to see Mr. Craskell* up here at all. So they are waiting every moment for the above on Monday.

(Signed) COLONEL MONTAGUE,†
and all the rest.

Mr. David Schaw	}	They will wait till Monday,
will see you on		nine o'clock, and if they don't
Sunday morning		come up, they will come down
for an answer.		themselves.”

*Extract of a letter from John Merody, assistant in
Trelawney Maroon Town, to Thos. Craskell,
Esq., the superintendent, dated Tre-
lawney Town, July 19th.*

“The Maroons inform you that they do not want anything, for they have got plenty of powder and ball, for it is too late to do anything that is good.”

* The superintendent they had driven away.

† Or, Montague James, the colonel or head chief of the Maroons.
—“It should not be omitted, that of late years a practice has universally obtained among the Maroons (in imitation of the other free blacks) of attaching themselves to different families among the English, and desiring gentlemen of consideration to allow the Maroon children to bear

To Major General Forbes.

“ 20th July, 1795.

“ Dear Sir,

I hope the torch of war is not lighted in this valuable island, but it is a fact that the Maroons are in open rebellion. I hope the intrigues of the French are not at the bottom, and that only private cabal is the source; but the alarm is general, and I have detached three troops of dragoons against them.

This may turn out nothing, but I must be prepared for the worst—I must act upon the offensive, and light cavalry is suited to our immediate operations. I therefore request that the detachment of the 18th Light Dragoons be landed to-morrow morning in lieu of the flank companies of the 130th regiment, which will proceed to St. Domingo. You will therefore give out the orders accordingly.

I am extremely concerned that this may derange the command of Lieut. Colonel Walpole. His remaining here must be highly gratifying to me,—on the other hand, Sir Adam Williamson must no less feel the value of an officer who is so capable of forwarding such an important duty as forming a corps of cavalry for the service of St. Domingo.

Lieut. Colonel Walpole has it in his option to which island he will devote his service; and his decision will be perfectly agreeable to me.

You may shew this to Sir Adam.

I have the honor, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the duke of Portland.

“ Jamaica, 19 July, 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

It is with much concern that I inform your grace of an insurrection among the Maroons in Tre-

their names. Montague James, John Palmer, Tharp, Jarrett, Parkinson, Shirley, White, and many others, are names adopted in this way.”
—*Edwards.*

lawney Town; and those insurgents will probably be joined by the Maroons of Accompong Town, to whom they are naturally hostile.* The magistrates in all the neighbouring parishes are alarmed in the highest degree. It is probable that this insurrection is owing to private disputes, hatred to their superintendent, and such causes, but your grace knows how very jealous I am of everything that has the least tendency to insurrection, and if the minds of these mountaineers have been poisoned by emissaries, it may prove very fatal to this country.

Though I have received volumes of reports, I have got nothing of that distinct nature to lay before your grace. The magistrates of Montego Bay have made some proposals to the Maroons, to which the enclosed is the reply. The superintendent thinks it impossible to settle the business amicably. I am, however, disposed to negotiate with them, but I have taken every vigorous measure to reduce them by force. The militia are arming all around them. Notwithstanding the date of the reply to the magistrates is the 18th of July, and that the distance to Spanish Town, via Montego Bay, is between 130 and 140 miles, I have been able, in thirty hours after the answer was sent, to detach from this three troops of the 20th Light Dragoons. The instructions I have given to Captain Wallen, who commands the party, are to put himself under the orders of the custos and magistrates of Montego Bay. If the insurrection

* They were related to each other, but had quarrelled for the custody of the original treaty of 1738.—*Dallas*.

is not instantly quelled, I shall march against them myself, with everything I can muster.

I take this opportunity of stating to your grace the efficiency of a force of light cavalry, and I am persuaded that nothing can be better judged than the measure adopted by ministers of sending out the 13th and 14th regiments of Light Dragoons to Jamaica; and I am of opinion that government will find them not only better adapted to preserve the tranquillity of this island, but that ultimately the expense will be less. I shall endeavour to post those dragoons in a way that will equally awe the Maroons and the negroes.

Upon examining some of the defences of this island, I find exactly the same fault and defect that I have observed in most of the British possessions, namely, that there is no regular *place d'armes* to retire to in the event of a successful insurrection in the country. Fort Augusta and Port Royal certainly can be made so:—connecting these two points with the security of the capital, Kingston, against an internal foe, I think, deserves the attention of an officer in these dangerous days, and I mean to employ my thoughts upon that subject.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas, Secretary at War.

"Jamaica, 21 July, 1795.

"Sir,

I am very sorry to inform you of an insurrection having taken place among the Maroons in Trelawney

Town, who have been for some days in a state of rebellion. If it is merely a dispute with the whites in the neighbourhood, the measures I have taken against them, I trust, may restore quiet. But if the intrigues of the French are at the bottom, it becomes infinitely more alarming. They have commenced with a regularity which shews more method than in any former dispute. They have made friendship with the Maroons of the next Town of Accompong, who are naturally hostile to them,*—they have sent all their women and children into the woods,—in all their former broils, they had always recourse with their complaints to the governor—they have not come near me; and the reply to the magistrates who endeavoured to communicate with them was, that they desired nothing but battle, that they were prepared to receive the whites, and if the whites would not come to them, they should visit the whites.

I immediately marched three troops of dragoons, from the 20th regiment, against them. I have sent them only to the neighbourhood, and put them under the orders of the magistrates of Montego Bay, until I have further information. If it is a serious and deep-founded plan, I must endeavour to keep the Maroons to the mountains, and separate them from the negroes in the low countries.

This I can only do by light cavalry. I intend, therefore, to detain the detachment of the 18th Light Dra-

* These Accompongs, in the result, proved faithful, and acted with vigour against the rebels.

goons, and I shall send the flank companies of the 130th to Sir A. Williamson, to replace them.

Having stated my fears to you, I should be sorry if this business should be taken up by the merchants in London in any other light than a Maroon insurrection. The country, however, is so alarmed, that many letters may go home by the conveyance of the packet, that may give more uneasiness than the affair, perhaps, deserves.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

Matters, in the meanwhile, had taken an unexpected turn at St. James's. The militia having assembled, on the 20th of July, to the number of four hundred, "moved," says Mr. Dallas, "up to Green-Vale, a penm at the foot of the mountains leading to the Maroon Town, about three miles distant, and of most difficult access. Mr. Tharp, the custos and chief magistrate of the parish, and several other gentlemen, accompanied the corps. As they approached the hill, they observed a single man winding along the acclivities with singular agility, and brandishing a lance to show that he had no other arms. This was a Maroon captain of the name of Smith, a young fellow of exquisite symmetry, whose limbs united all that was requisite both for strength and activity; the superiority of his gait, as he descended the side of the mountain, and the wild grace with which he flourished

the lance over his head, excited the highest admiration. He approached the custos, and delivered a letter to him, in which he was requested to proceed to the town, accompanied by Mr. Gallimore, Mr. Knowles, Mr. Galloway, and Mr. Stewart. The invitation was accepted, and these five gentlemen went forward to Trelawney Town, where they found General Reid, Mr. Mowat, and Major James, their late superintendent.

“The Maroons had prepared for this meeting, and received their visitors under arms, not however in the manner of a regular army, but with an apparent ferocity, wild manœuvres, and evolutions little suited to a deliberate and free discussion; nor indeed could the scene be viewed without a degree of alarm.* Some of the Maroons had been qualifying themselves, as they often did on great occasions, with a sufficiency of rum, with which they had been abundantly supplied by intimidated persons in the neighbourhood willing to secure their favour.

“After much clamour, it was settled that one of their captains, named John Jarrett, by no means the least violent, should moderate his voice, and deliver himself in such a manner as to enable one of the gentlemen to write down what the Maroons wished to say. This being reduced into some form, the grievances they complained of appeared to be as follows:—

* “There appeared about three hundred able men, all of whom had painted their faces for battle, and seemed ready for action; and they behaved with so much insolence, that the gentlemen were at first exceedingly alarmed for their own safety.”—*Edwards*.

“1. An infringement of their treaty by the magistrates of Montego Bay, in causing the punishment of whipping to be inflicted on some of their people by the hand of a slave.*

“2. That the land originally granted them for their subsistence was worn out, and being not sufficient for their support,† they required an additional quantity, saying that the penns of several settlers in the neighbourhood would suit them.

“3. That Captain Craskell, their superintendent, was,

* On this, Mr. Edwards remarks that, however much it is to be regretted that the magistrates had paid so little regard to the pride and prejudices of the Maroons in this respect, “the punishment and the mode of administering it were strictly legal, and according to the very letter of their treaty, and a white offender in a similar case would have been whipped by the same man.”—“It appeared afterwards,” says Dallas, “that these two Maroons were persons of no consideration among them, and that but for the occasion afforded them of a pretence for complaining, they would themselves have hanged them without ceremony.”—“The Maroons often afterwards declared that they wished for permission to hang both of them, having long considered them as runaways and thieves.”

† “It was not long before,” observes Mr. Dallas, “that the Assembly, on a similar complaint, had caused their tract to be surveyed and examined, and had judged it to be adequate to their support, notwithstanding their increase. Besides, they were actually trespassers on the adjoining settlers, who permitted them to continue on sufferance, and many of them lived at a great distance from their lands. The fact therefore is, that this demand of additional land was merely brought forward to support the turbulent insubordination into which they had been gradually falling, and which was now breaking forth into excesses.”

on account of his timidity, unqualified for his office ; and as they had experienced the disposition and abilities of Major James, they were desirous of his re-appointment, and averse to receiving any other.

“Other matters were also alleged by them as grievances, but which they were induced to relinquish, on condition that the gentlemen present would consider themselves as pledged to obtain redress for what was specified in this statement from the House of Assembly, who were to meet early in the ensuing month ; at the same time they showed a firmness of determination to pursue their object until these claims were satisfied. The gentlemen promised that their causes of complaint should be inquired into by the legislature, in order to be redressed. . . .

“The Maroons being soothed by the promises they had received, and the mediators being relieved from the apprehensions caused by the mode of their reception, the latter engaged to use all their influence to promote their wishes. Pleased at the result of the visit, or with a view of farther insuring the satisfaction that appeared, it entered the mind of one of the mediators to propose a collection of money among themselves for the people with whom they had come to mediate, and each gave something, except the gallant Colonel Gallimore. He saw in success, obtained by tumult and violence, the seeds of future turbulence ; therefore, instead of producing his purse, he took from his pocket some bullets, and showing them, said, ‘This is the reward you deserve, and no

other coin shall you get from me!"—In the evening, the mediators left Trelawney Town, hoping they had for a time, at least, tranquillised the Maroons."

That the insurrection had broken out prematurely—that this conference was an artful stroke of policy to lull suspicion till the period originally fixed for the outbreak, viz. the occasion of a fleet sailing for England with the greater part of the British troops then in the island—and that this plan was disconcerted by the unexpected arrival of the force intended for St. Domingo*—fully appeared afterwards.—“In the meanwhile,” says Mr. Edwards, “they pleased themselves with the hope of prevailing on the negro slaves throughout the island to join them, and, by rising in a mass, to enable them to exterminate the whites at a blow.

“The very day the conference was held, they began tampering with the negroes on the numerous and extensive plantations in the neighbourhood of Montego Bay. On some of these plantations, their emissaries were cordially received and secreted; on others, the slaves themselves voluntarily apprised their overseers.” . . .

* It will be observed, that Lord Balcarres's letter to Sir Adam Williamson, announcing the arrival of the St. Domingo troops, and that of the magistrates of St. James's, announcing the revolt of the Maroons, are dated the same day.

To Sir Adam Williamson, K. B.

“Jamaica, 25 July, 1795.

“Dear Sir Adam,

The insurrection among the Maroons has subsided for the moment, the magistrates having conceded everything, notwithstanding I had moved such a force as would have reduced them in a few days. I care the less about it, as it does not appear that there was any understanding among the negroes, although it is believed by the council that the French are at the bottom of it. . . .

I have ordered down the chiefs of Trelawney Town on Friday next, and if they do not come, I shall treat them as rebels. By such want of exertion, and such timidity among magistrates, arc countries lost. . . .

I am, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the same.

“Government Penn, July 27, 1795.

“Dear Sir Adam,

I have made every exertion to get off your fleet, and I hope they may sail to-morrow morning. I don't like our appearances here at all,—the magistrates have acted with the utmost timidity.

I have every reason to think the plan of the Maroons deeply founded, that the whole Maroons are in concert, and that an explosion is ready to burst. I have with difficulty opened the eyes of the council. Most of the gentlemen, I see, treat it lightly—I wish it may be so; if my hands had not been tied up, I should have extirpated Trelawney Town some days ago. I am inclined to think we shall have martial law before the week expires, but the indolence of gentlemen here, in viewing their danger, is extreme.

Yours affectionately,

BALCARRES.”

To the same.

“Jamaica, 28 July, 1795.

“Dear Sir Adam,

We are very much at a loss here for want of the large map of Jamaica, which Mr. Frazer conceives to be in your possession; if you can lay your hands on it, I need not say how very useful it may eventually be to us. . .

Several detached parties of the Trelawney Maroons have been seen on their road to the Blue Mountains,* and, some weeks ago, they have held general plays or dances, which is uncommon. The women have taken to the woods,—it has been in contemplation to kill their children. If the chiefs don't come on Friday, we must have martial law.†

If the Maroons are connected in this business, it is a most serious thing indeed, and I see no alternative but using the force of light cavalry to check any correspondence with the negroes on the estates. Should there be a coalition proved between all the Maroons, I shall be very desirous of the assistance of the 17th Light Dragoons. I shall seize upon every horse I meet to mount those detachments, in case there is martial law.

* The fastnesses of the Windward Maroons.

† The chiefs did not come down on the appointed day. It has been stated that they were unable to do so, owing to a delay occasioned by the messenger who brought the despatches. Be that as it may, after those despatches reached them, out of a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and fourteen captains, four captains only, with two private Maroons, (men, however, it is said, “of the greatest influence,”) started for Spanish Town—were arrested at St. Ann's, and on Lord Balcarres's passing through that town on his way to Montego Bay, on the 5th August, were handcuffed, sent to Montego Bay, and confined on board a ship in the harbour for security.

. . . Two o'clock, Tuesday.—It is reported that the Maroons of Trelawney Town are making abatis,* destroying the roads, &c.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To Lewis Cuthbert, Esq.

"Government Penn, 30 July, 1795.

"Dear Sir,

The present language of the Maroons is the effect of our energy.

Their timidity is owing to the same cause.†

I have my alarms, nor are they lessened by Mr. Vaughan's letter. . . .

If Mr. Vaughan's letter is correct in the facts, we have to bless God that our suspicions have been so early roused.

If he is correct, we have no medium—this country is lost, or it is preserved, at this moment.

My opinion is:—

That, if my hands had not been fettered, I could have put an end to this disturbance last week,—

It may be in my power next week—and a fortnight hence, instead of the action of the soldier, we may hear of the Rights of Man.

We have no force to oppose these doctrines—strike a blow, and

* A species of military defence formed of trees cut down and laid with their branches turned towards the enemy, so as to protect troops stationed behind them.

† "Finding that, far from being supported, they were upbraided by the Accompongs, the Trelawney Maroons had leisure to reflect on the insolence of their conduct, and after some days evinced a less intractable disposition," &c.—*Dallas*. This writer attributes the final relapse into violence to the arrest of the six "deputies," mentioned in a note to the preceding letter.

you will preserve the island until a force arrives; if you do not strike, they will.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

" Substance of my Speech to the Council of War, August 2, 1795.

" These papers, which you have just examined,* shew that something deeper was at the bottom of this evil than the mere circumstance of flogging the two Maroons.

Much mutiny and discontent had been shewn before that period.

I am of opinion that the minds of the Trelawney Maroons have been corrupted by incendiaries from the enemy.

That the enemy have felt the pulse of this country is notorious.

The attempt to burn Kingston—the intemperate expressions of Frenchmen, whom I had taken up as spies—the circumstance of some Frenchmen of the worst of characters hovering at large about the country—these, and many other such indications, have long ago given the alarm to my mind.

The letters before you have established beyond a doubt, that the Maroons of Trelawney Town were, to the amount of three hundred, in a state of rebellion on the 18th of July.

Allow me to consider the moment allotted for this insurrection.

The fleet for England was on the eve of its departure, and it may be said, this argument operates in favour of the Trelawney Maroons. But it was not likely that a measure would have been taken so very disagreeable to this island, as the detaining the fleet upon what might appear only as a private disturbance, and subjecting the planters and merchants to double insurance. On the other hand, they had to dread the arrival of the reinforcement from England, which everybody knew was shortly to be expected.—They therefore, whether by accident or

* All or most of these papers (as produced to the Assembly on the 22nd September) are printed in the appendix to Mr. Dallas's work.

otherwise, took the most critical period that possibly could be found for the accomplishment of their designs.

If Mr. Tharp's assertion is well founded, viz. *the aid* the Trelawney Maroons *could at pleasure receive from our slaves*, we have indeed to bless a merciful Providence for having preserved this country.—The arrival at Jamaica of the force destined for St. Domingo, and the mistake that produced it, have probahly saved this island.

The appearance of this force, and the rapid movement of the 20th Light Dragoons, have operated to humiliate in some degree the insurgents, and surely a more unfortunate *contretemps* to their designs could not have happened.

The majority of the magistrates have ascribed the cause of this insurrection to the flogging of the two Maroons; and, as they have been alarmed both for their properties and the credit of the island, they have considered it as a wise step to make every possible concession to the insurgents.

If peace and quiet could be attained by this most humiliating conduct, perhaps the steps taken by the magistrates might receive the approbation of a part of the proprietors of this country; but there seems to be but one opinion in the island in condemning the measures adopted by the magistrates.

Let me now consider whether these concessions produced the effects intended. You have now before you the letter of one of three magistrates, sitting on the bench in their judicial capacity. The letter states, that they have received remonstrances from the negroes of eight or ten plantations in the immediate neighbourhood of the Trelawny Maroons, complaining of their managers—men who are known in the country to be remarkable for clemency. If this is true, and if that credit is to be given to Mr. Tharp's assertion which is due to his character, abilities, and fortune, can gentlemen hesitate a moment in forming their opinions?

And I must here remark, that the Maroons themselves seemed dissatisfied with those unqualified concessions, as they said they were only granted to gain time,—and this also proves that they thought they had chosen the best time to effect their purpose.

This seems undeniable,—that the Trelawney Maroons have been in

a state of rebellion : whether this rebellion has proceeded from internal grievances, or from the machinations of an external foe, it does not alter the fact, that they have been in rebellion.

You have now present seventeen hundred infantry, in the full vigour of health and spirits. Twelve hundred of those belong to St. Domingo, and must leave Jamaica immediately. The 130th regiment is to remain. They are composed of nearly four hundred men, are all recruits, and a short time indeed may break down this regiment.—Before further reinforcements can arrive, this island will be weak indeed in regular force.

My opinion is,—strike at the Maroons of Trelawney Town. Strike at that source of rebellion, and its fibres will be cut off.

Providence has given you the means of doing it,—if you temporise, and lose the moment of securing your lives and properties, the responsibility must lie with yourselves. I have rung the alarm—it is long since it existed in my mind.”

To the duke of Portland.

“Spanish Town, 3 August, 1795.

“My Lord Duke,

It gives me peculiar concern to be under the necessity of communicating the intelligence of internal commotion in this island. The following is a transcript of the letter which first apprised me thereof.”

[See the letter of the magistrates of St. James’s, and extracts appended, pp. 14—17.]

“Having received those despatches on the 19th ult., and being very apprehensive for the terrible consequences of an insurrection in this island, I determined to lose no time in sending three troops of the 20th Light Dragoons, to keep in awe the negroes in the neighbourhood of

Trelawney Town. They marched that evening, under the command of Captain Wallen.

The following day my alarms were increased by a letter from one of the magistrates of Montego Bay, sitting in his judicial capacity, stating that the negroes of nine plantations had presented remonstrances against their managers,—all known in the country as men of remarkable clemency.—It was also substantiated to me from the strongest evidence, herewith sent, that the Maroons of Trelawney Town could command the aid of the plantation negroes at pleasure.

I conceived that not a moment should be lost in apprising the country of their danger. It appeared to me that the island was perhaps on the very brink of destruction,—and the alternative that presented itself did not convey much comfort to my mind—that I must either strike at the Maroons and cut out the very root of the rebellion, or that this valuable colony was for ever gone.

To think of reducing a race of men, who had hitherto resisted successfully every force brought against them—who had long maintained themselves in their mountains and fortresses—and who actually held their situation and property under a solemn treaty and compact made with this island—were circumstances that did not hold out any flattering view. But the necessity of giving the Maroons a severe and sudden check was decisive in my mind.

I therefore assembled his majesty's privy council, and

laid before them the letters and authorities which I had received. The council was pleased to recommend to me the measure of assembling a council of war, and to propose to them the question, whether it was, or was not, proper to declare martial-law?—The council, after examining the letters and authorities which I laid before them, unanimously voted the affirmative; and martial law was proclaimed in Jamaica on Sunday the 2nd inst.

The very sudden appearance of the three troops of dragoons at Montego Bay, operating like lightning, has hushed the clamours of the plantation negroes.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the duke of Portland.

“ Head Quarters, Vaughan’s Field,
11 August, 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

The very manly and energetic advice given to me by his majesty’s privy council, not to temporise with the Trelawney Maroons, gave me that confidence of support which is the soldier’s best consolation in an arduous undertaking of very doubtful issue.

Conceiving that similar motives would actuate the minds of the members of the council of war, composed of the members of the council, the members of the house of assembly, the chief justice, the commanders-

in-chief by sea and land, and the field-officers of the regulars and militia, I determined to begin my operations even before martial-law was declared.

Having obtained the most perfect knowledge of every road, path, or track of the minutest description, that led into the Trelawney Maroon towns, I resolved to blockade their country by seizing on every entrance,—although the manœuvre was to be performed in a circle of forty square miles of the most rugged and mountainous country in the universe.

For this purpose, and to conceal my design, I ordered, secretly and confidentially, the custodes of parishes, and colonels, to assemble their militia to make a search for concealed arms in all the negro huts over the island.

I also gave orders for their seizing the respective passes to the Trelawney Maroon towns,—this was executed in the morning of the 9th inst., with a precision that would have done honour to any troops. On the same morning I sent to the Maroons my two proclamations, and letter addressed to themselves, herewith annexed.*

* “ *To the Maroons of Trelawney Town.*

“ You have entered into a most unprovoked, ungrateful, and a most dangerous rebellion.

You have driven away your superintendent, placed over you by the laws of this country.

I had attempted to charter vessels for the carrying round some troops from Kingston. I procured one, in which were embarked two companies of the 63rd regiment, but I immediately abandoned the further prosecution of this idea, as all the small craft capable of beating

You have treated him, your commander, with indignity and contempt—you have endeavoured to massacre him.^a

You have put the magistrates of the country, and all the white people, to defiance.

You have challenged and offered them battle.

You have forced the country, which has long cherished and fostered you as its children, to consider you as an enemy.

Martial-law has, in consequence, been proclaimed.

Every pass to your town has been occupied and guarded by the militia and regular forces.

You are surrounded by thousands.

Look at Montego Bay, and you will see the force brought against you.

I have issued a proclamation, offering a reward for your heads. That terrible edict will not be put in force before Thursday, the thirteenth day of August. To avert these proceedings, I advise and command every Maroon of Trelawney Town, capable of bearing arms, to appear before me, at Montego Bay, on Wednesday the twelfth day of August, instant, and there submit himself to his majesty's mercy.

On so doing, you will escape the effects of the dreadful command ordered to be put in execution on Thursday the thirteenth day of August.

BALCARRES."

^a Mr. Craskell had retired to Vaughan's field, on being ordered to quit Trelawney Town, and a day or two afterwards an attempt was made on his life, which he very narrowly escaped.—*Edwards*.

to windward had been taken up, and had sailed the 31st of July, with eight hundred troops, for St. Domingo, under the convoy of his majesty's ship, *Success*, Captain Pigot.

Finding it impracticable to execute my purpose without his co-operation, I despatched an open boat to sea, acquainting him with my situation, and requesting him, as he tendered the safety of Jamaica, to go round to Montego Bay. He accordingly arrived there on the 7th inst., with four hundred and fifty men, exclusive of the emigrants. One of his transports had stranded, getting out of Port Royal harbour, and another had sprung a leak and had put into Port Antonio in distress.

I arrived at Montego Bay on the 8th, and at Vaughan's Field on the 10th inst., within a mile and a half of the Maroon towns.

It is remarkable that a manœuvre embracing the movement of all the light dragoons, the seizing of every pass by a scattered militia, and the operation of a fleet beating to windward, and afterwards falling down the length of the island, should have appeared as comprised in the space of seven days,—martial-law having been declared at Spanish Town on the 2d instant, and all the posts, up to the boundaries of the Maroon district, being actually occupied by his majesty's forces on the morning of the 9th inst.

I have the honour to enclose a sketch of the position taken on that day. The movement of the troops is my own, but I am solely indebted to Mr. Frazer, a half-pay

lieutenant of the 42nd regiment, and now island engineer, for the extreme correctness of the position.—To have blockaded such an enemy, in such a country, can only be ascribed to my having had so very able an assistant.

I have sent the Hon. Colonel Walpole, with a detachment of nearly one hundred dismounted dragoons of the 13th regiment, to St. Elizabeth's, to keep in check the negroes, as well as the Accompong Maroons.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

" Head Quarters, Vaughan's Field,

14 August, 1795.

" My Lord Duke,

The Maroons employed the 9th and 10th instant in reconnoitring our posts, and in considering the effects of my proclamations. Having explored every path, they found to retreat was impossible.

The older part of them then, but not sooner, proposed to surrender themselves in terms of the proclamation; the younger and more numerous part refused to listen to any other thing than to proceed to extremities. Each followed their own opinion.

About two o'clock p. m. on the 11th instant, proposals were made to me from the moderate party, to be permitted to surrender themselves, and, on my acceptance,

a body of thirty-eight came in, and laid their arms at my feet. This, with nine other Maroons of the same town, whom we had already secured, amounted to more than one third of their numbers capable of bearing arms.

The return of the township, made to me by the superintendent, dated first July, was—

Colonel	1
Lieutenant Colonel	1
Captains	14
Lieutenants	8
Privates	109
	<hr/> 133
Invalids	5
Women	201
Boys	164
Girls	157
	<hr/>
Total	660

Amongst those whom we secured, were—their colonel, lieutenant colonel, and eight other chiefs.

The moment that it was known in their towns that such an event had taken place, the wild and impetuous young savages set fire to both,—which is the immediate signal of the most inveterate violence and hostility.

At that moment, as I am informed, many of their children were massacred.

Early next morning, they seemed inclined to make a break towards Hanover. As I had received intelligence that they had endeavoured to corrupt the negroes in that quarter, I thought it proper to post at the extremity of the path leading towards that parish, a strong company of the mulattoes belonging to the St. James's regiment. This company was attacked at day-break with vigour, repulsed the Maroons, with considerable loss, and maintained their post with the greatest intrepidity and coolness, although, at the very first fire, they lost one man killed and four wounded, and one negro killed and two wounded.

As I had great reason to believe that a very considerable part of the Maroon force was drawn towards this extremity of their district, in which they have a large tract of fine provision-grounds, extending from their boundaries nearly to their New Town, I sent off an express to Colonel Sanford, who commanded on the Trelawney side, to mount the hill and attack the town, —leaving the disposition to himself, but commanding him, the instant he carried it, to wheel to the right, by which movement he got possession of the brow of the hill immediately above the provision-grounds, and had the Maroons in their rear while I had them directly in front.

Colonel Sanford moved on accordingly. He took with him forty-five dragoons, armed with their swords and pistols; several volunteers accompanied him, and he was supported by a very strong detachment of the Tre-

lawney militia. He ascended the hill about five o'clock p. m.; attacked, and immediately carried the post, without any loss.

Flushed with his first success, he determined to gallop on, unsupported, and to surprise the Old Maroon Town, which is distant about three quarters of a mile. Unfortunately, between the two towns, he fell into an ambuscade which proved fatal to himself and one quartermaster, to fourteen of his corps, and thirteen volunteers.

The command devolved on Captain Butter, of the 18th Dragoons, in a most awful situation indeed! To retreat to the New Town by the same track, through a tremendous ravine, over a road narrow, rugged, almost impracticable, and overhung with rocks lined by the enemy, was one alternative; the other—Forward!—to dash over mountains, an unexplored rocky country, and in the face of forty Maroons—who were so far surprised as to be found standing in a body to oppose him. The sight of the savages decided the difficulty, and after charging and cutting down eleven of them, he and his party rushed on, and, crossing at full gallop a country almost inaccessible, joined me at Vaughan's Field in the dusk of the evening, having traversed the whole of the Maroon district. This decision certainly saved the whole party, and Captain Butter has infinite credit in the adventure.*

* The officer who headed the volunteers, and fell on this unfortunate occasion, was Colonel Gallimore. "His death," I am sorry to add from

Happily Colonel Sanford had made so very rapid a movement that the Trelawney infantry had not been able to keep up with him. They made their retreat unmolested, after having occupied their post in the New Town all night.

While we lament the over ardour and the intrepid courage of Colonel Sanford, who fell a victim to this excess, I had only to console myself with the idea that so severe a lesson would induce our young soldiers to give in future the most scrupulous obedience to orders.*

Mr. Dallas, "was not immediate; he was certainly wounded, and never seen after. The Maroons could give no account of him. . . They had the watches, knives, pencils, and other things of the rest that fell, but nothing of Gallimore's except his gun, which he must have dropped on being wounded, and making for the woods. As his body was never found, it is probable that the confusion of the scene and the approach of night favoured his retreat into the covered woods, where, from fatigue or loss of blood, he may have expired, like others, in some recess, which from the difficulty of being penetrated, time itself may never discover. Gallimore was a brave, active man, and generally beloved."

More fortunate in his escape was, says Bryan Edwards, "my late excellent and lamented friend George Goodin Barrett. He was attended on that day by a favourite negro slave, of whom it is related that, during the first attack, perceiving a Maroon from behind a tree present his gun at his beloved master, he instantly rushed forward to protect him by interposing his own person, and actually received the shot in his breast. I rejoice to add that the wound was not mortal, and that the poor fellow has been rewarded as he deserved for such an instance of heroic fidelity as history has seldom recorded."

* "So general was the alarm," in consequence of this misadventure, "that the governor thought it necessary, in a proclamation which he

The effect of this disaster is nothing further than the loss of so many gallant and valuable lives.

I have ordered the whole party to resume their ground by a circuitous march of twenty miles.

The post they carried is everything. They will carry it again, and I trust, when they get it, they will be content with it.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"Head Quarters, Trelawney Old Maroon Town,
24 August, 1795.

"My Lord Duke,

"From the 12th to the 18th instant, our time has been entirely occupied in getting forward provisions and supplies.

The labour of effecting this service in so rugged a country, has been beyond description difficult and har-

issued on the occasion, to make public the orders he had given to Colonel Sanford, and to declare in express terms, that if the detachment under that officer's command had remained at the post which he was directed to occupy, the Maroons, in all probability, would have been compelled to surrender themselves prisoners of war. 'Soldiers will learn from this fatal lesson,' adds his lordship most truly, 'the indispensable necessity of strictly adhering to orders. An excess of ardour is often as prejudicial to the accomplishment of any military enterprise, as cowardice itself.'"—*Bryan Edwards*.

assing. Our out-posts have been daily disturbed, and our convoys as regularly attacked.

As I had fixed on the morning of the 19th instant for an attempt on the New Maroon Town, I made a false attack from Vaughan's Field, which had the desired effect of drawing off all their force from the Trelawney side, and Colonel Hull took possession of that very important post without loss. He immediately proceeded, by my orders, to hut the soldiers, and to prepare materials for erecting a block-house with a stockade round it.

On the 23rd, I moved against the Old Town by three different tracks, and in three columns, under the respective commands of Colonels Fitch, Incledon, and Hull. The columns under the orders of Colonels Incledon and Hull consisted of one hundred men each ; that of Colonel Fitch, with which I marched myself, was composed of one hundred and fifty men.

The movement commenced exactly at day-break. I had ordered secrecy, which was inviolably kept, and the columns preserved the most profound silence. This was absolutely necessary, as I had to march over a country where a very few determined opponents are sufficient to stop an army.

This exact obedience to my orders had the happiest effect.

The column under the command of Colonel Hull approached within two hundred yards of the Old Town and of the enemy, before it was discovered by their sentinels.

The heads of the other two columns appearing immediately afterwards, the Maroons were instantly dispossessed of a post which commands nearly all their districts and provision-grounds.

This important manœuvre was executed with the loss of only three men wounded.*

The Maroons retreated into a country of rocks beyond description wild and barren, into which no white person has ever entered.† In this situation they must starve ;

* "By some shots from a dozen Maroons, standing upon a high rock that overlooked the town."—*Dallas*.

† "The body of Maroons," says Dallas, "retired to their women in Guthrie's Defile, the entrance of which they occupied in such a manner as to render it impregnable. The sides of this defile are nearly perpendicular,^a and can only be entered one by one, nor have any of the gallant fellows who have attempted it ever returned. The practicability of advancing upon an enemy in these cockpits is not to be judged of by other seats of war ; nor the hardships of a campaign, by those sustained in a regular warfare. The tactics required in the Trelawney mountains are not to be learned from Saxe, Symes, Dundas, or any other writer on the military art.

