276
Sense, which Dr. Reid published in 1764. As this
work developed an argument against the sceptical
philosophy of Mr. Hume, the author, with more
magnanimity than some members of his profession
displayed at the time, procured, by the interposition
of Dr. Blair, a perusal of the manuscript by Hume,
in order that any of those disputes from mere mis-
understanding of words, so pernicious to philoso-
phical discussion, might be avoided. Hume at first
displayed some disinclination, founded on previous
experience of others, to encourage this new assailant.
"I wish," he said, "that the parsons would confine
themselves to their old occupation of worrying one
another, and leave philosophers to argue with tem-
per, moderation, and good manners." But his liberal
mind did not permit him, on seeing the manuscript,
and knowing the worth of its author, to yield to his
hasty anticipations. Writing personally to Reid he
said, "By Dr. Blair's means I have been favoured
with the perusal of your performance, which I have
read with great pleasure and attention. It is cer-
tainly very rare that a piece so deeply philosophical
is wrote with so much spirit, and affords so much
entertainment to the reader, though I must still
regret the disadvantages under which I read it, as I
never had the whole performance at once before me,
and could not be able fully to compare one part with
another. To this reason chiefly I attribute some
obscurities which, in spite of your short analysis or
abstract, still seem to hang over your system. For
I must do you the justice to own that, when I
enter into your ideas, no man appears to express
himself with greater perspicuity than you do; a talent
which, above all others, is requisite in that species
of literature which you have cultivated. There are
some objections which I would willingly propose
to the chapter "Of Sight," did I not suspect that they
proceed from my not sufficiently understanding it;
and I am the more confirmed in this suspicion, as
Dr. Black tells me that the former objections I had
made had been derived chiefly from that cause. I
shall therefore forbear till the whole can be before
me, and shall not at present propose any farther
difficulties to your reasonings. I shall only say, that
if you have been able to clear up these abstruse and
important subjects, instead of being mortified, I
shall be so vain as to pretend to a share of the praise;
and shall think that my errors, by having at least
some coherence, had led you to make a more strict
review of my principles, which were the common
ones, and to perceive their futility."
It may be as well here to pass over the interven-
ing events of Dr. Reid's life, and give a brief sketch
of the principles of his philosophy, as developed in
his other works, to which, as Mr. Stewart has pro-
perly remarked, the Inquiry into the Human Mind
forms an introduction. In 1785 he published his
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, and in
1788 those on the Active Powers. These two have
been generally republished together, under the well-
known title, Essays on the Powers of the Human
Mind; a work which has gradually gained ground
in the estimation of intelligent thinkers, and is now
used as a text-book by many eminent teachers of
philosophy. When it is said that Dr. Reid's philo-
sophy is entirely, or intended to be entirely, syn-
thetical, and that it adopts no theory, except as an
induction from experiment, it will readily be under-
stood that a view of its general principles and ten-
dency cannot be given; but it is not on this account
very difficult to describe the method by which he
reasoned, and came to the different conclusions he
has adopted.
Reid has generally received, and probably with
justice, the praise of having been the first to extend,
by a general system, the process of reasoning from
experiment, so strongly recommended by Bacon in
natural science, to the operations of the mind. In
this he was, to a certain extent, anticipated by Hume,
who, especially in his arguments on cause and effect,
and his essay on miracles, proceeded on analyses of
our experience: but the two philosophers followed
a different method; the sceptic using his experience
to show the futility of any systems of philosophy
which had been raised; while Reid made use of them
to redeem, as it were, mental science, by eschewing
these systems, and founding one of his own on that
experience which he saw had enabled the sceptic to
demolish the systems destitute of such a support. But
to accomplish his purpose—and this is what distin-
guishes his philosophy from all other systems—Reid
found it necessary to set bounds to his inquiries, which
other philosophers had passed. He abstained from
that speculation concerning the nature and essence
of the mind itself, which, as followed by others, had
formed the most convenient object of demolition to
the sceptic, and limited himself to observations on the
operations of the mind, as he saw them performed
before him. Instead, therefore, of appealing to any
theories of his own (which he knew would require to
be founded on vague speculation, and independently
of observation) on the essence of the mind, when he
tried the truth of his observations he appealed to
what he called " common sense," or that sense,
however acquired, which prompts us to believe one
thing and disbelieve another. Hence it might be
said, in common language, that instead of making
his inquiries by means of subtle and metaphysical
reasonings, he stated his views, trusting that his
readers would believe him from their common sense,
and if they did not choose to do so, knowing that
the greater part of the world was on his side, despite
of any fine-spun objections which might be produced
by the sophist. The following, perhaps, more than
most other passages in his works, bears a marked
stamp of his method of reasoning: "Perhaps Des
Cartes meant not to assume his own existence in this
enthymeme, but the existence of thought, and to
infer from that the existence of a mind or subject of
thought. But why did he not prove the existence
of his thought? Consciousness, it may be said,
vouches that. But who is voucher of the conscious-
ness? Can any man prove that his consciousness,
may not deceive him? No man can: nor can we
give a better reason for trusting to it, than that every
man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the
constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to
it, and to laugh at, or to pity, the man who doubts its
testimony. And is not every man in his wits as
determined to take his existence upon trust as his
consciousness?"1 It is easier to find objections to,
than to erect a system of metaphysical philosophy;
and that of Reid affords ample room for controversy.
Admitting that the only ground on which we can
ever place metaphysical truths is, the general belief
of men of sound mind, it must still, in every instance,
be a very questionable matter, whether these men of
sound mind have come to the right conclusion, and
whether it may not be possible, by a little more in-
vestigation and argument, even though conducted by
a sceptical philosopher, to show reasons for coming
to a different conclusion, and to establish it upon the
very same grounds, viz. the general belief of men of
sound mind. When Galileo discovered that nature
abhorred a vacuum, and was afterwards obliged to
admit that this abhorrence did not extend above
1 Inquiry (1819), 28.