"It was resolved to surround the seat of action, as far as it was practicable, and reinforcements were called up, consisting of a hundred men of the 62nd regiment, under Colonel Hull, a detachment of that gallant regiment the 17th Light Dragoons, and large bodies of militia. The men were employed several days in destroying all the provisions in the vicinity of the Maroon Town, a work the Maroons could not venture out of their fastnesses to repel. Upon the heights, however, within three quarters of a mile of the head-quarters, their advanced picquets kept their ground in sight, relieving their sentries with the utmost re-

^a See the description of this defile in the Introduction.

or if famine drives them out, many parties of militia and armed confidential negroes, equally accustomed with them to range in woods, are ready, supported by regulars, to fall upon them ; and the country is so exasperated

gularity, and communicating intelligence by their horns from height to height along their posts. The different bodies employed in destroying the provision-grounds fired frequent volleys into the gullies, which made the woods re-echo and the Maroons smile, for they knew where to obtain provisions, and were amused at the waste of powder. Success had increased their insolence, and rendered them more daring. Johnson and Smith had joined them with their families ; and the confidence they reposed in these chiefs, particularly the former, to whose command they submitted themselves, gave greater regularity and effect to their enterprises, and kept alive the hope of forcing the government to advantageous terms."

I subjoin a striking scene which occurs a few pages further on in Mr. Dallas's work.—Major James, going out shortly afterwards with a party of young huntsmen, his partisans, "led them to the Maroon tracks, and told them the route the rebels would take. By smelling the smoke of their fires, he directed the party to a spot where they found an old invalid or two, who had not strength to escape, and, after a very tedious and fatiguing march, close at the heels of a body of Maroons, he brought them up to Guthrie's Defile. 'So far,' said he, pointing to the entrance, 'you may pursue, but no farther. No force can enter here ; no white man, except myself or some soldier of the Maroon establishment, has ever gone beyond this. With the greatest difficulty I have penetrated four miles farther, and not ten Maroons have gone so far as that. There are two other ways of getting into the defile practicable for the Maroons, but not for any of you. In neither of them can I ascend or descend with my arms, which must be handed to me step by step, as practised by the Maroons themselves. One of the ways lies to the eastward, and the other to the westward, and they

against those rebels as to offer very large rewards for their destruction.*

The district lately possessed by the Trelawney Maroons, and its vicinity, are now occupied by his majesty's forces as follows :—

Atherton's Pen,	. 40 dragoons,	as a dépôt.
Shaw's Castle,	. 90 men.	
New Maroon Town,	100 men,	. . post fortified.
Old Maroon Town,	150 men,	. . post fortified.
Vaughan's Field,	. 100 men,	. . as a dépôt.

Having established this position, which I am confident can be maintained, I am proceeding to erect small fortifications, and to clear sufficient roads of intercourse, but I have been forced to disband the militia, as the

will take care to have both guarded if they suspect that I am with you, which, from the route you have come to-day, they will. They now see you, and if you advance fifty paces more, they will convince you of it.' He had hardly spoken when the Maroon horn sounded his call. To this he made no answer, and then a voice addressed the party, desiring to know if he was among them. 'If he is,' said the voice, 'let him go hack,—we do not wish to hurt him; but as for the rest of you, come on and try hattle if you choose.' It being impracticable to enter the defile, the party, exhausted by fatigue and hunger, returned by a circuitous route," &c. &c.

* For taking or killing every Maroon man of Trelawney Town carrying arms, three hundred dollars, offered by St. James's, three hundred by Trelawney, three hundred by the House of Assembly, and twenty by Westmoreland—in all, nine hundred and twenty dollars.

great consumption of provisions by that body and their followers renders a depôt for the troops in the Maroon district extremely precarious.

Martial law, or something equally effective, must however continue some time longer in force, as I must retain the power of commanding the negroes, to do the necessary and indispensable work I have described.

His majesty's forces have succeeded in carrying all those points that lay within the range of their exertions. They have been exposed to every hardship that can attend the most severe service. What we have attained is to be ascribed to the patience, fortitude, and courage which they have eminently displayed on this occasion.

I am much indebted to the strenuous exertions of Major Generals Palmer and Reid, in forwarding our means of subsistence, and also in endeavouring to bring back the rebels to a sense of their duty.

I am particularly obliged to Major General Taylor, who commanded at Kingston, and to Major General Campbell, who commanded in Spanish Town during my absence; as also to Major General Grizell, who had charge of the parishes of Hanover and Westmoreland. And it is with every confidence that I assure his majesty, that he is possessed of a gallant, obedient, and well-disciplined militia, equally capable of being presented with effect either to an external or internal enemy.

Colonels Fitch, Inledon, and Hull, conducted their columns in the most judicious manner.

Colonel Fitch remained on the same side of the country

with myself. His exertions could not be surpassed,—and I am the more indebted to him, as a very severe fall, by which I was much wounded in the head, had disabled me from visiting the out-posts. I have the greatest confidence in his abilities, and I have left him in command of the Maroon district, with orders to extend mercy to most of those deluded men, should they be disposed to submit themselves.

I owe much to the able assistance I have received from Lieutenant Alston, 63rd regiment, Deputy Quarter Master General, and Lieutenant Colonel Atkinson of the militia, my aid-de-camp.

The correctness of all my movements is to be ascribed to the great professional knowledge of Captain Frazer, island engineer, who also acted as aid-de-camp.

I cannot omit mentioning, in warm terms of approbation, the conduct of Lieutenant Dixon, commanding the detachment of Royal Artillery. The extremely steep and rugged face of the Maroon district rendered it necessary to take the light brass three-pounders off their carriages, and convey them by negro labour to the towns. His exertions on this occasion, and his uniform steady behaviour, marked his professional abilities, as well as his active zeal for the service.

The Hon. Colonel Walpole commanded upon the Accompong side, and has occupied the most judicious posts. He has also much conciliated the Accompong Maroons, who we have some hopes may be induced to act with vigour.

I deeply lament the misapplied valour of the Trelawney volunteers on the 12th instant. It now appears that the greatest part of them were not on horseback. Their high spirit unfortunately led them to leave the corps of Trelawney infantry which remained in the New Maroon Town, and to accompany the movement of the light cavalry. Thirteen of these brave men perished,—many of them from excessive fatigue; and it is only matter of astonishment to me how Colonel Barrett and the others, who behaved most gallantly, survived the difficulties they had to encounter before they joined me at Vaughan's Field. I pay the tribute due to the bravery and to the memories of these unfortunate gentlemen, by laying their names and singular merits before his majesty.

I cannot close my letter without expressing the sense I entertain of the very ready acquiescence of Captain Pigot with my request to proceed to Montego Bay, and remain there as long as I find his presence essentially necessary; as also that of Captain Bingham, of the Cormorant, who, at my desire, convoyed the detachment of the 13th regiment, Light Dragoons, to Black River, and that of the 62nd to Montego Bay.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

“ Head Quarters, Montego Bay,
25 August, 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

I have enclosed to your grace the chain of evidence which induced me to take the strong steps I have adopted,—in which I have been supported by all the leading interests in the country. I leave it with his majesty’s ministers to determine upon the weight due to that evidence,—I acted upon it; and, had I temporised or remained inactive, I might only have submitted correct proofs of the causes by which his majesty had lost his island of Jamaica.

My opinions were:—That the Trelawney Maroons, possessing a country of inconceivable strength, a district abounding in ground provisions, and, as a point, concentrating in a moment the five smaller Maroon nations—were a force formidable to this country.

—But, as a power commanding at their pleasure the aid of the plantation negroes—the properties and liberties of every person in this island were at their disposal and under their dominion.

They were a people enjoying the most uncontrolled freedom—possessing every comfort of life.

Their numbers were 276 persons in the year 1749. In July, 1795, they had increased to 660, exclusive of their numerous children by female slaves, residing on the low plantations.

The nature of their connexions was alarming, and their resources, their views, and the example of St. Domingo, naturally pointed their way to the dominion of this country.

I must close this description by remarking, that we found ground provisions for more than six times their numbers,—and, for about eighteen months past, they have with every industry cultivated pieces of land in their cockpits, (the technical term for an hollow, surrounded by perpendicular rocks,)—a thing they had never thought of since peace was concluded with them in 1738.

The contrast is,—that they are reduced, by surrender, capture, and deaths, upwards of one third, or nearly one half of their number capable of bearing arms.

Their ground provisions are already in a great measure, and in a few days will be almost entirely, destroyed.

Their district is completely possessed by his majesty's forces.

Lines of communication are formed, and regular posts established in both their towns, and in every situation commanding access to the low countries.

They are driven back among barren and almost inaccessible rocks, and nearly destitute of every species of subsistence.

Numerous parties of the militia, armed confidential negroes, and the Accompong Maroons, supported by his majesty's troops, are in pursuit of them. Immense rewards are offered by the country for their destruction.

They may escape in small numbers, and give disturbance as a band of robbers, but never are to be considered as an enemy capable of endangering the security of this island.

I have accomplished every object that I had in view, when I undertook the arduous task of giving a severe and sudden check to the Trelawney Maroons.

I was obliged to move with celerity and to strike with rapidity, as the safety, as well as the credit, of the island must have been materially injured by any procrastination.

I stopped the sailing of the Halifax packet for three weeks, judging that much less mischief would accrue by detaining her, than by her proceeding at so very critical a period.

As the Trelawney Maroons can only now subsist by depredations on private property, I have returned to Montego Bay, that I may combine civil police with military operation, and so close the effects of what I must now greatly regard as a local disturbance.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

PART II.

PART II.

To the duke of Portland.

“ Montego Bay, 29 August, 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

I held a council of war here yesterday, in order to submit the propriety or otherwise of continuing martial-law. It was attended by the speaker, and many members of the assembly—in all, thirty-three.

It was voted in the affirmative unanimously.

Although this business is reduced in great measure to a local disturbance, there is still a necessity for continuing martial-law, owing to a blunder in the Party act, which unfortunately renders it a nullity.

As nothing can be more severe upon this island than the continuing martial-law unnecessarily, I have thought it right, by the advice of the speaker, to call together the legislature on the 22d of September, and the first thing it will proceed to is the amending the Party act law,—under which act only I shall follow up the sentiments of the country in extirpating the Trelawney Maroons.

The seasons are now against me, and I must secure my posts. Those rains are as much distressing to the enemy, who have consumed all their ground provisions, as to us.

They must be reduced to despair,—their wives and children will be an insupportable load to them, and although it is impossible to divine how even distress and despair may operate on minds formed like theirs, still I think their submission may not be entirely out of the question.

As the country are determined to get rid of them if they can, it gives me a greater latitude in offering mercy by sparing their lives.

Mr. Speaker has informed me this day, that he had received letters seven months ago from America, informing him that our *Charibs* were soon to give us disturbance; and I have seen mercantile letters from that country, pressing for the payment of debts, because it was there conceived that Jamaica was not likely to remain in a quiet state.

While men's minds are alarmed, and the business [is] not entirely finished, it is not prudent to hazard an opinion that the island is in a state of security. But, viewing with sober coolness the causes and effects of my rapid advance upon the enemy, I have no difficulty in pronouncing that the blow is struck which will give that security.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

"To the countess of Hardwicke.

"Sept. 1, 1795.

"My dear Lady Hardwicke,

I have been exposed to fatigue and the open air on the high Maroon mountains of Jamaica for this month past, and engaged in an arduous and bloody war with the Maroons. If I had not attacked them as I have done, my firm opinion is, that the island of Jamaica was inevitably lost. . . . I had a had fall at the close of Colonel Sanford's rash business. . . . It jumbled my brain for two days, but I fortunately could retain my command.

As I have been much engaged in intrigue with all sorts of people of late, I have discovered and ferreted out this business *alone*, the indolence of this country not permitting the inhabitants even to see their danger when almost presented to their eyes.

I have had the good fortune to carry with me all the leading interests in the country, and my conduct will be publicly decided upon by the legislature of this country, when they meet on the 22nd of this month.

. . . Believe me ever yours,

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Balcarres.

"Old Maroon Town, 2 September, 1795.

"My Lord,

Eleven of the Maroons have been with me this morning; they seem desirous of peace, but they will not treat till two or three of their people appear from Montego Bay.* They are apprehensive that

* Two of the Maroons were allowed to go and see those at Montego Bay, on the rest pledging themselves to surrender to Colonel Fitch, if the permission were granted. "At the end of two days," says Mr. Dallas, "the visitors returned, bringing with them a few pounds of salt. Colonel Fitch remonstrated with them on carrying in the salt,

they have been destroyed, and nothing but their presence will convince them to the contrary.

I have granted them a truce for the present time. They have sent out people to call in their parties that have been scattered about this place.

What I have always apprehended, and have frequently represented to your lordship, was this day to have been carried into execution. A strong ambush was to have been formed on all the roads leading from Vaughan's Field to the Maroon towns; our supplies were to have been cut off, and every person murdered that should come within their reach. They urged in the strongest manner, that no person should be allowed to pass on this day, as it would be at the certain risk of life.

I must beg leave to state to your lordship, in the strongest terms, that unless a very large body of labourers, properly directed, and well supplied with the necessary tools, are immediately furnished, it will not only be impossible to carry on offensive operations, but it will be equally so to supply provisions, and in consequence the posts of the Maroon Towns cannot be maintained.

Parkinson headed the party that came in to me. He says, that he had nothing to do with burning the towns,—he has not been engaged in the out-parties—Dunbar and Forbes are at the head of them.

The body of Chambers* has this day been found; it is certain that he was murdered by the Maroons. His head was found at a considerable distance from the body. His torn handkerchief and some other articles were known to the Accompongs, who buried him with military honours.

which was unnecessary, as they were to surrender the next day; but on their observing that the quantity was so small as scarcely to admit a division, he suffered it to pass. With Dunbar and Harvey old Montague returned from Vaughan's Field, where he had been kept. . . . Dunbar and Harvey reported that their friends were *on board a ship*, and in consequence Colonel Fitch had no more visits from the Maroons, who now prepared to fight to the last man, rather than surrender."

* A captain of the Accompongs.

This man was sent by myself to offer terms to the Maroons, and, if they would not come in, to desire that they would send in the women and children of those that had delivered themselves up.—In this manner was the messenger of peace treated,—and his son an eye-witness.

I have the honour, &c.

WM. FITCH, Colonel,
Commanding Maroon District."

To Major General Taylor, &c., &c.

"Montego Bay, 7 Sept., 1795.

"Dear Sir,

I rejoice to hear from Mr. Atkinson, that near fifty of the Charleston Maroons have come in.

I look upon this as of the very highest consequence during our present contest.

The Maroons, as a body, have got a severe, and to them an irretrievable check.

The Maroons are more numerous here than I expected. One hundred and thirty-eight men, capable of bearing arms, were returned in July last; I now can account for one hundred and seventy men.

We have had a truce for some days, but it is likely to end in hostilities being recommenced; I believe from ten to twenty may be induced to surrender.

Provided justice is done me by granting me working negroes to clear my front and communication from Vaughan's Field, neither numbers nor their situation can distress me. It surely stands to reason that the occupying and the maintaining their district must starve them, provided they draw no resource from the surrounding plantations,—my idea is to grant safeguards, which must, in its effect, starve them out.

However, the disposition of the country is to try its prowess,—and why not? It may succeed—should it fail, my slower operation will carry the point.

I should be very glad to end this business, especially as our views must be directed to repel an external attack.

Should we be so attacked, our little experience that we have obtained here must be of the highest service.

I have discovered the weak points both of the regulars and the militia, which would have operated against us, when little errors might have counted seriously. . .

One singular advantage we have gained cannot escape your penetration, viz.—by our having taken possession of the Maroon district, we must have every advantage over an external enemy, that the Maroons could have over us.

Although our truce has lasted three days, I have not lost an hour in bringing up the force to act (as it is imagined) in the cockpits. I shall have an opportunity, I trust, of communicating our exact situation before I close this letter.

— 8th.—I am sorry I cannot close my letter so agreeably as I could wish. None of the Maroons have come in, and they seem determined on inveterate war. The appearance of peace was to gain time,—it has not, however, had that effect. I believe they will be attacked tomorrow morning—but what good can we expect from such an attack, in an unexplored country? I tremble for the consequences of my leaving this country; it requires the whole authority of the governor to keep in any bounds the disaffected spirit of the gentlemen,—neither do I exactly think it prudent to declare publicly my dread of an external attack. They laugh and treat every thing as a chimera. They were themselves the alarmists and the terrorists, and now they deny that they were afraid, or that there is subject for terror. Certain I am, if we had not carried the Maroon Old Town, that this country was in a deplorable state. The Maroons had abundant force to defend it against us, and unless the country will enable me to maintain that post, which can only be done by clearing round it, the consequences will be as bad as possible.

This country must take a very serious view of its situation. I must support St. Domingo. It not only appears from a general reasoning, but from our own actual intelligence, that the moment we lose St. Domingo, this island is in great danger indeed. Our intelligence has brought forward the reasons why Sir Adam Williamson has not been

earlier attacked by Rigaud,—I must, of necessity, send to Sir Adam the force intended for St. Domingo, otherwise the responsibility of the loss of both islands lies upon me.

On the other hand, the impolicy of calling away the militia from this country, leaving it bare—that would be madness. Can we reasonably expect that the negroes to windward have not been debauched? The enemy have been indefatigable in sending emissaries there, and the embodying the militia at any given point seems to be attended with danger.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.

P.S. I have just mentioned to General Palmer the examination of Monsieur Moranson,* and his exclamation was, ‘Good God! we have been all in the wrong!’—And completely have they been in the wrong, for every measure has been thwarted.

I have, however, secured my depôt of provisions,—and, if all their plantations are burnt to the ground, they have to thank themselves.”

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

“Montego Bay, — Sept. 1795.

“Sir,

I left the Old Maroon Town on the 25th August, it being necessary to assemble a council of war to determine whether the situation of public affairs required

* His declaration, proving the Maroon rebellion to have originated in Fauchet’s cabinet at Philadelphia, is printed in Mr. Dallas’s work, Vol. I. p. 353, and bears every appearance of truth. He afterwards retracted it. But a reference to Lord Balcarres’s expressions (see ante, p. 11, note) will show that he must not only have ascertained the truth, but discovered still more of the scheme than had been imparted to the traitor Moranson.

the continuance of martial-law. It was unanimously carried in the affirmative.

Colonel Fitch took the command of the Maroon district. For some days the Maroons professed an inclination to surrender, and Colonel Fitch granted them a truce accordingly.

It proved only a deception, for on the last day they murdered their own colonel, who was our prisoner, and who carried a message to them.*

On the 11th inst. Colonel Fitch, with great judgment, advanced Captain Leigh and a party of the 83rd regiment, to take possession of a very important post, near to the entrance of the cockpits. He advanced some hundred yards in front, to watch the effect of a shell, thrown from an howitzer towards the cockpits.—Unfortunately he fell into an ambuscade, by which we lost one officer and three rank and file of the 83rd, one volunteer, and two Accompong Maroons, killed,—and two officers and six rank and file of the 83rd, and two Accompong Maroons, wounded.

I am very sorry to add, that the officer killed was Colonel Fitch. He had received several wounds through his body, and had sat down on a rock, supported by Colonel Jackson of the militia, who had promised not to

* Even later than this, on the 13th inst. (the day after the death of Colonel Fitch, though I believe before he had heard of it,) I find Lord Balcarres writing to General Reid, "I believe no door remains open for receiving any proposal of surrender; should it, however, be otherwise, I am always inclined to shew them the king's mercy."

leave him. In that situation, he received a second fire from the Maroons.

The universal dread they entertained of that valuable and much lamented officer, and their anxiety to destroy him, can only account for the preservation of Colonel Jackson. *His* courage and sensibility merit my laying his name before his majesty.*

* Mr. Dallas gives a full and interesting account of the circumstances of this melancholy event.

Captain Lee (for so Mr. Dallas writes the name) having reported to Colonel Fitch, that his advanced post was commanded by heights accessible to the Maroons, Colonel Fitch "moved forward with the double intention of advancing the post, and of establishing it in a position less liable to be annoyed. As this party proceeded, the mountains seemed to rise higher and higher, and the valleys to sink; a better situation was sought in vain,—none presented itself. Marching on, however, they came to a spot, where the Accompong captains, (Reid and Badnage,) observing some recent traces of the Maroons, said it was better to advance no farther, as the rebels had just been there, and could not be far off. Being ridiculed for their timidity, they proved that they had good grounds for the advice they had given, by pointing out the tops of the wild cocoa or eddo that had been lately dug up, and other incontestible evidences.

"Proofs so unanswerable made an impression on Colonel Jackson, who immediately represented to Colonel Fitch, that his life was too valuable to be unnecessarily risked, requesting permission to advance with Captain Brisset a little farther to reconnoitre the ground, and declaring, that, if the nature of it proved impracticable and unpromising, he would return, but if at all favourable, he would despatch immediate information to him of it. The earnestness with which Jackson spoke made Colonel Fitch smile.—'What, Jackson,' said he, 'in a point of duty do you think I should not be as forward as any other man?' Then

The militia of Westmoreland have sustained a loss of one officer killed, and one officer and five privates wounded, in covering the party charged with the des-

in a placid manner, which was natural to him, he added, 'Well, go with Brisset; there is no keeping him back; but I shall expect to see you here again in ten minutes; for if no eligible position presents itself within a quarter of a mile, I must endeavour to secure Lee a little better.'

"Colonel Jackson proposed to Captain Brisset, that they should go alone; but the latter desired the two Accompong captains, Reid and Badnage, to advance with them. They moved on accordingly, Colonel Fitch and the party following slowly. When they had proceeded about a hundred yards, the path striking into two smaller ones of very abrupt descent, Jackson proposed taking the one, and Brisset preferred the other. After a moment's hesitation, Brisset, turning to the two Accompongs, said hastily, 'Come, take that way, and I will follow you.' These three had gone down about five yards, and Jackson, who had pushed in to examine the nature of the path he proposed, had returned, and was just descending after the others, when a tremendous volley of small arms was poured upon the whole party by the Maroons, from an elevation within ten paces of them. The soldiers mechanically discharged their pieces at the smoke made by the volley, but to little purpose; for, as usual, the unseen enemy were covered and protected by trees and rocks. On the fire of the Maroons, Brisset, wounded, was seen staggering to the right, and probably fell dead among the hushes. Reid, the Accompong, gave a loud shriek and fell; Badnage, the other Accompong, fell dead without a struggle or a groan.^a Jackson escaped unhurt, and running back on ground lower than the path, came up to Colonel Fitch, whom he found seated on an old fallen tree, his arm supported by a projecting stump, and his head resting on his hand. His blood was trickling down from the middle of

^a At the ensuing meeting of the Assembly, they voted £500 to reward the Accompongs for their good conduct, and particularly to provide for the families of Badnage and Reid.—*Dallas*.

truction of their provision-grounds. I have not as yet received the names of the officers.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

his waistcoat, and the short red and brown striped linen jacket which he wore, stuck out behind, appearing as if a rib had been broken. There could be no doubt that he was mortally wounded. Jackson, taking him by the hand that hung motionless by his side, repeated his name to him, 'It is Jackson, your friend Jackson; look at me.' Saying this, he drew from his side a small dagger, and holding it up to Colonel Fitch, assured him that he should not fall alive into the hands of the rebels while he could prevent it, declaring at the same time that he would die with him rather than leave him.^a No one who knew Jackson could doubt that he would have executed this brave resolution, had the occasion required it. Fitch knew him capable of it, and turned his face with a benign look towards him, as if to say something kind; but by this time the Maroons had re-loaded; and the clicking of their guns, as they were cocked one after the other, giving notice of their being ready to fire, Colonel Jackson called out to the soldiers to lie down, which being obeyed in proper time, the second volley did little mischief. On hearing the order, Colonel Fitch turned his head towards them, as if appearing to wish to speak, while Jackson at the same instant was endeavouring to pull him down under cover. This he resisted and again turned, seemingly to speak to Captain Lee or the men; but remaining in the situation I have described, he was too conspicuous a mark, and Jackson's efforts to remove him from it were succeeding.

^a This is related rather differently, and I hope truly, in the *St. Jago Gazette*:—"The first shot that Colonel Fitch received in the ambush, passed through his body; Colonel Jackson, who witnessed his situation, went to him, asked if he could assist him,—he was unable to reply. Colonel Jackson then assured him he would not depart from him while he saw life remained.—He had scarcely uttered the words when another shot struck him on the forehead, and stretched him breathless on the rock.—Colonel Jackson *then*, and not till *then*, retired."

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

“King’s House, 21 Sept. 1795.

“Sir,

I beg leave to observe that the only force that I have detained from the service of St. Domingo is 450 men, exclusive of the French.

when they were too well aided by a fatal ball, which penetrated Colonel Fitch’s forehead just above the right eye, and he fell lifeless.”

“No man,” adds Mr. Dallas, “was ever more lamented than the gallant and amiable Colonel Fitch. In his person he was tall and graceful. The manly beauty of his face expressing the liberality of his mind, rendered his countenance extremely interesting and engaging. Easy and affable in his manners, he was never happier than when relieving the wants of his soldiers, or providing some comfort for the younger officers from his own stores. It was his custom to lay in a stock of things for his men, which he occasionally dealt out in presents or rewards. His social disposition enlivened the tropic summits that were the seat of the Maroon campaign; his table was crowded by his friends; and, by method in his establishment, he threw around his hut a certain elegance that bespoke the gentleman. His activity in the field equalled his modesty in company. He fell in the bloom of youth. He was brave, benevolent, and of a bewitching address. He had talents, and energy, to make them useful,—he was therefore a great loss to his country; and his private virtues endeared him to his friends, to whom his death was a deep wound.”

“On the 15th ult.” (Dec. 1795) “was interred, at the Old Maroon Town, the remains of the late gallant Colonel Fitch. His funeral was attended by the whole of his regiment, and the officers quartered there. Although a period of two months had elapsed since his fall, yet his former goodness and peculiar mildness of disposition were fresh in the memories of all present. The feelings of his friends and fellow-soldiers on this melancholy occasion were sincere proofs of the affection they

Two other transports, with the 83rd on board, met with distress, and formed no part of the force with which I acted.

Having employed every small vessel to repair the error of bringing the St. Domingo reinforcement to Jamaica, no vessel remained for me to send to Sir Adam Williamson the accounts of my having detained part of his force.

I shall now make it up the best way I can. I hope no mischief has happened in consequence of what I have done. I certainly risked some post in St. Domingo to save Jamaica, but I trust no such loss has been sustained.

I have acted to the best of my judgment, and I am fully sensible of what I owe to St. Domingo, when I have weakened my post as I have done.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

bore his memory; and even this last sad ceremony infused into their minds a pleasing consolation, that they had saved his relics, and laid them near to those who had shared both his friendship and his fate—he was buried next to Captain Leigh, who died of his wounds. . . .

"Almost every one knows that, upon gaining the ground, the body could not be discovered. The unceasing researches of Colonel Jackson found it in a cockpit hidden by rocks, and thus brought the remains of his friend to the interment due to his rank. For an interval of two months it had lain exposed to the weather; but 'the sweetest tears shed on mortals are those with which Heaven bedews the unburied HEAD of a SOLDIER!'"—*St. Jago de la Vega Gazette*.

For the abominable insult offered to his remains by the Maroons, see the concluding note by Lord Balcarres to his letter to C. Yorke, Esq., 2 May, 1795.

*Lord Balcarras's Speech to the Assembly,
22 September, 1795.*

*" Gentlemen of the Council,
Mr. Speaker, and Gentlemen of the Assembly,*

The exigency of public affairs has put me under the necessity of calling you together at a very early season of the year.

The unfortunate insurrection which has taken place among the Maroons of Trelawney Town, is the immediate cause of my now assembling you.

These insurgents have committed the most daring acts of unprovoked rebellion.

I have every reason to believe, that hostility has long been premeditated, and at the instigation of the convention of France; whose object it undoubtedly is to throw this island into a state of anarchy and confusion.

I have ordered the several documents to be laid before you. The evidence contained marks, in a strong manner, the designs, the progress, and the expectations of the enemy, in fomenting internal commotion.

By the blessing of Providence, this conspiracy has been frustrated before it had ripened into maturity.

Their plan of raising a rebellion might have produced a co-operation of the most dangerous tendency, and the early intimation we have obtained thereof is truly fortunate.

The precipitate and insolent conduct of the rebels gave me the advantage of acting with celerity and vigour; for, had I permitted them to gain time, and to manage the war according to their arrangements and those of their supporters, this island would have been undone, and the inhabitants must have submitted to a dominion similar to that now exercised in several of the windward islands.

The valour and conduct of his majesty's forces have secured every advantage that could be obtained by regular manœuvres.

The troops now occupy a chain of posts through the Maroon district. They have stormed and carried their country; they have dispossessed

them of their towns, and have driven them to fastnesses rugged and barren, where they can subsist only as a band of robbers.

The insurrection has now assumed, in some degree, the form of a local disturbance; and it will deserve your most serious consideration, whether statutes may be so framed or amended as to put proper and efficient power into the hands of government, without subjecting the country to the serious inconveniences that result from the declaration of martial law.

Mr. Speaker and Gentlemen of the Assembly,

I have to lament the heavy expense incurred in consequence of the measures I have been obliged to adopt. But as you have witnessed the necessity of striking at the root of the rebellion, so I trust you will grant such supplies as, in your wisdom, the exigency of the service may require.

Gentlemen of the Council,

Mr. Speaker, and Gentlemen of the Assembly,

When you reflect, that the principles of the present rulers of France are to overturn every system of government founded on social order, morality, and religion, you will be aware that a degree of danger results to you from the general prosperity hitherto enjoyed by this happy island;—this they will endeavour to destroy, and this, I trust, your energy and unanimity will maintain.

Great vigilance is required at this moment, to guard against the admission of their dangerous systems; and every effort is necessary to resist their pernicious consequences, wherever they may appear.

It is with these maxims that I have entered upon the administration of Jamaica, and I now meet you with the avowal of those sentiments.

It gives me the highest satisfaction to observe the steadiness, the discipline, and the alacrity of the militia. It is with every confidence I have assured his majesty, that in them he is possessed of a force which, I am decidedly of opinion, will be found equally capable of being presented with effect to an external or an internal enemy.

The glorious and important victory gained by Lord Bridport, and the recent advantages obtained by his majesty's fleets, assuredly lessen the impending danger of this island; and the general aspect of affairs, in

the interior of France, may fairly lead our hopes to an honourable termination of the present war."

*Extract from the Address of the Council and Assembly
of Jamaica to his majesty, King George III.*

26 Sept. 1795.

"We humbly return our thanks to your majesty for your parental attention in appointing to the government of this island a nobleman of distinguished abilities, eminently adapted to fill, at this critical period, the arduous and important office committed to his charge; whose zeal and activity for the preservation and prosperity of the island endeared him to its inhabitants before their representatives had an opportunity of meeting him in assembly; who, by the vigour and promptitude of his measures in detecting and resisting a most unnatural, unprovoked, and unexpected rebellion of the Maroon negroes of Trelawney Town, has saved the country before he could well be said to have seen it; and who has opened his administration with such strict purity and disinterestedness in office, that it is with heartfelt satisfaction your majesty's faithful council and assembly augur the most auspicious consequences to the general interests of the island."*

* "At this crisis the inhabitants of the island, in looking back, had to view the following melancholy statement of the war. In the attack upon Captain Hamilton, there were two killed and six wounded; in Colonel Sanford's engagement thirty-seven killed and five wounded;

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

“Jamaica, Sept. 29, 1795.

“Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of my letter of the 21st instant. It is a painful thing to me to be under the necessity of sending away so many troops contrary to the sense of the country, and the more so as all the Maroons to windward expressly refuse to obey my orders to come in. This may be owing to fear, but it may be ascribed to a very different cause. The Mooretown Maroons, who are a very warlike tribe of men, have declared that they not only will not come in, but if

the Westmoreland militia, with their working-party of slaves, had been ambushed, seven of the soldiers killed, and five wounded, and ten of the slaves killed; Captain Oldbam, of the 62nd regiment, had perished through fatigue; of Colonel Fitch's party there were eight killed and seven wounded; two express dragoons, and a sergeant of the 62nd regiment killed; Brooks's house burnt and two men killed; Schaw castle burnt; Bandon burnt; Shands burnt; Stephens and Bernard's house burnt; Kenmure burnt, and twelve negroes carried away; Darliston trash-house burnt; Catadupa, Mocha, and Lapland burnt, and two negroes carried away; Lewis's burnt.—This was the progress of the losses sustained by the troops and the country:—on the other hand, not a Maroon was known to have been killed; the rebels had seen the troops abandon in a panic one of their towns, had set fire to both, and retired to their fortresses. The loss of Colonel Fitch threw a gloom over the whole island, and the frequent discomfitures which had rapidly succeeded one another, spread apprehensions through the colony which were not to be allayed by the governor's encouraging speech at the opening of the assembly.”—*Dallas*.

the Charles-town Maroons go into rebellion, that they will join them; the converse of the proposition may be nearly admitted, that if the Moore-town Maroons go into rebellion, the Charles-town Maroons will join them. I am very sensible that Sir A. Williamson has not been attacked hitherto with due vigour, and I am clearly of opinion, if St. Domingo falls, that this island may also go; to detain the troops is therefore impossible, and I must temporise with the windward Maroons the best way I can.*

The 130th regiment is nearly useless; all of them that are fit for duty go to St. Domingo. The island stores are exhausted of everything, from the support given to St. Domingo. The whole of the field artillery is almost useless, owing to the multitude of jobs; the carriages are rotten, and have been filled up from time to time with putty, merely to deceive the eye.

The rebellion having broke out to leeward, the impending danger is the more formidable. The card I have to play is difficult and critical. The general opinion here is, that the windward Maroons are solely actuated by fear. I hope they are correct in their judgment. My faith is not up to theirs, and much distrust hangs upon my mind.

* "If you had given way, my dear Lord, to the request of the assembly, and held back all the troops destined for St. Domingo, I must have deserted Port au Prince, for I have not now two hundred and fifty men fit for duty, and seventy of them at Fort Bizzator."—*Letter from Sir Ad. Williamson, Oct. 8, 1795.*

Six Charles-town Maroons, out of sixty-two, attended me this day according to my orders. I gave them presents, and said everything to remove their fears. They are a bold, hardy-looking people, and seem by their deportment to have a much greater portion of contempt than fear in their constitutions. The best hopes I have of their continuing quiet is, that the evidence I have received mentions that the French have only gained a part of the Maroons.

The Moore-town Maroons are near fifty, capable of carrying arms, exclusive of boys.

The collective force of the windward Maroons, consisting of Charles-town, Moore (or Nanny) Town, and Scott's Hall, may be about the same strength as those of Trelawney and Accompong, to leeward. They can fly in a moment to the Blue Mountains, but I do not understand they have got provision-grounds there, whereas there is the greatest abundance to leeward, which we are fast destroying.

As to the mode of proceeding against the Trelawney Maroons, there is much difference of opinion. My idea rather is, to keep possession of their towns, and to take again the position which I took on the 9th of August, but was afterwards obliged to alter from want of provisions. This mode, with continuing to destroy their ground-provisions, seems the only steady plan. The opinion of the gentlemen of the country was to form strong parties of those militia-men who were woodsmen, and some confidential negroes, and to follow the Ma-

rooms into their fastnesses. This was recommended to me, in form, in a council of war. I gave way to it, upon condition that they should find their own provisions, for I would not risk my post by supplying them. I shall give the country their full swing,—it may answer—if it does not, I shall adopt my own. But, as it must require time to produce due effect, the inconveniences of martial-law will be severely felt, and the legislature has not been able to frame a sufficient act for the purpose of quelling local insurrections.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

" 30 Sept. 1795.

" My Lord Duke,

The Valiant lugger, or cutter, not having sailed this morning, gives me an opportunity of writing your grace a few lines.—There is certainly a degree of distrust on the part of the Americans against Jamaica, as several merchants have withheld lumber, owing to the general opinion, there prevailing, that Jamaica is to be attacked.

In the present aspect of affairs I cannot go to leeward. Colonel Walpole will, therefore, command there, to whom I have given the rank of major-general, and put him on the staff, otherwise he is commanded by all the militia major-generals, which will not do. I intend to

send to him an able second, in Major Skynner, of the 16th regiment, who knows that kind of service. From militia interference, I gave him the rank of colonel in this island ; any such appointments are made, until his majesty's pleasure is known.

A report prevails to-day, that the Scott's Hall Maroons, a small tribe to windward, have joined the Tre-lawney Maroons. I could almost wish that it may prove true, for it would go far in establishing that the disobedience of the Charles-town and Moore-town Maroons proceeds from their fears only.

The emissaries of the enemy are now working upon these fears, and try to persuade them that I am sent over to extirpate them all. If they are so impressed, I hope the steps I took yesterday may remove those terrors, as I appropriated handsome presents for all the Charles-town people, (who seemed astonished at finding I treated them kindly,) and showed them the presents designed for their comrades, if they had presented themselves.

If they do not come in now to receive these presents, the rebellion may extend itself to windward. If they do come in, I shall be disposed to draw the opposite inference.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To Captain Douglas, Superintendent of the Moore (or Nanny) Town Maroons.

“ King’s House, 30 Sept. 1795.

“ Sir,

“ I am much grieved to find that some villains have been conveying most false reports into the ears of the Moore-town Maroons.

My king is the father of all good and loyal Maroons, and he has sent me here to give them protection.

The Moore-town Maroons have deserved and obtained my thanks for their quiet and orderly behaviour.—How is it possible that they can believe that I am their enemy, when I have declared myself their friend?—When I speak, they hear the speech of the king.

If they are afraid, let them stay where they are, until their fears are past, and then come to me; but if they come now, I shall be very happy to see them.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

“ King’s House, 1 Oct. 1795.

“ Dear Sir,

From the complexion of matters to the windward, I think it dangerous to leave this part of the island at present. I therefore think it right to throw more command into your hands. I have therefore named you brigadier-general, and, to give you rank over the major-generals of the island, I have named you major-general of the forces until his majesty’s pleasure is known.

As I am afraid they will hardly allow you the appointments, you being only a lieut.-colonel, that was my reason for naming you brigadier-general, because that establishment, there is every reason to think, will be allowed to you,—at the same time the other lies open for them to grant. I have written to the Duke of York on the subject.

You have the command of the five parishes round you, and I shall take care that you can draw force from St. Anne's.

Your object is to distress the enemy by every means in your power ; consequently, whatever you do about Lebanon will be fully supported by myself and the house of assembly. Two companies of mulattoes will be raised at St. Elizabeth's, and two black companies will be raised, —one here, and the other in the parishes of St. James's and Trelawney.

You are now supreme where you are, and will issue your orders accordingly. Commissioners are sent to every parish to support your requisitions for negroes, provisions, &c. You have only to ask and have.

The board of works is also transferred to your district, and £5,000 currency, voted for buildings, not £2,500 of which is expended ; you will of course make this money go as far as possible.

It is impossible to heap more powers than those now given you.

I think of sending you Skynner by land, and the 16th by sea. You will get about 110 excellent stuff there.—I am sorry to give you a piece of intelligence,—that the country don't like the idea of mounting the 13th and 14th regiments, light dragoons, nor finding them stabling. You will, of course, not exceed the fifty horses, as formerly specified.

I have wrote to St. Elizabeth's, to raise the two mulatto companies immediately.

Yours,

BALCARRES."

To the same.

" King's House, 3 Oct. 1795.

" Dear Sir,

I am favoured by yours of the 28th September, and am really concerned to find that so little punctuality is observed in sending forward the negroes. I hope every thing will now go smoother.—That we must do something is evident, and now all is in your own hands, and the articles of war are made much more efficient than they formerly were.

I send you the list of the commissioners in the parishes under your command, that you may make every requisition upon them that the good of the service and the speedy termination of the rebellion may seem, in your sole judgment, to require.—I expect that the four new companies will very soon be raised.—I am glad you think the provision-grounds nearly destroyed,—all the provisions in the environs should likewise go. Although you have only five parishes under your command, I shall, notwithstanding, give them orders in the parish of St. Anne's, to obey any order or requisition you choose to make.

The Maroons to windward are all in a state of rebellion, but it seems implied that, if we do nothing against them, they will not for the present act against us. They obey no order, they buy up gunpowder, and have built huts in the woods of the Blue Mountains.

I am ordering away the French—the rebellion proceeds from them unquestionably. A large force will be sent immediately to St. Domingo,—they say twelve thousand men, and we had accounts of their sailing.

With my compliments to General Reid,

I remain, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the same.

"King's House, 3 Oct. 1795.

"Dear Sir,

I think there are five material points in our consideration of this Maroon rebellion.

First :—To maintain our posts in the Maroon lands.

Second :—To destroy all their provision-grounds, and other sources of supply to them.

Third :—To attack them and harass them, as we are now doing.

Fourth :—To take post all round them, such as we occupied on the 9th August.

Fifth :—To plant safeguards in the surrounding plantations.

Our own resources seem not up to do the whole of this ; the question therefore is, which part of these five propositions we would adopt and which reject.

These are the different points for your turning in your mind. The Maroons surely must weaken themselves very much, by furnishing these numbers to make incursions into Westmoreland,—that is the time to attack them at home, and to get at those who remain with the women and children.

Yours,

BALCARRES."

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

" King's House, — Oct. 1795.

" Sir,

I have nothing new to communicate respecting the Maroons in rebellion. The legislature have been employed in rendering effective the resources of the island. Such arrangements were absolutely necessary, as we had not sufficient power to regulate either armed parties or gangs of negroes. A new set of articles of war was also requisite.—All these things being now adjusted, I shall return to Montego Bay, in order to bring every thing into due action. Forty negroes are missing from one estate ; it is possible they may have joined the Trelawney Maroons, though I have no certain account of it. If it is true, I think it would weaken instead of strengthening the Maroons. The less numerous the Maroons are, the more trouble will they give us.

I am now sending off multitudes of French people. Every soul that is capable of bearing arms all over the

island, must be shipped off—not for America, but to St. Domingo. The alarm has got among them, and immense sums, I hear, are in train to be remitted to America.

The Maroons to windward are in a state of inactive rebellion ; they refuse to obey any order from me,—they stop people on the roads,—they have out their sentinels,—they have bought gunpowder, and have built their huts in the heart of the Blue Mountains. If we do not attack them, it is, however, understood they will not attack us ; and, should the Trelawney Maroons succeed, everything to windward may be in the worst situation.

I have almost succeeded, I believe, in destroying the ground-provisions of the Trelawney Maroons, and their excursions are getting more frequent, I apprehend, from that cause. A good deal, however, is still to be done, in destroying all the ground-provisions within their reach. They are nearly driven out of their district.

We occupy a chain of posts through the centre of their lands. We have the New Town, and a small block-house there, which is stockaded. We have a barrack fit for two hundred men in the Old Town, which is in the middle of their grounds, and I am establishing two blockhouses, one at the S. W. the other at the S. E. extremities. That at the S. E. is beyond the point that was occupied by Colonel Guthrie when he made the peace with them in 1738-9. The other commands the entrance into the cockpits, and has been until now unexplored. . . .

. . . I trust, we shall soon have a reinforcement to this island. I do not desire a strong one. I wish the whole force applied to St. Domingo. But we are now at the mercy of the Maroons to windward, who seem to be losing the only moment that presents itself in their favour. I shall use no active force against the windward Maroons. I shall merely throw some companies of militia into Stony-hill.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"King's House, 7 Oct. 1795.

"My Lord Duke,

I enclose to your grace two letters from Major General Reid of the militia.* Your grace will observe how perfectly impossible it is to draw service from the militia. The fact is that they always go to the point of danger, but never encounter it.

* "I will proceed," says Mr. —, in a private letter of the 6th inst., after describing the extraordinary misbehaviour which occasioned Lord Balcarres's animadversions, "to signify to you the deplorable state of affairs in this parish. Many of the militia, in consequence of R——'s detestable conduct, have deserted; nay, not individually, but in companies. No confidence is placed in their commanders, (nor, in my opinion, do they deserve any,) and unless some extraordinary exertions are employed to rouse the dampened spirits of our men, they will not be rallied again."

Your grace will perceive the necessity of my going down there immediately. Laws are now enacted, by which I can both command the troops and the resources of the country.

The lines of operation are very long, and the service arduous in the extreme. I think I have read of a robber in Poland, that gave employment to some regiments for years,—this rebellion may not be so soon quashed. The rainy season is before us, and may prevent our acting. I shall succeed in a great measure if I break them up as a body. The Maroons to windward are lying by, waiting for events which will not happen. The great force coming out from England to St. Domingo will secure us against external danger, and the negroes will not join the Trelawney Maroons in their present desperate state.

This disturbance will be attended with a considerable expense, but it is little in comparison with the immense stake at issue.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"Head-quarters, Spanish Town,

24 Oct. 1795.

"My Lord Duke,

We are now in the midst of the seasons,* and I am rather averse to making an attack on the Maroons

* The periodical rains.

sooner than three weeks hence ; and my reasons are,—we are daily getting better acquainted with the actual situation of these cockpits, and some of our posts have got a bird's eye view of their range and extent.

My information is not so perfect as to enable me to decide whether we shall advance upon the enemy by our working-parties clearing towards them, or attack from different points without the assistance of those working-parties. The Maroons would do wisely if they would now break into small parties, but they have strong inducements to remain where they are. First, their women are with them, and in such numbers, that they cannot easily disperse. Secondly, they are afraid to scatter, as the rewards are so great for killing or apprehending them, and they must previously take the horrid step of murdering all their women. I suspect the children are already sacrificed.*

The best that I can hope for is, that by their remaining where they are, I shall have an option as to the manner of attacking them, and also that I may employ the interval in planting safeguards for the double purpose of protecting the properties when they do disperse,

* "The women," according to the deposition of Jumbo, a baggage negro who had been taken prisoner by the Maroons in October, and escaped in December, "all seem wishful to submit ; but when they are in danger of being discovered from the crying of their children, he says, they suffocate them, and that ten of them shared that fate since he joined them, and he heard the like cruelty was practised by the Trelawney party, and that they were by far the most numerous."

and following up the blow when that event happens. The last is so material a point, that it ought to be well systemized before we make our general attack, and I think of posting the militia of St. James's and Trelawney as the safeguards, and that we shall dislodge the enemy by the regulars and a detachment of brown militia from Kingston.

General Walpole is going on vastly well. His figure and talents are well adapted to the service he is upon, and he has got the confidence of the militia and the country. He is ably seconded in Colonel Skynner. We act so well together, that matters must go right; we only call for a little patience.*—I have found it impossible to leave this part of the country. I have pushed out of the island above one thousand of the greatest scoundrels in the universe, most of them Frenchmen of colour, and a multitude of French negroes. I was obliged to take the strongest and most expeditious measures throughout all this business.

The desperate situation of the Maroons to leeward, and my having cleared the island of the French banditti, has kept the Maroons to windward quiet, although they remain sullenly in their own district.

I have collected the 20th Dragoons, and am getting the horses into order, that I may dash them over the

* For a full account of General Walpole's operations (which were not, however, carried on so independently of the commander-in-chief, either in his presence or absence, as would appear from the narrative) see Dallas's work, vol. 1, p. 235, sqq.

country during the Christmas holidays, which is the dangerous moment for insurrection,—before which time I hope to report to your grace that the island is in a state of perfect security.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the duke of Portland.

“Jamaica, 25 Oct. 1795.

“My Lord Duke,

I have the honour to enclose to your grace a letter from Mr. Shirley to General Taylor, which will give you some information. I am confident that Mr. Shirley has exaggerated greatly the number of slaves who have joined the Maroons. Many of those negroes have joined them, but have afterwards left them. But if it is true, their junction can only distress the rebels, and give us the manifest advantage of working upon a point.

My mind is so impressed with the idea that the Maroons will not easily quit the cockpits, that my primary object is to render that post totally useless; if I had not laid the surrounding country waste by destroying ground-provisions, the rebels would have been joined by multitudes of negroes.

I am more afraid of their deserting their post, and giving me the slip, than by their remaining, which must end in their destruction. If four hundred negroes joined

them, instead of two hundred, it would not give me a moment's uneasiness, and the end of this business would be considerably nearer than if none joined them.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the same.

"Jamaica, 27 Oct. 1795.

"My Lord Duke,

I have the honour to enclose a letter from Sir Adam Williamson. . .

Sir Adam also notified to me that he had received letters from America, dated July 20th, informing him of the report current there of an intended insurrection among the negroes in Jamaica.

I have for some weeks past suspected the Spaniards as accessories. There are now in Jamaica several Frenchmen who came here with Spanish passports from Hispaniola, and under Spanish names. These Frenchmen have spoken Spanish in their common conversation until they were detected. Three of these men I have taken up—I cannot prove anything against them.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the Hon. the President of the Council, the Attorney General, and the Speaker of the Assembly.

“ King’s House, 18 Oct. 1795.

“ Gentlemen,

The enclosed paper states the reflections I made on my marching in force to quell the rebellion entered into by the Trelawney Maroons, as also the degree of success that has attended our operations.

‘ My reflections and reasoning on the insurrection of the Maroons of Trelawney :—

‘ I. That the Trelawney Maroons possess a country of the greatest strength, and a few men are capable to maintain it against the attack of an army.

‘ II. That their country is extremely fertile, and abounds in ground-provisions, and that the quantity now in their command is sufficient for the support of some thousand men.

‘ III. That these Maroons can communicate with, and concentrate in a moment, all the smaller Maroon townships.

‘ IV. That the Maroons, so concentrated, and enjoying these advantages, are a power most dangerous to this country.

‘ V. But, as a power also commanding the aid of the plantation-negroes in their vicinity, the property of the country is almost under their dominion.

‘ VI. That I give credit to the intentions of the enemy to raise an insurrection among the slaves.

‘ VII. That to suffer a combination between the Maroons and the slaves, if it is in my power to prevent it, would be to endanger this island.

‘ VIII. That a rapid movement of the light cavalry may strike a momentary terror into the minds of the negroes, and that I can, by means of a part of the force intended for St. Domingo, attack the Trelawney Maroons before they are prepared, and certainly before the other Maroons or negroes can join them.

‘ IX. That, if I can seize upon the Maroon district, and form a chain of forts through it, and also destroy their whole range of ground-pro-

visions, I certainly take from them the talisman by which they hold their power, and also cut out the heart of the rebellion.

‘Every thing that I attempted being effected—a chain of posts being established through their district—their ground-provisions being nearly destroyed—my object is fulfilled.

‘The Maroons can no longer be considered as a formidable power, endangering the general safety of the island and the empire.

‘Such negroes as have joined them have perceived the impossibility of their being subsisted, and the other Maroon towns will not now join them in their present desperate situation.

‘They are now to be regarded as a band of robbers and plunderers, and their new situation requires a new consideration.

‘The present state of the war appears to be as follows :—

‘The enemy, having lost their district, have retreated to the cockpits. These cockpits have been only cultivated lately, and the young provisions are not as yet in such maturity as to be of essential use.

‘The Maroons now bring the provisions for themselves and their families from a considerable distance. We have intelligence where these provisions are, and we are steadily pursuing our plan of destroying them.

‘We are occupying such posts in the vicinity of the cockpits, as will reduce the enemy to the constant hazard of fighting for their supplies of food; and there is every reason to hope, on our part, that we shall attain our object of starving them,—but this is a work of some time.

‘Considering these Maroons as a body, we shall succeed in shutting them in. But our being able to prevent their escaping in small parties, must be a matter of great doubt.

‘As the dry season approaches, those small parties of Maroons, unless very quickly followed up, must set fire to cane-pieces, and occasion heavy losses to individuals.

‘General Walpole agrees with me in opinion, that an attack on the cockpits will be a most dangerous expedient, the success doubtful, and the loss of men may be great. We hardly think it would be justifiable, where the object can be attained by pursuing our present plan of starving them.

‘The Maroons are now, evidently, much discouraged,—they never give hut one fire, and abandon their provisions when danger appears.’

Having stated what I conceive to be our present situation, I request your opinion upon the following points:—

First,—As to the propriety of prosecuting this war, and persevering in our object of starving them by destroying their provisions, thereby forcing them to surrender, or to give up their post of the cockpits?

Secondly,—Supposing they do give up that post, murder their women, and scatter:—is the mischief they may do, in burning cane-pieces in that country, &c., of sufficient public consideration to impose the necessity on the island of making terms with these Maroons?

Thirdly,—Under that supposed necessity, what kind of terms could be acceded to, short of restoring to the Maroons their district of country?

Fourthly,—If the Maroons accede to any terms short of restoring to them their district of country, or that they are conquered, is it your opinion that the internal tranquillity of the island has been promoted by these Maroons being dispossessed of their district, and that the value of property in Jamaica will be enhanced thereby?

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

Answers to Lord Balcarres's Queries.

I. “Considering that the Maroons are possessed of holds so strong and defensible by nature as to make any attack upon them very perilous and of doubtful success, and that a failure in any attempt of that kind would be productive of ruinous consequences to the island; we are of opinion that the mode of carrying on the war which has been hitherto pursued, with the view of starving the Maroons, is judicious, and ought to be pursued.

II. “We think the species of mischief which the Maroons are likely to do in their despair, when the dry season of the year arrives, is of such important consideration to the public, as to make it advisable to

accede to any terms which will not endanger a recurrence of the evil we have been combating at a very great expense.

III. "The consideration of this question involves so many possible events of the war, that we feel great difficulty in giving an opinion upon it; but, as well as we have been able to form a judgment, after maturely weighing all the present circumstances, we think that your lordship might, in case of an immediate surrender of their arms, assure them of the safety of their lives and of those of their wives and children, also either promising to abide the opinion of a Joint Committee of the Council and Assembly in all other matters respecting them, or requiring them to be confined to a residence in the towns, with the promise of a recommendation to the legislature to make a pecuniary provision for them during their lives. We, however, flatter ourselves with the hopes that, from the pressure of the difficulties with which they are surrounded, they will gladly accept of terms of the first description, and which are such as are most likely to insure the island against any future danger.

IV. "It is apparent that the Maroons of Trelawney are possessed of a country of great strength and fertility, a circumstance very favourable to their defence and population. This superior advantage has made them more formidable than the Maroons of the other districts. We are therefore clearly of opinion, that any terms which can secure the possession of that important district to the white inhabitants, will greatly contribute to the internal security of the island and to enhance the value of the properties in it.

(Signed)

THO. TRIDELL,
GEO. C. RICKETTS,
W. BLAKE."

Spanish Town, 26 Oct. 1795."

To the duke of Portland.

“Jamaica, 27 Oct. 1795.

“My Lord Duke,

The enclosed letter from myself to the president of the council, the attorney-general, and the speaker of the house of assembly,* states concisely my opinions respecting this Maroon insurrection, from its commencement until the present moment. My object in writing such a letter is, to draw an opinion from the speaker.

I may venture to assert, that the measures which have been adopted have had the sanction and approbation of almost all in this island, either in their public or private capacities. There is, however, an *imperium in imperio*, and that is, the parishes of St. James and Trelawney, which, at first, opposed and thwarted everything that was done. At all times they hold opinions of their own, and not regulated by those of the legislature, or the other eighteen parishes. In fact, most of the gentlemen have connections with the Maroons, and almost the whole of them pay contributions to those fellows, to induce them not to injure their properties. The most dangerous man in that country is Major James. He has been, I may say, all his life the head of the Maroons, and both those two parishes are generally connected with him by mar-

* Of the 18th October.—Answered 26th October.

riage and consanguinity. He rules the whole with a rod of iron. His niece, a young lady of twenty, is married to the custos, Major General Palmer, aged about eighty, —he is the senior major-general of the militia. The second major-general is Mr. Reid, who is a younger man and more active, but overbearing, hated by the whole militia, and is equally under the rod of Major James and the Maroons. Colonel Reid, the person alluded to in the enclosed letter, is his nephew.

It was impossible the service could go on under such commanders, and I was, therefore, forced to appoint Colonel Walpole to be a major-general in the king's service until his majesty's pleasure should be signified. This gives him the *pas*, and the appointment has given universal satisfaction, excepting to that set.

I believe their opinions are somewhat altered, and they are now acting with more zeal. The speaker lives in the adjoining parish, and is brother-in-law to General Reid.

As Mr. Speaker was absent at the commencement of the business, and as his office does not require of him to commit himself by voting on any question, I thought it very inexpedient to leave a person of his official consequence to reason solely upon events. I was, therefore, desirous by this letter to fix him to an opinion, which is a measure of safety when we are at the general issue of a war that leads to such important consequences. With respect to the terms specified in their answer to [my] third query, they are nearly those which I have offered

to the Maroons from the very beginning, and which I would most gladly give them now.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"Head Quarters, Dromilly, near Wilts,
16 November, 1795.

"My Lord Duke,

I had the honour to inform your grace by the last packet, the Countess of Leicester, that Major General Walpole, whom I had left in the command of the Trelawney Maroon town, had got a bird's-eye view into the cockpits adjoining to that post.

The major-general, having, by the most unremitting exertions, possessed himself of the different tracks and paths of communication into their cockpits, the Maroons chose rather to abandon their post than to risk an action,—which had been their intention, as we found some of the gorges of their cockpits regularly stockaded.*

* A letter to Colonel Atkinson, dated Old Maroon Town, 6 November, from Major Dixon, (the officer of whom honourable mention is made in Lord Balcarres's despatch of August 24th,) describes the capture of the cockpits as follows:— . . . "On the nights of Tuesday and Wednesday, shells were thrown, at intervals, into or rather towards the Maroon cockpits, to harass the enemy, and keep them awake from the dread of their effects. On Thursday morning, a detachment, under

The Maroons seem to have divided into two very strong bodies, one of which has been lurking for ten days past between Flemings and Wilts, near which Captain Stewart, of the Trelawney militia and a member of the assembly, had an obstinate engagement with them on the 6th instant.

The other strong party occupies the grounds near

the command of Colonel Skynner, moved eastward from this post; another, under Major Brown, passed by Cudjoe Town, and ambushed the Maroon paths leading from the cockpits to Tackey's Bum; a third, under Major General Walpole, entered Guthrie Glade (where they made their last stand). With *this* went your very humble servant, who took special care to scour it well with the howitzer before it was entered.—The Maroons, seeing themselves thus heset, abandoned, without resistance, their boasted cockpits and glade, which, had they defended it, would have cost us many lives in carrying them. That which Skynner entered, was stockaded regularly at the gorges with loopholes at proper intervals. The inside was level, round, and spacious. It had twenty huts, containing seventy beds, with fires between each. Nothing was found by the parties but a few belts, cartouche-boxes, and helmets, belonging to those whom they had slain, together with Montague James's identical white jacket, which you have seen him wear.

“From the tracks, &c. &c., we have reason to suppose the Maroons retreated to the eastward,—indeed, every other direction was so well guarded, that they could not pass. Every spot of ground bears testimony to the extremely wretched condition of these vagabonds; they eat cocoa-tops, and parts of the yam which are in general thrown aside by negroes. Two or three slaves, who made their escape from them this week, say they are absolutely starving, that they had nothing but what they obtained by plunder, which became very precarious and hazardous from the rebuffs they had lately experienced, and that their powder was nearly exhausted.”

Mocha, upon the borders of Westmoreland. Near this post, Lieutenant Williams, of the militia, had a very smart and an extremely successful affair on the 8th instant, having killed seven of them and wounded many.*

* "This body, which consisted," says Mr. Dallas, "of their greatest force, was still called old Montague's, though commanded by Captain Charles Schaw; but the chief commander among them was Johnson," (or Johnstone,) "who was generally at the head of a force inferior in number to those with Schaw, but more active and enterprising. These were the men by whom the greatest ravages had been committed; these, led by Johnson, had burned the settlements in Westmoreland, and afterwards Mocha, Catadupa, Lapland, Ginger Hill, Gowdy's, and other places. Johnson surprised a convoy of provisions guarded by ten soldiers, going to the posts established at Mocha and Augustus, and cut off the heads of the soldiers. He had no particular station, but shifted from ground to ground, according to the enterprise he meditated. Though known to be at a certain place one day, he would the next surprise another place at the distance of twenty miles. He was not encumbered with women or children, and to his own party he had attached about forty slaves, whom he had armed. These had cause to repent it, but having once joined, they could not retract, and suffered themselves to be persuaded that when a peace took place, they would be included in the terms as Maroons. Some of them Johnson flogged for not fighting, while he made others captains, whom he again broke or flogged if they deserved it. This treatment was general, nor did he scruple to inflict the same punishment on his own sons, and, Smith excepted, whose vigour and valour were equal to his own, he was a despot over his men, yet under his discipline they fought better than the rest."

Johnstone highly distinguished his valour in the engagement with Lieut. Williams. "Far from screening himself during the engagement, he was loud in giving his orders, and was violent in the abuse of Williams, whom he knew. Being wounded with a ball, he immediately

As it is impossible to get up with these savages without first receiving the fire of their ambush, our loss in

cut it out with his knife, and continued exerting himself to the utmost to obtain the victory; but all his efforts proved fruitless, and after a hard struggle, he was obliged to quit the field, which he managed to do with great address."

In the examination of Jumbo, (Dec. 30th,) the negro who escaped after having been several weeks his captive, Johnstone is described as follows:—"Johnstone, he says, is the most cruel, savage, and enterprising man amongst them,—that even his own people disapprove of his conduct at times, but that he has more authority than any other commander, and that his devastations would have extended far beyond what they did long ere this, only for the wound in his leg; and, were it not for his late defeat at Chester River," (in the beginning of December,) "that Belvedere, Hazelymph, Greenwich, Wiltshire, and Montpelier would have most certainly been burned—that was to be his first expedition after his recovery; his next was intended against St. Elizabeth's, and Gandy's, and Whittaker's—negroes were to be his guides; and that he never conceived the whites could have them to his last retreat."—"Johnstone has made a Coromantee negro, named Cudjoe, belonging to Mr. Fowler, a captain, and he raised another, belonging to the estate of Whittaker, named Casacrui, to the same rank. . . Johnstone has great confidence in these two villains, for he has not conferred such marks of his favour on any other plantation negroes. Unless they are runaways he views them with a jealous eye," &c.

According to Mr. Dallas, both Johnstone and Smith had been averse to hostilities and advised peace, but finding their settlements and provision-grounds had been destroyed in their absence, indiscriminately with those of the other Maroons, they at once made common cause with them.—Granting this statement to be correct, I must remark, that their wish for peace was not evidenced by obedience to Lord Balcarres's summons to Spanish Town, and, consequently, that there was no reason why their provision-grounds should be exempted from the fate that followed on the general disobedience.

every affair is constantly from eight to twelve men killed and wounded; and, as the ambuscade is generally formed within a few yards of the track, the return of the killed is often, unfortunately, greater than the wounded.

I found it impossible to carry on the business of the country, and to regulate the movements of the army, at one and the same time; I was, therefore, forced to prorogue the assembly and to repair again to the field.

The scene of our action is more tremendous than possibly can be described,—mountains rising one above the other, almost perpendicular from the base, all covered with wood, the surface everywhere sharp and rugged—each mountain detached, and only separated from the next by a narrow defile or glade, which, being daily watered by the rains, produces an inexhaustible stock of ground-provisions.

Bold as the scenery is, nature has exerted herself in producing something still more astonishing.

In the heart of this wonderful country, the mountains change their appearance,—losing nothing in their perpendicular height, they become stupendous honey-combed rocks, undermined into an innumerable range of caves, some of which are near two miles in length.—Immediately adjacent to these terrible retreats have the Maroons fixed and established themselves for ages.

This country* differs from all European settlements. *There* the vallies are fertile, and produce the necessaries

* Jamaica.

for the sustenance of man. *Here* it is exactly the reverse; the vallies produce nothing but sugar-canes,—the sustenance of man is received from the mountains.

Every settlement on the low grounds has a mountain as its appendage, that is parcelled out to the slaves; and every negro has his particular lot apportioned to him for raising his provisions,—which is absolutely his property, and his whole dependance. One day in each week is allowed him to cultivate his lot of land, and to bring down his subsistence for the following week.

Hence he must feel the greatest interest in preserving what in reality is his own, and any person that violates or destroys this property must necessarily be his enemy. So long as the Maroon (who lives behind him) holds out the charms of food and freedom to the negro, so long will the negro look up to him. But the matter is entirely changed, when the Maroon throws himself on the negro to be fed, instead of feeding the negro.

It was upon this principle that I attacked and carried their towns, and, by destroying all provisions planted by the Maroons, I have thrown them upon the lands of the slaves for subsistence.

My policy is, to destroy their power of concentrating any negro force, whether of Maroons or slaves. I shall follow them so close, as to force them, if I can, to disperse and to seek for personal safety, instead of looking for the dominion of the country.

No sign of repentance or contrition has hitherto appeared in any of their actions, and I see no alternative

but to use with the greatest vigour those powers and resources which the country have unanimously put into my hands.

It is equally in the power of a few Maroons, as of the whole body of them, to burn down the cane-pieces. But I have a month still to act in, before that dry and dreaded moment arrives.

The great quantity of ground-provisions is to be ascribed to the consequences of the hurricanes that prevailed here between 1780 and 1786. In the two latter years it is computed that fifteen thousand negroes died of famine. Every precaution has been since taken to avoid the effects of a similar calamity.

I am convinced the forcing of the Maroons to look for sustenance from the provision-grounds of the slaves, has already been attended with the happiest effects. A negro belonging to Pembroke estate has just seized upon a runaway negro, who had voluntarily joined the Maroons and left them this morning,—with the greatest difficulty the other slaves have been prevented from tearing him to pieces.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

“ Head Quarters, Dromilly, near Wilts,
20 Nov. 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

I enclose a rough sketch of the position I took in this quarter on the 15th instant.

Your grace will observe by it the nature of the protection, and the strength of the safeguards, which I have afforded to the adjoining properties.

I had the honour to state, in my letter of the 16th instant, that one strong body of Maroons lurked between Fleming's and Wilts.

Having posted the safeguards, I also formed three distinct columns, of one hundred and twenty men each, for the purpose of active operation, severally commanded by young, active, and intelligent officers of militia, to whom I gave suitable rank.

The first of these columns, under Lieut. Colonel Galloway, with Lieut. Colonel Shawe, had orders to turn Wilts, and to proceed in a line between that and the cockpits.

The second column, under Lieut. Colonel Stevenson, had directions to turn Fleming's,—and the third column, under Lieut. Colonel Stewart, was ordered to move straight upon Unity provision-grounds, where the Maroons had been posted.

I also ordered Major General Walpole to advance and to get, if possible, a more forward position in the cock-

pits. He proceeded on the 16th, and discovered a town of upwards of three hundred huts, which the Maroons had abandoned,—the only path to it leads down a precipice of one hundred and fifty feet. On the other side of this cockpit, General Walpole took post, waiting for the event of the movement which was to be made from this district by the three columns on the 17th instant.

Those three columns having taken their respective routes, the second column, under Lieut. Colonel Stevenson, on the morning of the 18th, observed their advanced sentinels descending from the tops of the highest trees; he immediately dashed forward, but could not spring in with them. The Maroons had only time to save their persons. Their pots were boiling; they left most of their clothes, provisions, and bags—containing musket-balls and some money. Several graves were also seen. Lieut. Colonel Stevenson pursued their track as long as he could find a trace.

The other two columns were not so fortunate as to fall in with the rebels.

These different parties have burned or destroyed upwards of seven hundred of their huts, and they will keep out in the woods as long as possible.

If the Maroons retreat towards Hector's River, they will be there received by the Clarendon, Vere, and part of the St. Elizabeth's militia. Different columns are looking for them in various directions. They are unable to move in large bodies. The slaves who had joined them are daily deserting them.

I have got the lead and I shall keep it ; they shall find neither rest nor repose anywhere.

We conjecture that part of their force are endeavouring to get to windward, to insurrect the Charles-town and Nanny-town Maroons.—Although those Maroons are very well inclined to join the rebellion, if it could be supported, they will hardly take up a desperate cause. The island being now cleared of the swarms of French banditti, and the Trelawney Maroons being now dispossessed of everything which made them formidable as a power, the windward Maroons will probably remain at peace.

My fears for the safety of the country are much abated. We often retake the slaves who had joined them. But, in such a country, and with such resources of ground-provisions, I am afraid we can hardly hope to secure the persons of the rebels.

However, to avert the terrible consequences of setting fire to the cane-pieces, we must persevere in the measures we are now pursuing.

I can assure his majesty, that both his regulars and militia have most honourably discharged their duty. They have encountered the extremity of danger and fatigue without a murmur. They have thrown themselves from ambuscade to ambuscade to get within reach of the enemy, who have suffered most severely from their fire.* And your grace is well entitled to represent to his majesty the magnanimity of their conduct.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

[After returning from the field to meet the Assembly on the 27th.]

“ 29 Nov. 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

I am somewhat alarmed by accounts I have received this day from the parish of St. Elizabeth, which state that a body of fifty-four negroes have joined the Maroons in rebellion.

I have already found the excellent effect that my presence has had upon the minds of the negroes in the neighbourhood where I commanded in person.

I must endeavour to make a third expedition to leeward, and I must do it if I can, [so] as to reconcile it with such business of the assembly as is indispensable.

It is hard labour in this climate, but I must go through with it. . . .

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

Arrived at this stage of the war, I must delay the reader for a few minutes, while I refer to a measure determined on by the general assembly, in its session of September, viz. the employment of the Spanish dogs of Cuba for starting the ambushes and securing the persons of the Maroons. It may be easily supposed that the

adoption of such a measure—misrepresented as it was, with the most infamous exaggeration—occasioned much outcry in England—not only on the part of those who took up the question simply as a legitimate topic of party invective, but of numbers who living in ease and quiet at home, in utter ignorance of the nature of the country, the character of the enemy, their mode of warfare—in short, of all the real facts of the case, were startled at the idea of such a seemingly ferocious engine of warfare.

The following is Mr. Edwards' account of the proceedings of the assembly on this point, and of the arguments, anticipative of future discussion in England, on which that body determined upon its adoption:—

“The first deliberations of the assembly were directed to the subject of the Maroon rebellion, with a solicitude equal to its importance. On this occasion it was natural to recur to the experience of former times, and enquire into the measures that had been successfully adopted in the long and bloody war, which, previous to the treaty of 1738, had been carried on against the same enemy. The expedient which had then been resorted to, of employing dogs to discover the concealment of the Maroons, and prevent the fatal effects which resulted from their mode of fighting in ambuscade, was recommended as a fit example to be followed in the present conjuncture; and it being known that the Spanish Americans possessed a certain species of those animals, which it was judged would be proper for such a service, the assembly resolved

to send to the island of Cuba for one hundred of them, and to engage a sufficient number of the Spanish hunters to attend and direct their operations. The employment to which these dogs are generally put by the Spaniards, is the pursuit of wild bullocks, which they slaughter for the hides ; and the great use of the dog is to drive the cattle from such heights and recesses in the mountainous parts of the country, as are least accessible to the hunters.

“The assembly were not unapprised that the measure of calling in such auxiliaries, and urging the canine species to the pursuit of human beings, would probably give rise to much observation and animadversion in the mother country. Painful experience, on other occasions, had taught them, that their conduct in the present case would be scrutinised with all the rigid and jealous circumspection, which ignorance and hatred, and envy and malice, and pretended humanity, and fanaticism, could exercise. The horrible enormities of the Spaniards in the conquest of the new world, would be brought again to remembrance. It is mournfully true, that dogs were used by those Christian barbarians against peaceful and inoffensive Americans, and the just indignation of all mankind has ever since branded, and will continue to brand, the Spanish nation with infamy, for such atrocities. It was foreseen, and strongly urged as an argument against recurring to the same weapon in the present case, that the prejudices of party, and the virulent zeal of restless and turbulent men, would place the proceedings

of the Assembly on this occasion in a point of view equally odious with the conduct of Spain on the same blood-stained theatre, in times past. No reasonable allowance would be made for the wide difference between the two cases. Some gentlemen even thought that the co-operation of dogs with British troops would give not only a cruel, but also a very dastardly complexion to the proceedings of government.

“To these and similar objections it was answered, that the safety of the island and the lives of the inhabitants were not to be sacrificed to the apprehension of perverse misconstruction or wilful misrepresentation in the mother country. It was maintained that the grounds of the measure needed only to be fully examined into, and fairly stated, to induce all reasonable men to admit its propriety and necessity. To hold it as a principle, that it is an act of cruelty or cowardice in man to employ other animals as instruments of war, is a position contradicted by the practice of all nations. The Asiatics have ever used elephants in their battles; and if lions and tigers possessed the docility of the elephant, no one can doubt that these also would be made to assist the military operations of man, in those regions of which they are inhabitants. Even the use of cavalry, as established among the most civilized and polished nations of Europe, must be rejected, if this principle be admitted; for wherein, it was asked, does the humanity of that doctrine consist, which allows the employment of troops of horse in the pursuit of discomfited and flying infantry; yet

shrinks at the preventive measure of sparing the effusion of human blood, by tracing with hounds the haunts of murderers, and rousing from ambush savages more ferocious and blood-thirsty than the animals which track them ?

“The merits of the question, it was said, depended altogether on the origin and cause of the war, and the objects sought to be obtained by its continuance ; and the authority of the first writers on public law, was adduced in support of this construction. ‘If the cause and end of war,’ says Paley, ‘be justifiable, all the means that appear necessary to that end are justifiable also. This is the principle which defends those extremities to which the violence of war usually proceeds ; for, since war is a contest by force between parties who acknowledge no common superior, and since it includes not in its idea the supposition of any convention which should place limits to the operations of that force, it has naturally no boundary but that in which force terminates—the destruction of the life against which the force is directed.’ It was allowed (with the same author) that gratuitous barbarities borrow no excuse from the license of war, of which kind is every cruelty and every insult that serves only to exasperate the sufferings or to increase the hatred of an enemy, without weakening his strength, or in any manner tending to procure his submission ; such as the slaughter of captives, the subjecting them to indignities or torture,” &c. &c. “These enormities are prohibited not only by the practice of

civilized nations, but by the law of nature itself; as having no proper tendency to accelerate the termination, or accomplish the object of the war; and as containing that which in peace and war is equally unjustifiable, namely, ultimate and deliberate mischief. Now all these very enormities were practised, not by the whites against the Maroons, but by the Maroons themselves against the whites. Humanity therefore, it was said, was no way concerned in the sort of expedient that was proposed, or any other, by which such an enemy could most speedily be extirpated. They were not an unarmed, innocent, and defenceless race of men like the ancient Americans, but a banditti of assassins; and tenderness towards such an enemy was cruelty to all the rest of the community."

I give the argument as I find it. I think it strong. But, whatever we, in calm deliberative security, may think of it, few will question the impression it must have made on the minds of men, whose friends and neighbours, wives and children, were daily massacred by parties of these miscreants—whose own lives were denounced—whose plantations would, ere long, in their regular progress to maturity, be in such a state of aridity that a spark of fire might involve the whole island in conflagration and ruin,—on the minds of men, I say, who, reduced to a desperate struggle for life and property with a gang of banditti, were destitute of a military force adequate to their defence—were surrounded by a population of negroes, many of them, there was reason to

fear, corrupted by French intrigue*—men who saw their small force daily diminishing in a war of ambuscades—and who knew that the *use* of these animals, and had reason to believe that the mere *exhibition* of such a weapon, would put an immediate end to the protracted struggle.†

Lord Balcarres, at least, thought the measure fully justifiable; and his reasons for thinking it so—grounded on the strict military distinction by which an instrument of war is considered lawful or not, according to the offensive or defensive character of the service in which it is wielded, will be found in his admirable letter to Charles Yorke, Esq., 2 May, 1796, which I earnestly recommend to the reader's perusal, before he proceeds with the remainder of these despatches.

I may add that the Spanish dogs did not arrive till

* Lord Balcarres says, in a letter to the duke of Portland, dated November 29th—"that every danger is to be apprehended, during the approaching Christmas holidays, of an insurrection, both of the Maroons and negro slaves, in the windward part of the island."

† Mr. Dallas's additional argument (after quoting that of Bryan Edwards) deserves candid consideration. "Had the suggestion proceeded from a despotic and ferocious spirit, bent on the extermination of some of the human species by a barbarous expedient, it is not likely that a mild, humane, and benevolent mind, like that of Lord Balcarres, or that the majority of any assembly of educated men, would have concurred in the experiment. It appeared to them at that time, as it must appear now to every rational man, a choice of two evils; and the one wisely chosen was trivial in comparison with the magnitude of the other."

the 14th of December,—that when brought into the field, they were kept in the rear of the column, till the 14th of January—and that the Assembly's estimate of their efficacy was justified by the pleasing fact “that not a drop of blood was shed after they arrived.” The Maroons, in fact, were terrified into submission, and thus, in all human probability, the island was saved.*

* See Dallas's History of the Maroons, for a full account of the dogs and chasseurs, and of the journey of Mr. Quarrell, the commissioner sent by the assembly to Cuba to fetch them.—“The dogs carried out by the *chasseurs del Rey* are perfectly broken in, that is to say, they will not kill the object they pursue unless resisted. On coming up with a fugitive, they bark at him till he stops; they then crouch near him, terrifying him with a ferocious growl if he stirs. In this position they continue barking to give notice to the chasseurs, who come up and secure their prisoner. Each chasseur, though he can hunt only with two dogs properly, is obliged to have three, which he maintains at his own cost, and that at no small expense. These people live with their dogs, from which they are inseparable. At home the dogs are kept chained, and when walking with their masters, are never unmuzzled, or let out of ropes, but for attack. They are constantly accompanied with one or two small dogs called finders, whose scent is very keen and always sure of hitting off a track.—The chasseurs are under an officer of high rank, the Alcalde Provinciale, and receive a good pay from the government, besides private rewards for particular and extraordinary services. They are a very hardy, brave, and desperate set of people, scrupulously honest, and remarkably faithful.”

“If entire credit,” says Edwards, “had been given to the description that was transmitted through the country of this extraordinary animal, it might have been supposed that the Spaniards had obtained the ancient and genuine breed of Cerberus himself. . . . Whether these reports were propagated through folly or design, they had certainly a

To the earl of Balcarres.

“Old Maroon Town, Dec. 20, 1795.

“My Lord,

I returned here last evening, and have the satisfaction to report to your lordship the success of the detachment under Colonel Hull. The Maroons, by his judicious conduct, were attacked before they discovered the advanced guard. I need add nothing further to your lordship; Colonel Hull's report will explain every thing.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE.”

To the same.

“[Private] Dec. 20, 1795.

“My dear Lord,

Hull has agreed, I understand, to a sort of

powerful and very salutary effect on the fears of the rebel Maroons,” &c.

“We cannot but take this opportunity,” says the House of Assembly, in a message to the governor, 1 May 1796, “of expressing our acknowledgments of the eminent advantages derived by the importation of the chasseurs and dogs, in compliance with the general wishes of the island. Nothing can be clearer than that if they had been off the island, the rebels could not have been induced to surrender from their almost inaccessible fastnesses. We are happy to have it in our power to say that terror excited by the appearance of the dogs has been sufficient to produce so fortunate an event,” &c.

truce. This is the only part which, *entre nous*, I dislike ; but, however, for the sake of public faith, I shall keep it. My intention was to give them terms, but by no means to suspend hostilities until they should first lay down their arms. I shall adhere strictly to your lordship's instructions. I understand that they will surrender on their lives only, wishing for land to be allotted them to cultivate.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the same.

"Dec. 22, 1795.

"My Lord,

I have the honour to inclose to your lordship the proposals of the Maroons, to which I have acceded.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

PROPOSALS OF THE MAROONS.

"First:—That they will, on their knees, beg his majesty's pardon.

"Second:—That they will go to the Old Town, Montego Bay, or any other place that may be pointed out, and will settle on whatever lands the governor, council, and assembly may think proper to allot.

“Third :—That they will give up all runaways.”

“I grant the above,

GEORGE WALPOLE, major-general.

MONTAGUE ^{his} — _{mark.} JAMES.

“Done on Guard-hill, 21st December, 1795.”

To the earl of Balcarres.

“[Private] 25 Dec. 1795.

“My dear Lord,

I was obliged to accede on my *oath*; I promised a secret article, that they should not be sent off the island.

Old Montague is, as far as I can guess, the obstacle to peace, as much as he dares. Some of the Maroons were heard to tell him, that they would have peace, whether he would or not.*

I am, &c.

G. WALPOLE.”

* According to Dallas, Johnstone, the Maroon chief, had become anxiously solicitous for peace, and was meditating an offer of terms at the moment General Walpole made the peace. “He had moved to concentrate the Maroon force for the purpose of adopting a dreadful alternative, had a negotiation been unsuccessful. . . It is a circumstance hardly known, that he meant, on the junction of the whole Maroon force, if he had found no opportunity of treating, or, in negotiating, had failed, to have crossed the island, and on the south of the cockpits,

“ Spanish Town, Dec. 24, 1795.

“ At a meeting of such members of the Council and of the Assembly as could attend at the King’s House,

Present,

EARL OF BALCARRES,

HON. MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

HON. MR. RODON,	MR. SHIRLEY,
HON. MR. SPEAKER,	MR. REDWOOD,
MR. TAYLOR,	MR. FITCH,
MR. VAUGHAN,	MR. CHRISTIE,
MR. COCKBURN,	MR. BATTY,
MR. CUTHBERT,	MR. GALBRAITH,

“ It was resolved, That if the Trelawney Maroons, according to the third article of their treaty, deliver the runaways that have joined them, and if they, according to the first article of their treaty, lay down their arms, which arms are to be taken away from them, that then, and in such case, General Walpole’s secret article ought

through Cave River, to have made a descent on the estates in the mountains of Clarendon, where he expected to find a more favourable disposition in the negroes than to the northward and westward; for in these parts, besides the great military force to awe the slaves, the majority of them were actually the determined enemies of the Maroons; whereas in Clarendon, whence the Maroons originally came, a degree of family connexion was still acknowledged among them, and emissaries had been employed to ascertain their inclination,” &c.

to be ratified, as far as their not being sent off the island ; but that they are to remain in Jamaica, subject to such regulations as the governor, council, and assembly may think proper to enact in that respect.”*

* The substance of the debate, preliminary to this resolution, is recapitulated as follows, in a letter of Lord Balcarres to the attorney-general :—

“ By those who favoured the ratification of the treaty, it was urged, ‘ That the question was not whether we should offer the Maroons any propositions by way of treaty, but whether we should advise the ratification of one which was already made by an officer of distinguished talents, who had been long fighting our battles, and who possessed to an extraordinary degree the opinion and confidence of the commander-in-chief.

‘ That General Walpole must have thought the terms of the treaty to have been within the limits of his instructions, or that he would not have acceded to them on his *oath*.

‘ That, independent of such idea, it is clear that both Colonel Hull and himself conceived the terms were not of a disgraceful kind, from the desire expressed by the former to be the hearer of the news to England, and urgently recommended by the latter in a letter written to the lieutenant-governor.

‘ That the concurrent opinions of two such respectable military characters, who had the best opportunities of knowing the ground, the nature, and resources of the enemy, and were capable of considering the question in its fullest extent, ought to have a great degree of strength.

‘ Superadded to these considerations, the state of the island was to be viewed. The time was arrived, when it was necessary that the crops should commence. The overseers who were to make the sugars were employed in the militia ; that, although the assembly has voted large assessments of slaves to be formed into corps, yet that a considerable time must elapse before these could be raised, and when raised, confidence could not be immediately placed in their fidelity ; therefore

“I have received, in Spanish Town, the treaty signed by General Walpole and Colonel Montague James, and

the militia must necessarily be kept to their duty, and martial-law continued.

‘That the expenses of the latter exceeded all former experience, and were likely, if not soon moderated, to overburthen every species of property.

‘That if the negotiations for peace were prolonged, much was to be apprehended from a foreign enemy, who knew of our troubles, were fond of anarchy and confusion, and so subtle and insidious as to be capable of plotting every artful and underhand scheme to foment and keep up the rebellion, and, in the weak state of our naval defence, might think it expedient to come down in force, and place us between two fires. That the nature and conduct of our internal enemy were not to be disregarded. That they had manifested great fortitude, great generalship, and had preserved a secrecy in their manœuvres unparalled among European soldiery. That the velocity of their movements, and their knowledge of the ground, were so superior to ours, as to make them be considered as almost unconquerable. At the same time, the concealment of their women, their old and infirm people, and their children, shewed that their haunts were still totally unknown to us.

‘That we had hitherto formed hopes of their being deficient in provisions and ammunition, but these had proved fallacious. It was now clear that they had an ample supply of provisions, and as to ammunition, the late conflicts had plainly shewn that they were not scanty in that article.

‘That, in viewing the treaty which had been made, the following observations occurred :—

‘First,—That in it there was an implied preliminary, “that the Maroons should surrender their arms, and deliver up the runaway slaves.” Two important circumstances to prove their state of humiliation to all the negroes.

‘Secondly,—That the preservation of their lives, and residence in

have ratified the same. And I do hereby appoint Friday morning, the first day of January next, at ten o'clock,

the island, were the only objects of *express* stipulation, either in the public or private articles, all other matters being left to the option of the legislature.

‘That, with respect to the first, no person was found to have any objection,—and that, as to the latter, it was not to be expected that they would surrender under fears of transportation, to be sold to the Spaniards and doomed to work in the mines—the usual terrors held out to negroes, as concomitant with the state of transportation. That, therefore, to refuse a compliance with that article was to resolve upon their extermination, which seemed almost impossible, or, at least, not without the danger of evils of much greater magnitude. What these were, would occur to a reflecting mind on the consideration that our estates were at this season of the year composed of very combustible materials.

‘That the small settlers in the mountains could not be sufficiently guarded. That their properties, and also their lives and those of their families, while they continued to draw the subsistence which residence supplied, must be exposed to the irruption and violence of the rebels.

‘That the residence of the Trelawney Maroons in the island would not appear of much consequence, when it was considered that their departure would not remove, but only lessen the evil; for that, while the windward Maroons continued to enjoy their freedom, the island could not be exempt from danger.’

“On the other hand, it was contended,—

‘That no punishment was inflicted in any degree adequate to the crime, and, in that point of view, it might be a very bad and dangerous lesson held out to the negroes.

‘That the effects of not sending the Maroons off the island may in future be severely felt.

‘That the power of the Maroons to windward has not been reduced.

‘That, in the event of settling in any shape the Trelawney Maroons in this island, they would undoubtedly on some future occasion join

for the Trelawney Maroons to come in a body to Castle Wemyss, to perform the treaty.

“Dated at Castle Wemyss, this 28th day of December, 1795.

(Signed)

BALCARRES, lieutenant-governor.”

the Nanny-town, Charles-town, and Scott's Hall Maroons; and if this should be the case, we had in fact achieved little or nothing.^a

‘That, when we had expended so much blood and treasure—when we had by our active measures greatly succeeded in subduing their minds—and at a time when they were appalled with horror at the idea of being hunted down by dogs of the most terrible description, it would be very unwise and puerile on our parts to grant such terms.’”

^a The views and character of the windward Maroons are entered into more at length in the letter from which the preceding note is extracted.

“The Charles-town Maroons, although they have disobeyed my orders to come in a body to Kingston, have, notwithstanding, come in by small and detached bodies. They are an infinitely softer and more docile people than those of Trelawney Town.

The Nanny-town Maroons are closely connected in relationship with the Trelawney—they have *not* come in, either in a body, as they were commanded, or in parties, and have sullenly rejected the bounty of the Assembly.

They have openly declared, that if the Charles-town Maroons will go into rebellion, they will join them, regardless of the causes of that rebellion. They have actually built huts out of their own district, within the range of the Blue Mountains, (a country of immense strength,) as if preparing for hostilities, either in the event of the Trelawney Maroons proving successful, or of a rebellion taking place among those of Charles-town. This body, being equally depraved with the Trelawney Maroons, is more to be dreaded from the ease with which it could be supported from St. Domingo.”

To the duke of Portland.

[Accompanying the preceding treaty, resolution, &c.]

“ Castle Wemyss, near Old Maroon Town,
31 Dec. 1795.

“ My Lord Duke,

The Maroons have been so closely pressed since the commencement of the rebellion that they have been reduced to the greatest distress. They have been driven out of their cockpits, but have retreated into a country equally impracticable. They have been harassed without intermission, and have suffered most severely in the several actions we have had with them. The loss they have sustained has not been much felt, as their numbers of fighting-men are recruited by Coromantee runaways, who have joined them.

I estimate their force to be three hundred men armed, the unarmed runaways two hundred, and their women and children upwards of four hundred.

I look upon all the Maroons in the island as ripe for rebellion. I have intelligence that a party of ten Maroons from Nanny-town, under a lieutenant, have been visiting the rebel Maroons, and are now about to leave them to return home. I hear, also, that most of the furniture and finery among the Accompongs has lately disappeared, and that they do not consume the salt rations which are allowed them.

The mountains occupied by the leeward Maroons are

of great extent, and the sugar-plantations, which nearly encircle this tract, everywhere encroach upon the base of those mountains. The Maroons, being central to all those sugar-plantations, can with ease descend from any mountain, and set fire to the cane-pieces. Hence their power of doing mischief is almost unbounded, and I do not see that an army of twenty thousand men could prevent it.

That peace is desirable in such a situation is perfectly obvious, but nothing, in my opinion, is more remote from the intentions of the Maroons, than to make peace with us. They have held out proposals twice, merely to extricate themselves out of some momentary difficulty, and to remove to some new place of concealment, when we had discovered their haunts. Twice have the country struck at the lure, and twice have they been deceived.

My principal object in ratifying the treaty has been, to prove to the conviction of the country that no pacific intention has ever entered into the minds of the Maroons. If I had refused to ratify it, the whole responsibility for the mischief that may ensue, would have been thrown upon my shoulders. Whereas, my having ratified it must unite the country in the opinion that these rebels mean destruction to this island, and that no alternative presents itself but to follow them up, whatever may be the difficulties or expense.

The Maroons have received every benefit from their insincerity that they looked for.—They have got a supply

of ground-provisions, which may enable them to change the scene of the war to another part of the circle.

I have now every military difficulty to encounter. The sugar-crop is beginning. It is impossible to keep the militia together, and it is really almost impracticable to put the sugar-mills round without them. The whole of the carts and cattle, that have been used for the carrying of our provisions, must now be applied to the bringing in of the canes, and the manufacturing of the sugar.

Should the enemy remove to Hector's River, our magazines here would be of no service to us; and at that point, where the roads are abominable, our line of operation from the sea is nearly fifty miles. We have live cattle, however, much nearer,—and they shall be followed up with all the vigour and celerity that circumstances can admit of.

I have one resource from which I have great expectation,—that is, the Spanish dogs.

I have only to add, that the rebels are in want of everything, clothing, shelter, salt, and gunpowder. But I speak of this last the more doubtingly from the circumstance of their shooting wild pigeons.

Upon the whole, this is an alarming war. If followed up with due vigour, I have no great terror of the consequences, but any unnecessary relaxation of it, any repetition of these dangerous truces, may prove very fatal indeed.

The packet cannot be detained, as she would lose the benefit of convoy to St. Domingo.

I am in the field, and my accommodation of paper is bad.—I have given my sentiments upon the outlines of this war very hastily. They will, however, pretty accurately convey to you my way of thinking on this most interesting subject.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Balcarres.

" January 1st, 1796.

" My dear Lord,

I now give the matter up ; only Smith, Dunbar, Williams, and two boys, are here. I shall send them to Falmouth to-morrow. I suppose that your lordship will admit them to the terms of the treaty upon which they have surrendered.

I fear that our baggage negroes will not be here in time for me to move after these rascals in the morning, and that I must postpone it till Sunday. In this case I shall endeavour to seduce the Maroons still to keep near us.

Your lordship shall hear the result as soon as possible.

Should any future parley proceed from them, I shall refer them to your lordship.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the duke of Portland.

" Castle Wemyss, 1 Jan. 1796.

" My Lord Duke,

I fixed upon Friday, the 1st of January, (this day,) for the surrender of the Trelawney rebel Maroons,

in conformity to their proposals for peace, which were signed by their leader, Colonel Montague James, acceded to by Major General Walpole, and ratified by myself on December 28th, 1795.

The farce has ended as I expected,—only three of them and two boys have come in. I shall be ready to attack them in less than forty-eight hours, preceded by the Spanish dogs. I cannot say what the effect will be, but I am sanguine in my hopes.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the earl of Balcarres.

“ Old Maroon Town, Jan. 4th, 1796.

“ My Lord,

I ventured yesterday to trust Smith to return to the cockpits to bring in his family, which he did in the evening, to the amount of thirteen,—three of them very fine young men, the others comprehended his wife and several small children. He had (which induced me to trust him) given me a strong proof of his fidelity and gratitude by a material piece of information, that one of those who surrendered, in my absence with your lordship, is a runaway; that this is an experiment on the part of the other runaways, to try whether they can pass for Maroons; and by his (Smith's) advice, I let him return to the cockpits. A large body are expected in to-day of Maroons, and I hope others,—it will take some days, I suppose, to get in the whole; for they are as mistrustful as possible, and each is desirous that the other should make the experiment before him. All this will naturally and conclusively prove to your lordship the impropriety of holding forth more harsh conditions than those now granted.—Should there be any person so dull to common policy and common sense as to think that another turn of the

screw would he better, ask him this question, 'Is he prepared to spin out the contest till foreign assistance may arrive?' This may be followed up by another question, 'If foreign assistance arrives, what will be the situation of the island?'

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"Castle Wemyss, 5 Jan. 1796.

"Dear Sir,

Unless a great number of the Maroons came in last night, or do come in in the course of this day, I hope and trust that nothing will prevent the dogs from going out to-morrow.

I am perfectly with you, that the pin ought not to receive another screw; but also clear that it ought not to be relaxed.

Should the Maroons disencumber themselves of their women, children, old men, sick and convalescents, they would acquire a degree of pliability which they have not at present, and, by removing from their present country into a new one, we should be very much censured by the island for not having made the attack while it was in our power. We cannot stop the operations of war; I look upon the treaty in the same point of view with yourself, but I see the danger of not attacking them so very clear as to induce me to declare, that I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of acceding to a moment's unnecessary delay.

I remain, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Balcarres.

"January 5th, 1796.

"My Lord,

Nine (additional) Maroons, men, women, and children, came in last night. I have permitted two or three to return this day, to

bring in more of their relations; one, however, I suspect will not come out to us again.

The Spaniards are, I fear, a little out of temper. If they cannot be kept, it would be better to avail ourselves of the breach of the treaty by the Maroons themselves, and to move on,—as nothing can be clearer than that all treaty would soon terminate were they off the island.

I am, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the earl of Balcarres.

" January 8th, 1795.

" My Lord, . . .

One misfortune will, I fear, occur as to the dogs—the extreme want of water. There is none, during seven hours' march, between the great cockpit and the spot where Colonel Hull engaged the Maroons. Smith likewise informs me, that there is none beyond the last-mentioned place, except what may chance to be got from wild pines.* If

* The wild pine, (*Tillandria maxima*,) the black and grape withes, which are about two inches in diameter, and the roots of the cotton tree, all furnish a supply of water to the thirsty wanderer in these wilds of Jamaica. "Of the last," says Mr. Dallas, "six feet junked off the smaller part of the root, where it tapers to the thickness of a man's thigh, will yield several gallons of water. In the greatest drought these resources seldom fail. For the wild pine they" (he is speaking of the Spanish chasseurs) "are obliged to climb trees; but that they do almost with the velocity of a monkey. This plant takes root on the body of a tree, and the leaves of it are so formed as to catch the rain and conduct it to a reservoir at the base, where being never exposed to the sun, it is found delightfully fresh and cool. But the easiest method of obtaining water in the woods, and with less delay on the march, is from the black and grape withes; it is done with greater expedition

the dogs cannot be got on through want of water, we must leave them behind; but I fear that it will be impossible to supply the post with provisions through such a length of defile, and so difficult a path as it must be, that it takes up seven hours to go only five miles.

However, we will get at them somehow or other, either with or without dogs; and the best shall be done that can by me.

I am, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"Castle Wemyss, 9 Jan. 1796.

"Dear Sir, . . .

I sincerely hope and trust, that no column shall proceed against the enemy without the dogs, until their inefficacy is proved; such a measure, I know, would set the country in an uproar. My own responsibility, as well as my opinion and the report I have made to his majesty of the intended operations with the dogs, leaves no other alternative than to give immediate and due energy to the enterprise and ideas of the country, in sending, at an enormous expense, for these dogs.

Yours faithfully,

BALCARRES."

than drinking at a spring. The chasseur catches a pendant withe, which, with his muschet, he divides about two feet from the ground, and applies the end of the withe, as it hangs, to his mouth, or to his dog's, who indicates his thirst; he then cuts the withe off, about six feet higher, keeping the upper end elevated, when, the air being admitted above, he receives through the porous fibres of it near a quart of delightful cold water,"

To the earl of Balcarres.

“O. M. Town, Jan. 12, 1796.

“My dear Lord,

Two new Maroons are arrived, and three that were in before, and two women. Johnstone has sent to me to say, that he has not been able to prevail on the women, several of whom have been lost, and only one found since the late actions. He desires to know what I have to say in answer to his message; my answer is, that I shall move against him, unless twenty men come in to-morrow. I shall therefore begin my march at two to-morrow afternoon, weather permitting, unless I hear to the contrary from your lordship. I am, however, apprehensive that Johnstone's reply will scarcely arrive in time. They beg till four o'clock; but, if I delay till that time, it will be too late for me to move till next day.

Your lordship will please to consider what I mentioned this morning, exclusive of the position stated by you; viz. whether we should be the first to recommence hostilities; certainly we shall not make peace for some time to come, after the first shot is fired.

I remain, &c.

G. WALPOLE.”

To the earl of Balcarres.

“January 12, 1796.

“My Lord,

The Maroons were so terrified last night, and legged so hard, that I told the man who was to return to Johnstone, that if they were not able (the twenty men) to reach me by two o'clock, and yet were disposed to keep the agreement, that I would, upon hearing their horn, defer my march for one hour.

I think that we shall not, on account of water, be able to move beyond the great cockpit this night. On further examination, it will, I fear, not be practicable to carry water enough in heakers for so many men and dogs, but we can carry some.

I am, &c.

G. WALPOLE.”

To the earl of Balcarres.

“ Jan. 12, half-past two.

“ My Lord,

We had scarcely advanced two hundred yards, when I met a Maroon coming from Johnstone, to say that he would come with his people to-morrow into the cockpit to make their huts, and begged that I would have provisions for him ; and that he would adjust every point. I have therefore ordered the troops to stop at the advanced posts, which is about half a mile on this side where we meant to halt during the night. If Johnstone will build his huts within our posts, I shall permit him to keep his arms till he sees you, then to lay them down. If, on account of the women, he insists on building them in the cockpits, in that case he must lay down his arms to me.

In hopes that your lordship will not disapprove of my proceedings,
I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE.”

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

“ Castle Wemyss, Jan. 13, 1796.

“ Dear Sir,

The Maroons with Johnstone at their head are either serious, or they are not serious. If serious, it can make no difference to them whether they go immediately to Montego Bay barracks, there to remain until the Assembly shall dispose of them, or that they are permitted to re-build their huts in the Old Town, or vicinity. If they are not serious, we shall only give them time to get out of our way.

We are not a match for them in duplicity. We may put our strength in truth and openness.

I think you may give them an opportunity until two o'clock to-morrow afternoon, to come in, and then proceed against the remainder. I really am for pushing them hard. We have this day seen the good effects of it.

Permit me to express the very high sense I have experienced of your

punctuality. Although the principle of the order is not discretionary, still I give you free permission to modulate it according to your judgment.

Yours very sincerely,

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Balcarres.

"Advanced Post, 17th Lt. Dragoons,
Jan. 14th, 1796.

"My Lord,

Young Jarrett, and four boys, capable of bearing arms, with nineteen women and children, have arrived at the Old Town; but on my arrival here, I found Bonny, the Maroon despatched to me by Johnstone yesterday, returned with another message, saying, that he had so many sick people that he could not reach me this day, but would not fail being with me in the morning. This is really so perplexing, that I do not know what to do. Your lordship's directions will reach me time enough, if despatched immediately, to enable me to proceed part of the way to-night, if your lordship disapproves of my waiting till to-morrow; but if, on the other hand, your lordship should think it proper for me to wait till the morning, it will certainly be right for me to delay where I am at present.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"C. W. Jan. 14, 1796.

"Dear Sir,

My orders are,

That young Jarrett, the four boys, Bonny, and the nineteen women and children, be immediately secured as prisoners;

That you do advance against the rebels at the very earliest moment after you receive this order;

That you may take Bonny as a guide, if you choose, and take every measure to discover where the Maroons are ;

Should the Maroons, in a body, offer to surrender, you may receive their arms on the spot ;

Any messenger going backwards or forwards is not to delay your operations ;

All the Maroons now in, to be sent to Montego Bay, as soon as you can procure a sufficient escort.

I have the honour to remain, with the greatest esteem, yours,
BALCARRES."

To Major General Campbell, Spanish Town.

" Castle Wemyss, 16th Jan.

" Dear Sir,

I have great satisfaction in announcing to you, that, in consequence of orders which I issued to Major General Walpole, he moved forward with a strong column of regulars, accompanied by the Spaniards and the dogs.

He had only advanced some hundred yards, when a Maroon delivered a message from Johnstone. As he had experienced much trifling evasion and insincerity, it was judged expedient to move slowly on, merely taking the precaution of keeping the dogs in the rear of the column.

In consequence of this arrangement of the line of march, which I conceive was both firm and temperate, the Maroons, to the number of two hundred and sixty, have surrendered.

I have in my possession, of Trelawney Maroons, upwards of four hundred persons, of whom I count about one hundred and thirty men. Some of the young Maroons are still out ; but I think we have a near and happy prospect of extinguishing the embers of this rebellion.

You will announce this pleasing event, as speedily as possible, in the Spanish Town papers.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

“ Castle Wemyss, Jan. 15th, 1796.

“ Dear Sir,

I give you joy of your successful operations.

I have no orders to give; those which I have already issued are exactly conformable to his majesty's intentions, which have been communicated to me this day by Mr. Dundas and the Duke of Portland, *per* the ‘Duke of Cumberland’ packet. Every person that comes in shall receive quarter, but you will not relax one moment in using every means in your power to crush these rebels;—if mercy can be shewn, your own feelings will point out the way, but it cannot be extended at the expense of one moment's delay.

All the Maroons who come in are to be disarmed within your posts, and they will be conducted to Montego Bay.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the earl of Balcarres.

“ Old Maroon Town, Jan. 17th, 1796.

“ My dear Lord,

Mr. Mathison will have informed your lordship of the result of yesterday. . . I hope to despatch a body of about two hundred, this day or to-morrow, to Montego Bay. There does not appear to be the least hesitation either to go down there or to deliver up their arms. Johnstone is more easily to be brought to a conclusion than any of their chiefs whom I have met with, and he preserves very strict discipline amongst his people.

I wish that your lordship would have the goodness to allow me to keep such a body of them here with me as, from circumstances of the moment, may most conduce to keep them satisfied in their minds. There is more in this than most people think for, and we are at present very great friends. . .

I have to thank your lordship for your personal kindness to me, and

the approbation that is likely to flow to me from the king. It ever has been my wish to discharge my duty honestly; and, although I do not expect that his majesty will ever consider my bumble exertions to the disparagement of my seniors, yet I hope that your lordship will not think me unreasonable in requesting, at the termination of this rebellion, your permission to return to Europe, with a view to obtain his majesty's consent, at a general peace, to a sale of my commission.

I have the honour to be, with every regard and respect, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"Castle Wemyss, Jan. 17th.

"Dear Sir,

I am honoured by yours of the 17th instant, and I have not the smallest doubt you will do all you can to realize those advantages we have attained, which are in some degree insecure, until such time as these quicksilver rebels are under lock and key. . .

At the end of the rebellion, I shall very eagerly embrace any opportunity of doing what may be pleasing to yourself.

Yours faithfully,

BALCARRES."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"Castle Wemyss, Jan. 22, 1796.

"Dear General,

I must use one other argument, in addition to those I urged this day, as to the expediency of sending down the Maroons to Montego Bay, and that is a strong one; viz. that it will be most difficult, I may say impossible for me to meet the legislature until this measure is effected.

The situation of the Maroons must be the immediate object of their deliberations, and something must be done by the Assembly as to the disposal of their persons.

It will be impracticable for me to inform the Assembly that the people have surrendered themselves, unless I can give a much more solid proof of it than the information of their skipping about in the Old Town. . .

Yours sincerely,

BALCARRES."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

" Castle Wemyss, Jan. 23rd, 1796.

" Dear Sir,

I give every respect to the solidity of your opinion, though it is contrary to my own.

It is impossible, however, that I can meet the legislature, until the persons of the Maroons, who have come in, are actually at Montego Bay.

It is impossible also that I can carry into effect those commands which have been given to me by his majesty, and which are rather of a secret nature.

When I enforce the measure of sending these Maroons to Montego Bay, I surely take off from you all responsibility respecting the bad effects of our taking such a step, for which I am alone answerable.

I therefore most earnestly and most pointedly request, that all the Maroons may be sent to Montego Bay, previous to the return of the dogs, excepting only a few, which you may keep, as being useful to you, as described in my letter to you of the 20th instant.

I remain yours very sincerely,

BALCARRES."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

" Jan. 27, 1796.

" Dear Sir,

I had the pleasure of your two letters last evening.

We have already secured advantages beyond either my own expecta-

tions, or any formed by the country. I have already realized everything pointed out to me in my instructions from his majesty. To allow eight Maroons to go into the woods, to endeavour to persuade people to come in, whom you yourself could not prevail upon, would be in contradiction to the spirit of my orders.

I am much afraid that you have not been able to carry into execution my orders of sending down the Maroons to Montego Bay. The delay is of the highest inconvenience. . . .

The opinions of his majesty's confidential servants are fixed and determined on the principles of carrying on this war. I feel and I know that I am acting with them in the orders I have given on the subject of sending the Maroons to Montego Bay. Nothing can be left, under these circumstances, to your discretion. My orders therefore are,

That the Maroons be sent down immediately to Montego Bay . . .
—If you wish to keep a few men with you, agreeably to my letters of the 20th and 23rd, you may; but even that goes much against my inclination. . . .

I am, &c. &c.

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Balcarres.

"Old Maroon Town, Jan. 29th, 1796.

"My Lord,

In obedience to your Lordship's orders, received this morning, I have sent the Maroons down to Montego Bay.

I cannot but lament that the opportunity (as far as I am capable of judging) of bringing in those at present out, should be thus lost. Positive I am, that, had your Lordship had the same opportunity of judging on the spot that I have, you would have been of the same opinion, and the war probably terminated.

From the information which I received from Smith, there seems to be but little chance of any but a Maroon discovering a Maroon, whenever these people are where they can remain quiet for any time. Dogs cannot scent but on a recent step; and I fear that the Maroons are

now so deep in the woods, that no expedition can be supported against them, without risking a failure of food and water for those animals, with a great probability, even if it could be sustained, of never finding the enemy. Had we accompanied Smith, we should, if they had not been induced to surrender, at all events have discovered where they were, and then could have pursued them. The die is cast, and it is now too late, unless they discover themselves; for I am told that the Spaniards say, that they could live in these woods for ever,—that they never saw such woods for sustenance anywhere.

Your Lordship will be so good as to let me have your orders,—but I could wish that nothing should be left to my discretion.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"Dromilly, 1st Feb. 1796.

"Dear Sir,

I am rejoiced to find that all the Maroons are now secured; but I am sorry that your judgment has differed with mine on the propriety of that measure.

Your requisition of twelve hundred negroes, I am afraid will startle the country, who believe, and I think with reason, that their efforts to crush this rebellion have nearly succeeded, and that they may look with some reasonable hope to their being suffered to go on with their crop, in a degree of tranquillity and repose.

Baggage negroes will be required, as usual, to attend any columns which you may send out; but if the 1,000 or 1,200 pioneers are wanted for the purpose of making roads and communications, I am of opinion that such a measure should be done by an act of the legislature, and not without it. I cannot, however, judge of it, as you have not mentioned the specific, or even the general purpose for which they are wanted.

With respect to the active operations of the war, our opinions have gone hand in hand, but although we cannot be too watchful to smother

the embers of rebellion, still I think you give much more consideration to the present state of the war than either I do or the country does.

My general notion of it is, that, the instant the reinforcement arrives, the militia may go home; if a further reinforcement is necessary, I think it should be dogs :—

That the duty of the regulars will be to guard the Maroon prisoners at the posts of Montego Bay, Falmouth, and St. Ann's, which last place some of the prisoners should be sent to from Montego Bay:—

That the troops should be so posted as to be able to furnish a column to move to any point where the rebels may appear, in a very short space of time; three posts are very evident, as being consonant with this idea, viz. Mocha, Dromilly, Old Town, and Vaughan's Field. I should have liked a division of the dogs to have been at each of these places; but at all events, Dromilly ought to be a post for one division.

My situation in this country, and the necessity I am under to attend personally when there is a meeting of the legislature, must confine me much to the fixing of general principles, which are founded both upon my instructions, public and private, from the king and his confidential servants, and also regulated by what relates to the civil government of the island. I know how pleasant it is to an officer to act under direct orders; the next pleasant circumstance is, to have the greatest latitude given, consistent with the absolute duty of the commander-in-chief or governor. But your request, to have nothing left to your discretion, is totally incompatible with the very high situation in which you are placed; I must leave much to your discretion, as having the chief command in my absence; and the great opinion I have had of the proper exercise of that discretion assuredly will justify the favourable report I have made to his majesty of your services in this war. *

I have the honour to be, dear Sir, yours sincerely,

BALCARRES."

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

[Number I.]

“ Castle Wemyss, 30 Jan. 1796.

“ Sir,

I had the honour to inform you, by my despatch of the 30th December, 1795, that I had entered into a treaty of peace with the Trelawney Maroons, which was duly signed, ratified, and exchanged. Two of the articles were very important, namely—the surrender of themselves and arms, and their giving up all the runaway slaves who had joined them in rebellion.—Notwithstanding that I had ratified the treaty, I had not the smallest confidence in their sincerity, and every preparation was made to continue the war with unabated vigour.

Three weeks having elapsed without any apparent intention on the part of the Maroons to fulfil the treaty, I ordered the Hon. Major General Walpole to move forward on the 14th instant, with a strong column of regular troops. He had only advanced some hundred yards, when a message was delivered from the Maroon chief, begging that no further hostile step should be taken. As we had experienced much duplicity and evasion, it was judged expedient to move slowly on, and the line of march was so arranged as to give the Maroons an opportunity of coming in with safety. This had the desired effect,—the Maroons, to the number of five hundred, surrendered themselves and were conducted within our posts. Including those whom I had formerly secured, I have in my possession near six hundred.

Thirty Maroon men, and one hundred women and children, still remain out,—of this number, several men are severely wounded, others are sick. I do not compute the effective Maroon warriors now in rebellion to exceed *fourteen*; and these are afraid to come in, from a consciousness of their crimes.

The Maroon rebellion, I think, is drawing to a close—and a substantial proof of my assertion is, that public credit, which was destroyed at the commencement of this revolt, is now completely restored. The general opinion is, that property has acquired a degree of security which it never had before in this island.

His majesty's forces, regulars and militia, have fought the rebels in more than twenty actions.* They have been impelled by one sentiment, that of crushing a most daring, unprovoked, and ungrateful rebellion.

I should, indeed, find it a most arduous task to detail individual merit. The efforts of the whole community have been directed to shew their attachment to his majesty and to maintain his government and their own happiness against all banditti whatsoever. I must, however, recommend to his majesty's notice the Hon. Major General Walpole,—and I am proud to say, that much is owing to his personal activity and excellent conduct.

Our success, though great, is not without its alloy. The Maroon rebels, like to other rebels, have found it easier to raise rebellion than to quell it.

* "Each," Lord B. says in another letter, "preceded by an ambush."

Runaway slaves are still in the woods, to the number nearly of one hundred and fifty, ill-armed and with very little ammunition. Their reduction may take some time, and create further expense and uneasiness to the country. But they merit the less consideration, as I am happy to give the most unqualified assurances of the excellent and peaceable disposition of the negro slaves throughout the island.

I shall certainly esteem it a most important part of my duty to watch over the embers of this rebellion, until I am satisfied of its being thoroughly extinguished. But I conceive I shall be enabled, on the arrival of the expected reinforcement, to give every relief to the militia, and permit them to return to their homes with those honours which they have so justly deserved.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

Supplement to my Letter, Number 1.

"I throw in this sheet, to mention one or two little circumstances.

When I say, credit is restored, I give the following anecdote. Lieutenant Colonel Shawe, an attorney, who is doing duty here as one of my militia aid-de-camps, received, previous to this rebellion, an order from the house of Manning in London to lend Mr. Shirley, of Jamaica, £40,000. At the troubles breaking out, he would not give Mr. Shirley a shilling of his clients'

money; but, upon the last batch of Maroons coming in, he let him have the £40,000 sterling.

With respect to the number of Maroons, I stated in a former letter, in August, that the number on July 1st, were 660.

We secured early in the business . . . 103

Surrendered now 481

In the woods now, men (thirty), women,
and children 130

Killed, died by sickness, and lost in the
woods 50—764.

The excess is accounted for by their numbers proving, as I suspected, more than were specified in the return, and also by a considerable number of runaway negroes who had joined them in rebellion and had come in as Maroons. Perhaps we must devote a number of these as victims to public justice. This I shall submit to his majesty's council, and the attorney-general, as, perhaps, their punishment may be the ground-work of a general amnesty.

I have the honour, &c.

B————.”

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

[Number II.] “Castle Wemyss, 30 Jan. 1796.

Sir,

In my letter, No. I., I have avoided giving any account of the arrangement of our line of march on the 14th instant. The disposition was this:—

The dogs and their keepers were placed at the head of the column, but when indications were shewn on the part of the Maroons of a desire to come in, the dogs were placed in the rear of the column.

As it is possible my letter, No. I., may be published, I have sunk the circumstance of the dogs, as that is an engine of war which many people may reprobate.—I shall soon make a report respecting these dogs, as it may deserve the attention of government.

The rebels have retired to some new retreat, which we have not as yet discovered.

Although the Maroons of Jamaica have got a blow nearly amounting to the extirpation of their principal nation, still they have not received the check to the extent that I wish.—The Maroons to windward have absolutely refused to obey any orders from me, and they have remained inactive, only waiting to see the event of the rebellion to leeward. The terror they have at the dogs, and the misery which the rebel Maroons have brought upon themselves, will probably operate to reduce these windward Maroons to submission on such terms as may leave no grounds to apprehend future danger to the island. This I shall probably effect by negotiation.* The security of the island, I think, is established by what

* “Although there are other Maroon tribes in this island still remaining, their power is at an end by the extirpating the Trelawney Maroons. Civil polity will produce the extinction of the rest, by mixing them in the mass of the free people.”—*Letter to the earl of Hardwicke.*

has already been done, and I assuredly shall take no step that can tend to throw the windward part of this island into a state of war.

It is proper that I should apprise you of one other circumstance.

I hold the treaty signed by Major General Walpole on the one part, Colonel Montague James, chief of the Maroons, on the other part, and ratified by me—absolutely as nothing. Exclusive of my having been obliged to move against them weeks after it was exchanged, the main article of it, viz. the surrender of the runaway slaves, is not fulfilled.

I believe Major General Walpole, and part of the country, think otherwise,—and should any difficulty arise respecting the disposal of the persons of the Maroon prisoners, I shall send to you the whole correspondence.* I have purposely kept out of the way of a meeting with the Maroons, consequently the country and myself are unfettered.

As General Walpole had the additional merit of going

* So much of this correspondence as is requisite to shew the progress of events and the commander-in-chief's sentiments and line of conduct, is inserted in this volume. The correspondence is printed entire in the "Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica in regard to the Maroon negroes, published by order of the Assembly." London, 8vo. 1796.

See also, for all that can be said on the other side of the question, Mr. Dallas's Hist. of the Maroons, ii., 173 sqq., and, for what Lord Balcarres calls *the key* to the whole business, his letter to Lord Hardwicke, *infra*, July 17, 1796.

unarmed into the woods, and held a conference with them, it is possible he may feel a delicacy which my public duty cannot allow me to support.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

"Jamaica, 15 Feb. 1796.

"Sir,

My letter of January 30th, apprised you that thirty Maroon men and one hundred women and children remained out in rebellion. I have now the honour to inform you, that, after having ineffectually searched for them from four different points, forty-three more have surrendered themselves, of which six are stout, able Maroon men. The Maroons now out consist of twenty four men, and sixty-three women and children. The body of runaway negro slaves, which I had the honour to state as being near one hundred and fifty, are still out; some, however, have come in, but I have not as yet been able to discover where the main body of them are gone to. I imagine that we shall be able to take off martial-law in the month of March, or as soon as the legislature shall have amended the Party act, under which I trust his majesty's regular troops will put an end to this disturbance.

The Maroons to windward still obstinately refuse to obey my orders. I believe they are actuated by their

fears of being laid hold of and sent off the country. From our great success against the Trelawney Maroons, and also from the favourable appearance of revolt in our favour in St. Domingo, we can have no dread of those windward Maroons.

Although I have not made up my mind as yet respecting the conduct that ought to be adopted, what I anxiously wish for is, peace in this island—so absolutely decided, that I may venture to throw some force into St. Domingo, as, under your late arrangement of the forces destined for the West Indies, even such a reinforcement as I can spare may be extremely well timed.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Balcarres.

" March 5th, 1796.

" My dear Lord,

The enclosed I send with all speed to your lordship, and give you joy of having again the opportunity of finally and effectually terminating the rebellion.

The letter is written in so much hurry as not to admit of giving any detail; but the affair I believe to be this:—That the Maroons, finding that we could get at them, sent forward Shawe, whilst the others were conveying, as well as they could, their families from the dogs. Nothing but the exhausted state of both the detachment and dogs would have prevailed, I am confident, on either the Spaniards or the 13th, to have continued the pursuit; but I fear there was no conquering the want of water; for nearly three days, I was a witness to it; and my reasons, under these circumstances, for permitting the detachment to go forward, your lordship is already in possession of.

I shall grant lives only. I have been too scandalously traduced already, to exert my judgment for the public good, notwithstanding your lordship's ratification of the terms heretofore granted. I shall endeavour to keep the matter afloat till I may be honoured with your lordship's commands; for I cannot but apprehend that they may make some effort to get to windward, desperate as it may appear, should they be dealt with too rigidly in their conceptions.

I hope that the country will not lose the opportunity.

I have the honour, &c.

G. WALPOLE."

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

"March 9, 1796.

"Dear Sir,

In your letter of the 5th instant, you write me that you have been too scandalously traduced already, to exert your judgment for the public good, notwithstanding my ratification of the terms heretofore granted.

This I do know, that all public men everywhere will be traduced by restless and violent characters,—but my ratifying the treaty which you signed sufficiently marks the support which I gave to that measure; and the respectable council that advised me to ratify it bears you out as well as myself. The same council expressed themselves in clear terms as to the assurance you gave the Maroons, that they should not be sent off the island; and it stands on the minutes taken at that council, that, provided the Maroons performed the first and third articles of the treaty, the secret article should be complied with.

Every man, however, will form his own opinion as to these two points,—First, whether or not the treaty is a wise one? Secondly, if it has been performed? It now lies before the Assembly, as well as our correspondence upon it, from the period of Colonel Hull's action to the moment of the Maroons coming in, inclusive, and also my letter dated 2nd of February.

In regard to the third article of the treaty, it stands upon a matter

of fact to establish whether the runaways were surrendered, agreeably to that article, or not.

As to the first and second articles, my mind is made up on the subject; and my opinion is, that if force had not been sent out against them, in conformity to my orders of the 14th of January, issued in consequence of my receiving your letter of that date, they would not have come in at all.

But from the high situation which you have filled, from the intercourse and conversation you have had with these Maroons, and, above all, that these unhappy people may have every circumstance adduced to the Assembly that can operate in their favour, it may be fair and right in you to give an opinion, if you are so inclined, how far, in your conception, these people have complied with the articles of that treaty.

I am perfectly aware, and shall hold in my recollection, the favourable opinion you have of the Smiths and Johnstone; and I shall represent it to the Assembly at a proper time. Whatever opinions we may hold respecting the treaty, we are united in the sentiment of bringing the business before the public in the fullest and fairest manner; and if the state of the war can permit of your absence, I could wish you here, that we might do it in conjunction.

I wish to make a remark upon the first part of your letter of the 5th, which runs in these words:—‘I give you joy of having again the opportunity of finally and effectually terminating the rebellion.’

This, I presume, alludes to the circumstance of your wishing to keep the Maroon prisoners at the Maroon Town, instead of sending them to the coast. I really cannot state this to have been a difference of opinion between yourself and me; and I am free to confess that their remaining in that situation might have been an inducement for those still out to have come in. But I thought it was playing too deep a game; and if the Maroons had given us the slip, I should have had a dreadful reckoning to account for to the king, this country, and my own tranquillity of mind.

I am, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the earl of Balcarres.

“ [Private] March 11th, 1796.

“ My dear Lord,

I must trouble your lordship with a few words in privacy and confidence.

For some days past I have been in a state of considerable uneasiness at a report, which seems to gain ground, that the legislature means to infringe the capitulation accepted by me and ratified by your lordship.

My lord, to be plain with you, it was through my means alone* that the Maroons were induced to surrender, from a reliance which they had on my word—from a conviction impressed upon them by me that the white people would never break their faith.

All these things strongly call upon me, as the instrumental agent in this business, to see a due observance of the terms, or in case of violation, to resign my command; and if that should not be accepted, to declare the facts to the world, and to leave them to judge how far I ought or ought not to be implicated in the guilt and infamy of such a proceeding. So much the more strong is this call upon me, as there was no occasion to ratify the terms; for your lordship will well recollect, that I told you at Castle Wemyss, that the time appointed by me for fulfilling them was expired, and the terms therefore null and void; but your lordship then thought, that there was so much advantage to the country in those terms, that it would be best not to give them up.

As the great object of the war is now declared to be accomplished, I shall shortly solicit your lordship for permission to return to England, with an intention to retire from the service.

I am, &c.

G. WALPOLE.”

* Lord Balcarres, I must remark, entertained, and has expressed, a totally different opinion.

To the Hon. Major General Walpole.

“ King’s House, 16 March, 1796.

“ Dear Sir,

If I had not looked upon the treaty signed by you as advantageous to the country under the existing circumstances, I never would have ratified it. But the country has a right to every advantage which that treaty affords; and I am decidedly of opinion, that if the terms of the treaty have been complied with by the Maroons, the country is bound in honour not to send them off the island. So far I go with you, and so far I will support you; but I shall certainly leave it with the legislature to decide whether that treaty has been observed or not,—indeed, they will decide that for themselves, as a matter of right inherent in them.

All I can say is, that I have not the smallest light upon what their decision will be; but I assure you, those strong sentiments which you have expressed relative to these Maroons shall be fairly canvassed. I do not enter into what the country, in its wisdom, ought to do. I feel we have done our duty as soldiers. The executive power, in my person, has amply supported you, by ratifying the treaty which you acceded to.

But, in a political consideration of this subject the country will not be guided either by your politics or mine. There is a word in your last letter, namely, *capitulation*, is used instead of *treaty*: it has always hitherto been mentioned as a treaty; perhaps it may be a distinction without a difference. Be it what it may, I look upon my responsibility to the public as *equally* committed; for surely, if there is any thing upon earth in which a legislature has a right to exercise its judgment, *it is internal rebellion*. Under the whole circumstances of the case, you have done extremely right in withholding any offer to the rebel Maroons still out, excepting *lives, and their being placed exactly in the same situation, and to share the fate, whatever it may be, of the Maroon prisoners now in our possession*. I cannot offer them more, until the sentiments of the legislature respecting those now in be communicated to me.

In respect to your going home, I shall be extremely happy in doing

whatever may be agreeable to yourself on this point. But I regret your determination of quitting the service, in which you are so well advanced.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"Jamaica, 26 March, 1796.

"My Lord Duke,

I have the satisfaction to inform your grace of the termination of the Maroon war.

Thirty-six Trelawney Maroons, and all the runaway negroes who had joined them in rebellion, surrendered their arms on the 17th and 21st March.

The Maroons to windward, who had shewn a most refractory and disobedient spirit since the commencement of the rebellion, have made their submission, and, on their knees, in the presence of commissioners, have sworn allegiance to his majesty. I shall, by the packet, enclose the commission, and the return upon it.

The most perfect internal tranquillity is restored to the island; the slaves on every plantation are obedient, contented, and happy.

Our operations against the rebels have been carried on with unremitting vigour. In following the enemy into their new recesses, the troops have undergone fatigue hardly to be credited. The last column which moved against them were five days without one drop of water, excepting what they found in the wild pines.

The rebels, worn out with fatigue, continually harassed, and disturbed in every new settlement, have been conquered in a country where no European had ever thought of penetrating.

Thus has ended the nation of Trelawney Maroons,—a people which historians assert were not to be overcome, but would ultimately acquire the dominion of this island.

The very fortunate close of this war is to be ascribed to the activity and good conduct of Major General Walpole,—and I most humbly recommend him to his majesty's favour.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

. HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.

Friday, April 22, 1796.

"Resolved, *nem. con.* That the receiver-general do remit the sum of seven hundred guineas to the agent of the island, for the purpose of purchasing a sword, to be presented to the Right Hon. ALEXANDER, Earl of BALCARRES,* as a testimony of the grateful sense which the house entertains of his distinguished services, dis-

* The same day, five hundred guineas were similarly voted for the presentation of a sword to General Walpole. He refused to accept it, on the idea that the treaty with the Maroons had been broken.

played both in the field and cabinet ; and under whose auspices, by the blessing of Divine providence, a happy and complete termination has been put to a most dangerous rebellion of the Trelawney Town Maroons, whereby the general value of property, as well as security of the island, have been highly augmented.

Ordered, that a copy of the above resolution be sent to his honour, the lieutenant-governor."

Saturday, April 30.

The lieutenant-governor's answer to the message from the House, with the resolution of the 22nd inst.

" Mr. Speaker, and Gentlemen of the House of Assembly,

The present you have made me, by your unanimous resolution of the 22nd instant, is inestimable.

A soldier's honour, with emblem and emphasis, is placed in his sword ; and I shall transmit your precious gift to my posterity, as an everlasting mark of the reverence, the attachment, and the gratitude I bear to the island of Jamaica.

BALCARRES."

The following address was this day presented to his honour, the lieutenant-governor :—

" We, his majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects, the Assembly of Jamaica, beg leave to offer to your honour our most sincere and cordial congratulations on the happy and complete termination of the rebellion of the Trelawney Town Maroons.

This great and important event must be productive of substantial benefits and salutary consequences to the country, in every point of view in which it can be contemplated; tranquillity and the enjoyment of our civil rights are restored; public credit, so essential to the support of government, and to the prosperity, if not to the very existence, of the country, is re-established; and our internal security greatly increased and confirmed.

From all these inestimable advantages, we look forward with confidence to the augmentation of the value of property, which is likely to take place; and which, in time, we trust, will compensate all the losses and expenditure of treasure unavoidably incurred in the prosecution of the war.

It is with peculiar satisfaction and gratitude we acknowledge the lively impression made on us by the energy displayed by your lordship in difficult operations of war; which affords the most convincing proof, that the zeal, ardour, and activity manifested in your military conduct, have only been equalled by the sound policy and decisive measures, which marked the wisdom of your councils."

HIS HONOUR'S ANSWER.

"Mr. Speaker, and Gentlemen of the House of Assembly,

Your address excites in my bosom every sensation of pleasure the mind of man is capable of receiving.

The picture you have drawn of the future prosperity of the island, is strong and impressive.

After contemplating the unavoidable calamities of war, a sentiment arises, grateful and soothing to a feeling heart—

That, during your contest with an enemy the most ferocious that ever disgraced the annals of history,—

That, during your contest with an army of savages, who have indiscriminately massacred every prisoner whom the fortune of war had placed in their power—no barbarity, nor a single act of retaliation, has sullied the brightness of your arms.

I pray that the energy, the vigour, and the humanity, which you have so honourably displayed, may descend to your children, and secure to them for ever those blessings which you have hitherto enjoyed, under the mild and happy government of the illustrious House of Hanover.”

PART III.

PART III.

To the duke of Portland.

“Jamaica, 17 April, 1796.

“My Lord Duke,

I have the honour to enclose to your grace the resolutions of a secret committee, formed from the two branches of the legislature of this island.

The committee consists of twelve,—three from the Council, and nine from the House of Assembly.

The matter under their discussion was,—the future disposal of the persons of the Trelawney Maroons, and also the situation of those slaves who had joined them in rebellion and are now our prisoners. The question being of the greatest importance to the general interest of the island, the House of Assembly named three members from the three different counties. The resolutions this joint committee have come to, are founded upon a chain of evidence, commencing with the proposals which were made by the Maroons for peace, accepted by General Walpole, and ratified by myself. And also upon a chain of circumstances that took place from the day of ratifi-

cation to the period of the final surrender of the whole.

I have thought it my duty to submit to your grace copies of all the correspondence and papers which I laid before the committee, on which they have in great measure founded their report. And I feel the necessity of sending these papers, as a violent opposition party in this country have asserted that we have broken faith with the Maroons, the fallacy of which will stand exposed on reading these papers.

Although the committee have closed their report, it is not as yet presented. But I lay it before your grace, as sufficiently authentic.

In the course of this service, I have met with republican and inflammatory principles where I least expected them,—I have sailed over a sea of prejudice. I look upon the enclosed address of his majesty's council as flattering in the extreme, being the winding up of a business, the aspect of which made me tremble. As soon as the report is made, a similar one will be presented by the House of Assembly.

The war has been expensive. The country have thought fit to incur that expense in their own way; and the appointment of commissioners in each parish was not the most likely mode to do it at the cheapest rate. Although the nature of such appointments is, in my conception, objectionable in principle, still it was attended with much energy and effect.

My idea is, that the amount of the expense will be

near £350,000 sterling, which will be paid off in two years. There is not one dissenting voice in the whole country, of any respectability, in the opinion that the money is well laid out.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"Jamaica, 20 April, 1796.

"My Lord Duke,

Among the papers submitted to the committee of the two houses of the legislature of this island, an extract from your grace's letter of the ———, addressed to me, has given most peculiar satisfaction. Your grace has there anticipated both the wishes and policy of the island, in adopting the measure of sending off the rebel Maroons to another country. I have embarked about eight hundred of them on the northern side of the island, about two hundred of which may be runaway slaves, and some women attending them. The number to be shipped off I should guess to be from four hundred and fifty to five hundred, of which one half nearly may be men and boys. On their arrival at Port Royal harbour, I shall move them from the small craft into two of the transports now lying in that harbour; and they must proceed to sea with the convoy which will sail, I believe, on the 1st of June, but possibly on the 21st May.

I cannot possibly divine your grace's sentiments or resources, as to the future fixing of this people. New Brunswick may, perhaps, be a likely place for establishing them. The price of provisions here is enormous at this moment, and a scarcity, almost bordering upon famine, is to be apprehended. At Halifax they will be fed at much less than half the rate they are now subsisted at. I have therefore consulted with Rear Admiral Parker, who will order the two transports to proceed to Shelbourne Bay, under convoy of the *Dover*, (old 44,) employed in the transport service; and they will keep company with the homeward-bound fleet, as long as their lines of voyage are the same.

The admiral will write to Admiral Murray, and I shall submit the case to the governor and commander-in-chief at Halifax, who, I believe, is H. R. H. Prince Edward.

I have no doubt that, however unwilling they may be to admit a tribe that have ever proved so dangerous, they will not refuse the two vessels anchorage-ground, until your grace's commands shall arrive respecting these Maroons and the transports. . . .

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

“Jamaica, 8 May, 1796.

“My Lord Duke,

I have the honour to enclose to your grace the report of the joint committee of the general assembly of this island.

This committee have made their report to their respective houses, after a very minute investigation, which had in its object, not only the wisdom of the measures it recommends, but also the strict preservation of the honour and the public faith of Jamaica. Your grace will observe, that it discriminates between the various classes of the rebels, and the dates and circumstances under which they respectively surrendered. I am, however, to inform your grace, that, although some of the Maroons are permitted to remain in the island, they decline accepting the indulgence, and have petitioned me to be sent off. Many other Maroons, whom Major General Walpole has recommended to a similar indulgence, have also declined accepting it, and the reasons they give, are—that, when they were embarked on the north side of the island, to be brought round, it was done amidst the execrations of the whole people, and, they say, they wish to go, because they see that neither the whites nor browns will ever forgive them.*

* “I have spent,” says Mr. Quarrell, in a letter to Lord Balcarres, same date as the above, “a considerable part of this day on board of the Dover and the other transports with the Maroons, and from long conver-

By the last packet I sent your grace a report of the joint committee, although it was not at that moment presented to their respective houses. I then told your grace that my intention was to send them to Halifax, there to remain until his majesty's commands shall be signified as to their ultimate destination.

Upon my receiving your grace's letter of the ———, and Mr. Dundas's letter, dated the ———, I felt myself less inclined to take responsibility to any great extent, and therefore wrote the enclosed letter to Admiral Parker. I also enclose his answer, by which you will perceive that I am driven by necessity to the measure of sending the Maroons away. For, I assure your grace, that I could not reland them, without exposing the Maroons to be torn in pieces by the people, or creating such a clamour as would go very near to the adopting the most violent means of enforcing the sending of them away. The very shipping of these people has already made a spring in property of at least 15 *per cent*.

sations with Johnson, Smith, Shaw, and other of their chiefs, I find that their minds are perfectly made up to leave the country, strongly impressed with the opinion that they could never live in security or quiet with the free people of colour and negroes in the island. They in general look very well, are quiet, and express no other concern but at the delay of their sailing. Many of them have demands in the country, of which I have taken a list, and shall collect them. They are not without money, and individuals are pretty rich,—the plunder obtained at Gowdy's and elsewhere is not expended. The following are possessed of slaves, which they have desired me to apply to your lordship for permission to dispose of," &c. &c.

I do not think his majesty's ministers have ever thoroughly known either the difficulties of my situation, or the full extent of danger to which this island stood exposed.

I have, &c.

BALCARRES."

REPORT, ETC.

[Enclosed in the preceding Letter.]

" Wednesday, 20th April, 1796.

" Mr. Murray, from the special secret committee appointed to join a special secret committee of the council, in a free conference on matters of business of the utmost importance to the island, reported,

That both committees accordingly met; and his honour the lieutenant-governor's message of the 2nd day of March last, and the papers therewith sent, and his honour's message of the 23rd March last, and the papers therewith sent, also a petition of sundry persons known under the denomination of Maroons, presented to the house on the 30th day of November last, and also his honour's message of the 3rd day of December last, and the petition of the Trelawney Maroons then in Kingston barracks, therewith sent, were severally read; and also an extract of a letter from his grace the duke of Portland to his honour the lieutenant-governor, to the said report respectively annexed, having been laid before the joint committee by his honour, the same were also severally read: And that the joint committee having proposed certain questions in writing to his honour the lieutenant-governor, which questions and his honour's answers thereto are to the said report annexed, the joint committee thereupon came to the following resolutions:—

1st. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that all runaway slaves, who joined the Trelawney Maroons in rebellion, ought to be dealt with according to law.

2nd. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that all persons of free condition, who joined the rebels, ought to be dealt with according to law.

3rd. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that the thirty-one Maroons who surrendered at Vaughan's Field, under the proclamation of the 8th of August, together with the six deputies taken up at St. Ann's, having come in before any actual *hostilities* commenced, should be sent off the island, and some settlement provided for them in another country.

4th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that Smith, Dunbar, and Williams, with their wives and children, and the two boys who came in on the 1st of January, are entitled to the benefit of the treaty.

5th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that all the Maroons who are confined in Kingston, Falmouth, and elsewhere, that have petitioned the honourable House of Assembly to be permitted to take the benefit of an act, passed in the year 1791, intituled, "An Act to repeal 'An Act for the better order and government of the negroes belonging to the several negro towns, and for preventing them from purchasing of slaves; and for encouraging the said negroes to go in pursuit of runaway slaves; and for other purposes therein mentioned,' and for giving the Maroon negroes further protection and security; for altering the mode of trial; and for other purposes,"—not having been at any time in rebellion, be allowed to do so, according to the prayer of their petition.

6th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that the Maroons who petitioned his honour, the lieutenant-governor, on the 3rd of November last, (the thirty one Maroons who surrendered at Vaughan's Field excepted,) being also guiltless of any act of rebellion, be likewise admitted to take the benefit of the said act.

7th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that all the Maroons who surrendered after the first of January, and until the 10th day of March last, (within which period Johnstone and his party came in,) not having complied with the terms of the treaty, are not entitled to the benefit thereof, and ought to be shipped off the island; but the joint committee are of opinion, that they ought to be sent to a country

in which they will be free, and such as may be best calculated, by situation, to secure the island against the danger of their return; that they ought to be provided with suitable clothing and necessaries for the voyage, and maintained at the public expense of this island for a reasonable time after their arrival at the place of their destination.

8th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that Parkinson and Palmer, and all the Maroons who came in with them, are entitled to their lives only, but ought to be sent off the island; and as their conduct was marked by aggravated guilt, they ought, in the manner of their being sent off the island, to be dealt with more rigorously than those in the class mentioned in the preceding resolution.

9th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that as there may be among the rebels a few who, by their repentance, services, and good behaviour since their surrender, may have merited protection and favour, that it be recommended to his honour, the lieutenant-governor, to permit such to remain in the island, together with their wives and children; and to distinguish them by any other marks of favour, as his honour in his discretion may think proper.

10th. That it is the opinion of the joint committee, that the lieutenant-governor, in complying with the matters mentioned and recommended in the preceding resolutions, should be fully indemnified at the public expense."

Extract of a letter from his grace the duke of Portland, to his honour the lieutenant-governor, referred to in the annexed report, dated Whitehall, 8th January, 1796.

"From the cordiality and zeal with which the militia and the inhabitants in general co-operate with your lordship, I have no doubt of your being able to take such measures against the Maroons as will most speedily and effectually tend to their reduction.

The very defence which, from their local situation and other causes, they have been able to make against a very superior force, renders it essential that the island, in any terms which may be granted them, should be secured against the possibility of a similar insurrection.

This will, I conceive, be best effected, first, by not restoring to them their district ; and secondly, by placing them in such a situation within the island (if it cannot be done out of it, which would be preferable) as will, from its nature, incapacitate them from contriving further mischief."

Questions proposed to his honour the lieut.-governor, and his honour's answers thereto, referred to in the annexed report.

Q. ' Whether General Walpole, upon the surrender of Palmer and Parkinson, and other Maroons in their party, had promised anything more than safety of their lives ?'

A. ' Lives only.'

Q. ' Upon what terms were Harvey and Williams, the two brown men, received, and did they surrender in the character of negroes ?'

A. ' They surrendered as Maroons, without any special conditions, and after January 1st.'

Q. ' Were the runaways surrendered by the Maroons, and were they received upon any express terms ?'

A. ' No runaways have been surrendered by the Maroons ; they came in in the character of Maroons.'

*To His Royal Highness Edward, Duke of Kent,
Governor of Halifax.*

" Jamaica, 3 June, 1796.

" Sir,

The general assembly of Jamaica have decided upon the fate of the Maroons lately in rebellion. They have determined, that they shall not remain in this island, and, from the knowledge these Maroons have of the very strong fastnesses in the interior of this colony, it would be risking too much to re-establish them.

The legislature of this island have passed an act, making it felony for these Maroons to return to Jamaica ; their future destination must, of course, be fixed by his majesty. These Maroons are now in three transport-ships,—the *Dover*, Lieut. Wilson, (44,) is one of the three vessels. I could wish extremely to keep them in Port Royal Bay in Jamaica until the king's pleasure should be known ; but the very great scarcity of provisions that now unfortunately prevails here, and the convenience of getting the transports, put me under the necessity of sending them away to another port. I have therefore to request that they may be permitted to come to anchor at Halifax, until his majesty's pleasure is signified. And from the early intimation I have given to his majesty's ministers respecting the temporary allotment of these people, there cannot be a doubt but orders will arrive on the subject at Halifax, about three weeks after your royal highness may receive this letter.

One of the members of the House of Assembly, Mr. Quarrell, accompanies the Maroons. He has a letter of credit, and is very deserving of any attention that may be paid to him. He has, also, a commission, which he will, of course, lay before your royal highness.

It would be a most fortunate and pleasing circumstance to the island of Jamaica, the permitting Mr. Quarrell to purchase some lands in Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, for the settling of these Maroons ; and he is charged with instructions, should this be granted to them,

to provide suitable clothing, implements, and whatever else is deemed necessary for their establishment.

I have the honour to remain, &c.

BALCARRES."

Two Letters to Charles Yorke, Esq., published, with comments, by the writer, Lord Balcarres.

Number I.

"Jamaica, May 2, 1796.

"Dear Sir,

General M——, on the authority of a low, private letter, has arrogated to himself the right to call me to the bar of the House of Lords.

If I stand charged at the bar of that august tribunal, I presume it will be at the instance of all the commons of Great Britain,—not at the pleasure of General M——, who seems to have forgot the primary principles of the British constitution.

My public character is never prominent; but, when contrasted with that of the honourable general, I think it is at least a matter of doubt which of us may first appear as a culprit at the bar of that right honourable house.

The general has honoured me with the endearing names of friend and fellow-soldier.

I dined twice in company with him during my whole life.

I am gratified by being classed as his fellow-soldier, but I lament I never had the good fortune to serve one hour with him in any country.

The only circumstance the general in his kindness and friendship has omitted, is the calling me his fellow-citizen.

I have the honour to be,
 Very faithfully and sincerely yours,
 BALCARRES."

*Copy of a letter from the Hon. Major General Walpole to the earl of Balcarres, dated Jan. 1, 1796.**

"My dear Lord,

I now give the matter up; only Smith, Williams, and two boys are here; I shall send them to Falmouth to-morrow. I suppose that your lordship will admit them to the terms of the treaty, upon which they have surrendered.

I fear that our baggage negroes will not be here in time for me to move after these rascals in the morning, and that I must postpone it till Sunday. In this case, I shall endeavour to seduce the Maroons still to keep near us.

Your lordship shall hear the result as soon as possible.

Should any future parley proceed from them, I shall refer them to your lordship.

I have the honour," &c.

* January 1st was the day appointed for carrying into execution the treaty ratified on the 28th of Dec. 1795, by which the Maroons stipulated to surrender themselves, and give up all the runaway slaves who had joined them in rebellion.

Extract of a letter from the Hon. Major General Walpole to the earl of Balcarres, dated Jan. 5, 1796.

“The Spaniards are, I fear, a little out of temper. If they cannot be kept, it would be better to avail ourselves of the breach of the treaty by the Maroons themselves, and move on,—as nothing can be clearer than that all treaty would soon terminate were they off the island.”

Copy of a letter from the earl of Balcarres to Major General Campbell, dated Castle Wemyss, 16 Jan. 1796.

“I have great satisfaction in announcing to you, that, in consequence of orders which I issued to Major General Walpole, he moved forward with a strong column of regulars, accompanied by the Spaniards and the dogs.

He had only advanced some hundred yards, when a Maroon delivered a message from Johnstone. As he had experienced much trifling evasion and insincerity, it was judged expedient to move slowly on, merely taking the precaution of keeping the dogs in the rear of the column.

In consequence of this arrangement of the line of march, which I conceive was both firm and temperate, the Maroons, to the number of two hundred and sixty, have surrendered.

I have in my possession, of Trelawney Maroons, upwards of four hundred persons, of whom I count about one hundred and thirty men. Some of the young Maroons are still out, but I think we have a near and happy prospect of extinguishing the embers of this rebellion.”

(Signed)

BALCARRES.”

Number II.

“Dear Sir,

Do the above papers prove those crimes and cruelties imputed to me by the hon. general?

Do they prove any forwardness on my part to use these dogs as a dreadful instrument of war?

Is it of any weight that not a drop of blood was shed by these animals?

These dogs were brought here at the instance of the general assembly of Jamaica, who sent one of their own members to procure them, one of their own ships to convey them, and were at the sole expense.*

It is most strange that the use which the Spaniards made of blood-hounds against the Indian inhabitants of the western world, should be deemed by the honourable general a case parallel to ours.

The Spaniards sent them, for *attack* and *robbery*, against the peaceful proprietors of those countries.

This island has brought dogs (not blood-hounds, as they are styled) *for their own defence*, and *for their own protection*, against a banditti who had entered into a most dangerous and ungrateful rebellion.†

These Maroon savages‡ possessed a country the most

* “Apropos to the chasseurs and the dogs”—says Lord Balcarres, in a subsequent letter to the duke of Portland, “I have just discovered a letter, of which I send an extract; it not only shews that Jamaica had formerly used such an instrument *unimpeached*, but also that the measure of sending for these dogs had been adopted during the lives of the present generation.”

† “Let us pause for a moment on the dreadful consequences, had those assassins succeeded,—certainly no less than a general revolt and the massacre of all the white people of Jamaica.”

‡ “I served last war with eleven nations of Indian savages. Their

tremendous, into which no European had ever dared to penetrate.

dress is not more wild and fantastic than that of the Maroon savage ; but the one is a real character, the other an assumed one.

“ In war, a Maroon savage goes through his exercise with his hair plaited, his face besmeared, and his body painted the colour of the ground or foliage ; he conceals himself ; when discovered, he twists and turns to avoid his enemy’s fire,—he throws his arms in the air with wonderful agility, and when a victim falls, the children rush forward, and with their knives close the scene.

“ As it suits their views, all this is reversed ; they change with their dress their ferocity ; they assume the most mild and most insinuating manners ; they descend from their mountains to the plains, and mix with civilized society ;—the proprietors of estates dare not, however, refuse them any thing they ask.

“ Looking at the country in a military [point of] view, it is this :—These Maroons possessed a district, in the rear of their town, of amazing strength ; and their policy was such as to deter all Europeans from approaching it.

“ This country is in the centre of the island, and is surrounded by plains which, in the value of their produce and consequential effects, employ forty millions of British capital.

“ To reduce my argument, as I would do a chart by a pentagraph, the power of these Maroons was that of a fort on an eminence which commands the plains below it :—that the Maroons understood this, is evident ; and the bolder sister of a bold and noted Maroon, on the first day of the rebellion, took the title of Queen of Montego Bay.

“ In attacking the Maroons in their district, my line of operation was more than twenty miles long, the last six miles of which was through tracks and glades of which the military term *defile* can give no adequate idea ; and notwithstanding our unremitted exertions, at no time could we bring up a force nearly equal in numbers to our enemy. Delay, in my opinion, would have produced as fatal effects, and was as much to be dreaded by us, as a defeat.”

Their skill and ability in planting ambushes, made it impossible to reduce them by ordinary means.

Our skill and ability started these ambushes by extraordinary measures—measures justified in the eye of God and man.

An instrument of war* is in one case fair, and in another unfair.

Why do the laws and customs of war authorize a fort to fire red-hot shot, and deny it to a ship of war? The reason is obvious; the one is defence, and the other aggression.

It is upon that principle that I used the instrument in question in Jamaica.

It is upon that principle that I have refused it to St. Domingo, who offered to reimburse to the island the expense, provided they could get the dogs.

* “Why did the late earl of Chatham make use of such an instrument of war as savages?”

“Why did those great and illustrious characters, Lord Amherst and Marquis Townshend, avail themselves of such an instrument?”

“That reason is also obvious:—If those officers had neglected to use them, the enemy would; and a dreadful responsibility would immediately attach,—no less than the sacrificing the lives of his majesty’s subjects, of wounding the sensibility, and committing the honour of their sovereign.

“In that case, which was supported by General Burgoyne, it was a fair instrument of war. But, if the neutrality of those savages could have been secured, the mildness of the British government would have absolutely fixed it an unfair instrument.”

I refused them in the one case, because territory was to be acquired ;

I employed them in the other case, because territory is to be maintained by every possible means that resource can suggest.

I *must* be judged by my actions ; I desire no screen, no shelter, but the honour of my own mind.—But I publicly avow, in the face of the world,

That if necessity had obliged me to use those dogs, I should have had exactly that compunction which yourself might have felt, if a murderer* had entered your gates, and was torn by your house-dog.

I have the honour to remain,

Very faithfully and sincerely yours,

BALCARRES."

* "Let Britain shed her tears—let the strong nerves of Englishmen be unstrung—when I relate that the decollated head of the brave and gallant Colonel Fitch was found entombed in his own person, and both denied the rites of sepulture.

"One of the Maroon chiefs, in his *civilized* state, was overseer on the property of a Mr. Gowdie, who had always been an affectionate and indulgent master to him ; he came to the house of his benefactor, murdered his nephew, murdered himself,—and gave as his reason, that all the Maroons had taken an oath to kill every white person. All our evidence establishes that the Maroons had entered into this obligation.

"Let this affecting narrative close with a melancholy truth, that all the prisoners who fell into their hands were murdered in cold blood ; and the shrieks of some of the miserable victims were distinctly heard by their fellow-soldiers.—But let this island and the empire rejoice, that no barbarity, no act of retaliation, has disgraced the national character of virtue and humanity."

To the duke of Portland.

“Jamaica, 9 May, 1796.

“My Lord Duke,

In reply to your grace's letter of the 3rd of March, I have, very shortly, to observe—That what I have done admits of no medium. I have either deserved the thanks of my country, or I merit to be branded with infamy, and separated from society as a monster of cruelty and barbarity.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the same.

“Jamaica, 9th May, 1796.

“My Lord Duke,

In obedience to his majesty's commands, signified in your grace's letter of the 3rd of March, I shall endeavour to collect as many of the dogs as I can. But, the most of them being private property, I neither know where they are, nor can I enforce their being given up. However, such as I can procure shall be sent back immediately to Cuba.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the same.

“Jamaica, 9 May, 1796.

“My Lord Duke,

The island of Jamaica having conferred upon me a mark of their esteem, by presenting me with a sword, I must remind your grace that it is not lawful for me to accept of any present, until I have his majesty's permission.

I therefore most humbly entreat his royal consent, to enable me to accept the very precious gift that is so tendered to me.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the countess of Hardwicke.

“Jamaica, 10 May, 1796.

“Dear Lady Hardwicke,

I thought the saving of Jamaica and seventy millions of British capital was rather a good service.

I find, however, that a man may lose empires, provided he does it only in a regular way.

Thanks to Yorke! He is the only man who has ventured to say that a man of character may be consistent. My actions will bear me out, and as they are before the public, honest ministers have no medium; they must censure or applaud. . .

As to the propriety of what I have done, it can admit of no doubt. Ministers have got alarmed at the nature of the business, and I must have been sacrificed if I had not succeeded.

Yours ever affectionately,

BALCARRES.”

To the same.

“Jamaica, 23 May, 1796.

“Dear Lady Hardwicke,

Mr. Foster Barham has taken up my cause, and that of Jamaica, so warmly that I have addressed a letter to him, as preparatory to my defence on the attack of Mr. Shcridan, as to the justice of the war, and its principle of being a war of extermination.—I can easily perceive that this business is not nearly finished, and that it will come forward again in the course of the next session of parliament.

Although the Maroqns are extirpated, and that I have taken and dispersed four hundred slaves who had joined them in rebellion, there are a few slaves straggling in these fastnesses, who have descended last week into the plains, endeavoured to murder one man, and have severely wounded another. Sorry I am to say, that no party is equal to march against so small and apparently so insignificant a force; with the scenting-dogs which I had here, these men could have been followed and secured in a few days,—at present, they are exactly the foundation of a new race of Maroon savages. I have done *my* business, and let future governors save the island in their own way, and by their own resources, as they can. I certainly feel at present more obliged to my personal friends at home than to his majesty’s ministers; perhaps a necessity existed for them to stand between the king and a measure which might be unpopular in the first instance, and stamped with opprobrium in the second. However, one thing is certain, that, if I had not succeeded, poor Pil must have gone to the wall. . .

Yours affectionately,

BALCARRES.”

To Foster Barham, Esq.

“Sir,

I return you my most sincere thanks for the very manly and generous manner in which you have

supported my conduct in the measures I adopted for the reduction of the rebel Maroons.

I am astonished to find it has been asserted that the militia of Jamaica have been employed solely against the Maroons.

The militia here were called out upon the same principle by which the militia of England were embodied. Danger was in every quarter—the island swarmed with multitudes of French people of colour, that had been introduced to raise an insurrection—half the negroes on every estate were ready to revolt; but the quickness of my movements to crush the rebellion forced the slaves to wait the event of the Maroon war.

The rapidity of our march with the light dragoons inspired them with such terror as to prove to me the happy effects that must positively result by my continuing to work upon that passion,—and this principle of the war I never lost sight of.

Four hundred negroes did, however, join them in rebellion. And if I had not taken the precaution of destroying all the ground-provisions in the neighbourhood of the Maroon town, this island was to a certainty gone.

Had I delayed one moment, I should have had it only in my power to have informed his majesty and the people of England, with much correctness and great precision, of those causes by which the valuable island of Jamaica had been lost for ever to the British empire.

Had I hesitated an instant, no after exertion of mine

could have prevented a general massacre of all the whites in the island.

My responsibility is immense—not only the lives of his majesty's subjects, but also the preservation to the empire of seventy millions sterling of British capital, dependent on the prosperity of this island.

As to the justice of the war:—The first intelligence I had of hostility was an overt act of rebellion on the part of the negroes by driving away their superintendent, and a public determination of those savages for war at all events against the *country*, signed by their colonel in his own name, and in the name of all the rest of the Maroons,—which was most duly notified. This was accompanied by entreaties from the country for troops to protect them.

I thought the danger of magnitude, and marched against the rebels myself, but did not attack the Maroons before they attacked me; and it is notorious, that his majesty's troops were fired upon, and numbers killed, before one single shot was returned.

You know the constitution of Jamaica, and that it is not in the power of any governor, or commander-in-chief, to make war either from his own caprice, or on any urgency whatever.

Martial-law can only be declared with the advice and opinion of a council of war.

This council of war is composed of all the members of his majesty's council, of the members of the House of Assembly, field-officers, &c.

I laid before his majesty's council the several papers which I had received, and the council advised me to call a council of war.

A majority of the General Assembly were actually present at the council of war, and, on due investigation, unanimously voted for the declaring of martial-law.

More formality, more cool and temperate discussion, could not have been observed, nor could the sense of the country be more honourably or more effectually taken.

The acrimony of those people who seem to have no other wish than to plant the seeds of discord and confusion in the British empire, makes no impression upon me; but I will tell those worthy characters, that neither themselves nor any man alive shall instruct me how I am to defend my post. I am solely responsible for it, and when my general conduct is disapproved at home, his majesty will no doubt fix that responsibility upon some other person better qualified for the important charge of Jamaica than

Your most obliged humble servant,

BALCARRES."

To the earl of Hardwicke.

[With copies of correspondence with General Walpole.]

"July 17, 1796.

"My dear Lord,

. . . General Walpole has ventured to accuse this respectable country "of a breach of faith towards the Maroons." That General Walpole was the first man

who asserted that the Maroons had violated the treaty, stands established by himself.

The ground he now takes is, that the treaty should have continued open from the 1st to the 14th of January.

I should with pleasure have extended that indulgence, if, even on that day, the Maroons had complied with the first and third articles, so that the country might then have enjoyed a state of peace instead of a state of war.

I have done General Walpole ample justice as a soldier. I look on the fair side of all men's actions, and although I had reason to be somewhat uneasy at his not securing such of the Maroons as did come in between the 15th of January and the —, still I looked on General Walpole's exertions in getting in the remaining part of the Maroons as meriting the honourable mention of his name,—and I accordingly recommended him to his majesty.

But in the same proportion I condemn his after conduct as a politician.

. . . I well knew the cautions that were required to be taken in the steps of internal rebellion; and the consequences of my having taken every precaution, both as a soldier and as a man acquainted with the constitution of this island, have borne me out against a host of enemies. . .

The intention of this letter is, to give the key to this business.

The only disaffected parish in this island is the parish

of St. James, which was the principal seat of the Maroon war.

Notwithstanding the general support which I got from the other parts of the country, this parish did everything they could to thwart all my measures, both military and civil. The head of the party is a Major James, a bold, violent, and determined man, who had been formerly superintendent of the Maroons, which he had been forced to resign. This man rules a party in that parish with a rod of iron. The party, though small, was, however, formidable, as having in it two gentlemen who hold the rank of majors-general in the militia, both of whom opposed me in everything. This Major James I have ever looked upon as the head of that rebellion, and I had it in serious contemplation, in conjunction with the attorney-general, to prosecute him for high treason.

Finding myself thus opposed, and being under the necessity of leaving the seat of war to meet the General Assembly, it was found indispensably requisite that a regular officer should be advanced to a rank which would supersede these two militia generals. This is the history of the rank of major-general, which I gave, *pro tempore*, to Lieut. Col. Walpole; and, in order to give him further power to counteract this faction, I invested him, by general orders, with every power in that district that I could confer,—and nothing short of that was up to the case, so as to defeat the evil without plunging the country into confusion.

I am sorry to say that General Walpole yielded to the intrigues of this party, and submitted to be entirely ruled by these designing men, who alone formed his councils and governed him in everything.

Their interested policy made it necessary to create a schism, if possible, between the first and second in command.

Hence,

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES."

To the duke of Portland.

"July 17th, 1796.

"My Lord Duke,

I trust your grace will forgive me for using the freedom to refer you to the letter I have written to Lord Hardwicke, analyzing and commenting upon General Walpole's correspondence.

The truth is, that General Walpole was led astray by evil and designing men so very far indeed, as imposes the necessity upon me to confute by evidence and proof those most extraordinary and wild opinions which he has advanced.

I have troubled your grace with general reasoning only, and, as I think it impossible that I can be incorrect in it, my wish is to stop short there, if it can be done with propriety; but it is most highly proper that your grace should have an opportunity (if you choose it) to

make yourself master of the whole circumstances,—and that may be done without bringing the matter to public controversy by the line I have adopted. . .

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

To the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

“Jamaica, 1 Oct. 1796.

“Sir,

By the duke of Portland’s letter to me, of the 12th July, I evidently see that a most unfair impression is made on the mind of his grace by Colonel Walpole. I shall only say, that I am at issue with the colonel upon all public points, and the business (as far as it relates to him) lies completely and clearly stated in the hands of Lord Hardwicke, to which reference may be immediately had.

I therefore wrote to his grace the enclosed letter,—the arrival of the Westmoreland packet has prevented me sending it. I find the people of England are with me, but, as it is highly probable that the propriety of many points in that Maroon war may be the subject of public discussion, I take the liberty to send the letter to you, as being a short abstract of the whole; and I well know that you will give it that liberal exposition which a soldier, who has acted upon upright intentions, may expect to receive from a fair and liberal investigation.—Should it be deemed worthy to be laid before his majesty,

it would be a comfort indeed to me,—and as nothing is more interesting to me than the preservation of the esteem of the duke of Portland, I should be very happy in his receiving it, though not officially.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.”

“Jamaica, 1 Oct. 1796.

“My Lord Duke,

I am honoured by your grace's letter of the 12th July, which relates to our sending the Maroons to Halifax, and also to the proposed removal of the 20th regiment of light dragoons. I am now to reply to what regards the Maroons, and in my following number I shall enter into the business of the 20th.

I should, unquestionably, have preferred the detaining of the Maroons in Port Royal harbour until instructions should have arrived from your grace; but the scarcity of all kinds of provisions, and an appearance of famine, made it impossible to subsist them here. Immediately on their departure, Indian corn rose in price from 10s. to 32s. 6d. per bushel. Rear Admiral Parker gave his consent to our using the transports for the purpose of conveying the Maroons to Halifax, but gave most powerful reasons why those transports could not remain in the harbour of Port Royal. The temper of the island was so justly irritated against those Maroons, that it would have been unsafe to have relanded them.

The humanity of the measure, and not its severity,

was another cause which most powerfully operated. Those people, if relanded, must have remained in rigorous imprisonment. To have allowed them to repossess their district of country, or to have given them an opportunity of doing it, would have been madness, and in direct opposition to my orders and instructions from your grace and Mr. Dundas. The Maroons saw their situation, and were most impatient to leave the country. The generosity of this island has been unbounded. They have sent commissioners to watch over their comforts, to provide them in everything necessary to their happiness, and to establish them at the sole expense of the colony.* To have sent the men without their families, would have been cruel in the extreme. I must, however, impress on your grace, that no Maroon was sent off, excepting such as had been concerned in the rebellion. All who were innocent were permitted to remain on the island.

And now, my lord, my honour, my character, and I may say, my glory, impel me to make some solemn assertions; and if I do not make every one of them good to the minutest scruple—I surely can have no future claim to the confidence of his majesty or my country.

£25,000 * “I am to inform your grace that large sums of money
 £10,000 have been granted to defray the expenses of the Maroons
 £ 6,000 at Halifax, from the day of their embarkation to the
 £ 8,400 22nd of July, 1798; the total sum voted in that period
 ——— amounts, as per margin, to £49,400.”—*Letter to the duke*
 £49,400 *of Portland, 1798.*

First :—If I have acted with rashness and intemperance, and plunged this island into a war without due grounds,—or that I could have avoided it by any means consistent with the preservation of Jamaica—

Secondly :—If I have compromised the dignity of the crown, by wantonly, cruelly, and unwarrantably carrying on a war of extirpation—

Thirdly :—If I have, in the smallest degree, violated public faith—

—In either of these cases, I ought to be regarded as a dangerous man, and unsafe to trust.

As to the *First* point—Before his majesty's troops entered their district, those Maroons committed three most atrocious actions, which I construed into three overt acts of rebellion :—by chasing away the superintendent placed over them by law, and threatening to kill him ; by setting fire to their towns, and also the king's house in that district (so named by being the residence of the superintendent) ; by attacking and killing his majesty's soldiers, sent to secure the peace and to re-establish the quiet of the country.

These were my reasons for entering their lands in a hostile manner.

As to the *Second* point—The Maroons carried on a war of extirpation against us ; they murdered every white person who fell into their power ; they put to death all their prisoners ; and they took an oath, to spare no white person whatsoever.

As to the *Third* point—Did the Maroons comply with

one article of their proposals, which were accepted as a treaty?—I say, *not one item of it*.

My Lord, I think I have as competent a knowledge of the British constitution as any officer in my line of service. I know that humanity, benignity, and mercy, are the ornaments of the British crown. I also know how intimately they are interwoven into the texture of our government. I hope and trust these may ever be my rule of action as a governor.—But, where I have supported those principles,—where I have offended none of them, nor even erred—I dare to shew the spirit of an upright man, and I call upon the justice of your grace to vindicate my character, and to give it to the world with the stamp that belongs to it.

I court investigation,—I think it may be demanded elsewhere,—and I stand pledged to answer to those three points. . .

My lord, although I have saved the island, it is of the highest importance to me to prove to his majesty that I have done it by means strictly honourable,—and that I have not extinguished this rebellion as Gulliver did the flames of the palace of Lilliput.

I have the honour, &c.

BALCARRES.

P.S. I add a postscript—to shew to your grace that this country has barely acted up to its self-preservation, and also to shew the danger this island would have stood exposed to, had we relaxed in any point. The arms

which the Maroons gave up, are good for nothing ; it now appears that they left in the woods other arms, and my conjecture is not unnatural, that they left the good and brought in the bad. We have reason to believe this, as near one hundred runaway negroes have lately appeared armed. They had the address to conceal themselves for a long space of time after the conclusion of the Maroon war. Forty of them were lately seen in a body ; they put to death one man,—but they enquired most earnestly of other negroes, if the Maroons were really sent away, and, upon receiving assurances that it was so, they declared that they would never molest the whites. Is not this an indication that the Maroons left this as a rallying point, in case this island had been so weak as to have given them the opportunity of repairing the error they committed in beginning their rebellion too soon ?—One effect of our success has been, that the negroes hold us in high estimation, having conceived that the Maroons were not only invincible, but invulnerable.

From our late intelligence it is evident that the plots of the enemy against Jamaica were getting into maturity ; and perhaps it is not a wild idea, that their plans are rendered abortive by the unexpected reduction of the Maroons, and their measures thereby frustrated.

I close this business by sending to your grace the copy of a letter from Captain Gillespie to myself, which I beg may be added to those already sent. The justification of my conduct begins only with the commence-

ment of hostilities. My responsibility does not go back to the causes of those hostilities. But this letter, with the others forwarded by me, as well as the intelligence which his majesty's ministers received from other quarters, ought to carry conviction to men's minds, that this war had its origin in French principles and the unjustifiable mode of warfare adopted in these islands by the ruling power in France. And, of whatever nature the spark might have been that set fire to the combustibles, the Maroon war had not its origin in the killing of a pig, or the consequent violence against the magistrates of Montego Bay for having sentenced two Maroon criminals to receive a punishment for that offence—those culprits having been regularly tried, according to the laws of the land, and duly convicted.

BALCARRES."

NARRATIVE
OF
THE OCCUPATION AND DEFENCE
OF THE
ISLAND OF ST. LUCIE,
1779.

BY
THE HON. COLIN LINDSAY,

46th Light Infantry.

NARRATIVE, &c.

ALMOST six months had elapsed, since it was known to the British army in America that a large detachment was to be sent to the West India Islands, under the command of Major General Grant.

A war with the French was seen to be inevitable, and there could be no doubt that they envied our valuable possessions, and would attempt to snatch them from our hands, while our rebellious colonies were employing our force, and were assisted by their arms.

Then let us, it was said, by timely caution, frustrate their intentions, and have an army long before them on the spot ; let us render it unnecessary to retake what now belongs to us, or by a vigorous attack revenge the bitter injuries we have received. These were the sentiments that universally pervaded the British army at this period. They felt that the interference of France in the contest between Great Britain and her American colonies was likely to render ineffectual all her efforts to recover them, and that the object of a three years' war would be at once destroyed by the perfidious and unprovoked aggression of that restless and ambitious nation.

Nothing appeared to detain the expedition, when the commissioners* arrived at Philadelphia, with an order, as was generally understood at the time, for the immediate embarkation of the troops. But as in other national affairs, perhaps of greater consequence, they had been entrusted with discretionary powers, they exercised the same powers upon this occasion; and, by their authority, delayed the expedition from the time of their arrival, early in the month of June, until the third of November, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight.

Our patience was by this time severely tried by the accounts which had reached us. The French had transported a considerable force to the West Indies; they had already captured Dominica, and had probably proceeded to take an advantage of the defenceless state of our other islands.

The necessity of the measure became too urgent to admit of a dispute. Ten regiments were immediately named for this service,† and by drafts from other corps, were completed to five thousand men; and though the answer to the commissioners' remonstrance was expected every hour, we sailed.

Our voyage was conducted by Commodore Hotham with such care and skill that, notwithstanding a violent storm, and other difficulties in the way, our fleet was

* The earl of Carlisle, William Eden, Esq., and George Johnston, Esq.

† Namely, 4th, 5th, 15th, 27th, 28th, 35th, 40th, 46th, 49th, 55th.

safely conducted to Barbadoes on the 10th day of December, with the loss of only one sloop, containing the horses of the field-officers of the army. It was thought that she had lost us in a fog, and for some time we knew not what was become of her. At Barbadoes we joined Admiral Barrington, who now took upon him the command by sea.

Having staid only one day at Barbadoes, on the 13th of December we came in sight of St. Lucie; by twelve at noon we got in with the shore, and in sailing along saw the French flags upon a number of mountains. We were also saluted with cannon ball from three several batteries, which, excepting one, were at too great a distance to reach our ships. We passed a deep bay, with the village of Carenage at the bottom of it on our left, and at two o'clock the commodore's ship came to an anchor in a bay three miles farther up, surrounded by very high ground. The rest soon followed, and brought up near the shore, the water being remarkably deep.

The first division of troops was landed before five o'clock, and marched immediately. Our road was remarkably steep and narrow, being cut through thickets which no man could penetrate.

Having moved about two miles in single file, the light infantry fell in with a few of the enemy, and took one prisoner. The rest fired, and ran off. He said, he was *pris, pas vaincu*—taken, not conquered; a distinction which our soldiers did not comprehend, and they imagined that the French rascal, as they called him, said

baisez mon cu. He added, that there were many French upon the island to defend it, and vapoured considerably.

It was now dark, and we had drawn up on the side of a hill, where we halted for the night. Next morning, soon after break of day, we were joined by the rest of the army.

We saw the enemy on a much higher hill, and close to us. They began to fire some cannon, and sent eight or ten plunging shot near us. An hour after sun-rise we proceeded, and they fired no more till we got near the top, which took both time and breath to accomplish.

The first object which the advanced guard then saw, was a well-dressed man carrying in his hand a flag of truce, who scarcely had advanced, when a volley of musquetry came from the enemy, which wounded several of our men. This occasioned the death of the unfortunate man who bore the flag, who proved to be surgeon to the French hospital, and came out of it to capitulate for the sick. The soldier next him shot him through the head.

After this defence the enemy retired; and some prisoners informed us, that all the force upon the island consisted of one hundred and eighty of the regiment of Martinico, and fifty or sixty of the inhabitants in arms. They observed that, with so small a force, they never could have thought of opposition, but that a few shots from their twenty-four pounders were necessary for the honour of France; and agreed with us in opinion, that the volley of musquetry did not contribute to the national

honour, but alleged that it was fired by the inhabitants, who were ignorant of the customs of war.

It was obvious to every one of us, that the enemy might have dearly sold us this acquisition of their post. To surround a body posted here would, for a length of time, have been impossible. It was inaccessible but by the narrow path; so rank and luxuriant was the vegetation which choked up the woods. But their behaviour was far more polite and acceptable to the strangers. They left us their magazine untouched and entire, their barracks, their hospital, their governor's hotel, and eight pieces of small cannon.

We gained the top and these acquisitions together; and, from the height we had ascended, expected to have found a widely extended prospect, with fertile vallies underneath, houses and inhabitants below their conquerors' feet. All this was magnificent in idea, and the disappointment was proportionate. A wilderness appeared on every side, and the hill, on which the mighty conquerors stood, was over-topped by mountains, which interrupted the view without the least appearance of an interjacent plain. A gloomy mist was settled on their tops, which the sun, notwithstanding his powerful influence in this part of the world, could never dissipate, so that deluges of rain poured down upon us every hour. Every step we took, even on the declivity, was treading in a marsh; and this continual increase of moisture, shielded from the air, was cherished by the earth, and there gave birth to myriads of disgusting reptiles, or, by

the heat of the sun, was drawn forth in noxious exhalations.

The effects of this were visible, not upon us, thank God! but upon the great number of sick belonging to the small French garrison, in number about fourscore. The utmost humanity was shewn to them during our halt here, which lasted about two hours; and we now received the following orders :—

“General Orders, St. Lucie, Dec. 14, 1778.

As a considerable body of troops will always be kept on this island, it is absolutely necessary to protect the inhabitants, their property, and their houses. It is expected that the commanding officers will exert themselves in keeping good order and military discipline. The general will look to them only, and it is, therefore, incumbent upon them to take proper notice of officers commanding companies, who allow their men to straggle.

The general is determined to punish, with the utmost rigour, all marauders, and will not trouble courts martial, but will order them to be executed upon the spot by the provost. This will be the most disagreeable part of his duty, and he will sign the order for their execution with the greatest reluctance; but the unfortunate marauder will not be the only person to suffer, for no promotion will be given in the corps to which he belongs. It is recommended to the commanding officers of corps, not to bring any man to a court martial but for a capital crime, as no corporal punishment will be inflicted

in consequence of the sentence of a general court martial."

"Brigade Orders, Dec. 13.

Brigadier General Meadows is extremely sensible of the high honour conferred upon him, by having the command of the flank corps. From the active gallantry of the light infantry, the determined bravery of the grenadiers, and the confirmed discipline of the fifth regiment, every success is to be expected; and he sincerely hopes that the lustre of their actions in the field will not be tarnished by any irregularity in their behaviour out of it. The officers, of course, will instil this precept strongly into their men, and, at the same time, set them examples which they ought to follow. Marauding, drunkenness, and want of vigilance, lead not only to disgrace, but danger; on the contrary, while discipline and bravery go hand in hand, they deserve that fortune which they almost ensure. The troops are desired to remember, that clemency should ever attend upon victory; that to be brave and cruel, are almost incompatible; and the glorious character of a British soldier is, to conquer and to spare.

Acting on these principles, they can never fail in doing honour to their king, their country, and themselves."

Before we moved, a person, having the appearance of a gentleman, came in. We understood that he was a

man of consideration in the island, and that he expected the whole would capitulate the next day ; but, in the mean time, we saw the French colours in three different places, and as we now were moving down the hill, the troops expected a resistance. All the inhabitants had left their houses, except a few women and the priest. The women said, that there were twenty companies to oppose us ; the priest said, there was not a soul ; and so, indeed, it proved, when our corps under Brigadier General Medows marched round a creek of the harbour, and took possession of a peninsula, which formed the right-hand side of it, called the Vigie, upon which, on a high hill and on one beneath nearer to the sea, two of the flags were still displayed. General Grant remained with the brigades on the Morne Fortunée, for so the governor's hill was called, and every thing seemed as it ought to be. The island we had taken, it is true, seemed totally uncultivated, and nearly in a state of nature ; but, from its situation, it afforded an easy access to any of the French islands, as well as to our own,—the harbour, which we now surrounded, was a valuable acquisition, since it could contain our whole fleet, and, being fortified, would protect them against every attack by sea.

We now saw nothing to prevent the fleet from entering the harbour, as they were only two miles to leeward, and between the tropics the wind always blows nearly from east to west. We expected next morning to have our ships with every fit equipment for the field, of which

we were totally destitute, having been ordered to leave every thing on board but arms and accoutrements, and one day's provisions. Talking of these expectations, we chanced to cast our eyes towards the sea, on that side where the island of Martinico appeared like a black cloud at a distance, and the height upon which the flag-staff was placed afforded us a commanding view of whatever floated in the ocean—when in half an hour a fleet appeared.

What they were, the distance and the hazy sky would not permit us to discern, and various were the conjectures on the occasion. From their numbers, for we already counted twenty-four, they could hardly have followed us from Barbadoes; and yet many were of that opinion, believing that the inhabitants,—who, from the shortness of our stay, had not had time to bring down refreshments to us, and who knew that, from the length of our voyage, his majesty's officers could have only salt provisions left,—from their regard to us and the desire of gain, had followed us in sloops, containing every luxury; for we had as yet no idea of the size of their ships.

Others began to repeat the various rumours they had heard at Barbadoes, of the French West India fleet; some having said, that it was very powerful; others, that it consisted but of two ships of war. Some wags declared, they thought it was D'Estaing, with his whole fleet of great ships of the line; that, at two morsels, he would swallow our little squadron; and asked their friends, if they had ever been at Paris; but there were

many reasons why this appeared too ridiculous to be seriously supposed, and one of these was quite sufficient. Was he not blocked up in Boston harbour by the superior fleet of Byron?

Thus night came on, and we were left at liberty to repose our limbs upon our rocky hill, and to form new conjectures.

And now many soldiers, myself among the rest, were seized with a violent sickness and incessant vomiting, owing, as was afterwards believed, to the having eaten too freely of the green oranges, which grew by the side of the roads along which we had marched; but I ascribed it at that time to the sugar-cane. Three of them had been given to me in the morning, and I then observed that they were at least twice as thick as those which grow upon Barbadoes. The sugar-cane is grateful to the taste, but I then supposed it to be improper to be eaten in that state. I have since found that I was mistaken, as the negroes on the estates of the West India planters, when the canes are ripe, soon acquire a degree of health, strength, and appearance, very different from their dejected habits during the rest of their sad year, when the most wretched fare and treatment prolong their miserable existence.* The sickness ceased in a few hours, but left a languor for several days.

Violent as it had been, it could not interrupt our curiosity, which led us to the flag-staff by the dawn of

* Written in January 1779. (1793.)

day, when we were no longer at a loss to say what this fleet should be. A French newspaper had been found, giving an account of D'Estaing's arrival in the West Indies.

And now we could discern every ship, in number twenty-four, thirteen of which were of two decks,—the rest were sloops of war, or frigates; besides a multitude of sloops, which from their numbers, more than fifty, our soldiers termed the Musquito fleet. This armament we now saw crowding every sail, and moving slowly on directly for our shore.

Our feelings are more easily imagined than described. The total destruction of our little navy and the transports appeared inevitable. What fate would then attend the army, without the means of life in this inhospitable climate? We had the utmost confidence in British seamanship and British spirit, but now they could be of no avail; and perhaps, (nay, the event seemed certain,) in three hours we should be the passive spectators of the most vigorous exertion of our gallant sailors, of the glory they would gain in the disproportioned shock, and of their infallible captivity.

They had now advanced so near, that we could discern every man upon their crowded decks. Their largest ships had steered into a line two miles in length; their admirals had now displayed their several flags; and any of the three divisions, which their different stations marked, appeared a match sufficient for our fleet. Their fleet of sloops was guarded by the lesser ships, and kept aloof.

But a cape of land prevented us from seeing how our sailors were employed. The admiral had seen the enemy the night before. His doubts of what or who they were, were not of long duration, nor was there time, or indeed much necessity, for much deliberation. His signals were immediately hung out, and this expeditious mode, by which the orders in our navy are expressed, was on this occasion seconded with universal ardour. The ships of war were disentangled from the transports, and formed in line across the entrance of the bay ; the transports were pushed farther back, that they might be of no encumbrance, and to guard as much as possible against their being shattered by the shot. The ships were cleared from stem to stern. Every cabin was knocked down. Every thing which might be found to stand in the way, was removed or thrown overboard ; and every measure being taken which the occasion required, or the time would permit, an officer of the 49th regiment, sent by General Grant, found it necessary to wake the admiral, who was gone to rest in a hammock in the midst of his ship's crew.

The admiral said to him, " Young man, I cannot write to the general at present, but tell him, that I hope he is as much at ease on shore as I am on board." But in the fleet they had already begun to remove the provisions from on board ; and undismayed as Mr. Barrington appeared, it can hardly be supposed he could behold the enemy with the same indifference, now they had advanced so near.

They stood directly for the harbour's mouth, came within a quarter shot of our peninsula, and seemed to consider our handful of troops as unworthy of their notice, till a battery upon a little rock, surrounded by the sea upon the left side of the harbour, began the important day which was to decide, it seemed, at once, to whom the West Indian empire should belong.

To the insult of this single gun, which had been left there by the French, D'Estaing, whose ship sailed first, returned a reply in two broadsides, but could not strike the little rock, and, having changed his course, he was followed by the rest along the shore between us and our fleet, half-way to which he hardly had attained when he began his fire. He did not long continue it unanswered. Although we could not see our ships, we heard their warm cannonade, and saw their shot, which all, excepting a few, fell short.

Nor did the French admiral permit them long to fire at him, but after having given two broadsides, sheered off, and worked upon the wind. The same was done by every ship, forming in the whole the figure of a half moon, some coming nearer, others not so far, some staying longer, others a shorter while than their admiral-in-chief.

In this sham battle, all the damage or loss sustained scarcely deserves to be mentioned, being only three men ; and yet their heavy guns sent every shot beyond our ships, without doing them any material injury.

By their retreat we now had time to breakfast and

make remarks. Two days' provisions had been sent us round in boats before the French came on; and though we were without the means to dress our pork, this was not the first time we had eaten it raw, or sliced and broiled upon the end of a bayonet with yams and plantains, of which we found abundance upon the post, affording to a hungry man no despicable meal; nor did we relish it the less from the behaviour of the French.

But they advanced again at four o'clock, and again our spirits sunk within us. We had every reason to suppose, that the meaning of their first manœuvre was to see the disposition of our fleet; and having now obtained the utmost information they could wish, that they were returning to the attack in that determined way which must have proved decisive. They did indeed return, but it was to make the self-same caracole as they had done before, and with an effect as insignificant.

The only difference this time was that, as they sailed past our hill, their admiral, whether he had now conceived a less idea of his own importance, or was inclined to think more favourably of us, did deign, with a prodigious elevation of his two-and-forty pounders, to send two shot across the summit of our hill, on which some twenty of our officers at that time stood, who did not fail, with a very low bow, to return the salute.

While they were thus employed, their fleet of sloops had steered their course towards the shore, and seemed inclined to come into a spacious bay which lay upon the right. Our glasses had already shewn us, that they were

filled with troops; that by the most moderate computation they must hold one hundred men each, which in the whole amounted to five thousand; and on board their ships we always understood, from the time of their appearing before New York, that their force in land-troops amounted to nearly four thousand men.

After some appearance of hesitation, they passed the bay, turned round a point of land still farther to the right, and passing between an island and the land, vanished from our sight.

That evening, as we expected, they landed every man.

Here then the army saw employment for themselves. The situation of the navy, it may now be understood, remained no longer the only object of our thoughts: besides, we had already seen that they were able to defend themselves against every enemy, however superior in numbers by sea. It was our business to maintain the land.

But it was not till the morning after, that every thought of a serious attack upon our ships was totally abandoned by the enemy. The night of the 15th they continued to cruize along the coast, still hovering near, as if prepared to seize upon their prey; and their third and last disposition bore a different face from either of the two before, as if at last they were convinced of their mistake.

The whole advanced at once, to all appearance with a view of running right a-head, to carry every obstacle before them. But they again changed their mind,—at least they changed their course; the mountain brought forth nothing, and all this fire did not this time produce so much as smoke.

They at last came to an anchor before the bay upon the right, and soon began to try experiments upon us, upon the Vigie, the very first of which, had it succeeded, must have driven us from our post. They attempted to bring ships of war to lie on both the sides of the peninsula, but at length discovered, by sounding several nights successively, that there was no depth of water in the bay. All they could do, was to send in two little armed sloops from time to time, which discharged a few broadsides from four-pound guns.

Many fruitless attempts were made to send in the Lively frigate, which had been made their prize some time before, when cruising in the British channel. Having failed in this, they next directed her to make her way by entering at the harbour's mouth; but this was likewise found to be impossible, as no ship can enter it without assistance from the shore to warp her in, according to the seaman's phrase. This, at present, she could scarcely expect; and the assistance she did receive from General Grant's side of the harbour, quickly served to help her back again.

Their next attempt was to cut off the provisions from this post, by sending ships of force to cruise before the mouth of the harbour.

All the provisions for the army had now been landed on the beach, and most of those for the navy, as they kept on board only ten days' allowance for every man; but still they were to be carried on the men's shoulders to the top of Morne Fortunée, and a magazine was to be established there.

When the enemy came down before the wind, no boat could shew its face; but this at night they seldom cared to do, so that we never lost a single boat.

But to proceed, and not to make my journal too minute. This account, or journal, or whatever it may be called, was not begun until the 23rd of December. Until this day we have remained without a tent, and wet both day and night incessantly. Being now dry, thank God! should I attempt to be jocose, it will not, perhaps, appear extraordinary to such of my friends as may hereafter be disposed to peruse it.

And now I think it is brought down to the 16th of December; and yet from that day to this, events of the most serious importance remain to be set down. The French send many of their vessels back to Martinico, and once and again with the utmost diligence returning, they land whomsoever they have brought.

The timid soldier, if now there be any such among our troops, has opportunity to add his apprehensions to the force and numbers of the enemy, of which our leaders have no means of information,—and various are the projects formed among ourselves. At first, to march and to prevent their coming to the shore,—and when this

was now too late, another scheme succeeded to it. Shall we, it was said, permit them, now they are on shore, to cut our communication off? Or, if our post is judged of use, what are the brigades about? Let only one of them descend, and passing through the town, march on, strike down the only flag we have left to the inhabitants, and occupy a ridge of hills which form at the distance of two miles a right angle with our peninsula.—Such generals were there to be found among us. It is amusing to recollect even the very absurdities that are uttered upon such an occasion.

And yet it cannot be denied, that on the morning of the 16th the French came there, and took possession of those heights. A captain's picquet posted there from the brigades retired, and the white-coated gentlemen were now conspicuous in a line before a house, which stood upon a spot which had been cleared. Elsewhere the woods concealed them wholly from our view, if we except the opening in a path, through which, during two days, we saw them pass at intervals in files towards the house.

The pattern which we saw was such as served to give a high opinion of the enemy's appearance; but the whiteness of their clothes and lustre of their arms were much diminished, after they had been next morning as completely drenched with rain as we were ourselves.

This morning it was no consolation to myself and other officers of the 55th flank companies to be informed, that our transport and another which belonged to the regi-

ment had dragged their anchors up, had driven to sea, and had been taken by the enemy. Then was not the time for us to be jocose, when every thing we had was gone, and when we never felt our wants so great. Our joy in the evening must be confessed, when we found that neither of the two was ours ; but when we received the further information that both were the ships of the regiment, our joy gave place to our concern for this no small misfortune of our friends and brother-officers and the soldiers under their command. One of them was taken, the other made her escape and, next morning, came safely back into the fleet.

This and the Ceres sloop of eighteen guns were the only prizes taken by the enemy, who still lay anchored where they were beyond our cannon's reach, increased in number now to eight-and-twenty sail. The sloops had come into the bay, and extended in a line quite to the water's edge. Many hours did not escape before fortune gave us a revenge. A sloop from Guadaloupe mistook our navy for that of the French, and running in at night became our prize with the soldiers and officers on board of her.

What could the intentions of the enemy be now ? They were in possession of the village—they had pushed their picquets close to ours ; so near, that our sentries and the French could almost shake each other by the hand,* had they been so inclined. Byron was expected

* A grenadier of the writer's company was tried by a court-martial, and sentenced to be punished for taking a pinch of snuff from a French

every hour. What if we should join our fleets? The time was critical. What could D'Estaing intend but an attack? for the command among the French remains the same by land as on the sea. But would he attack our post, or General Grant's, or Sir Henry Calder's near the shipping?

A deserter came in on the evening of the 17th, while we were eager after information.

Our general was then, according to his frequent custom, going round the post, taking his observations with respect to every spot, and conversing with the different officers in that lively and engaging manner which so much distinguishes his valuable character. But now he was the general, and waving with his hand, he gave the deserter into his serjeant's charge, ordered them to follow him, and instantly retired.

We learned soon, that he was a serjeant in the regiment of Martinico; that he had deserted because he was in debt; that he believed the French to be twelve thousand strong; and that their only talk was of an attack intended on our post of thirteen hundred men, now that we were completely disunited from the army by their means.

To this report of a deserter every one gave that degree of credit he thought fit. It might be so. Our disposi-

sentry, the orders having been to hold no communication with them. He was a very well-behaved man in general; and Major Harris pardoned him at his captain's request, but cautioned the battalion against French civility upon this occasion.

tion was already made ; the nature of the ground was such as we could wish, and most minutely had it been attended to. The troops were but a handful, it is true ; but they were such as were not much addicted to giving way. Every one indulged such meditation as he chose, nor could it have been perceived from any alteration that an engagement was at hand.

The night, as usual, was extremely wet, and it continued to rain till seven in the morning, an hour and a half after the break of day. From that time we had been amused with a very unmilitary custom of the enemy, in popping off the pieces they had loaded in the night, which some of us observed were considerably more in number, and nearer to the post we had advanced, than usual.

This post was beyond the neck upon two hills, between which five companies of the light infantry were divided, commanded by Captain Henry Downing of the 55th light company. On one of these there stood an old redoubt, built when the duke of Montague possessed the island. It was a pentagon of solid masonry, but had no parapet, and, affording no cover for a defendant, was not occupied.

The general, with Major Harris the commanding officer of our battalion of grenadiers, and Sir James Murray who commanded the light infantry, had gone down to visit this post and to repeat such orders as they should see necessary, when, from a grove of Manchineal, extending in a line along the beach, the enemy at once

rose up, and advanced in line against these hills, equal in numbers to two of our battalions.

We lost no time in standing to our arms : but from whom should we receive commands ? The grenadiers called out, " Shall the light infantry be cut off ? A moment more, and they will be surrounded. Let us move down the hill." Had they but seen the danger which their three commanding officers were in, they could not, men nor officers, have been kept back.

But they soon appeared, for having spoken everything they wished in case of an attack in force upon the post, they already were returning when the enemy appeared.

" The light infantry," said the general, " will take care of themselves ; but as for you, stand fast." None of the officers to whom he spoke durst offer a reply to his judgment ; but the poor light infantry ! were they not now hemmed in ? They keep smartly up their straggling fire indeed, but now it seems to cease. The enemy have given two heavy vollies. They are moving on again in numbers four times theirs. The light infantry are gone.

But, huzza ! the French come to the right about and run. The light infantry, formed in a body, have charged through. The whole regiment of Martinico, which was clothed in blue, gave way, and ran along the beach. A regiment clothed in white were still advancing. A smaller party falling in with them were killed or taken every man.

The affair stood thus, when we observed the whole French army moving on slowly in solid columns to the attack. The light infantry, who had broken through, were already returning into the action; and to no purpose did the grenadiers, and the rest of their battalion, call to them to return. At last they saw the danger they were in was greater than before,—and thanks to the thickness of the brush which favoured their escape!

Our cannon then began. The enemy were within musquet shot, as we discovered by the dropping of our men; and our troops began their fire with the greatest silence, and the least confusion possible.

Our hill was near the bottom covered with shrubs, from behind which a considerable body of the enemy kept up a constant fire. They had three ammusettes, from which they fired grape and leaden balls of a pound weight with great effect upon our line; but these were soon silenced by our four three-pounders. The columns never fired a shot. They for a length of time seemed to pay no attention to our cannon ball, which swept away whole ranks; but inclined their heads, now to the right, now to the left, as if to see which way they could most easily ascend the hill. One column gave way twice, and was twice rallied in our sight beneath our fire. They came to a halt at last, and there they stood or fell.

Our men dropped fast. Our ammunition could not last long, for we had but thirty rounds at first. Fresh columns still continued to advance. The enemy appeared to be determined. Orders were given that we

should fire no more until the enemy came close, then to retire to the summit of the hill, to form in a line, to charge and drive them headlong back.

These orders were obeyed to admiration. The firing ceased from us, but the enemy did not advance. Our men sate down, and bore the enemy's fire, reserving five rounds each. A reinforcement of French ammunition from the magazine we had taken when we first landed, was brought across the harbour in the ferry-boat. Our fire began again. The enemy retired.

This action lasted about three hours, having begun at eight in the morning and ended at eleven. The grenadiers had but eighty-seven killed and wounded. The loss of the light infantry in every way was sixty odd; that of the fifth regiment was eighteen. Few of the wounded were disabled.

From the spot on which we stood we scarcely could see a single Frenchman dead; but when we went down into the field, we then indeed beheld a horrid scene. None of us had ever seen so many dead upon so small a spot.

Four hundred men at least lay there. The effects of the artillery are not to be described. The mangled portions of the human frame lay scattered round on every side. The dying were confounded with the dead, and added to the scene their piercing agony and groans, which even by the roughness of the British soldiers' nature could not be resisted, nor beheld without concern. They now forgot they were their country's enemies; and

we, the officers, who half an hour before could behold with joy a cannon-ball take effect, and sweep away a rank of men, were shocked at the various examples, now before our eyes, of the calamities to which mankind are liable in the events of war.

Many of our soldiers were employed in giving the assistance they required to these afflicted men ; and next the burial of the dead became our care ; but this our general was resolved the French should do themselves, and waited for a while before he sent a flag of truce.

He had been wounded in the arm, but continued to go round, to see whatever might be necessary ; and, when the action ended, visited every wounded officer himself, praised their behaviour till they forgot their pain, and saw that the wounded soldiers had the proper assistance, at the very time he stood in need of it himself. He was much pleased with the reply of Lieutenant Gomm of the 46th grenadiers. This gentleman had been wounded in the eye, and in the heat of the action the general saying, " Sir, I hope you have not lost your eye,"—" I believe I have, Sir," he answered, " but with the other I shall see you victorious this day."

At four o'clock the flag went out, and by a mistake was fired upon, the light-infantry bugle horn having been employed to sound a parley, instead of a drum which is the custom. Every apology was made for this by the party which received them, which a captain from the enemy brought down. Many compliments passed

between Captain Courtney* and him. The French spoke first. "You have shewn by the defence that you have made that you are Englishmen." And the reply to this was, "You have shewn in your attack that you are worthy of the name of French."—Some of their young officers spoke much about revenge; and the material message being given the conference broke off, after they had said that they would fire three guns before hostilities commenced again. To this it was replied, that we should be very happy to have the honour of another visit, and were at all times prepared for their reception.

They were inquisitive to know if they were actually our chasseurs which we had had in front, for the French chasseurs are never supposed to make any serious resistance; "But they retired," said they, "and they advanced—they broke, and they rallied; and when we no longer saw a single man, we received a heavy fire in every direction." It must be observed, that the light infantry themselves say that they did not charge as we imagined when the enemy gave way. Probably this unexpected method of defence had struck the enemy with consternation. A novelty can never fail to have a great effect in action.

This circumstance alone may serve to prove the truth of an observation frequently made, "that any two per-

* This accomplished young gentleman was one of the first who fell a sacrifice to the climate.

sons giving an account of an engagement, will often differ essentially even in material circumstances." Every battalion, however, can tell exactly what happens to themselves; and thus, by carefully collecting the component parts, the figure of the whole may be accurately ascertained.

Captain Downing's conduct was remarkable. He and his lieutenant, Mr. John Waring, and three men of the 55th light company, by names Rose, Duffy, and Hargrove, defended a narrow path against the French for a considerable time, till most of the five companies had made good their retreat. These officers and soldiers parried the bayonets of the French grenadiers for some time. Mr. Waring was at length run through the body; and Captain Downing would soon have shared the same fate, if a French officer had not advanced, and slightly touched his sword, which Captain Downing instantly surrendered. He and his three faithful soldiers were immediately escorted prisoners to the old redoubt, where they found Count D'Estaing. Captain Downing here experienced most extraordinary treatment. The coat he happened to have on was not exactly new, nor was the appearance of it probably the better for the soaking it had had for many days and nights. He wore no shoulder-knot, it being often the custom of our light-infantry officers to wear, instead of them, a sort of fringe, called wings. In short they believed, or pretended to believe, that he was not an officer, and tied him back to back with one of his own men. This gentleman has

often, with much good humour, described his feelings in this ludicrous situation, and the distress of the poor fellow, who certainly never expected to have experienced so close an intimacy with his captain.

This piece of insolence, in supposing that French customs must be those of all the world, is not unworthy of remark; but at the same time it would be easy to bring many arguments to shew that their method of marking the different ranks of their officers by a distinguishing badge is perfectly judicious, especially when we consider how much men are apt to be guided by externals.

Captain Downing was unbound before the French retired, their civility having apparently been improved by their adventures. He was carried to Martinico, and some time afterwards received a visit from Mons. de Latterette, the French officer who saved his life. He expressed great satisfaction, and added, with elegance of manners, that he was certain, whenever the fortune of war enabled him, he would do the same by a French officer.

Mr. Waring was run through the lungs. He was deemed to be the captain, an honour which had nearly cost him his life. Several messages had been sent from us by flags of truce, desiring that Captain Downing might be sent back and exchanged. This, at length, they thought they had complied with. Four French soldiers came to our post, carrying a bier, on which, to our great surprise, we found Mr. Waring. The motion brought on a fever, which had nearly destroyed him;

but he recovered, to the great satisfaction of his brother officers, who had much regard for him. He informed us, that nothing could exceed the good regulations of the French hospitals, but that the number of their wounded was by far too great to be accommodated in houses.

Among ourselves, the comparison occurred between this action and that of Bunker's-hill.

The attack in both affairs was made by troops who had never seen an enemy before. Both actions happened on peninsulas. Like young soldiers, both halted under the enemy's fire, and both severely suffered for it. But there was this difference :—

At Bunker's-hill a small body attacked an infinitely larger one, entrenched in works; and moving on again after the first check, they gained their point, and put the enemy to flight. Here the numbers had attacked the few without a work, and were repulsed. The events were different, and the reader will draw his own conclusion.

On the 19th, a flag came in the morning from the enemy; they were as anxious as ourselves to know the fate of Byron. Our Admiral had declared that the Pearl frigate had brought a letter from him, saying, that he knew D'Estaing had sailed, and that he certainly should follow him on the 19th of November; a great relief to us, if we could give implicit credit to the report; but it seemed probable that this was framed to keep up our spirits, for where was the Pearl frigate to be found? At Barbadoes, it was said. But now the French affirmed

that they had authentic accounts of his having actually sailed; that a violent hurricane had totally dispersed his fleet; that the Somerset was wrecked; and that almost all the rest of the ships were totally disabled.

Nor could we say if this were true or not. It was a mystery from first to last. How came it that D'Estaing escaped? and the grand question was, how Byron could know whither he had gone? Our danger was the same as ever. The provision was much reduced, and probably would have failed before this time, if General Grant, just before we sailed from New York, had not obtained, though with some difficulty, the addition of a fortnight's supply. Our stores were at Antigua, and the swiftest-sailing frigates were despatched to bring as much as they with safety could, as nothing but superiority in sailing could prevent their being taken by the enemy.

Had it not been for the victory the troops had gained, their spirits would have sunk; and they were now employed in throwing up a work, each company before itself, in case the enemy attacked again, which they gave out they certainly would do. The advantage of such a measure had been conspicuous. Captain John West, of the 4th grenadiers, having been detached with his company to a hillock in our front and on our right flank, having contrived to find a couple of spades and a pickaxe, told his men that they would probably be attacked in the morning, and that if they wished to have *whole bones*, they would work hard. He traced out the front,

they completed the breast-work, and only one man of the company was wounded. General Medows now gave out an order, that he expected the grenadiers would shew themselves as famous for making as for taking works, or defending a hill without works.

After the conference, the enemy sent down a party of four hundred men in answer to our flag, in order to inter their dead. A number of our men soon mixed among them, rather with a dangerous degree of familiarity, to which our officers soon took care to put a stop, by ordering them away. They were above six hours employed, but did not complete their work; many of the bodies still remained exposed, and few of them were completely covered. A French soldier observed, that as the wind always blew in that direction unto our post the effluvia would be too noxious to be endured. This soon became apparent in this very hot climate, and we applied the only remedy by completing the interment.

In every other point of view their behaviour was remarkably polite. Their chief surgeon was sent in to offer General Medows his assistance. The general's horse strayed out, they sent him back. Captain West, in giving his assistance to a wounded man, had dropped a silver-hilted sword; their working party carried it away; it was brought back by the next flag, and no money was suffered to be given to the soldier in return. Their sentries often, when they saw our soldiers passing near, would point to their arms, shake their

heads, and laugh, but never fired ;—a very different style of war from that which we had been used to in America.

Their officers agreed with us most feelingly, that the climate was most villainous ; that if we staid much longer here, both armies would perish ; and that the island was not worth the fighting for.

But we rather were inclined to alter our opinion, when Colonel Musgrave, the quarter-master-general, came over on the morning of the 20th.

This experienced and able officer had been here the day before the landing of the French, by orders from General Grant, most probably with a view of bringing back a more minute account of the post than he could have by viewing it from the place where he stood. From him we learned, that the fertility of the island was remarkable, that it was as large as Dominica and better cultivated every where than the part we saw, and that it contained a considerable number of inhabitants. We learned further how the enemy had lately been employed. Thirty of their sloops had sailed the day after the action, carrying a considerable body of their troops. These they landed with some mortars below our shipping, with a view to seize upon some heights that surrounded the bay, and, by throwing shells among our crowded ships, to oblige them to quit a station which they had found so advantageous, or else to set fire to them.

But parties from the 35th and 40th regiments, detached by the vigilance of Sir Henry Calder, forced

through the woods which grew upon the declivity, and gained the top. The enemy, finding that they were prevented, immediately returned to the place whence they came. It is extraordinary that Count D'Estaing's first attempt by land was not in this quarter.

According to their own accounts, they had lost fifteen hundred men in the late action, in killed or badly wounded. The disproportion between our loss and theirs will not appear extraordinary, when it is considered in the first place how much more numerous they were; secondly, that they were in solid columns, which the nature of the ground positively required in passing over the neck of land; and lastly, that the fire of our troops was concentrated upon them like the focus of a burning glass.

There cannot be a doubt that our fire would have been much more destructive, but for a most extraordinary instance of neglect; namely, the badness of our flints. We have always had the same cause of complaint. The French flints are excellent, though their powder is bad. What can the reason be, that every effort shall be rendered in some measure vain, as well the labour of the soldier as the counsel of the chief? From what and how? From the badness of a pebble stone! In the attack, the bayonet is always a remedy for this deficiency, but to find in a defence that one-third of your men are useless from this cause is indeed extraordinary; it is by no means impossible that the fact

itself must have escaped the scrutiny of government, for the remedy can be easily applied.*

But to proceed from this digression, or rather transgression, of a military murmur.

After the action we received the following orders :—

*“ Copy of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief to
Brigadier General Medows.*

‘ Sir,

I cannot express how much I feel myself obliged to you, and the troops under your command, for repulsing with so much spirit and bravery so great a body of the enemy. I own it was just what I expected from you and them ; and I am sure under your command they will always behave as will do honour to you, themselves, their king, and the country which they serve ; and I must beg of you to express my thanks to them in the strongest manner.’

Brigadier General Medows has the highest satisfaction in communicating so flattering a letter from the com-

* It is now thirteen years since this was written, yet the flints are as bad as ever. On a review-day the captains buy flints at their own expense. It was a common saying among the soldiers in America, that a Yankee flint was as good as a glass of grog. The government flints will often fire five or six shots very well, but they are of a bad sort of flint, and are too thick. The black flint, such as is sold for gentlemen’s fowling-pieces, or a trifle larger, is the proper flint for the soldier’s musket ; and the springs of the locks are probably too strong. (1793.)

mander-in-chief to the troops under his command, and begs leave to mark to the officers and men his admiration of their gallantry and good conduct in the affair of the 18th. He feels too much to be able to add more than that, at the head of such a corps, he must be pleased to live or proud to die."

We now observed the enemy employed in raising batteries on every little height, and were in daily expectation of a new attack. We saw multitudes employed in dragging guns and mortars; and the enemy gave out that, under cover of a bombardment and a heavy cannonade, they would again attack our hill.

"Brigade Orders, December 21.

Whenever the picquet is attacked, the drums are to beat to arms, and the lines are immediately to be manned. As soon as our gallant and generous enemy are seen to advance in great numbers, the troops are to receive them with three huzzas, and then to be perfectly silent and obedient to their officers. Whilst they are cool by day, and alert by night, they have nothing to fear. If the enemy want our arms, let them come and take them. During the attack, some of the drummers to assemble round the colours of the fifth regiment at the flag-staff, and beat the grenadiers' march."

On the 24th, towards break of day, a rebel sloop of war anchored near our ships. A boat from her came on board of Admiral Barrington, and the person who commanded it beginning to speak French as he came up the side of the ship, the officer upon deck seeing that they had mistaken our fleet for that of the French, took care not to undeceive the boat's crew till he got the whole on board. The sloop of war had come to an anchor, but at day-break discovering her mistake, she slipped her cable, and would have escaped, had not a battery on shore, at the very first shot, struck her between wind and water, which obliged her to surrender, lest she should sink.

This was the battery which had struck two of our ships when we were landing, and the same guns, under Lieutenant Garstin of the artillery, did material service when D'Estaing attacked our ships, for which the general and admiral had given him their thanks. The sloop which was now taken by his means was called the Bunker's-hill, had lately sailed from Boston, and reported that Byron had sailed on the first day of December; but we could hardly be convinced he had not sailed for England. This sloop was now named the Surprise, and the intelligence which she brought served to keep alive our hopes, and made us pass a more cheerful Christmas-day than otherwise we should have done.

Our belief was increased when on the 26th we saw the French sail out and form a line. They went almost out of sight, but soon returned to their former station.

By land we were astonished not to have a single battery opened upon our hill; but we judged that the longer they delayed, the more formidable and numerous their artillery would be. We found the rainy season now somewhat beginning to abate, and saw, what would have been before a matter very hard to convince us of, that it was the greatest friend we had, for the only water on the post was supplied by the rain.

Good fortune had attended us throughout. We learned now that the sloop which carried the horses of the field officers of our little army had fallen in with the enemy six hours after she had separated from our fleet. Her commander, Mr. Thomas Middleton, was immediately carried on board Count D'Estaing's ship, where every argument was used to no purpose, persuasion, promises, and threats, to make him disclose our place of rendezvous. He told that he had opened his instructions before he struck, and had instantly destroyed them; that no person in his sloop (the *Betsy*) knew this but himself; but that nothing should prevail upon him to make the discovery. As they were proceeding to put him in irons, he said, "Since they must know it, *Antigua* was our destination." Upon this Count D'Estaing immediately directed his course thither, sending off a ship to *Martinico*, with orders to collect all the troops which could be brought together, to embark them, and immediately to proceed with them to join him. Had Mr. Middleton informed him that *Barbadoes* was our place of rendezvous, or even if we had staid there one

day longer, there cannot be a doubt that our fleet and army must have fallen into the hands of the French, as the harbour of Barbadoes is an open road affording no protection for shipping. Had D'Estaing succeeded in his attempts upon this little army, the loss of every one of the leeward islands must have been the certain consequence.

This sea-manceuvre of D'Estaing appeared quite inconsistent with the labours he was forwarding on shore. We began to think it not impossible he might retreat; and on the 29th we found that we had not prophesied in vain.

At break of day the soldiers saw and soon called out that the Musquito fleet was gone. This was the name which they had given to the sloops. A prodigious fire appeared the evening before on Martinico. We had seen two days before that they were making preparations to retire, and now two companies were sent out to reconnoitre; but every enemy was gone. Byron was now expected every hour; could he but get between the enemy and Martinico, and Barrington slip out, and shut them up between their fleets! but no! the long-lost, long wished-for Byron was not to be found.

It was no unpleasing task for us to go beyond our lines, to tread upon the ground which it was before so dangerous to approach,* and view the prodigious works

* Juvat ire et Dorica castra

Desertosque videre locos litusque relictum.

VIRGIL.

they had thrown up at the very time we were entrenching against them.

This was their employment, instead of sailing off, availing themselves of their superiority by sea, and landing the overplus of their land-force on our defenceless islands.

“ General Orders, December 29.

The capitulation is signed. The inhabitants are to take the oath of allegiance, and are therefore to be allowed to go where they please.”

The same terms were granted here which the French had given upon Dominica, that is to say, the utmost liberty and protection which the constitutions of the different kingdoms will permit, and they will soon perceive which has the preference. The English laws were already in force, as may appear from

“ Brigade Orders, January 3, 1779.

The lines to be manned to-morrow morning at eight o'clock for the execution of John Blank. The bravest troops, when they forget their discipline, and degenerate into a lawless banditti, are a curse upon the country which they come to serve. However, such a corps as the reserve can never be disgraced by such an individual.”

Four inhabitants had come into the lines complaining that they had been robbed and maltreated the night before by a soldier whom they described. The troops

were drawn out and one by one, as each complainant had done, these people were brought from a small house upon the post, and each as they came near this man instantly singled him out as the person. He was a man of remarkably good character, brave, sober, obedient, and till then had been reckoned strictly honest; but though his absence from his company had not been perceived, and though he persisted to the last in denying the charge when tried by a general court-martial, yet he was executed by their sentence, upon this remarkable testimony. It was extraordinary to see how much the soldiers were affected at the sight of death in this shape, who so often had beheld it without concern.

What had we to think of now but Byron, or what the French were now employed about? A ship was sent to Martinico to treat about the prisoners of war upon a flag of truce, and was there detained for a considerable time. As for Byron, he was no longer expected.

But on the morning of the sixth of January, the moment that we thought of him the least, his fleet appeared. He soon got in, and we then found that he had been straining every nerve. The very day we first saw D'Estaing from St. Lucie, and not before, he sailed to follow him. For after he had repaired his ships and masts, shattered by the storm which had driven him off from Boston-bay and let D'Estaing escape, he could not quit America till he was assured, by despatches sent to every port, that the French fleet was actually gone. After he was satisfied of this, and ready to depart, the

wind was contrary for ten days, and would not suffer him to sail. He had long given us up for lost, but was determined that it should not be his fault.

And now that we can say Britannia rules the waves, long may her arms control her enemies by land !

SOME ACCOUNT
OF THE
ASSAULT ON GIBRALTAR

IN 1782;

IN A LETTER TO THE EARL OF BALCARRES.

BY

THE HON. COLIN LINDSAY,

73rd Highlanders.

SOME ACCOUNT,

&c. &c.

GIBRALTAR, Sept. 14, 1782.

Parole, King George and Victory.

I SIT down with no small satisfaction to inform you, that last night and this morning we have defeated the attack of France and Spain, and that their Armada, so long in preparing, is totally destroyed before the eyes of their whole combined fleet and army.

We have experienced various sensations during the last four-and-twenty hours, and I seize the very first moment of leisure to relate to you the events as they happened, in as plain and concise a manner as my imagination will allow in speaking of the grandest and most awful objects which perhaps were ever exhibited.

In my two last letters I gave you a full detail of their immense preparations; they had nearly forty thousand men before the place, and piles of ammunition, which, to appearance, could never be all expended, even by their innumerable and heavy ordnance; I also described, as they appeared to us across the bay, their long labours upon ten large ships, mounting nearly two hundred pieces of heavy cannon. On these, by our information from various quarters, they had tried numberless experi-

ments, and had clearly demonstrated to their people, that they were impenetrable to cannon ball and shells, that it was impossible to burn them, and that they could not be sunk. The truth of these assertions we found to be incontestible for many hours. Such was the situation of our affairs on the 11th instant, when my last letter to you was sent. On the 12th a large fleet appeared in the Straits from the west, but, the morning being hazy, it was not till they approached very near that we discovered them to be the combined fleets of France and Spain, consisting of forty-four sail of the line including those that were here before, with three fifties, and several frigates and fire-ships.*

* "Before the garrison had well discovered the force of their new visitors, an occurrence happened, which, though trifling in itself, I trust I shall be excused for inserting. When the van of the combined fleet had entered the bay, and the soldiers in town were attentively viewing the ships, alleging, amongst other reasons for their arrival, that the British fleet must undoubtedly be in pursuit, on a sudden a general huzza was given, and all, to a man, cried out, the British admiral was certainly in their rear, as a flag for a fleet was hoisted upon our signal-house pole. For some moments the flattering idea was indulged; but our hopes were soon damped by the sudden disappearance of the signal. We were afterwards informed by the guard at that post, that what our creative fancies had imagined to be a flag, was nothing more than an *Eagle*, which, after several evolutions, had perched a few minutes on the westernmost pole, and then flew away towards the east. Though less superstitious than the ancient Romans, many could not help fancying it a favourable omen to the garrison, and the event of the succeeding day justified the prognostication."—*Drinkwater's Hist. of the late Siege, &c.* p. 282.

It must not now be denied, that their arrival, which was totally unexpected, had some effect upon the spirits of the garrison. The numerous assaults which the enemy would now be enabled to make on every side at once, could not fail, as was almost generally thought, to divide and distract our very inferior numbers; consisting, on the 1st of September, of five thousand seven hundred and one men, including seventy-two Corsicans, to which must be added near eight hundred seamen. Or if this should not be the mode of attack, still it appeared to many, that their repeated efforts could not fail to wear down the garrison with fatigue, when no man could ever quit his alarm-post, or, if he did, could obtain rest in his tent, exposed on every quarter to the cannon of the enemy.

In short, a degree of uneasiness existed until the hour of action was at hand; and those who had beheld the Duc de Crillon's formidable force by land, and frequently had stood his cannonade and bombardment, from nearly two hundred guns and mortars, with firmness of mind, were startled at the addition of a force greater than had been ever brought against any place in the history of the world; and at inventions which, though new, promised to be of a most extraordinary nature, and had inspired the enemy with the most unbounded confidence.

But, on the memorable 13th of September, at eight in the morning, (the anniversary of the day when General Wolfe fell and Quebec was won,) they appeared in mo-

tion on the other side, and all ideas of doubt or apprehension instantly gave way to others of a very different nature. The wind was strong at north-west, and their vessels had been so stationed that it was now directly in their stern.

Our artillery and additional gunners instantly repaired to their alarm-posts, till it should be seen at what and how many points of the garrison the efforts were to be directed. We then saw, what we could not have believed, that these unwieldy-looking machines sailed and steered with as much quickness and precision as the lightest ships, so that before nine o'clock they were at their station. Their admiral, Don Buena Ventura Moreno, did not bring up till his vessel had brushed the ground; they then all followed his example, and were anchored and moored almost instantaneously, without the least confusion; their right extending a little beyond the King's Bastion, their left nearly opposite to Waterport. Our batteries could not open upon them more than about ten minutes before they began their fire, seconded with all Monsieur de Crillon's artillery. The regiments remained undisturbed spectators on their respective parades to the south, except such officers as chose from curiosity to risk reprehension, and to be eye-witnesses of the gallantry of the artillery, or to animate, by their presence, if necessary, the men of their respective corps employed on the batteries, or on duty in the ruins of the town.

But no man stood in need of encouragement; and

yet it may be affirmed, that such a shower of shot and shells, in various directions, would have prevented any soldiers from doing their duty with effect, but such as had been in the daily habit of being exposed to danger for near two years.*

Yet, after many hours of this trying situation, their efforts still appeared to be unsuccessful; they had long found the range of the battering ships of war, but now, when it was near sun-set, their fire, and that from the enemy by land, continued still incessant, unabating, and well directed; penetrating through the merlons of the old thin wall between the bastions, killing and wounding numbers there, and, most probably, shaking the foundations in places which we did not see.

Our well-directed fire appeared, even at that hour, to have no effect; our balls seemed to rebound into the

* ——— “Our artillery allowed the enemy every reasonable advantage, in permitting them, without molestation, to chuse their distance; but as soon as the first ship dropped her anchors, which was about a quarter before ten o'clock, that instant our firing commenced. The enemy was completely moored in little more than ten minutes. The cannonade then became in a high degree tremendous. The showers of shot and shells which were directed from their land-batteries, the battering-ships, and, on the other hand, from the various works of the garrison, exhibited a scene, of which perhaps neither the pen nor the pencil can furnish a competent idea. It is sufficient to say that *four hundred pieces* of the heaviest artillery were playing at the same moment; an instance which has scarcely occurred in any siege since the invention of those wonderful engines of destruction.”—*Drinkwater*, p. 284.

sea, and even such shells from the thirteen-inch mortars as struck, glanced off the shelving roofs, composed of logs, and did them not the least apparent injury; yet shells of this nature, when loaded, weigh above two hundred pounds upon the ground, and where they fall from their elevation, as that weight increases every instant of the fall, we might suppose the shock to be irresistible; accordingly, wherever they fall on our most solid fortifications, they never fail to make such havock as requires time and prodigious labour to repair. Of what sort of materials, it was then naturally asked, can these formidable engines be made, to possess a repelling and elastic power to so very wonderful a degree?

It occurred to many, that our artillery-men must soon be exhausted with mere bodily fatigue; and now, that the wind had subsided to a breeze, and the sea was smooth, their whole train of gun and mortar-boats, and all their ships of war, were every hour expected; they however never appeared, and the men declared, that had they but a short refreshment, they could stand to the guns for eight and forty hours, whatever might be apprehended. One hundred sailors now arrived to their assistance, and their refreshment was a draught of water from the fountain, and such salt provisions as could be brought. After this short abatement, their fire was renewed with redoubled vigour, and red-hot shot continued to be wheeled from the furnaces, and were put into the guns with the same speed and dexterity as if they had been cold. A little before dark

the enemy hoisted a chequered flag, which inspired some hopes that all might not be quite so well with them on board; some lucky shot, entering their embrasures, were heard to ring against their cannon, and several ten-inch shells, sent with a fortunate horizontal direction from our howitzers, were seen to enter in the same manner, and some at last to stick in their sides, and afterwards explode; a considerable and increasing smoke was seen to issue from the vessel of their admiral, but was soon extinguished. To what purpose then was all our fire? It was directed against masses composed of cork, of wool stuffed hard, of the largest cables laid the one above the other, and of earth rammed in to fill up every chink. The very wood, it was said, was soaked in alum piece by piece, and, wherever it was exposed, was covered with strong plates of tin: as to the effect of alum upon wood, we were entirely ignorant; but each of the other materials were such as every one knew could scarcely be made to catch the flames; and the same truth, it was feared, was but too applicable to the solid mass which they composed, six feet in thickness.

With these unflattering ideas in the mind of almost every person in the garrison, the night came on; the regiments and their officers retired to take repose, not knowing how soon they might be called upon to withstand the enemy's assault; and the Duc de Crillon had often publicly declared, that one half of his army should be sacrificed, were it necessary, in order that the other

might obtain his point; and that, in such case, no quarter should be given to the garrison. The Marquis de Santa Cruz, from whose book all these operations have received almost implicit directions, strongly inculcates the same principle—that only the chief officers should be spared. Such declarations would have served our purpose well, and could not have failed, if the trial had been made, to have produced the most desperate resistance from every individual, when the principle of self-preservation was so intimately connected with their duty to their king and country; they were not lost for want of industry on the part of the officers in spreading them amongst the people.

It soon appeared, however, that ours was not a situation in which we could expect repose; and events, very different from what we expected, soon occurred to interrupt every disposition of that nature.

First, About eleven at night a boat was seen approaching to the shore, which, on its coming near, was discovered to be floating on its side, with twelve French soldiers and a Spanish officer upon it. The assistance they implored was sent to them, and they were received into the garrison. We learnt that the slaughter of the enemy on board had been so great, that a reinforcement had been necessary; that they had been volunteers for that purpose, and had almost reached the vessel they were destined for, which was manned entirely by the French, when a shot from the garrison upset the boat, which had fourscore men on board; that they had floated

above four hours in the water, between both the fires; that the tide had driven them in beneath our walls, where they every instant expected destruction; but being received in a different manner, and treated with great humanity, they seemed thankful for their preservation; and, on being asked, they shook their heads and said, “that if we thought to destroy the battering-ships by our artillery or by fire, we might spare ourselves the trouble of making the attempt; that whatever numbers we might kill on board could be of no avail, for their whole army and their fleet would eagerly crowd to supply the places of the slain, well knowing that it could not require any great length of time to make a sufficient breach.” Nor were these opinions given with an air of gasconade; they appeared nothing more than the creed with which the enemy were universally inspired.

But the hour was at hand when these their sanguine expectations were to be as universally disappointed; for the admiral’s ship burst out in flames a little after twelve, and the cannonade from all of them began to slacken, while ours increased. Another soon, and then a third took fire, not in the same manner as the admiral’s, but slowly, and with a progress hardly visible for nearly two hours, till the flames gradually insinuated, and, established to a certain pitch, then rapidly increased in fury.

Then were heard the shrieks of horror, of agony, and despair, rendered more striking from the perfect stillness of the night, the scene illuminated to a distance and at hand as bright as day, closed in the back-ground with

the rugged declivity of Gibraltar, towering to the sky, and projecting upon every side defiance to two haughty nations.

The dawn was now approaching fast, and our twelve-gun boats being manned, Captain Curtis, of the navy, sallied forth with them, directing their fire against the approach of boats which might attempt to carry off the people from the ships ; but nearly all of them had already retreated, and day-light increasing discovered only three boats just putting off from them, and several already at a distance. One of these three immediately was taken, one escaped, the third attempted to row off, but was struck by a ball from our boats, which wounded five men and pierced her sides.

But the attention of Captain Curtis was soon called to objects of a far more interesting nature to humanity, the entreating cries and gestures of the people that were still on board ; and every ship was now on fire but one ; he listened only to the dictates of his feelings, and not to the suggestion that the gunpowder in the ships would soon catch fire. He was already in the midst of them, when one of them did actually blow up with a prodigious explosion, totally enveloping our boats, and involving the whole garrison in a state of prodigious anxiety and suspense on their account : this was not without cause, for one of them immediately was sunk ; the people in her were saved, though not unhurt. Captain Curtis's helmsman was killed ; fortunately he himself received no injury, and still persevered in his design of saving the lives

of the enemy. He sent his boats on board of every ship, and nearly four hundred were rescued from destruction. He even ransacked the holds of several, and removed the wounded. Some infatuated wretches were employed in drinking spirits, and in search of plunder, losing thereby the opportunity of being saved. Of these there were in number three who afterwards appeared upon the decks, cured of their intoxication by the terrors of approaching death in the various choice of horrible appearances, whether by the flames, by drowning, or explosion of the powder. In vain they stretched their supplicating hands, falling on their knees, entreating our assistance, uttering the yells of despair, and at length of madness. No boat durst venture to approach them; the most positive orders had been given that no one should attempt it, and the boats had been hauled on shore. Captain Curtis had well nigh been destroyed a second time, another vessel having blown up the moment after he had taken out the prisoners, some of whom were up to the neck in water to relieve themselves from the scorching heat; and, strange to say, the enemy directed every mortar they could bring to bear upon our boats while they were thus laudably employed. On these three wretches then the eyes of thousands were engaged for nearly an hour, forming a thousand fruitless wishes for their preservation, till two of them were seen at length to throw themselves reluctantly into the sea, and one remained the only victim. He retreated from the fire to various quarters of the vessel. He appeared repeatedly as if he was

preparing some materials to float upon, and as often laid the enterprize aside. At length he was obliged to take refuge on the bow, still followed by the flames. He was at last compelled by them to quit his hold, which he contrived however to regain, after floundering in the water like a drowning man; he hardly was replaced when the wreck blew up, and he was seen no more. The other two were saved; one, though it appeared he could not swim, yet gained a piece of wood and paddled with his hands, assisted by the tide, till he gained the Spanish shore, none of our sentries offering to fire upon him. The other by being a remarkably good swimmer had well nigh lost his life; he at first depended too much upon himself, and being soon hurried out of the reach of the floating materials, swam half way to Spain; he most likely would have gained his point, one deserter having swam into the garrison during the siege, the distance being about two miles, but the tide turned and hurried him back among the burning ships. Having fortunately gained a barrel, he was taken up by our boats after being above six hours in the water. His joy at being saved, and indeed that of all the prisoners, was next to being frantic.

When they were saved, there then remained nothing to interrupt our attention to the vessels burning on the water, and the prodigious explosions which they formed; particularly one which contained their magazine. After it had burnt almost an hour, we felt every thing near us tremble; there was a thunder from it which was dread-

ful; but the cloud which it formed was beyond all description, rolling its prodigious volumes one over another, mixed with fire, with earth, with smoke, and heavy bodies innumerable, on which the fancy formed various conjectures while they rose and fell, till the whole, arriving at its height in a gradual progress of near ten minutes, the top rolled downwards, forming the capital of a column of prodigious architecture, which a first-rate painter must have been eager, though perhaps unequal, to have imitated.* Thus perished seven of their vessels before twelve at noon, and two were burnt down, the enemy having themselves drowned the powder. One remained entire, and we flattered ourselves that we should possess her as a trophy; but, for reasons unknown, a boat was sent on board of her by the governor's command, with an officer of the navy on board of her, and she was set on fire, blazing out in a far more sudden manner than any of those which had been burnt by the red shot.

The governor took his place on the King's Bastion during almost the whole of the attack; the lieutenant-governor on the South Bastion.

Such is hitherto the event of the long and immense preparations against Gibraltar, towards which, we flatter ourselves, the eyes of all Europe have been turned for

* Of all the painters who have since attempted the subject of Gibraltar, not one has in any degree succeeded in the point of time here alluded to. Patoun's four pictures, in the possession of Alderman Boydell and which also are engraved, are by far the best, and indeed are excellent, except the morning scene.

some time past ; a glorious recompense to the garrison for three years of a situation irksome and disagreeable from many causes which shall now be nameless.*

In continuation.—October 2nd.

Every opportunity has hitherto failed of sending any vessel, however small, from this place with the accounts of our success, by the lightness of the nights, and the numberless cruising vessels from the grand combined fleet, which has continued ever since to lie dormant on the other side. Three days afterwards, every ship saluted at one and the same time in the evening, when it was nearly dark, repeating the salute a second time after a short interval, which afforded a very grand appearance ; and we imagine it was a compliment to the two princes of the royal blood of France, d'Artois and Bourbon, and likewise perhaps to the prince of Nassau, on setting out upon their return to France.† I can now

* “The enemy, in this action, had more than three hundred pieces of heavy ordnance in play ; whilst the garrison had only eighty cannon, seven mortars, and nine howitzers in opposition. Upwards of eight thousand three hundred rounds, (more than half of which were *hot shot*,) and seven hundred and sixteen barrels of powder, were expended by our artillery. What quantity of ammunition was used by the enemy, could never be ascertained.”—*Drinkwater*, p. 293.

† A *pièce de théâtre* about this time was represented in almost every town in France, called, The Taking of Gibraltar.

add some particulars to what I have above related. The prisoners say they were sent on board five days before the attack,—some volunteers, but most in the ordinary tour of duty; that there were about five thousand men on board; that the ships mounted one hundred and fifty-eight new brass twenty-six pounders, and had several spare guns in each. Two-thirds of each crew were below, under the surface of the water, and relieved the decks alternately; they were there almost suffocated for want of air. They mention that several of our shells entered at the ports or embrasures, and killed and wounded between thirty and forty men each time. A frigate cruised behind as a hospital ship. They complain bitterly of their countrymen having left them to perish in the flames. By the way, most of them are Frenchmen; and they say the Spanish officers shoved them aside on that account. The antipathy between the two nations is infinite; the Spaniard hates from the bottom of his soul the Frenchman, who in his turn only does the other the honour to hold him in supreme contempt. They had however all intended to make a much longer stay in these vessels, having ten days' provisions on board. They had a priest on board of every ship, one of whom, according to the French reports, was so frightened a little before coming on, that he let the Bon Dieu fall into the water, and that many attributed their failure to that piece of unintended sacrilege. Whether this was merely a French *jeu d'esprit* or not, it is certain that two of the priests remained in the exercise of their

functions, and were made prisoners. Our balls, though they glanced off at first, yet they say at length so shook the fabric of the ships, as to make way for the red-hot shot. A certain signal of lights which was fixed upon in case of the extremity of distress, being hoisted at midnight, occasioned the utmost consternation in the fleet; three boats were instantly ordered from every ship to carry off the people. The boat of the Terrible, a Spanish seventy-four, was one of those that was taken. They were all made to believe, that we could not fire above one red shot in an hour from a gun, and that it was against the rules of war. Not one accident happened to any of our men in firing red-hot shot that day, and but one during the siege.

In continuation.—October 18.

A number of events are yet to be related :—A Spanish ship of the line, of seventy guns, taken by this rock ; her name is the San Miguel : their whole combined navy a good deal put out of order, and in the greatest danger of being destroyed at anchor by a prodigious storm, which drove the ship in here : Lord Howe with the grand fleet of Great Britain weathering that storm near their land, coming in next evening in perfect order through the Straits, but at a time when this garrison, as it happened, no way stood in need of such assistance ; driven to leeward with nearly the whole convoy by the

current, and prevented by a westerly wind from working up: an alarming train of consequences apprehended, not the less by the combined fleet sailing out two days after their arrival (which was on the 11th of October) superior to ours by twelve sail of the line, three being disabled by the storm.

It then appeared very evident that Lord Howe either must abandon his convoy, or if he kept them with him, that he would so embarrass his manœuvres as to fight at great disadvantage. Accordingly he made a signal for his convoy to sail from him to the eastward, as the west wind still prevailed; half of it either did not see, or did not attend to that signal, and got in here,—the other half with one ship of the line sailed off the next day; after they had separated, the wind came easterly. Our fleet still continued near. The combined fleet was out of sight; we then concluded that they had followed the convoy. This was a chapter of perplexities, which for one complete week had agitated the minds of every officer and soldier in this garrison. On the 17th however a termination was put, in a manner we did not expect, to our apprehensions for the convoy. Two ships getting in, told us that the whole were in sight; and accordingly, in two hours the whole got in, excepting one brig which had separated in the night, and had fallen into the hands of the enemy, carrying the women and children and all the heavy baggage of the 25th and 59th regiments. These two regiments were landed here in the space of half an hour, and the ships of war which

brought them instantly sailed out again to Lord Howe. It seems impossible to account for the conduct of the combined fleet under Cordova. In a narrow sea to let that convoy pass him and get in here, is acting in a manner which we landsmen cannot comprehend.

Lord Howe then steered for the Straits; the combined fleet followed at the distance of about two miles; we soon lost sight of both, and we remain ignorant of the event.*

* *Contents of the concluding chapter of Drinkwater's History of the Siege of Gibraltar.*

“The combined fleets remain in Gibraltar Bay, being determined to oppose the relief of the garrison—Captain Curtis visits the enemy’s camp to establish a cartel—Enemy raise additional works—The combined fleets greatly distressed by a hurricane—A Spanish line-of-battle ship is driven under the walls of Gibraltar, and submits to the garrison—At this juncture the British fleet appear in the Straits, but the convoy unfortunately pass the rock to the eastward—Letters received from the British ministry by the governor—The combined fleets, after making repairs, follow the British fleet, but avoid an action—Lord Howe conducts the convoy safe into the bay, sails to the westward, and is followed by the combined fleets—Enemy’s cannonade diminishes, and the fire from the garrison increases—Enemy establish a post under the rock near the Devil’s Tower—Repeat their attacks from the gunboats—The Duke de Crillon acquaints General Elliott that the preliminaries of a GENERAL PEACE had been signed—Hostilities in consequence cease—The Emperor of Morocco sends a present of cattle with a letter to General Elliott, who soon afterwards receives from England official accounts of the peace—Interview between the Duke de Crillon and the governor—The governor views the Spanish batteries and lines at San Roque—The duke returns the visit, in the garrison—Ceremony of investing the governor with the Order of the Bath—Sir George Augustus

P O S T C R I P T .

The paper which here follows is curious in this respect :—The French have given it out that they are the inventors of the machines which were sent against the walls of Gibraltar in 1782. In their book “*Sur L'Evenement de Gibraltar*,” which contains near four hundred pages, with Mons. D'Arçon's narrative, correspondence, &c., the whole “*pour servir d'instruction pour les sièges*,” it is said, “Among the variety of inventions proposed none appeared so good as that of Mons. D'Arçon,” &c., &c. Now, whatever the merit of the invention may be, it appears from the following paper that it certainly does not belong to the French. The book from which it is extracted fell into the writer's hand about six weeks before the attack. He translated this part of it, and sent it to the governor immediately. The Spaniard who wrote the book avows that he took a great part of it from Santa Cruz.

Translation of Part of a Chapter in a Book entitled “Prineípios de Fortificacion,” published in the year 1772, by Don Pedro Lucuzé, Major General in the King of Spain's Army, and Director of the Royal Military Academy at Barcelona.

“ATTACK OF A MARITIME PLACE.

“In the attack and defence of a maritime place, an important use may be made of floating batteries, of which there are three different

Elliott's speech to the garrison, upon communicating to them the THANKS of the King and Parliament for their DEFENCE OF GIBRALTAR.”
—p. 302.

sorts. The first, which fire when under sail, such as the ships of war; others, which batter when at anchor. These must have a rampart, proof against cannon ball, and must be either made on purpose, or otherwise the hulks of old ships may be employed. Their masts must be cut down, they must have lining on the side, and the intermediate space being filled with wool, earth, cork, or any other light materials, will cause the balls from the enemy's cannon to lose their force, and preserve the floating battery from being destroyed. The third sort must be of a lesser nature, carrying two or four guns, with a view to throw their fire to any particular place as occasion may require, and therefore must be capable of advancing with rapidity, or retiring by means of oars, and being towed by lesser vessels. All of these must not only be furnished with mariners, artillery men, and ammunition proper for the battery, but likewise with troops, which, with swivels, grenadoes, artificial fires, as well as with their usual arms, may oppose any enemy which shall endeavour to take possession of or destroy them; and for greater security it will be proper to escort them with galleys, galleons, and xebecs, to counteract such light armaments as the enemy may form.

“These sorts of batteries must be constructed by ship-builders; and in order that they may give the right proportions to them, they must take into consideration the use which is to be made of them, and the circumstances of the place against which they are to be employed, which may be open, or embayed, or sheltered from particular winds.

“In an undertaking against a maritime place, a naval superiority both of light and heavy armaments is much to be recommended, although some occasions should occur, when, by possessing commanding points for anchoring, &c., an investiture may be found practicable with an inferior force. But it would be acting with great uncertainty to trust to winter weather during the time of the expedition, or to imagine that storms will of themselves prevent the enemy from introducing frequent succours, for they will take advantage of the uncertainty of the ocean itself; nor will they wait until the place is near extremity, before they endeavour to throw in all succours necessary for the defence.

“ We have already said, that the principal attention in the siege of any place should be to prevent the introduction of succours. Therefore, although you are superior by sea, you must take possession of any neighbouring or intermediate roads for shipping open to the enemy, and preserve them by a garrison and good artillery, otherwise they will deposit their secret succours there, and watch for an opportunity when the stationed ships are driven off by a storm,” &c.*

* Tangier is here alluded to; and the Spaniards gave the emperor of Morocco a large sum of money to permit them to establish a post there.

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